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U.S. INTERAGENCY REGIONAL FOREIGN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION: A SURVEY OF CURRENT PRACTICE AND AN ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT

by

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Abstract

The United States has a complex, multi-agency structure to plan, synchronize, and execute foreign policy and national security. By statute, the State Department is the lead agency for foreign policy. However, in practice, the much larger and better-funded Department of Defense conducts much of America’s foreign policy activity, often with little coordination with the State Department or other relevant agencies. Over the past two decades, the military’s Geographic Combatant Commands have taken an increasing lead in planning and executing foreign policy activities around the world. This has often effectively put a military face and voice on America’s foreign policy, sometimes to the detriment of broader U.S. goals and relationships. More effective U.S. foreign policy requires greater interagency coordination at all levels and a greater role for the State Department as America’s lead agency for foreign policy.

This study examines current interagency structures, focused particularly on the regional and sub-regional levels, describes several current or recent shortfalls in interagency unity of effort, and surveys the interagency reform literature. This study then suggests a typology of interagency reform proposals, analyzes the potential reforms, and recommends a new model: a State Department-led regional interagency headquarters. This U.S. Regional Mission would lead all U.S. foreign policy activities in the region, including the activities of the Geographic Combatant Command and the U.S. embassies in the region. The U.S. Regional Mission would conduct sub-regional operations by creating Interagency Task Forces, which would be headed by a leader from the department or agency most appropriate to the mission.
Chapter 1

Introduction

The United States has a complex, multi-agency structure to plan, synchronize, and execute foreign policy and national security. By statute, the State Department is the lead agency for conducting America’s foreign policy. However, in practice, the much larger and better-funded Department of Defense conducts much of America’s foreign policy activities – from peacetime engagement to post-war state building and counterinsurgency – often with little coordination with the State Department or other relevant agencies. This is particularly true at the regional level, between agency headquarters in Washington and embassies at individual countries, where only the Department of Defense has an effective presence, via the military’s Geographic Combatant Commands. This study argues that more effective U.S. foreign policy requires greater interagency coordination at all levels and a greater role for the State Department as America’s lead agency for foreign policy.

The Department of Defense has attempted to improve interagency unity of effort at the regional level through the creation of several interagency entities at the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs), such as the combatant commanders’ Foreign Policy Advisors (FPAs) from the State Department, Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) to attempt to produce regional interagency unity of effort from within the combatant command, and Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs) to bring together several federal agencies to work together at the sub-
regional level below the combatant command headquarters. However, these mechanisms have only brought the key foreign policy and national security agencies a small part of the way toward true unity of effort, and have done little to put a non-military, diplomatic face and voice on America’s foreign policy.

The U.S. military views the world through a three-level hierarchy: strategic, operational, and tactical. At the strategic level, the government determines strategic objectives and develops broad policy and plans to achieve these objectives. At the operational level, plans are formulated to translate strategic objectives into tactical actions. Finally, the tactical level focuses on planning and executing individual activities or engagements to achieve operational or strategic objectives. All U.S. foreign policy agencies operate at the strategic, national level in Washington, and many function at the operational and tactical levels in individual countries through U.S. embassies, but only the military has a substantial operational presence at the regional level, between Washington and the country level.

The regional level is important for both organizational and operational reasons. Organizationally, a regional-level entity facilitates more manageable spans of control for key leaders. National-level structures cannot achieve sufficient day-to-day control over all subordinate foreign policy activities around the globe. On the other hand, country-level structures cannot integrate U.S. activities and messages across multiple countries and cannot effectively share resources between countries. Operationally, a regional-level organization assists U.S. foreign policy planning and execution because the U.S. must increasingly deal with regional groups and issues, in addition to traditional bilateral relationships. While the U.S. maintains bilateral diplomatic relations with nearly 200 countries, there are more than 800 intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) around the globe which shape issues at a regional level,
including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the African Union (AU), the Organization of American States (OAS), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as well as thousands of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) which frequently operate in more than one country. Additionally, many threats and challenges to the United States exist at a regional level, including transnational terrorist, criminal, and narcotics organizations. According to the Hart/Rudman Commission’s January 2001 report:

Regions will become more important in the emerging world of the 21st century. State borders no longer contain the flow of refugees, the outbreak of ethnic violence, the spread of deadly diseases, or environmental disasters. Humanitarian and military operations will often depend on access rights in many different countries.

As U.S. foreign policy activities have become increasingly regional in nature, the military’s Geographic Combatant Commands, in the absence of any regional-level State Department or other interagency presence, have taken the lead in planning and executing both military and nonmilitary activities in regions around the world. This has often effectively put a military face and voice on America’s foreign policy, and this trend has increased since the 9/11 attacks. According to Washington Post investigative reporter Dana Priest,

Long before September 11, the U.S. government had grown increasingly dependent on its military to carry out its foreign affairs. The shift was incremental, little noticed, de facto. . . . After September 11, however, the trend accelerated dramatically. . . . Without a doubt, U.S.-sponsored political reform abroad is being eclipsed by new military pacts focusing on anti-terrorism and intelligence sharing.

The primacy of the Geographic Combatant Commands in regional U.S. foreign policy leads to over-militarization of foreign policy. The commanders of the military’s Geographic Combatant Commands are four-star generals or admirals with a career-long military outlook and a predominantly military tool kit, leading them to define most problems and, and often their solutions, in military terms. Ambassador Robert Komer, who led interagency counterinsurgency
pacification and development efforts during the Vietnam War, stated, “Military men are naturally going to give primary emphasis to the military aspects,” and former Secretary of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director James Schlesinger stated that the military will, “of course, by definition argue for military solutions.”

Though Komer and Schlesinger’s observations are perhaps less true today after more than two decades of expanding interagency thinking by senior military leaders, it is still true that the Geographic Combatant Commanders are first and foremost military officers and are not primarily professional diplomats.

With the military in the lead for regional foreign policy and the Geographic Combatant Commander as the public face of U.S. policy, the United States loses the ability to engage many governments, actors within states, NGOs, and IGOs that do not wish to be publicly associated with the U.S. military.

A 2006 Senate Foreign Relations Committee investigation concluded, “There is evidence that some host countries are questioning the increasingly military component of America’s profile overseas.” Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs John Hillen stated in 2005:

If we subvert, however unintentionally, our ability for the lead foreign policy agency of the U.S. government [the State Department] to deliver credible and consistent messages – in the field and at all levels – to those actors whose behavior we are trying to shape and change, we will lose influence and legitimacy. Especially when those messages are inherently about democracy, political pluralism and compromise, the rule of law, civilian control of the military, the importance of institutions in civil society, legitimacy and governance gained through peaceful means and processes, and diplomatic exchange and negotiation as the preferred way of solving differences. These are not inherently military messages, needless to say, but today it is most often the U.S. military that delivers them on the ground.

One of the major reasons for the overwhelming influence of the military in foreign affairs is the massive resource imbalance between the Departments of Defense and State. The State Department is much smaller in terms of both budget and personnel than the Defense Department. The Department of Defense (DoD) has an annual budget of about $660 billion and a workforce
of approximately three million people, while State has an annual budget of about $50 billion and a workforce of fewer than 60,000 people, of whom only 6,400 are Foreign Service Officers (FSOs). After the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization, which created today’s joint military, the Geographic Combatant Commands expanded in size and importance. Around the same time, Congress cut the State Department’s operating budget and personnel by twenty percent, forcing closure of more than thirty overseas missions. The 9/11 Commission concluded, “State came into the 1990s overmatched by the resources of other departments and with little support for its budget either in Congress or in the President’s Office of Management and Budget.”

However, instead of fixing this imbalance, it has continued to expand, causing Washington to increasingly rely on the military to execute foreign policy. Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs John Hillen stated in 2005, “The resources that [Combatant Commanders] bring to bear in their theaters, in terms of people, money, and logistics support, far outstrip the foreign assistance programs that ambassadors and their country teams can routinely deliver to host governments.” Hillen cautions, “When [military-to-military] relationships bear more and better fruit than political relationships can deliver, we run the risk [of] sacrificing our larger foreign policy goals to the exigencies of military priorities with shorter horizons.” One U.S. ambassador echoed this, noting, “Foreign officials are ‘following the money’ in terms of determining which relationships to emphasize.”

While it would seem the Defense Department is the bureaucratic “winner” in terms of obtaining the majority of operational resources and funding, many in the DoD would prefer to see the State Department receive additional resources so the two departments can both carry out their core missions abroad. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has several times noted the
resource imbalance between the Departments of Defense and State and has argued for increased funding for the State Department. In June 2008, Gates warned against the “creeping militarization” of foreign policy and advocated for more funding for the State Department, stating, “America’s civilian institutions of diplomacy and development have been chronically underfunded for far too long relative to what we spend on the military, and . . . the responsibilities our nation has around the world.” In July 2008, Gates said, “Our diplomatic leaders . . . must have the resources and political support needed to fully exercise their statutory responsibilities in leading American foreign policy.” Continuing this theme in testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee on 30 April 2009, Gates said, “I believe that the challenges confronting our nation cannot be dealt with by military means alone. They instead require whole-of-government approaches – but that can only be done if the State Department is given resources befitting the scope of its mission across the globe.”

In addition to the resource imbalance between the Department of Defense and other U.S. agencies involved in foreign policy, another significant challenge in today’s system is how to obtain interagency unity of effort without unity of command. For the military, the Goldwater-Nichols Act created a direct chain of command from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Geographic Combatant Commanders, creating both unity of command and unity of effort for the joint military force. However, in the interagency foreign policy arena, no one below the President can direct the efforts of all executive branch agencies or settle disputes among them. Congress created the National Security Council in the National Security Act of 1947 to assist the President with interagency coordination and unity of effort in foreign policy and national security, but the system rarely produces true unity of effort. Interagency working groups in the National Security Council or under a lead agency can set policy, but cannot enforce compliance
across the interagency. Since the President has no way to delegate his authority over these agencies, issue management for interagency foreign policy is overly centralized in the White House and the President and his advisors must spend time on crisis management and dispute resolution, leaving little time for the formulation of strategic policy.20

In the more than two decades since Goldwater-Nichols created the joint military and increased the effectiveness of the Department of Defense, hundreds of authors have examined the problem of interagency unity of effort and offered various proposals for reform. Some have advocated comprehensive, Goldwater-Nichols-type reforms. Military authors and defense-centric think tanks have often focused more narrowly on interagency solutions to the challenges of “complex contingency operations”21 or post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction operations, largely arising out of the challenges the U.S. military has faced in operations over the twenty-one years from U.S. intervention in Panama to today’s operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This study examines the current interagency structures established by the military, the State Department, and the White House; describes several cases of shortfalls in interagency unity of effort in peacetime engagements, humanitarian operations, and military operations; surveys the interagency reform literature; and finally analyzes the potential reforms and recommends a new model, focused particularly on the regional and sub-regional levels.

Focusing below the national/strategic level, this study proposes a typology of interagency reform divided into two levels: the operational level across a region and the operational level in a sub-region or country during crisis operations. Within these two levels, the reform proposals at each level break out into four major categories. At the regional level, proposed structures include a regional interagency organization, putting the State Department in charge, putting the
military in charge, or using a parallel structure with no one in charge. At the country level during crisis operations, the options include an interagency organization, a State Department-led organization, a military-led organization, or a parallel structure.

This study argues that an improved interagency structure needs to accomplish the following:

1. Provide a non-military voice and face for U.S. foreign policy
2. Produce fully-coordinated planning
3. Produce unity of effort during execution
4. Be more efficient and effective than agencies working alone
5. Give the leader authority commensurate with his responsibility
6. Provide legitimacy to the leader’s decisions
7. Enable the leader to access necessary resources
8. Provide a clear chain of command to the President
9. Avoid overburdening the President with operational or crisis matters
10. Balance the power and prestige of the Departments of State and Defense
11. Develop interagency expertise among working-level personnel
12. Minimize the financial, personnel, and material costs of reform
13. Minimize agency culture shocks resulting from the reform.

Based on the understanding developed from the examination of the current interagency structures, the shortfalls in unity of effort in several current and recent operations, and the goals for reform above, this study recommends a new structure with a State Department-led regional interagency headquarters. This U.S. Regional Mission would lead all U.S. foreign policy activities in the region, including the activities of the Geographic Combatant Command and the U.S. embassies in the region. The U.S. Regional Mission would conduct sub-regional operations by creating Interagency Task Forces, which would be headed by a leader from the department or agency most appropriate to the mission.

Notes

Notes


6 Ibid., 40.


9 Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) are commissioned officers of the United States Foreign Service. FSOs are the State Department’s professional diplomats, and they fill most of the leadership roles at the State Department headquarters in Washington, DC, and at U.S. embassies abroad, including about two thirds of U.S. ambassador positions (the other third are political appointees). FSOs are selected through a competitive written and oral exam process called the Foreign Service Exam. See Harry W. Kopp and Charles A. Gillespie, *Life and Work in the U.S. Foreign Service* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008).


14 Ibid., n.p.

15 S. Prt. 109-52, 12.


17 Secretary Gates, quoted in “A Foreign Affairs Budget for the 21st Century.” *Foreign Service Journal* (December 2008), 54.
Notes


21 Pirnie, *Civilians and Soldiers*, 10: “The more ambitious post-Cold War peace operations, currently [as of this 1998 writing] styled ‘complex contingency operations,’ blur the traditional distinction between peace and war.”
Chapter 2

Current Practice - Military

The first task in the analysis of U.S. foreign policy and national security planning and implementation at the regional level is understanding the current U.S. mechanisms and organizations which plan and execute regional-level foreign policy and national security. Across the globe, numerous actors, including ambassadors, country-level representatives of a multitude of federal agencies, and regional military Geographic Combatant Commands and their subordinate forces, as well as higher headquarters of both the military and civilian agencies in Washington, plan and execute U.S. foreign policy and national security.

This study focuses on two primary actors – the Department of Defense (primarily the military) and the Department of State (including the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)) – and also considers the role of the National Security Council. This chapter describes the mechanisms the military has created to facilitate interagency unity of effort at the regional level, and then describes how each of the military’s Geographic Combatant Commands has implemented, modified, and evolved these mechanisms.

Military-Led Interagency Coordination Mechanisms

Over the decades since the end of World War II, the military has developed three primary tools to drive interagency unity of effort from the military side – the Foreign Policy Advisor, the Joint Interagency Task Force, and the Joint Interagency Coordination Group.
Foreign Policy Advisor

Since 1952, the State Department has provided the military with Political Advisors, or POLADs (renamed Foreign Policy Advisors in 2004), to act as personal advisors and provide foreign policy advice directly to senior military leaders. As of January 2008, there were 26 Foreign Policy Advisor (FPA) positions allocated to the four military service chiefs in the Pentagon, six Geographic Combatant Commands, four Functional Combatant Commands, NATO headquarters and its key subordinate commands, as well as several subordinate U.S. commands in combat zones. Congress provided funding for ten additional POLAD positions in 2009 in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

At the Geographic Combatant Commands, the FPA is a State Department Foreign Service Officer with ambassadorial rank assigned by the State Department to provide foreign policy advice directly to the Combatant Commander. The FPA aids in assessing the diplomatic implications of military planning and strategy, serves as the principal source of counsel on international issues to the respective commander, provides the combatant commander with a State Department perspective and serves as an information conduit between the combatant commander and the State Department (both the Bureau of Political Military Affairs and the appropriate regional bureau). However, the FPA has no formal role as a coordinator between the State Department and the military and has no authority to commit the State Department to any course of action. Indeed, the essence of the FPA’s effectiveness is his or her ability to function as a personal and confidential advisor to the military commander, and any requirement for formal reporting back to the State Department could compromise the necessary relationship of personal trust and confidence between the FPA and the commander.

While the FPA has no formal role in civil-military coordination, the FPA forms relationships up and down the military chain of command, as well as with other military headquarters,
embassies, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and civilian entities, all of which can provide personality-driven means to facilitate interagency unity of effort. According to Dr John Finney and Ambassador Alphonse La Porta, both of whom served as Foreign Policy Advisors to senior military commanders, the FPA “can help translate the local environment into operational ground truth and can facilitate the conduct of operations on the ground through negotiation, facilitating allied and indigenous contacts, and providing access to local actors and institutions.”

**Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG)**

As the U.S. prepared for the Global War on Terror in response to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, planners and policy makers in the Defense Department recognized the complex nature of the counterterrorism mission and many came to believe a “whole of government” response using all elements of national power would be required. To facilitate this, the Joint Staff requested, and in February 2002 the Deputies Committee of the National Security Council (NSC) approved, a JIACG concept, directing the combatant commands to each establish a JIACG “to provide interagency advice and expertise to combatant commanders and their staffs, coordinate interagency counterterrorism plans and objectives, and integrate military, interagency, and host-nation efforts.” By the time the NSC and Joint Staff issued their guidance, all of the combatant commands had already established some form of counterterrorism office and for the most part renamed whatever structure they had already created as a JIACG for counterterrorism (JIACG/CT).

As originally directed, the JIACG was limited to the counterterrorism mission and prohibited “from making policy, tasking non-DoD personnel, or altering lines of authority and coordination channels already in place.” However, over the ensuing years, the JIACG concept
has evolved, both under the guidance of the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and as a result of unique conditions and initiatives at the Combatant Commands (COCOMs), beyond counterterrorism, and JIACGs now also support “military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities, as well as operations ranging from crisis response and limited contingency operations to, if necessary, major operations and campaigns.”

JFCOM, as the combatant command charged with military-wide joint doctrine, transformation, and organizational standardization, now guides the development of the JIACG across the COCOMs. Broadening beyond the initial counterterrorism mission, or any other specific mission, JFCOM envisions a “full spectrum” JIACG at each COCOM as a full-time interagency planning and advisory body for the commander. The JIACG would support peacetime theater engagement, as well as the full spectrum of military operations, and JIACG members would act as informational liaisons with their respective departments and agencies in Washington. The JIACG may also provide interface with host nations, intergovernmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations. If the combatant commander employs joint military forces in an operation, JFCOM envisions that he may choose to either retain the JIACG at the COCOM headquarters or integrate selected members of the JIACG into the Joint Task Force (JTF) established to conduct the operation.

JFCOM codified its vision of the JIACG in doctrine in the two volumes of JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination during Joint Operations. Additionally, in March 2007, JFCOM issued the Commander’s Handbook for the Joint Interagency Coordination Group to provide non-doctrinal “best practices,” a “common, practical baseline for continuing the evolution of the JIACG,” and “a bridge between the evolving JIACG and its migration into doctrine.” Per these documents,
JFCOM envisions a standard COCOM JIACG as a “separate staff directorate or element of approximately 12 personnel” led by a full-time civilian director and “consisting primarily of USG [U.S. government] civilian personnel with extensive interagency experience.” The notional staffing includes three military personnel, three DoD civilians (including the Director), two Foreign Service Officers from the State Department, and one representative each from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Justice, Homeland Security, and Transportation Departments. JFCOM’s “standard model” for interagency coordination at the regional level is shown in Figure 1.

![The JFCOM “Standard Model”](image)

**Figure 1. JFCOM’s “Standard Model” for Interagency Coordination**

Essentially, in the absence of other mechanisms to facilitate interagency unity of effort at the regional level, the Department of Defense attempted to establish its own organic capability by
creating the JIACGs and empowering the Combatant Commanders to conduct interagency coordination. However, because the JIACG is located in one agency (the DoD) and has no Presidential directive or legislative backing, other agencies are under no obligation to participate. Indeed, the initial JIACG concept was not well received across the agencies and departments asked to participate, as many agencies perceived a military-led JIACG as an erosion of their autonomy or authority.17

Because the other executive branch agencies are so much smaller than the Department of Defense, providing even one or two qualified individuals to each of the Geographic Combatant Commands is a significant drain on available personnel. Thus, many agencies proposed providing representatives to the JIACGs on an “as needed” basis, to develop a specific plan or participate in an exercise or crisis, rather than providing permanent representatives. William Olson, who served as both a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, says even if there is enough work for a full-time JIACG during a crisis, it is not clear there is enough work for a full-time JIACG in the absence of a crisis to justify the use of limited personnel resources.18 However, part-time JIACG staffing creates a lack of continuity and inhibits teambuilding.

In December 2003, DoD attempted to make it easier for other agencies to send personnel to the JIACGs by using DoD funds to pay for individuals from the State Department, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Treasury to staff JIACGs at nine COCOMs. However, Colonel Michael Bogdanos, who served in U.S. Central Command’s (CENTCOM’s) JIACG, notes, “This decision overlooked the possible effect on the nonreimbursed agencies, [which] became less inclined to continue providing representatives for JIACGs after they learned they did not make the final cut.”19 Similarly, Bogdanos criticizes JFCOM’s standard 12-person...
model for excluding other agencies such as Treasury, FBI, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), CIA, and other organizations which played key roles during the time he served with CENTCOM’s JIACG. He says each COCOM should be permitted to fund representatives from the agencies and departments best suited to their regional issues, rather than following a JFCOM-directed, one-size-fits-all model.20

Within the COCOM staff, there are now potentially two (or more) State Department representatives, the commander’s Foreign Policy Advisor and the State Department representative to the JIACG. The relationship between the JIACG and the COCOM’s Foreign Policy Advisor is neither well documented nor agreed upon. As the JIACG concept was being developed, the FPAs reportedly believed they should not be a part of the JIACG because it would undermine their current role with the commander.21 However, former Foreign Policy Advisors Finney and La Porta disagree, saying FPAs should both serve their individual commanders and exercise some level of oversight over the issues under JIACG responsibility “in order to provide a broad regional picture and to help in bridging U.S. agency, region, and multilateral interests,” perhaps even dual-hatting the FPA as the JIACG director.22 As of now, the nature of the FPA-JIACG relationship is left up to each individual COCOM.

In interviews conducted in 2003 with personnel from State, Defense, Justice, and Treasury, participants pointed out several pros and cons of the JIACG concept. On the positive side, JIACGs can provide civilian agencies with access to DoD resources, facilitate information sharing, remove institutional barriers, and provide the DoD with outside perspective. One participant said the regional focus is good since, “Terrorists don’t care about borders.”23 On the negative side, respondents perceive a lack of mission clarity with the JIACG. Some like a narrow focus on counterterrorism, while others believe the JIACG should have a larger scope.
Many said there is a lack of understanding of the JIACG’s role on both the military and civilian side. Participants also said the lack of continuity on the JIACG staffs was a problem. Finally, they felt the JIACG was too DoD-centric, saying “The military is driving the JIACG process too much. . . . JIACGs should not be beholden to DoD or regional [combatant commanders].”

It is then, still an open issue whether the JIACG is an effective solution to the problem of interagency unity of effort at the regional level. The construct is military-centric and still has little input or stake from other agencies. Additionally, the JIACG construct expects to produce unity of effort, but still does not provide any leader with unity of command. Olson concludes that “it is not clear that the JIACG concept or its reality can deliver” on the level of interagency unity of effort expected of it.

**Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)**

In addition to the Foreign Policy Advisor and the Joint Interagency Coordination Group, the combatant commander may create a subordinate joint task force with enough interagency representation that it is designated a Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF). There are currently two units designated as JIATFs, JIATF-West (JIATF-W) under PACOM and JIATF-South (JIATF-S) under SOUTHCOM. JIATF-W and JIATF-S both date back to 1989 and are focused on the counternarcotics mission. A third unit, JIATF-Iraq (JIATF-I) was established in 2008 to facilitate interagency unity of effort against threats to Iraq’s stability, but has since been disestablished.

a JIATF as “an interagency organization under a single military director that coordinates counterdrug operations at the operational and tactical level,” thus seemingly limiting the JIATF construct to just the counternarcotics mission, though the concept is at least mentioned in doctrine dealing with the counter-weapons-of-mass-destruction (WMD) and special operations missions.29 The white paper further notes the difference between a JIATF and a JIACG is, unlike a JIACG, a JIATF “exercises tactical control over attached elements when executing a mission.”30

Like the JIACG, the JIATF is codified in neither executive order nor legislation; a JIATF derives its authority through a memorandum of agreement signed by the head of each participating agency or department.31 The JFCOM white paper notes that, while agencies subordinate some of their assets under another agency’s leadership in the JIATFs, these JIATFs do not have true unity of command because “the different agencies still retain many of their authorities, responsibilities, and prerogatives.”32 However, because many of the participating agencies’ and departments’ field-level headquarters are collocated in the JIATF in something of an integrated command structure, the organization has the ability to cut across traditional agency stovepipes and facilitate rapid integrated action.33 Finally, the JFCOM white paper says the existing JIATFs took a long time to develop the level of trust needed to work collaboratively, so planners should not expect to form a new JIATF rapidly for a crisis operation.34

**Interagency Structures at the Geographic Combatant Commands**

This section describes the internal interagency organizations used and customized by each of the five military Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) with significant foreign policy responsibilities – U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), U.S. European Command (EUCOM), U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), and U.S. Africa
CENTCOM’s interagency entities at the unified command headquarters level include the commander’s Foreign Policy Advisor, a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (now called the Interagency Action Group or IAG), and a Target Synchronization Board (TSB), and for a time included a Joint Interagency Task Force in Iraq. CENTCOM’s current structures to facilitate interagency unity of effort are shown in Figure 2. Most of the following section will focus on the evolution and current status of the IAG, but will also briefly describe CENTCOM’s FPA, TSB and JIATF.

The ambassador serving as the Foreign Policy Advisor, together with a State Department deputy, another Foreign Service Officer focused on Iran, and a military Foreign Area Officer focused on Middle East Peace, executes the traditional role as the primary foreign policy advisor to the commander. Both the FPA and the State Department liaison to the JIACG are the primary conduits for coordination and information sharing from CENTCOM to the State Department headquarters and to the embassies in each country in CENTCOM’s area of command.
responsibility.\textsuperscript{37} At CENTCOM, there is no formal relationship between the FPA office and the Interagency Action Group.

CENTCOM formed a JIACG in October 2001 specifically for operations in Afghanistan, initially as more of a counterterrorism task force and intelligence fusion center than a staff coordination element. (This organization should probably have been called a JIATF rather than a JIACG.) The unit deployed to Afghanistan in November 2001 with representation from the FBI, CIA, National Security Agency (NSA), the State Department’s Diplomatic Security Service (DSS), Customs Service, and New York’s Joint Terrorism Task Force, among others (a total of 36 U.S. military personnel and 57 non-DoD personnel, as well as several British and Australian special forces personnel), leaving a small detachment at CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa to
facilitate communication from Afghanistan back to the various agencies in Washington.\textsuperscript{38} In Afghanistan, the unit functioned primarily as an intelligence-gathering fusion center and assisted in operating the main interrogation facility in Bagram.\textsuperscript{39} Bogdanos concludes that, while achieving several tactical successes in Afghanistan, the unit lacked the resources to assist in shaping theater-level or national-level interagency strategy.\textsuperscript{40}

Upon returning to the U.S. in April 2002, CENTCOM’s JIACG transformed from a counterterrorism-specific task force to more of a “full-spectrum” coordinating group more akin to the JFCOM model. By September 2002, the JIACG came under the supervision of CENTCOM’s Director of Operations (J-3),\textsuperscript{41} who was dual-hatted as the JIACG Director, and CENTCOM established a JIACG force structure of 26 military positions.\textsuperscript{42} Prior to the establishment of a full-spectrum JIACG, CENTCOM’s plans were usually in final form before they were seen by other agencies. Bogdanos says, through the efforts of the full-spectrum JIACG, “all relevant agencies participated in the plan’s actual development.” While the JIACG representatives of the various agencies could not speak for or coordinate on behalf of their agencies, they were able to conduct “informal coordination with their parent agencies in advance of the plan’s release, enabling them to advise CENTCOM of what that particular agency’s official position would ultimately be.”\textsuperscript{43} In addition, the JIACG “provided both interagency-trained liaison officers and task-organized teams” to CENTCOM’s subordinate commands around the world. “This export of liaison officers and mini-JIACGs brought the same force-multiplying benefits to subordinate commands that [the] JIACG brought to CENTCOM.”\textsuperscript{44}

In March 2003, the JIACG again assumed a tactical focus. The majority of the JIACG’s personnel deployed to Iraq “to search for evidence [of] terrorist-financing networks and terrorist activity in the United States, to investigate United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution
violations, and to initiate criminal investigations of U.S. and foreign individuals who aided Iraq with its weapons of mass destruction programs. Lieutenant Colonel Terry Sopher, who served as the first CENTCOM JIACG J-3 and later as the JIACG Deputy Director, says the JIACG was not as successful in Iraq as it had been in Afghanistan, due to “leader turbulence and the resultant shifting of mission and focus, rotation of personnel,” and lack of JIACG involvement in planning the invasion of Iraq, with DoD citing operational security in its refusal to authorize the interagency representatives access to the developing plan.

In July 2004, the JIACG once again returned to CENTCOM headquarters and resumed its full-spectrum focus, providing interagency advice and facilitating coordination of CENTCOM operations and plans. Upon return, the JIACG reported to the CENTCOM Deputy Commander rather than the J-3, to whom it reported prior to departing for Iraq. Today, CENTCOM’s JIACG is called the Interagency Action Group (IAG). The IAG once again reports to the J-3 and currently has several military billets and eight interagency billets: one each from the State Department, USAID, Treasury, DEA, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and two from the FBI. Each agency contributing personnel retains operational control of their personnel, but the senior JIACG leader, at headquarters or in the field, has tactical control. Since its establishment in 2001, the director and deputy director of the JIACG (now IAG) have been military personnel. In addition to the headquarters presence in Tampa, the IAG has military liaison officers in Iraq at the headquarters of the Multinational Force – Iraq (MNF-I), the FBI’s Baghdad Operations Center, the Iraq Threat Finance Cell (co-led by CENTCOM and the Treasury Department to disrupt the flow of money to both insurgents and terrorists in Iraq), and in Afghanistan at the U.S. embassy in Kabul.
In addition to the interagency personnel in the FPA office and the IAG, CENTCOM has a State Department representative from the Office of the Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) working in the Humanitarian Affairs office of the Directorate of Plans Policy and Strategy (J-5) and a State Department Diplomatic Security Service officer in the J-3 Force Protection office, and USAID is considering adding a USAID officer in the J-5 Humanitarian Affairs office, in addition to the USAID representative already serving in the IAG. Filling the interagency billets continues to be a challenge, though most of CENTCOM’s interagency billets are filled as of March 2010.52

In August 2004, CENTCOM’s Deputy Commander decided CENTCOM needed a higher-level entity than the action-officer level JIACG to facilitate interagency coordination, so he established an Interagency Executive Steering Committee, since renamed the Target Synchronization Board (TSB).53 Today, the TSB operates out of the IAG, and the interagency personnel from the IAG sit on the board, together with representatives from other CENTCOM headquarters directorates and representatives from CENTCOM’s deployed task forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. The TSB meets approximately weekly and is chaired either by the IAG Director or the J-3.54

In August 2008, CENTCOM established a Joint Interagency Task Force in Iraq (JIATF-I), located in Baghdad. According to Robert Birkenes, a Foreign Service Officer who served as USAID representative to JIATF-I, Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus jointly created JIATF-I as an interagency planning team focused on threats to Iraq’s stability from Iran and al-Qaida. JIATF-I included representatives from USAID, the State Department, the Department of Energy (DoE) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).55
JIATF-I participated in the development of a Joint Campaign Plan (JCP) for Iraq, “the first interagency attempt to define all priorities, objectives and approaches to be taken by all U.S. agencies in Iraq.” The JCP was jointly approved by Ambassador Crocker and General Odierno in December 2008. Upon implementation of the JCP, JIATF-I identified non-military means to assist in countering threats to Iraq from foreign terrorists and Iran and worked with both the embassy and MNF-I to track progress toward achieving the goals spelled out in the plan. After a year of operation, Birkenes credits JIATF-I with creating and managing the whole-of-government strategy for Iraq as expressed in the JCP and assisting in weakening violent extremists in Iraq, leading to a forty percent decrease in weekly attacks against coalition forces. The mission of the JIATF has since been subsumed by the U.S. embassy in Baghdad.

PACOM

The United States Pacific Command (PACOM) has a Foreign Policy Advisor to the commander and has had a JIACG since 2001 and a JIATF since 1989. Additionally, PACOM briefly experimented with establishing a second JIACG under crisis conditions. Today, the JIACG is part of a new directorate called the J-9 Pacific Outreach Directorate, and the FPA is dual-hatted as the J-9 Director. PACOM’s current structures to facilitate interagency unity of effort are shown in Figure 3.

Prior to 9/11, PACOM Commander Admiral Dennis Blair proposed the creation of a JIATF for counterterrorism in the Asia-Pacific region (JIATF-CTAP). By December 2001, this organization evolved into PACOM’s JIACG for counterterrorism (JIACG/CT). Admiral Blair declared that the JIACG/CT would be the command’s office of primary responsibility for the Global War on Terror and directed the organization to conduct planning for a whole-of-government CT campaign in the region. According to Ambassador (Retired) Edward Marks,
who served as a contractor on PACOM’s JIACG/CT, the organization began by focusing on tactical issues like “actionable intelligence” and actions to eliminate key terrorist actors, but by late 2002 expanded its focus to expanding working relations with U.S. embassies in the region, as well as bilateral and multilateral engagements with governments in the region. Marks characterized the JIACG/CT as a “tiger team” that pulled together disparate elements of the PACOM staff across J-code lanes and produced a CT program for PACOM which was “well coordinated if not integrated with the programs of the other members of the interagency community.”

![PACOM's Current Structures for Interagency Unity of Effort](image)

Figure 3. PACOM’s Current Structures for Interagency Unity of Effort

For a time, the JIACG/CT placed liaison teams in key U.S. embassies to facilitate communication between the JIACG at PACOM headquarters and the tactical operations of the
ambassador and his interagency country team, but after a year, PACOM concluded the liaison teams were unnecessary, as the function could be provided by the Defense Attaché or Military Group commander already present at the embassy.64

The JIACG/CT was led by a military colonel or equivalent and initially staffed with over forty military personnel (both active and reserve), but PACOM had difficulty getting interagency participants. By the end of 2002 it had just three interagency personnel: a full-time analyst from NSA, a retired Foreign Service Officer from State, and an officer from Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) on 60-day temporary duty assignment.65 An FBI officer served between 2004 and 2005 and one USAID senior staff member served in 2005.66 From its inception until mid-2005, PACOM’s JIACG/CT was the “most robust JIACG as measured by personnel and budget allocation among all of the combatant commands.”67 Over time, manning authorizations declined, and by mid-2005, the organization had just twelve authorized military billets, one DoD civilian billet, five DoD contractors, and three interagency representatives, though the agencies had difficulty filling the non-DoD billets.68

From its creation until mid-2005, the JIACG/CT was an advisory group reporting to the PACOM commander through the Chief of Staff, though JIACG/CT personnel worked in the J-3 for administrative purposes.69 However, PACOM subsequently assessed that the JIACG/CT was not well integrated with the rest of the PACOM staff, so in mid-2005 PACOM commander Admiral William Fallon transferred responsibility for CT operations to the PACOM/J3 and reassigned most of the personnel, including most of the interagency representatives, from the JIACG/CT to the J-3. The remaining, much smaller organization was named simply the JIACG and aligned under the J-5, where it remained for several years, working on maritime security, the Counterterrorism Fellowship Program, and some funding management responsibilities.70
PACOM’s JIACG recently received a substantial increase in importance and visibility when the new PACOM Commander, Admiral Robert Willard, decided in October 2009 to create a new J-9 Pacific Outreach Directorate, which became operational on 15 January 2010. The J-9 is led by PACOM’s FPA (while the FPA also retains his traditional role as a direct foreign policy advisor to the commander) and includes the JIACG, as well as a Public-Private Partnership Division, a Legislative Affairs Division, and PACOM’s Washington Liaison Office. The mission of the new J-9 is to “orchestrate and enable enduring, collaborative partnerships between PACOM leadership/staff [and] key U.S. government, nongovernmental and international partners by facilitating introductions, information sharing, and collaboration in support of U.S. objectives” in PACOM’s region. The JIACG within this new J-9 currently has a representative from the State Department and one from USAID, as well as a liaison from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), an officer from the United Kingdom’s Royal Navy acting as the U.K. Advisor, five U.S. military officers, and a Department of Defense civilian. The military officers on the JIACG further broaden PACOM’s interagency relationships by forming and maintaining relationships with Washington-based representatives from Commerce, Homeland Security, Treasury, and the Department of the Interior who are not assigned to PACOM. Outside the JIACG and the FPA office, PACOM also has interagency intelligence representatives in the Directorate of Intelligence (J-2) and a USAID Humanitarian Assistance Advisor in the Directorate of Logistics (J-4), where he can advise PACOM’s logisticians in response to humanitarian emergencies.

In addition to the JIACG described above, after the December 2004 Asian tsunami, the PACOM commander established a second JIACG, which he called a full-spectrum JIACG, to focus on interagency coordination for the response to the disaster, staffing it with 30 individuals.
detailed from across the PACOM staff. USAID detailed two experts from its Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), but after spending some time in the JIACG, they moved to the PACOM/J3’s Joint Operations Center, where they were better able to coordinate with Washington-based relief agencies and with the field, as well as providing their expert advice directly to the J-3. Additionally, because the disaster struck without warning and relief operations began immediately, there was no time for interagency operational planning, nor was there ever a formal transition of the initial PACOM response operation to another agency, so there was no need for a formal post-emergency transfer plan. While the relief operation is generally considered to have been a success, Marks concludes there is little evidence this full-spectrum JIACG contributed much, saying that despite its full-spectrum name, it was in effect an “ad hoc, short-term, single subject JIACG” which had no interagency representation and was largely redundant to other available interagency coordination channels.74

The other significant interagency organization in PACOM is the Joint Interagency Task Force - West (JIATF-W), which is PACOM’s executive agent for DoD support to counternarcotics initiatives in the region. JIATF-W provides interagency intelligence fusion, supports U.S. law enforcement, and develops partner nation counternarcotics capabilities in the region with the goal of detecting, disrupting, and dismantling narcotics-related transnational threats in the region. JIATF-W was initially established in California in 1989 as Joint Task Force - 5 (JTF-5). It was granted additional interagency authorities and renamed JIATF-W in 1994 and in 2004 was collocated with PACOM headquarters in Hawaii. JIATF-W is led by a U.S. Coast Guard rear admiral and consists of “approximately 82 uniformed and civilian members of all five military services as well as representatives from the national intelligence community and U.S. federal law enforcement agencies” including the DEA, FBI, and ICE.75
JIATF-W has used its interagency mix of capabilities to achieve U.S. counternarcotics goals in the region in several ways, including deploying intelligence analysts to U.S. embassies in the region to support U.S. law enforcement agencies, constructing interagency intelligence fusion centers for partner nations in the region, constructing infrastructure such as border patrol stations and customs checkpoints in four partner nations, and conducting counternarcotics training for six partner nation militaries and law enforcement agencies.  

In pursuing its counternarcotics mission, JIATF-W is closely aligned with PACOM’s War on Terror, Theater Security Cooperation, and Maritime Security missions. The synergy between counternarcotics and counterterrorism has been particularly helpful because many of the capabilities needed to fight narcotics trafficking are also useful in fighting terrorism. In addition, many governments in the region have been much more open to initial cooperation with the U.S. in counternarcotics, while being very reluctant to openly join the U.S. in its Global War on Terror. The initial counternarcotics cooperation often opens the door to follow-on engagement with PACOM to develop host nation capabilities to combat local terrorist, insurgent, and criminal threats.

**EUCOM**

EUCOM’s entities to facilitate interagency unity of effort include the traditional Foreign Policy Advisor to the Combatant Commander and a JIACG, which EUCOM now calls the J-9 Directorate of Interagency Partnering. In January 2010, the new EUCOM commander, Admiral James Stavridis, dual-hatted the FPA as the EUCOM Civilian Deputy (ECCD), creating a EUCOM command structure with a military commander, a military deputy, and a civilian deputy, similar to structures which had previously been established at SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM. Unlike SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM, the EUCOM commander is also dual-hatted
as the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), so the EUCOM commander spends much of his time at his NATO headquarters in Mons, Belgium, and leaves day-to-day operations at EUCOM in the hands of the Stuttgart, Germany-based military and civilian EUCOM Deputy Commanders. EUCOM’s current structures to facilitate interagency unity of effort are shown in Figure 4.

![EUCOM's Current Structures for Interagency Unity of Effort](image)

**Figure 4. EUCOM’s Current Structures for Interagency Unity of Effort**

EUCOM established a JIACG in October 2001 in response to the NSC and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) guidance. From 2001-2002, the focus of the JIACG was on interagency and international coordination of actions to facilitate U.S. goals in the Global War on Terror in the region, such as overflight rights, maritime interdiction, and intelligence sharing.

EUCOM’s JIACG started as a stand-alone staff element in the headquarters with a DoD civilian Senior
Executive Service (SES) director and Army general officer deputy director who reported to the EUCOM commander through the chief of staff and deputy commander. As with other COCOMs, EUCOM staffed its JIACG with military billets from across the headquarters, but non-DoD interagency participation was more difficult to obtain. However, by July 2002, the JIACG had either representatives from or access to individuals from State, Commerce, Justice, Treasury, several intelligence agencies, and other specialized experts.

In 2003, EUCOM decided to broaden the JIACG’s portfolio beyond counterterrorism to include participation in the full spectrum of EUCOM’s plans and operations in the region, including Theater Security Cooperation (TSC). As part of this broadening of mission, the JIACG transitioned from a stand-alone staff element reporting directly to the chief of staff to an element of the Directorate of Operations (J-3). Under the new construct, the SES-level civilian director was eliminated and the director became a brigadier general who also served as the Deputy J-3. At this time, the JIACG consisted of 29 military personnel, plus interagency representatives from the FBI, DEA, ICE, and Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), while representatives from State, DoE, DTRA, the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA), the Coast Guard, and several intelligence agencies were present elsewhere in the EUCOM headquarters with linkages to the JIACG. In addition to the presence in the J-3 on the staff, the JIACG maintained full-time representation in EUCOM’s standing joint force headquarters (SJFHQ) to both maintain situational awareness and provide interagency input to EUCOM’s current operations.

In 2007, the JIACG became the Commander’s Interagency Engagement Group (CIEG) and moved from the J-3 to become part of the EUCOM commander’s special staff, headed by a DoD SES-level civilian. The CIEG focused on developing relationships by hosting a series of
 conferences with interagency, international, and academic participants to provide EUCOM leadership and staff with a broad range of inputs on issues such as global supply chain management, money laundering, drug trafficking, Islamic identity in Europe, and a forecast of issues which EUCOM would likely face in 2020.87

In November 2009, under new EUCOM Commander Admiral James Stavridis, the CIEG became the J-9 Partnering Directorate. The directorate still has a DoD SES-level civilian director, and the director reports to the State Department ambassador serving as the dual-hatted Foreign Policy Advisor and EUCOM Civilian Deputy, the only EUCOM staff directorate that reports directly to the ECCD.88 While PACOM kept a JIACG division within its J-9 Partnering Directorate, EUCOM eliminated a separately-named organization and spread the interagency coordination mission across their new J-9. The EUCOM J-9’s mission is to “integrate the efforts of all [USG] agencies at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels,” lead “the EUCOM effort to integrate interagency, academia, NGOs, [international organizations], and private sector partners to better execute the EUCOM mission through a ‘Whole of Society Approach,’” and to advise the EUCOM commander “on objectives, support requirements, authorities, and limitations of other [USG] agencies.”89 The J-9 currently has interagency representatives from State (2), ICE, USAID, and Treasury, and expects to acquire representatives from the DoE, CBP, and DEA by the end of the fiscal year.90

SOUTHCOM

It is particularly important to ensure that U.S. foreign policy in SOUTHCOM’s region of Latin America and the Caribbean does not have a military face and voice. Between 1898 and 1994, the U.S. government successfully intervened at least forty-one times to change governments in Latin America, and Latin Americans remember this.91 According to a 2006
Senate Foreign Relations Committee report, “In Latin America . . . , military and intelligence efforts are viewed with suspicion, making it difficult to pursue meaningful cooperation on a counterterrorism agenda,”92 and “Latin American suspicions of American pressure and what is seen as an unspoken threat of military intervention run deep.”93

Recognizing this sensitivity, as well as the fact that U.S. goals in Latin America and the Caribbean are less about preparing for major military operations and more about building international partnerships, and that this requires working together with other U.S. agencies, as well as non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations, SOUTHCOM has developed a number of structures to facilitate interagency unity of effort in the region.94 These structures include a State Department ambassador who is dual-hatted as the FPA and the Civilian Deputy to the SOUTHCOM Commander, a JIACG which is now called the J-9 Partnering Directorate, a JIATF for counternarcotics operations that has been hailed as the model both for JIATFs and for interagency cooperation in general, and a headquarters command structure which was, until recently, built around partnership rather than a traditional J-code structure. SOUTHCOM’s current structures to facilitate interagency unity of effort are shown in Figure 5.

Looking first at the overall SOUTHCOM headquarters structure, former SOUTHCOM commander (and current EUCOM commander as of June 2009) Admiral James Stavridis said in 2008, “We are working to create an organization that can best adapt itself to working with the interagency, with our international partners and even with the private-public sector.”95 On 1 October 2008, SOUTHCOM transitioned to a structure with two deputies reporting to the four-star military commander – a three-star military deputy to the commander focused on military operations and an ambassadorial-rank Foreign Service Officer from the State Department as the civilian deputy to the commander focused on civil-military activities. SOUTHCOM chose to do
away with the traditional, stand-alone Foreign Policy Advisor to the commander, instead using this Foreign Service Officer as the civilian deputy and relying on this individual to also provide foreign policy advice to the Combatant Commander.

![SOUTHCOM's Current Structures for Interagency Unity of Effort](image)

**Figure 5. SOUTHCOM’s Current Structures for Interagency Unity of Effort**

In October 2008, SOUTHCOM also replaced the traditional J-coded staff structure with a new six-directorate structure, with three mission directorates focused on ensuring regional security, enhancing regional stability, and enabling partnering, and three functional directorates to support the mission directorates. However, in January 2010, under new SOUTHCOM commander, General Douglas Fraser, SOUTHCOM transitioned back to the standard J-code structure. This was largely as a result of the U.S. response to the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti. To assist SOUTHCOM in the response effort, hundreds of military officers from U.S.
Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and other staffs came to SOUTHCOM to augment the
SOUTHCOM staff and establish SOUTHCOM’s Joint Task Force for the response. During this
influx, SOUTHCOM found reverting to the standard structure greatly simplified staff
coordination. However, SOUTHCOM has not committed to keeping the J-code structure and
may return to the previous non-traditional structure; the issue is still under study.97

SOUTHCOM formed a JIACG in 2003, initially staffed by a single lieutenant colonel and
located in the command’s J-9 Transformation Directorate, to “facilitate coordination, enhance
information sharing, and integrate the planning efforts between [SOUTHCOM] and the
interagency community.”98 In 2004, JIACG duties passed to two contractors, who periodically
convened meetings of interagency personnel assigned to SOUTHCOM’s JIATF-S or assigned to
their respective agencies’ Miami field offices to collaborate on specific requirements dealing
with counternarcotics, foreign internal defense for SOUTHCOM partner nations, and
contingency planning for stabilization operations.99 By 2005, the JIACG expanded to include
four military personnel and two or three DoD civilians, as well as the two contractors. This
larger DoD team worked with five part-time representatives (one each) from State, Treasury, the
FBI, Customs and Border Protection’s Office of Border Patrol, and the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF).100 In addition, the SOUTHCOM J-3 Operations
Directorate sent liaison officers to the JIACG in the J-9 “to maintain staff interoperability.”101 In
2006, SOUTHCOM commander Admiral James Stavridis decided to move from a part-time to a
full-time JIACG, so he established a more robust JIACG, still within the J-9.102 When
SOUTHCOM reorganized in 2008, the J-9 directorate became the new Partnering Directorate,
and the JIACG changed its name to become the Interagency Coordination Group (IACG) under
the Integration Division within the Partnering Directorate.103
In January 2010, when SOUTHCOM reverted to the J-code structure, the Partnering Directorate became the J-9 and what started as the JIACG is now simply called the J-9 Partnering Directorate.\textsuperscript{104} There are three interagency billets in the J-9, two from the State Department and one from USAID. There are twelve additional interagency billets spread across the staff, including two from the FBI, two from ICE, one from ATF, one from CBP, two from DoE, one from USAID’s OFDA, one from the State Department’s DSS, and two from the Coast Guard. Four additional Foreign Service Officers from the State Department are projected to join SOUTHCOM in the summer of 2010.\textsuperscript{105} The number of agencies represented in SOUTHCOM is larger than any other GCC, in large part because many of the agencies have regional offices near the SOUTHCOM headquarters.\textsuperscript{106} In addition to maintaining contacts with Washington and with U.S. embassy country teams, the interagency staff across the SOUTHCOM headquarters coordinates frequently with these regional offices, meeting monthly at SOUTHCOM to discuss regional issues. Through the State Department representative, the J-9 has also established a dialogue with several NGOs.\textsuperscript{107}

SOUTHCOM’s Joint Interagency Task Force - South (JIATF-S) in Key West, Florida, was created in 1999 from the consolidation of two other counternarcotics task forces which DoD had established in 1989.\textsuperscript{108} The JIATF’s mission is to detect, monitor, and consign suspected narcotics trafficking targets to appropriate law enforcement agencies; promote regional security cooperation; and coordinate U.S. country team and partner-nation counternarcotics initiatives.\textsuperscript{109} Because the Posse Comitatus Act limits the use of the U.S. military in federal law enforcement, military personnel and assets can detect and monitor counternarcotics targets, but enforcement actions are executed by U.S. law enforcement agencies. Because these law enforcement
agencies are represented in the JIATF, the transition from military monitoring to law
enforcement action “happens with little or no disruption.”

JIATF-S has an integrated interagency structure, including a U.S. Coast Guard admiral as its
Director, an officer from CBP as Vice Director, and participants from all U.S. military branches,
the DEA, FBI, Customs, Homeland Security, and elements of the U.S. intelligence community.
Interagency integration continues through the lower levels of the organization, as well; while the
directors for intelligence and operations are both military officers, the deputy for intelligence is
from the DEA and the deputy for operations is from CBP. This integrated structure also
includes a key element – all personnel assigned to the task force, regardless of their parent
agency, are rated by their bosses on the task force rather than someone from their parent agency
outside the task force, giving the task force the all-important ability to reward personnel for their
job at the task force rather than for loyalty to their agency or department.

JIATF-S is also a multinational organization, with participants from countries both inside
and outside SOUTHCOM’s area of responsibility (AOR) working together both at the JIATF-S
headquarters and in combined force packages across the region. From Europe, the United
Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands (all of which govern territories in the region) provide
ships, aircraft, and liaison officers to the task force, and the commander of the Netherlands
Forces Caribbean also commands a subordinate task group under JIATF-S. From within the
AOR, JIATF-S has liaison personnel from the Argentinean Air Force, the Brazilian Intelligence
Agency, the Colombian Air Force and Navy, the Ecuadorian Air Force, the El Salvadorian Air
Force, and the Peruvian Air Force. While Mexico is not part of the SOUTHCOM area of
responsibility (it falls under NORTHCOM), the Mexican Navy also has a liaison at JIATF-S.
This robust liaison program not only facilitates operational cooperation, but improves information sharing across the region.\textsuperscript{113}

Many have concluded that JIATF-S is the benchmark interagency organization to emulate. Dr John Fishel, who has written extensively on civil-military relations, concludes that the JIATF-S model is an appropriate organizational construct “to coordinate the activity of many interagency players.”\textsuperscript{114} U.S. Coast Guard Lieutenant Commander Tom Stuhlreyer concludes that the organization is effective and makes best use of limited U.S. resources across the interagency. He notes that JIATF-S narcotics seizure records were being broken at a time when fewer U.S. military assets were available due to high operational requirements in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the Global War on Terror, demonstrating “the efficacy and force-multiplying aspect of the joint, interagency, and multi-national approach to operations at JIATF South.”\textsuperscript{115} The Government Accountability Office (GAO) credits SOUTHCOM with more success than the other COCOMs in its interagency collaboration in part due to the effect of having JIATF-S in the command.\textsuperscript{116} Indeed, SOUTHCOM approached its 2008 headquarters reorganization with the proven JIATF-S interagency model in mind.\textsuperscript{117}

According to Fishel, “The real reason JIATF-S works is that it is structurally an organization that has unity of command. The Director is a commander with the authority to hire and fire, as well as to task[,] organize and direct actions.”\textsuperscript{118} However, because JIATFs are not codified in executive order or legislation, the authority remains largely voluntary. Stuhlreyer characterizes the JIATF as an interagency “coalition of the willing” and notes that, while assigned military personnel are subject to normal military order and discipline, the interagency partners “are only obligated to remain invested in JIATF-South as long as the command assists them in achieving individual interagency goals.”\textsuperscript{119} However, because the counternarcotics mission of JIATF-S is
a core mission of many of the interagency participants, these agencies are likely to continue to participate.

AFRICOM

On 30 September 2008, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) became the newest combatant command. AFRICOM is unique among the military’s combatant commands in that it was created to focus on security cooperation and humanitarian issues more than warfighting and was envisioned from birth as an interagency entity. AFRICOM Commander General William E. Ward says the U.S. needed an integrated, interagency approach to Africa because, prior to establishing AFRICOM, there were “lost opportunities to establish programs or partnerships [with African partner nations] because of misunderstandings or conflicts within the U.S. Government.”

Like SOUTHCOM and EUCOM, AFRICOM has a four-star military commander with a three-star Deputy to the Commander for Military Operations (DCMO) and an ambassadorial-rank Foreign Service Officer from State serving as the Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities (DCMA). The DCMA supervises the coordination between the military and non-DoD agencies working on African issues, directs AFRICOM’s civil-military plans and programs, outreach, and strategic communication effort, and leads the command’s theater security cooperation policy development, resourcing, and assessment. However, the DCMA has no authority over the U.S. ambassadors in Africa. Unlike SOUTHCOM and EUCOM, AFRICOM has a second senior Foreign Service Officer (below the rank of ambassador) serving as the commander’s FPA. AFRICOM chose to maintain these as two separate positions rather than combining them because it provides one Foreign Service Officer (the FPA) to travel with the commander, while the other (the DCMA) can either travel separately or remain at the
headquarters to provide diplomatic expertise. This additional Foreign Service Officer is certainly an asset to the Combatant Commander, but may not be able to be replicated across all of the GCCs because of the short supply of senior Foreign Service Officers.

Like SOUTHCOM from 2008 to 2009, AFRICOM’s focus on missions other than warfighting led the command to choose an organizational structure other than the traditional J-code staff. It instead organized around a set of “cross-functional directorates,” such as the Outreach Directorate, which focuses on strategic communication and USG partnership and engagement with nations in Africa. This directorate also manages AFRICOM’s contacts with interagency, intergovernmental, nongovernmental, and multinational agencies relevant to the command’s mission in Africa. Unlike the other GCCs, AFRICOM has never had a JIACG; instead, AFRICOM decided to integrate interagency personnel across the staff. AFRICOM plans to have a total of approximately 42 interagency personnel. Currently, there are approximately 27 interagency personnel, including twelve from the intelligence community and about 15 personnel from State, USAID, Treasury, Commerce, and the Coast Guard. This is an increase from only 13 in October 2008. Filling the billets has been difficult, because even though AFRICOM reimburses the parent agencies for the salaries of the interagency personnel serving in the headquarters, many agencies simply do not have qualified personnel to spare. AFRICOM’s current structures to facilitate interagency unity of effort are shown in Figure 6.
In addition to action-officer-level positions, non-DoD agency personnel also hold leadership positions across the AFRICOM headquarters staff. The director of the Outreach Directorate is from State, the chief of the Programs Division under the Directorate of Strategy, Plans, and Programs is from USAID, and the Deputy Director of Resources is from Commerce. These interagency personnel rate their subordinates, civilian and military, and have all the authorities of a military member in their position, with the exception that the interagency civilians cannot command U.S. forces during military operations. Many of the current interagency personnel, whether supervisors or not, are very senior in rank – equivalent to a general officer or member of the Senior Executive Service (because AFRICOM requested this senior-level representation). This has led to frustration among some of the interagency representatives that they are buried too
deeply in the staff and do not have authority commensurate with their rank. Over time, more of these billets will be converted to action-officer-equivalent ranks (equivalent to military majors and lieutenant colonels) to address this issue.  

In 2008, AFRICOM’s DCMO, Vice Admiral Robert Moeller, and DCMA, Ambassador Mary Yates, said AFRICOM decided not to construct a JIACG, preferring to integrate interagency personnel throughout the command “where their impact can be the greatest.” Because the interagency personnel are dispersed across the headquarters, AFRICOM created the Command Collaborative Forum (CCF) to bring together all of the interagency reps at least once a month, together with the AFRICOM Chief of Staff and representatives from the operations and plans directorates. The CCF provides an opportunity for the interagency personnel to coordinate with each other, provide and receive feedback, and ensure their voices are heard.

AFRICOM does not have a Joint Interagency Task Force, but it has a Combined Joint Task Force in the Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), which “spends an enormous amount of time assisting in nonmilitary actions,” while at the same time assisting local security forces in counterterrorism. Established in October 2002 to counter violent extremism in East Africa, the task force is led by a two-star U.S. military officer and includes personnel from all branches of the U.S. military, plus interagency civilians (a Foreign Policy Advisor from the State Department and a few representatives from U.S. national intelligence agencies) and international liaisons from countries in the region. While the task force was established in 2002 primarily as a direct-action counterterrorism organization, it has evolved today to focus on military-to-military counterterrorism training, as well as international development operations such as building schools and clinics and conducting medical, dental, and veterinary civic action programs, all in coordination with USAID and local U.S. embassies. CJTF-HOA has also assisted in several
humanitarian operations, such as floods in Ethiopia and Kenya and a capsized passenger ferry in Djibouti. The organization aspires to be “a model for the integration of Defense, Diplomacy, and Development.” Given the successful track records of JIATF-W, JIATF-S, and JIATF-I in integrating interagency personnel into a sub-regional task force to conduct predominantly non-military missions, it seems that CJTF-HOA’s predominantly non-military mission makes it a good candidate for reorganization as a JIATF, though AFRICOM says it gets all the interagency assistance it needs through direct liaison with the various embassy Country Teams and thus does not require an integrated civil-military command structure in the task force itself.

Several observers, both in Africa and in the U.S., have criticized the apparent decision in creating AFRICOM to put the military in charge of interagency engagement with Africa. For example, Ambassador (Retired) Edward Marks, says AFRICOM, though well-intentioned, “will only exacerbate the problem of over-militarization of U.S. policy and programs.” Marks questions how military-to-military programs in Africa will be subordinated to larger U.S. policy goals when the military is put in charge and says the U.S. “should be looking for a whole-of-government approach, not the tweaking of a military model designed primarily for warfighting.”

Summary of Current Structures at the GCCs

Since the JIACG concept was first introduced in 2001, interagency coordination structures have evolved differently in each of the Geographic Combatant Commands. While JFCOM recommends a construct with an ambassadorial-rank Foreign Policy Advisor reporting directly to the Combatant Commander and a JIACG consisting of six DoD and six non-DoD personnel, also reporting directly to the commander, none of the GCCs currently follow this model.
In CENTCOM, the ambassadorial-rank FPA reports directly to the commander, but the JIACG (called the Interagency Action Group or IAG at CENTCOM) is located in the J-3. Not counting the interagency intelligence community representatives in the J-2, CENTCOM has thirteen non-DoD personnel assigned: three in the FPA’s office, eight in the IAG, one in the J-3’s Force Protection office, and one in the J-5’s Humanitarian Affairs office. Additionally, CENTCOM is considering adding a second non-DoD representative to the Humanitarian Affairs office.

In PACOM, the ambassadorial-rank FPA has been dual-hatted as the director of the J-9 Pacific Outreach Directorate. The JIACG (which retains the JIACG name in PACOM) is now J-91, subordinate to the J-9, thus reporting to the FPA/J-9 Director rather than directly to the Combatant Commander. Not counting the interagency intelligence community representatives in the J-2, PACOM has four non-DoD personnel assigned to the staff: the FPA/J-9 Director, two representatives in the J-91 JIACG, and one representative in the J-4. In the field, PACOM has a sizeable contingent of non-DoD personnel, predominantly from law enforcement and intelligence, assigned to JIATF-W.

In EUCOM, the ambassadorial-rank FPA has been dual-hatted as the EUCOM Civilian Deputy Commander (ECCD). The JIACG is now called the J-9 Interagency Partnering Directorate and is the only staff directorate which reports to the ECCD. Not counting the interagency intelligence community representatives in the J-2, EUCOM has six interagency personnel assigned to the staff: the ECCD and five representatives in the J-9. By the end of fiscal year 2010, EUCOM plans to have three additional non-DoD personnel assigned, bringing the total on the staff to nine.
In SOUTHCOM, like in EUCOM, the ambassadorial-rank FPA has been dual-hatted as the Civilian Deputy Commander and the JIACG is now called the J-9 Partnering Directorate. Not counting the interagency intelligence community representatives in the J-2, SOUTHCOM has sixteen non-DoD personnel assigned to the staff: the Civilian Deputy Commander, three representatives in the J-9, and twelve representatives in other directorates on the SOUTHCOM staff. The command plans to have four additional representatives from the State Department by the summer of 2010, bringing the total number of non-DoD representatives on the staff to twenty. In the field, SOUTHCOM has a sizeable contingent of non-DoD personnel, predominantly from law enforcement and intelligence, assigned to JIATF-S.

Finally, in AFRICOM, the FPA reports directly to the commander but is a Foreign Service Officer without ambassadorial rank. The ambassadorial-ranked FSO assigned to AFRICOM holds the position of Deputy Commander for Civil-Military Activities (DCMA). Unlike the other GCCs, AFRICOM has never had a JIACG, preferring to integrate non-DoD personnel across the staff. Not counting the interagency intelligence community representatives in the Intelligence Directorate, AFRICOM has seventeen non-DoD personnel assigned to the staff: the FPA, the DCMA, and fifteen representatives assigned across the staff. AFRICOM has requested fifteen additional non-DoD representatives, but it is not clear when or if the command will receive them. In the field, AFRICOM has one representative from the State Department serving as the FPA to the CJTF-HOA commander in Djibouti, and the CJTF also has representatives from the national intelligence agencies.

While the GCCs have made great strides in integrating non-DoD expertise and viewpoints into their staffs, planning processes, and operations, these constructs still fall far short of the ideal regional interagency construct. First, not counting the national intelligence community
representatives with their very specialized functions, each GCC staff has only four to seventeen representatives from non-DoD agencies, serving on a staff of military officers, DoD civilians, and DoD contractors which numbers well over a thousand. Given these numbers, the GCC staffs will always be predominantly military in outlook and processes. Second, while the organizational constructs have evolved, the non-DoD representatives still do not have any authority to coordinate on military plans or operations on behalf of their parent agencies, nor can they commit their agency’s resources. Finally, while three of the five GCCs have elevated the ambassadorial-ranked FSO to the level of Civilian Deputy Commander, the organizations are still led by a four-star military officer, so even when the organization intends to execute whole-of-government foreign policy, the top-level face of that policy, as seen by countries in the region, continues to be a military officer.

Notes

1 Howard J.T. Steers, Bridging the Gaps: Political-Military Coordination at the Operational Level (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 17 May 2001), 13.
2 John D. Finney and Alfonse F. La Porta, “Maximizing the Value of the Political Adviser Function,” Foreign Service Journal (October 2008), 16. Dr John Finney has had an extensive career in political-military affairs at the Departments of State and Defense in Washington and abroad. Retired as a career diplomat, he serves as POLAD to the Chief of the National Guard Bureau. He served as the POLAD coordinator at State and as the POLAD to the CNO, USPACOM, and other various U.S. and multinational commands. Alphonse La Porta served 38 years in the Foreign Service, including as Ambassador to Mongolia and POLAD to the Commander of NATO South in Naples.
3 Ibid., 18.
5 Ibid., 288.
6 Charles N. Cardinal, Timber P. Pagonas, and Edward Marks, “The Global War on Terrorism: A Regional Approach to Coordination,” Joint Force Quarterly (no. 32, Autumn 2002), 50. At the time of this article, Colonel Cardinal, U.S. Army, was chief of staff of the 25th Infantry Division (the Army service component to PACOM), Commander Pagonas, U.S. Navy, was assigned as strategy, plans, and policy officer to the PACOM JIACG/CT, and Ambassador Marks was the State Department representative to the PACOM JIACG/CT. See also, United
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7 Edward Marks, *PACOM, JIACG, and the War on Terror* (Camber Corporation, on contract to the Joint Interagency Coordination Group on Counterterrorism, United States Pacific Command, 18 August 2005), 7.


9 The United States Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) is a joint military Functional Combatant Command which provides trained and ready forces to other Combatant Commanders and supports the development and integration of new joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities for the joint force.


11 William J. Olson, “Interagency Coordination: The Normal Accident or the Essence of Indecision,” in *Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security*, edited by Gabriel Marcella (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, December 2008), 222. Dr Olson is a professor at the Near East and South Asia Center for Strategic Studies. He has served as both a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense.


15 United States Joint Forces Command, *Commander’s Handbook for the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG)*, cover letter, i.

16 Ibid., vii, III-8.


18 Olson, “Interagency Coordination,” 244-245.


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Policy, National Defense University, August 2007), 13. See also Bogdanos, Joint Interagency Cooperation,” 14.


23 Marcy Stahl, Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) Training and Education Survey Results (Vienna, VA: Thought Link Inc., 15 January 2004), 15. In 2003, on behalf of JFCOM and the National Defense University, Thought Link Inc. conducted interviews with 26 USG officials – from State (12), Justice (5), Defense (6), and Treasury (3) – associated directly or indirectly with the JIACG concept to learn agencies’ perceptions of the JIACG concept and to identify the training and education needs of JIACG participants. Nearly all of the interviewees were familiar with the JIACG concept. Two were serving members of a JIACG, about half had some direct experience or interaction with JIACGs, and most of the rest had some experience with other interagency groups.

24 Ibid., 16.


26 Ibid., 247.


28 Joint Publication 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations (13 June 2007). Joint Publication 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations (26 April 2007). Joint Publication 3-40, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (10 June 2009). JP 3-07.4 briefly describes JIATF-S and JIATF-W but gives no broader doctrinal applications of JIATFs. JP 3-05.1 describes the JTF as the operational focal point for interagency coordination and mentions the JTF may be assigned a subordinate JIATF to assist with interagency coordination. JP 3-40 provides the brief statement above, but then notes “JIATFs currently do not have authority to conduct WMD interdiction.”


31 Ibid.


33 Ibid.

34 Ibid, 15.

Notes

36 U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Fadi Petro, CENTCOM Special Advisor to the Commanding General for Middle East Peace, interview by the author, 9 March 2010.
37 Holmes, 5.
40 Ibid.
41 The typical “J-coded” joint U.S. military staff includes the following eight directorates: J-1 (Manpower and Personnel), J-2 (Intelligence), J-3 (Operations), J-4 (Logistics), J-5 (Plans, Policy, and Strategy), J-6 (Communications), J-7 (Training, Exercises, and Engagement), and J-8 (Resources and Assessments). Recently, some staffs have added a ninth directorate, the J-9 Partnering Directorate.
44 Ibid., 13.
46 Sopher, Joint Interagency Coordination Groups, 11.
47 Holmes, 4.
49 Mr James Bond, State Department Representative to CENTCOM Interagency Action Group, interview by the author, 11 March 2010.
50 Arnas, et al., Harnessing the Interagency for Complex Operations, 10-11.
51 Holmes, 4-5.
52 Mr James Bond, State Department Representative to CENTCOM Interagency Action Group, interview by the author, 11 March 2010.
54 Mr James Bond, State Department Representative to CENTCOM Interagency Action Group, interview by the author, 11 March 2010.
56 Ibid., 29-30.
57 Ibid., 30-31.
58 Ibid., 32.
59 Mr James Bond, State Department Representative to CENTCOM Interagency Action Group, interview by the author, 11 March 2010.
61 David S. Doyle, Interagency Cooperation for Irregular Warfare at the Combatant Command (Ft Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 14 April 2009), 37-38.
62 Marks, PACOM, JIACG, and the War on Terror, 3.
63 Ibid., 2-3, 9.
64 Ibid., 9.
65 Ibid., 8.
66 Doyle, Interagency Cooperation for Irregular Warfare, 38.
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67 Ibid., 37.
68 Marks, *PACOM, JIACG, and the War on Terror*, 8.
71 Mr John Crowley, State Department Liaison to PACOM’s JIACG, interview by the author, 15 March 2010.
74 Marks, *PACOM, JIACG, and the War on Terror*, 16.
76 United States Pacific Command, “Joint Interagency Task Force-West.”
77 Marks, *PACOM, JIACG, and the War on Terror*, 2005, 3.
80 Ibid., 15.
81 Ibid., 16-17.
82 Ibid., 11, 22.
83 Ibid., 18-19.
84 Ibid., 19-20.
85 A standing joint force headquarters (SJFHQ) is a staff organization that provides a Combatant Commander with a full-time, trained command and control element that enhances the command’s peacetime planning efforts, improves operational-level situational awareness, and stands ready to serve as the nucleus of or augment a Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters during crisis operations.
87 United States European Command, “Biography of Mr Michael G. Ritchie, Director of Interagency Partnering.”
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Interagency Partnering Directorate, ECJ9,” 12 March 2010, provided to the author by Mr Mike Anderson, Deputy Director EUCOM/J9, 12 March 2010.


United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., 15 December 2006, S. Prt. 109-52, 12. See also Laurence L. McCabe, “Panel II: Western Hemisphere – Summary of Discussion,” in American Foreign Policy: Regional Perspectives, Proceedings of a Ruger Chair Workshop (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 13-15 May 2009), 96-97: At a May 2009 workshop of foreign policy scholars and retired ambassadors, when the discussion turned to SOUTHCOM and U.S. actions in Latin America, “The general consensus of the group was that the U.S. government would be best served by a military with a more reserved, secondary role in regional policy implementation—not the agency leading policy formulation and implementation.” One panelist said, “because of the relative lack of interstate conflict the U.S. military should not be ‘out front’ in the region,” though other participants said it was important for the U.S. military to work with Latin American militaries as they continue to reshape themselves.

United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign, 13.

Over its history, SOUTHCOM has pioneered a number of exercises, conferences, modeling and simulation systems, and planning systems to coordinate SOUTHCOM efforts with those of the U.S. ambassadors and their country teams in the region, to promote interagency and international partnerships in the region. For example, see William W. Mendel and David G. Bradford, Interagency Cooperation: A Regional Model for Overseas Operations, McNair Paper 37 (Washington, DC: National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, March 1995), 41-42, 49, 64.


U.S. Navy Captain Kevin Hutcheson, SOUTHCOM/J9 Deputy Director for Interagency Integration, and Mr Kirk Dahlgren, USAID Senior Development Officer, SOUTHCOM/J9, interview by the author, 9-10 March 2010.

Doyle, Interagency Cooperation for Irregular Warfare, 41.

Ibid., 41-42.

Ibid., 42-43.

Ibid., 43.

Ibid., 42.

Ibid., 12, 42.
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104 Mr Kirk Dahlgren, USAID Senior Development Advisor to SOUTHCOM, interview by the author, 9 March 2009.
105 Mr Ted Halstead, SOUTHCOM/J9, interview by the author, 9 March 2009.
106 Doyle, Interagency Cooperation for Irregular Warfare, 45.
107 Ibid.
112 Stahl, Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) Training and Education Survey Results, 43.
118 Fishel, “The Interagency Arena at the Operational Level,” 429.
120 Robert T. Moeller and Mary C Yates, “The Road to a New Unified Command,” Joint Force Quarterly (no. 51, 4th Quarter 2008), 68. At the time of this article, Vice Admiral Moeller was AFRICOM Deputy to the Commander for Military Operations and Ambassador Yates was AFRICOM Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities.
124 Moeller and Yates, “The Road to a New Unified Command,” 70.
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130 Senior AFRICOM staffer, interview with the author, March 2010. (unattributed interview)
132 Senior AFRICOM staffer, interview with the author, March 2010. (unattributed interview)
133 Isaac Kfir, “The Challenge that is USAFRICOM,” *Joint Force Quarterly* (no. 49, 2nd Quarter 2008), 111.
134 Ibid.
135 Senior AFRICOM staffer, interview with the author, March 2010. (unattributed interview)
137 Senior AFRICOM staffer, interview with the author, March 2010. (unattributed interview)
139 Ibid., 149. See also Robert Munson, “Do We Want to ‘Kill People and Break Things’ in Africa?” *Strategic Studies Quarterly* (Spring 2008).
Chapter 3

Current Practice – U.S. Civilian Agencies

Armed with an understanding of U.S. military structures designed to facilitate interagency unity of effort, this chapter examines structures on the civilian side of the U.S. government. The chapter first describes the State Department’s salient actors in regional foreign policy. Next, the chapter looks at the National Security Council and its current influence on regional foreign policy planning and execution. Finally, the chapter offers some brief examples of other interagency actors in the U.S. government which, while perhaps not directly relevant to regional foreign policy planning and execution, may serve as models as the analysis turns to options for reform.

State Department Structures for Civil-Military Coordination

This study now turns to interagency (and specifically civil-military) structures within the State Department. The State Department is lead foreign affairs agency for the United States. As such, State has the primary role for interagency coordination of the development and execution of U.S. foreign policy. Thus, we might expect the State Department to have robust capabilities to lead interagency foreign policy planning and execution and to synchronize the efforts of the military and other agencies with overall U.S. foreign policy goals.

The State Department is much smaller in terms of both personnel and budget than the Defense Department. While the military is organized in a three-level hierarchy—the strategic
level in Washington, the operational level at the Geographic Combatant Commands, and the tactical level of individual military units—the State Department is predominantly a two-level organization—the strategic level in Washington and at the operational (primarily bilateral) level of the U.S. embassies. The DoD has a workforce of approximately three million people and an annual budget of about $660 billion, while State has fewer than 60,000 people, of whom only 6,400 are FSOs, and an annual budget of about $50 billion. At any given time, about two thirds of FSOs are serving abroad. ²

The State Department’s headquarters has four entities which are most relevant in examining civil-military unity of effort in regional U.S. foreign policy: the Under Secretary for Political Affairs (P), with its six regional bureaus; the Bureau of Political Military Affairs (PM); the Secretary’s Office of the Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS); and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). These four entities are highlighted in the State Department organizational chart at Figure 7 and these four Washington-based entities, plus the U.S. embassies and regional missions around the world, are described in the following sections.
The State Department has six regional bureaus – African Affairs (AF), East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP), European and Eurasian Affairs (EUR), Near Eastern Affairs (NEA), South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA), and Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA) – each headed by an Assistant Secretary of State and all of which report to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. There is a Country Director assigned to each country to “set policy guidelines, coordinate outside the bureau, and administer and implement the programs for his assigned country” as well as to communicate the direction of the regional Assistant Secretaries to the U.S. embassies around the world.

The Under Secretary for Political Affairs is the State Department’s third-ranking official, as well as its senior career diplomat. The Under Secretary manages overall regional and bilateral policy issues and oversees the six regional bureaus, as well as the Bureau of International Organization Affairs and the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement. The Bureau of International Organization Affairs conducts multilateral diplomacy with global intergovernmental and international organizations such as the United Nations.

The regional bureaus are the State Department’s focal point for the development and implementation of U.S. foreign policy strategies requiring interagency coordination. The Assistant Secretaries who lead the six regional bureaus advise the Under Secretary for Political Affairs and the Secretary of State on regional issues and assist the Secretary and Under Secretary in supervising and coordinating all U.S. government activities, across the interagency community, within their assigned regions. One way they accomplish this in Washington is through strategic-level Interagency Working Groups (IAWGs), which are chaired by the regional Assistant Secretary and include representatives of all U.S. government agencies engaged in
operations within the region. Decisions from IAWG meetings are communicated by each agency’s Washington-based representative through their respective agency channels.8

The regional Assistant Secretaries are technically chartered to issue direction to the U.S. embassies in their region. However, the U.S. ambassadors leading these embassies are appointed by the President and generally prefer to deal directly with the Secretary of State or the President, bypassing the regional Assistant Secretary.9 Thus, in a military analogy, the position of the regional Assistant Secretary is much less like a Geographic Combatant Commander, who exercises command authority over the military elements in his area of responsibility, and more like a director on the Joint Staff at the Pentagon, who advises the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and develops policy and guidance for military forces, but does not exercise any command authority over fielded military forces.

In addition to the regional bureaus, the State Department has a large number of functional bureaus. Two are of particular relevance to the issue of military-diplomatic unity of effort for foreign policy, the long-standing Bureau of Political Military Affairs (PM) and the newer Office of the Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), which was established after the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq.

**Bureau of Political Military Affairs (PM)**

The Bureau of Political Military Affairs, headed by an Assistant Secretary and staffed with a mix of nearly 300 Foreign Service Officers, Civil Service Officers, contractors, and uniformed military personnel, is State’s lead for all operational military matters and its primary link with the Defense Department.10 PM manages diplomatic personnel support to military organizations, such as the State Department personnel serving as Foreign Policy Advisors to the Combatant Commanders and other senior military leaders, as well as State Department personnel serving on
the Joint Staff and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) as part of the State-DoD Officer Exchange Program.\textsuperscript{11}

PM provides U.S. foreign policy direction in several military-related areas, including defense strategy and policy, military operations, the overseas sale of military equipment by U.S. companies, and security assistance to overseas partners. The bureau also diplomatically assists the military in several ways, including negotiating status-of-forces agreements, securing basing and overflight rights for U.S. forces deploying overseas, coordinating foreign participation in U.S.-led military coalitions, and facilitating the training and education of foreign military personnel and international peacekeepers.\textsuperscript{12}

**Office of the Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)**

The Office of the Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization was established by Act of Congress in August 2004 to “lead, coordinate and institutionalize U.S. government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict.”\textsuperscript{13} The office is tasked to coordinate among U.S. civilian agencies involved in reconstruction and stabilization operations, the military, and multilateral organizations to develop and execute plans for a coordinated reconstruction and stabilization response. The office is also tasked to train and deploy U.S. government civilians to reconstruction and stabilization operations, either in partnership with the U.S. military or as part of an international peacekeeping mission.\textsuperscript{14} Currently, S/CRS has a headquarters staff of about 170, drawn primarily from elsewhere in the State Department, plus a Civilian Response Corps of approximately 900 active and standby volunteers from across the interagency who are trained and ready to deploy to the field to conduct reconstruction and stabilization operations.\textsuperscript{15}
Key entities within S/CRS staff include the Office of Conflict Prevention, the Office of Civilian Response Operations, and the Office of Planning. The Office of Conflict Prevention coordinates interagency processes to identify and monitor unstable states which may require a reconstruction and stabilization response, develops contingency plans for U.S. reconstruction and stabilization efforts, and coordinates preventative strategies with foreign partners, international organizations, NGOs and the private sector. The Office of Civilian Response Operations is responsible for developing, training, equipping, deploying, and coordinating the Civilian Response Corps for reconstruction and stabilization operations. The Office of Planning leads the interagency planning process and guides the execution of U.S. reconstruction and stabilization operations. The Office of Planning is also responsible for building the U.S. government’s whole-of-government civilian planning capacity for reconstruction and stabilization operations and, when the scope of the operation requires it, leads the Interagency Management System to synchronize interagency reconstruction and stabilization planning and execution at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.\(^{16}\)

When activated, the Interagency Management System (IMS) includes the Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG) at the strategic level, the Integration Planning Cell (IPC) at the operational level, and the Advance Civilian Team (ACT) at the tactical level. At the strategic level, interagency planning and coordination for a reconstruction and stabilization operation would be conducted by a CRSG established in Washington for that operation. The CRSG would be co-chaired by the S/CRS Coordinator, the regional Assistant Secretary of State with responsibility for the country in question, and the appropriate National Security Council Director, and would include members at the Assistant Secretary level from all U.S. agencies involved in the operation. The CRSG would be established as soon as
reconstruction and stabilization operations were under consideration and would remain in existence throughout the operation to facilitate Washington-level interagency coordination, provide recommendations to policy makers, and provide guidance to the field. In 2005, S/CRS established a CRSG to develop an interagency strategic plan to implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan.

At the operational level, S/CRS would create an Integration Planning Cell (IPC) of civilian planners and regional experts from the USG, which would deploy to the headquarters of the relevant Geographic Combatant Commander to act as a civilian planning cell to assist in the development of crisis action plans for the operation and coordinate military and civilian planning and operations. The IPC would be a small team of six to eight planners, most probably taken from the S/CRS staff in Washington. JFCOM sees the IPC as complementary to the JIACG concept, believing these interagency civilian planners should collocate with the COCOM’s JIACG upon arrival.

At the tactical level, S/CRS would create an Advance Civilian Team (ACT) of interagency civilians to deploy to either the U.S. embassy or the military’s operational-level Joint Task Force headquarters to implement the civilian portion of the coordinated reconstruction and stabilization plan. Additional ACTs could collocate with military units at the division or brigade level, potentially providing a foundation for Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) throughout the country.

While S/CRS was established in August 2004, Congress was slow to provide adequate resources for the office to fulfill its Congressionally-mandated mission. The first head of S/CRS, Ambassador Carlos Pascual, resigned after serving only fourteen months, expressing frustration over the lack of support. Three years later, the situation started to improve. The
Congressional Research Service reports that by August 2007, S/CRS had a staff of about 70, including nineteen permanent State Department personnel, with others detailed from USAID, OSD, JFCOM, the Joint Staff, the Army Corps of Engineers, the CIA, and Treasury. According to S/CRS Coordinator, Ambassador John Herbst, “It took until early 2007 for the federal government to reach an agreement on an operational plan for S/CRS, and then it took 18 months to receive the initial funding to put these plans into effect.” S/CRS received a direct appropriation for the first time in 2009, receiving a total of $140 million for reconstruction and stabilization personnel and support costs, which provided S/CRS with the resources to establish its current headquarters staff of approximately 170 and Civilian Response Corps of approximately 900.

To provide trained and ready interagency civilians for reconstruction and stabilization operations, in 2006 S/CRS established the Civilian Response Corps (CRC), which consists of two components: an active component (CRC-A) of full-time “first responders” who are trained and ready to deploy for up to a year within 48 hours of notification, and a standby component (CRC-S) of interagency personnel who can deploy within 30 days of notification. The personnel for the CRC currently come from eight federal departments and agencies—the State Department, USAID, and the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Homeland Security, Justice, Treasury, and Health and Human Services.

Staffing the CRC has been a slow process, because Congress did not make direct funding available to establish, train, and equip the CRC until fiscal year 2009. By August 2007, CRC-A had eleven trained volunteers and CRC-S has about 300 trained volunteers. By 2008, CRC-A increased to 33 personnel. By the end of 2009, CRC-A had reached 78 members, while CRC-S expanded to 554 members, with Congressional funding available to increase the active corps to
250 members and the standby corps to 2,000.\textsuperscript{30} During 2009, 177 CRC personnel deployed to seventeen reconstruction and stabilization activities in Africa, Latin America, and Central and East Asia.\textsuperscript{31} While the CRC has not yet grown to the goals set in 2009, on 16 April 2010, the State Department announced that the active corps had reached 100 active members, while the standby corps had reached 800 members.\textsuperscript{32} S/CRS has plans, but does not yet have funding, for a third tier of the CRC, a reserve corps (CRC-R). The reserve corps would consist of trained and ready civilian professionals from outside the federal government possessing expertise not readily found in the U.S. government—such as local governance, policing, and municipal administration—and would be prepared to deploy within 45-60 days of notification.\textsuperscript{33}

**U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)**

USAID is the USG’s lead agency in providing foreign aid humanitarian assistance and supporting development, and democracy around the world. While USAID is nominally an independent federal agency, since the 1999 reorganization of U.S. foreign affairs agencies,\textsuperscript{34} USAID receives general direction and overall foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State, and the USAID Administrator holds a rank equivalent to a Deputy Secretary of State.

Development is a key piece of the USG’s capabilities overseas, in peacetime, in disaster operations, and in post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization operations. The State Department often speaks of better coordinating the “three Ds” of diplomacy, development, and defense. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently said, “Development must become an equal pillar of our foreign policy, alongside defense and diplomacy, led by a robust and reinvigorated [USAID].”\textsuperscript{35}

However, USAID’s resources and capacity to provide personnel to interagency coordination cells or assist other agencies in planning and operations is very limited. The agency’s worldwide
staff in Washington plus over 100 offices around the world consists of only about 1,100 Foreign Service Officers, another 1,100 civil service employees, and an additional 5,000 foreign nationals serving with USAID offices overseas. Because USAID is so small, it often relies on contractors, NGOs, and international organizations to carry out even its core responsibilities. Ambassador (Retired) David Litt said, “USAID’s cadre of Foreign Service Officers is so miniscule that the agency no longer has the organic expertise in health, education, and agriculture that it once enjoyed. It now relies on the private sector to fill that need without adequate policy and programmatic supervision.” Recognizing this, Secretary of State Clinton said in January 2010, “For too long, we’ve relied on contractors . . . and we have diminished our own . . . institutional capacities. This must change. . . . USAID and the State Department must have the staff, the expertise, and the resources to design, implement, and evaluate our programs.”

Secretary Clinton says USAID must have the capability to coordinate U.S. development activities across Washington and in the field, a capability which is currently lacking. Clinton stated, “You have all the other agencies who are providing assistance of some sort or another. It’s not coordinated at the country level and it is certainly not coordinated at the national level or the international level.” Clinton described her travel to U.S. missions abroad, saying:

We . . . have to have better coordination on the whole-of-government front. I have been in countries where I’ve asked to see everybody doing any development, and the ambassador nicely invites people that are on a list given to him or her. He or she has never met the people, has no idea who they are or what they do, and even more, the people themselves have never met each other.

USAID has three offices under its Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance which are particularly relevant to civil-military coordination between USAID and the military: the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), the Office of Transition Initiatives
(OTI), and the Office of Military Affairs (OMA). USAID’s organizational structure is shown in Figure 8.

![USAID Organizational Chart](image)

Since 1964, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has been charged with both providing and coordinating the USG interagency provision of humanitarian assistance to natural disasters and emergencies abroad, with a focus on immediate needs such as saving lives, reducing suffering, and mitigating the economic and social impacts of disasters. OFDA has approximately 250 permanent staff and consultants, which is quite large for a USAID organization. When the USG interagency response includes the U.S. military, such as the 2004 Asian tsunami or the 2010 Haitian earthquake, OFDA “may” send a liaison officer to either the
headquarters of the relevant combatant command or to the military command in the field to coordinate the OFDA and military activities in response to the disaster.\textsuperscript{42}

USAID created the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) in 1994 “to support U.S. foreign policy objectives by helping local partners advance peace and democracy in priority countries in crisis.”\textsuperscript{43} OTI typically works in 10-12 countries each year and focuses on short-term (2-3 year) assistance in areas such as post-conflict reconciliation, re-starting local economies, and developing independent local media. OTI is very small, with a staff of fewer than 50 personnel and an annual budget of about $50M (less than one half of one percent of the USAID budget), though it also receives funds from other sources, such as supplemental appropriations for Iraq and DoD’s Section 1207 funds.\textsuperscript{44} OTI’s largest total funding to date was $226 million in fiscal year 2004. With the limited number of full-time staff, OTI hires a large number of contractors to round out its necessary personnel pool.\textsuperscript{45} James Stephenson, head of USAID’s Iraq Mission in 2006, says synergy between USAID’s OTI personnel and the military in post-conflict operations is critical, but has been difficult to achieve because it is so hard to provide the right USAID experts in the conflict zone due to the very small number of personnel available.\textsuperscript{46}

In 2005, USAID established the Office of Military Affairs (OMA) to improve coordination between USAID and the military for doctrine development, planning, and execution of joint endeavors, such as providing humanitarian relief after natural disasters, strengthening fragile states such as Afghanistan, supporting underdeveloped strategic states such as Pakistan, and addressing global strategic issues such as the Global War on Terror. Speaking shortly after OMA’s establishment in October 2005, USAID’s Assistant Administrator for the Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance Michael Hess said, “Since post-conflict reconstruction is a pillar of the U.S. national security strategy, it is imperative for USAID to have
an operational link with the military on how to better coordinate strategic development goals.”47

OMA is very small, with a staff of approximately sixteen personnel, including advisors posted with the Geographic Combatant Commands.48

U.S. Embassies

In most countries with which the U.S. has diplomatic relations, the U.S. has an embassy headed by an ambassador and staffed with State Department personnel as well as personnel from many other U.S. agencies, which together make up the embassy “country team.” Dr Gabriel Marcella characterizes the country team as “a miniature replica of the Washington interagency.”49 Today, personnel from approximately 45 USG agencies are represented at one or more embassies abroad, and these personnel often outnumber the State Department personnel at the embassy. According to Ambassador Louis Nigro, “State employees make up just over one-third of the staff at U.S. Government posts worldwide.”50

In this environment, interagency coordination and unity of effort can be difficult for the ambassador to achieve. The Center for the Study of the Presidency’s Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) study team notes, “Representatives from different agencies often pursue their organizational interests at the expense of a broader, integrated approach,”51 and former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice testified to Congress that it has “become an almost impossible task of coordinating massive numbers of agencies on the ground.”52

In an effort to aid the ambassador in achieving interagency unity of effort, since the Kennedy administration, every U.S. ambassador receives a letter of appointment from the President which makes the ambassador the personal emissary of the President and charges the ambassador “to exercise full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all executive branch officers in (name of country), except for personnel under the command of a
However, many observers contend there is too much ambiguity in the authority given to the ambassador. The PNSR study team notes other agencies often view the ambassador as a State Department representative rather than a Presidential representative, and the letter of appointment does not clearly establish the ambassador’s authority over the interagency country team, so other agencies sometimes contend the ambassador is attempting to assert authority over them that he does not have.

In the area of country-level civil-military coordination, the letter gives the ambassador authority over U.S. military personnel in the country except those under COCOM authority. Dr John Fishel, who has written extensively on civil-military relations, says this exception applies only when “major U.S. military operations are being conducted in the country” and does not apply to security assistance or military exercises. However, Geographic Combatant Commanders have not always interpreted the authority this way and have sometimes claimed authority over peacetime military activities in the host nation. Marcella says the ambiguity requires the ambassador and COCOM (or their bosses the Secretaries of State and Defense) to work together to agree on specific issues of control over U.S. military personnel in the country.

U.S. Regional Missions

While the majority of U.S. embassies and ambassadors serve bilateral relations between the U.S. and a single foreign state, the U.S. has a small number of regional missions which conduct multilateral diplomatic relations with several regional states. Currently, the U.S. has diplomatic missions to the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization of American States (OAS), and the African Union (AU), and is in the process of establishing a mission with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
The U.S. has had diplomatic relations with the European Union and its forerunners since 1953, and has had a permanent U.S. Mission in Brussels, Belgium, since 1961. This U.S. Mission to the EU is led by an ambassador and includes representatives from the Departments of State, Agriculture, Commerce, Homeland Security, Treasury, Justice, and Defense, as well as USAID and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. Also in Europe, the U.S. has a Mission to NATO in Brussels and a Mission to the OSCE in Vienna, Austria, both led by ambassadors. The U.S. Mission to NATO includes personnel from the Departments of Defense and State, and the U.S. Mission to the OSCE has a team of more than 30 staffers from the State Department, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the joint Congressional/Executive Branch Commission on Security Cooperation in Europe.

In the Americas, the U.S. has a Mission to the Organization of American States. Because the OAS is headquartered in Washington, DC, the U.S. Mission to the OAS is also located in Washington. The U.S. Mission is headed by an ambassador and supported by representatives drawn largely from the State Department’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs.

In Africa, the U.S. has a Mission to the African Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The mission is headed by an ambassador and includes representatives from State, USAID, and the Department of Defense, including military officers serving as liaisons from AFRICOM and CJTF-HOA.

In Asia, the U.S. is in the process of establishing a permanent U.S. Mission to ASEAN in Jakarta, Indonesia, to be headed by an ambassador. In July 2009, Secretary of State Clinton announced plans to open the Mission, and President Obama in November 2009 announced his expectation that the first U.S. representative to the new mission would be in place by the middle
of 2010. On 25 January, 2010, the U.S. announced the arrival of the first officer to the Mission, acting as the Resident Representative of the U.S. Ambassador for ASEAN Affairs. 61

**The National Security Council’s Role in Regional Interagency Unity of Effort**

This section briefly describes the National Security Council (NSC). Established by the National Security Act of 1947, the NSC provides the President with a national, strategic-level forum for interagency coordination of foreign policy and national security issues. While the NSC is a national-level strategic body and not a regional-level body, because most executive branch agencies lack regional-level staff organizations, the NSC’s regional-level policy committees are sometimes called upon to fill a staffing gap between policies at the strategic level and execution in the field.

The four statutory members of the NSC are the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense, and the two statutory advisors to the NSC are the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of National Intelligence. President Obama added the Secretary of Energy as a statutory member of his NSC and the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the U.S. representative to the United Nations, the President’s Chief of Staff and the National Security Advisor as additional members. Still more members attend if the agenda includes economic issues, homeland security or counterterrorism-related issues, or science and technology-related issues. 62 Meeting without the President, the cabinet secretaries are referred to as the Principals Committee (PC) and a gathering of their deputy secretaries as the Deputies Committee (DC).

Below the PC and DC in President Obama’s NSC are the Interagency Policy Committees (IPCs), each chaired by an under secretary or assistant secretary from an executive-branch agency, which manage “the development and implementation of national security policies by
multiple agencies of the United States Government.”63 The IPCs are “the main day-to-day fora for interagency coordination of national security policy,” which could be aligned by mission or function or by geographic area, and provide policy analysis for the DC and PC. The IPCs replace President George W. Bush’s Policy Coordination Committees (PCCs).64 However, the Project on National Security Reform’s September 2009 report on interagency reform says the IPC approach may fail to produce optimal, coordinated policies because each IPC representative comes from a home agency or department and is generally inclined to protect the home agency’s turf or equities at the expense of broader interagency unity of effort.65

The President appoints a National Security Advisor, who is not subject to Congressional confirmation, to support the work of the NSC and coordinate the activities of the National Security Council staff. The National Security Advisor and NSC staff work directly for the President; the cabinet principals on the National Security Council have no authority over the National Security Advisor or NSC staff.66 The NSC staff does both the daily and long-term integration and coordination of national security and foreign policy across the U.S. government. The NSC staff is frequently pulled in two different directions. On the one hand, it is asked to be an interagency coordinating body, while on the other hand, it has sometimes been called upon by the President to take policy control over an issue or to direct and/or monitor policy execution in a given area.67 Following the 1986 Iran-Contra scandal, the Tower Commission’s report on the incident strongly cautioned that the NSC staff and National Security Advisor should not be engaged in operations or the implementation of policy, as happened during Iran-Contra.68

While it seems that the NSC should be an ideal entity to ensure interagency coordination at the strategic, national level, many say the NSC often fails to produce coordination in practice. For example, former CENTCOM Commander General (Retired) Anthony Zinni, U.S. Marine
Corps, wrote, “In Washington, there is no one place, agency, or force that directs interagency cooperation. The only such cooperation is on an ad hoc, person-to-person or group-to-group basis. So if you have a problem like putting Iraq back together after Saddam . . . there’s nowhere to start.” Similarly, American Forces Press Service journalist Jim Garamone, interviewing JCS Vice Chairman Marine General Peter Pace, wrote, “It’s after the president makes a decision that the process slows up. Each department or agency takes its share of the mission and goes back into its ‘stovepipe’ to do the work.” Pace goes on to say that “there is no one below the president ensuring the agencies work together.”

Other Interagency Examples

While the National Security Council is in theory the only necessary body for interagency foreign policy and national security coordination in Washington, highly-visible failures of interagency coordination have led to the creation of other interagency entities in Washington outside the NSC, from new federal agencies, to mission-oriented interagency “centers,” to mission-focused “czars” or special envoys. However, Michael Donley, who is currently the Secretary of the Air Force, cautions that these “new organizations and activities are being created piecemeal, so far without discussion of the broader interagency framework in which they operate.” While these organizations largely exist at the national, strategic level in Washington, it is worth briefly describing why and how they were created and how they are structured.

DHS and ODNI

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established after 9/11 in response to the perceived failings among the many executive branch agencies with roles in homeland security. The creation of DHS brought together the homeland security activities of more than forty
separate agencies under one new agency. DHS was initially established by executive order on 8 October 2001 as the Office of Homeland Security and DHS was formally established in law as a new federal agency on 25 November 2002.72

Similarly, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) was established in response to the 9/11 Commission’s identified failures of separate U.S. intelligence agencies to coordinate terrorist threat information prior to the 9/11 attacks. In response to the Commission’s findings and recommendations, Congress in December 2004 passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which established ODNI, saying “interagency coordination of intelligence should be and is a significant and complex function unto itself and should be separated from management of the CIA or any other particular agency.”73

National “Centers”

Since 1994, national “centers” have been established for counterintelligence, critical infrastructure protection, and counterterrorism. These interagency entities are located and funded in a specified lead agency and staffed by personnel detailed from other agencies. They have been created by executive order, though two were subsequently codified in legislation.74

The National Counterintelligence Center was established in 1994 by executive order at the CIA, staffed by senior counterintelligence and other specialists from across the national security and intelligence communities, to improve interagency counterintelligence activities in response the CIA and FBI’s failure to discover long-time spy Aldrich Ames. In 2002, Congress codified the organization into law, aligning it under the new ODNI and renaming it the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive.75

The National Infrastructure Protection Center was established in 1998 by executive order at the FBI, in response to a 1997 report from the President’s Council on Infrastructure Protection.
Interagency staffing for the center comes from the FBI, the intelligence community, Defense, Transportation, and Energy, as well as a public-private partnership with private corporations who own much of the U.S. critical national infrastructure.76

The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) was initially established by the President in January 2003 as the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, and was re-established as the NCTC by executive order in August 2004 and codified into law in December 2004 in the same law which created the ODNI. Aligned under the ODNI, NCTC combined counterterrorist elements from the intelligence, homeland security, law enforcement, and defense communities. The NCTC fuses and analyzes all-source intelligence on terrorism, maintains a shared database and systems for interagency counterterrorist information sharing, and functions as the operational planner and coordinator for interagency counterterrorism operations across the USG, assigning operational responsibilities to lead agencies.77

The Project on National Security Reform’s study team assessed in September 2009 that the NCTC “represents one of the most mature interagency planning models in the U.S. government today.” However, because NCTC lacks formal authority over the participating departments and agencies, bureaucratic resistance creates barriers to the development of true whole-of-government strategic and operational counterterrorism plans, so “unity of effort remains an elusive goal.” The participating agencies have their own “deeply institutionalized” counterterrorism policies and process, so they often avoid following an integrated strategy which runs counter to their own institutional processes, resulting in frustration, and attempts “to achieve their individual objectives using their existing authorities, rather than attempting to develop partnerships and cooperative arrangements with other departments in a harmonized and integrated approach.”78
Policy “Czars” and Special Envoys

President Obama, like many presidents before him, has delegated responsibility for interagency coordination and implementation of several foreign policy matters to “czars,” who report either to the President, the National Security Advisor, or the Secretary of State (see Table 1). The Project on National Security Reform’s 2009 study on interagency reform characterizes czars as “an established, if often unsatisfactory approach” because “the czars’ abilities to coordinate policy and strategy vary widely” and because they are ad hoc additions to the system.79

Table 1. Obama Administration Foreign Policy “Czars”80

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Official Title</th>
<th>Incumbent</th>
<th>Reports to</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Director of the Office of National AIDS Policy</td>
<td>Jeffrey Crowley</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for the Central Region</td>
<td>Dennis Ross</td>
<td>National Security Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White House coordinator for Weapons of Mass Destruction, Security and Arms Control</td>
<td>Gary Samore</td>
<td>National Security Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Envoy for Climate Change</td>
<td>Todd Stern</td>
<td>Secretary of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Envoy for Middle East Peace</td>
<td>George Mitchell</td>
<td>Secretary of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Envoy to the Organization of the Islamic Conference</td>
<td>Rashad Hussain</td>
<td>Secretary of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Envoy to Sudan</td>
<td>Scott Gration</td>
<td>Secretary of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan</td>
<td>Richard Holbrooke</td>
<td>Secretary of State</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Recently, some czars have constructed interagency support staffs drawn from the departments and agencies relevant to their missions, which may help produce better interagency
coordination, because an agency may be more willing to support the czar’s policies if representatives from that agency helped develop them. This would both produce a more coordinated policy and require less direct dispute resolution from the President. The Special Envoy to Sudan is a good example of this new approach, as well as some of the drawbacks of the czar system in general. Special Envoy Gration has built an interagency support staff, which has arguably contributed to recent U.S. successes in brokering settlements to the crises in Sudan after many years of no success. However, there are still several drawbacks, which are similar to the limitations of the Interagency Policy Committee model at the National Security Council. First, while Special Envoy Gration officially reports to the Secretary of State, he also can report directly to the President, which can overburden the President with crisis management at the expense of strategic leadership. Second, Special Envoy Gration has no formal authority to compel interagency collaboration. Third, the Special Envoy has limited control over funds or resources outside his lead agency.

**Summary of Non-Military Interagency Structures**

As this chapter has shown, the civilian side of the U.S. government has several organizations and structures which play key roles in interagency unity of effort for planning and implementing U.S. foreign policy at the regional level. However, none of the current structures provide all of the desired attributes described in the first chapter of this study.

The regional bureaus at the State Department provide interagency policy coordination at the strategic level in Washington, but are much less influential at the operational level. The Assistant Secretaries of State who head the regional bureaus are staff officers who provide support to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and the Secretary of State, not
commanders like the military’s Geographic Combatant Commanders, so these regional Assistant Secretaries do not have the authority to compel interagency unity of effort at the regional level.

The State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization has established a good model for strategic, operational, and tactical interagency unity of effort for planning and execution, but this model is limited to reconstruction and stabilization operations. Also, because the office has only recently received sufficient funding from Congress, and because the model has not yet been fully used in a real-world operation, there is as yet no track record to judge whether S/CRS’s construct and concepts will produce the desired level of interagency unity of effort even in its assigned mission area.

State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and the U.S. Agency for International Development both provide critical capabilities to America’s civil-military national security and foreign policy team, but neither plays a leading role in coordinating interagency planning and execution. Thus, the U.S. needs these offices on the team, but should not look to them to take a leading role in an improved interagency structure.

At America’s embassies around the world, each ambassador has de jure authority over all U.S. interagency actors in the country, including the military (except when the military is conducting “major military operations” in the country), which should produce a high degree of interagency unity of effort at the country level. However, the ambassador does not always have de facto control, as the military Geographic Combatant Commander or civilian agencies in Washington sometimes work directly with their agency’s counterparts in the country rather than working through the ambassador. Even when the ambassador achieves a high degree of control over the U.S. activities in his or her assigned country, there is no mechanism to ensure unity of effort with the other U.S. ambassadors in the region.
America’s regional missions conduct multilateral diplomacy, unifying U.S. civil-military engagement with a handful of regional IGOs, such as NATO, the EU, and the AU. However these regional U.S. missions are in no way regional headquarters like the military’s GCCs. The staff at each regional U.S. mission is much smaller than a GCC staff, and the ambassador at each mission is focused only on engagement with the specified IGO; the ambassador has no regional synchronization role or any authority over the other U.S. ambassadors in the region.

In Washington, the NSC is a strategic-level interagency policy coordinating body which has occasionally been tasked to synchronize and monitor policy execution, sometimes with negative results. Even when the results are positive, placing too much execution responsibility in the NSC staff risks overburdening the White House and distracting from the NSC’s primary role in strategic policy formulation and coordination.

The new Department of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of National Intelligence were both created by Act of Congress to unify America’s homeland security and intelligence organizations, in response to perceived failures of interagency coordination leading up to the 9/11 attacks. In many ways, the creation of these two new organizations mirrors the reorganization of the Department of Defense mandated by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, which created today’s successful U.S. joint military team. Some interagency reform advocates believe similar legislation may be required to achieve interagency unity of effort for regional-level foreign policy planning and execution.83

The national centers for counterintelligence, infrastructure protection, and counterterrorism are three recent examples organizations established to improve interagency unity of effort in a specific mission area. Two of these three centers (counterintelligence and counterterrorism) are codified in law, making them effectively permanent and providing a better chance of sufficient,
continuous funding. These centers have generated successes in their mission areas which probably would not have occurred if each participating agency had been working separately, but these constructs still do not provide their directors with a level of authority commensurate with their assigned responsibilities. Thus, while these centers provide some lessons for interagency reform, these constructs still fall short of providing the leader with the authority required to execute his interagency responsibilities.

Finally, the President has assigned mission-specific interagency coordination and implementation for some issues to Presidential Special Envoys. In some cases, these envoys have assembled interagency staffs to assist them in their missions and to provide a point of entry to the various agencies required for the mission. While these envoys can achieve successes with sufficient backing from the President and/or key cabinet secretaries, these envoys have no formal, legal authority to compel interagency unity of effort. Absent some level of formal authority, these ad hoc constructs risk overburdening the White House or the cabinet secretary assigned to support their activities.

In summary, none of the currently available civilian structures appear to be able to produce the desired level of interagency unity of effort for the planning and execution of U.S foreign policy at the regional level. The next chapter will provide some examples of shortfalls in unity of effort in current and recent operations, from peacetime to war, providing further evidence that the current interagency structures leave room for improvement.

Notes

Notes


5 Mark L. Curry, The Interagency Process in Regional Foreign Policy (Ft Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 5 May 1994), 6-7.


7 United States Joint Forces Command, Commander’s Handbook for the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (USJFCOM Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Innovation & Experimentation Directorate, 1 March 2007), IV-5.

8 Curry, The Interagency Process in Regional Foreign Policy, 6.

9 Ibid., 9, 17.

10 Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Andrew J. Shapiro, “Political-Military Affairs: Smart Power Starts Here” (Keynote Address to ComDef 2009, New York City, 9 September 2009), n.p.


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19 Reed, *The Battle Within*, 10; Nigro, “The Department of State and Strategic Integration,” 266.


21 Reed, *The Battle Within*, 10; Nigro, “The Department of State and Strategic Integration,” 266.


27 Ibid., 6-7.


30 Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, United States Department of State, *2009 Year in Review*, 6, 8.

31 Ibid., 6, 14-15.

32 United States Department of State, “Civilian Response Corps Reaches 100 Active Members” n.p.
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36 Nigro, “The Department of State and Strategic Integration,” 276.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
42 Ibid., 11-12.
44 United States Agency for International Development, Office of Transition Initiatives, 2, 6-7, 14. United States Agency for International Development, “Transition Initiatives,” http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/transition_initiatives/, n.p. In Section 1207 of the FY 2006 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress authorized the DoD to transfer up to $100 million per year to the Secretary of State for “reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance to a foreign country.” This assistance can be in the form of either services or funds. Congress then reauthorized this authority in Section 1210 of the FY 2008 Defense Authorization Act. These funds have hence been informally referred to as “Section 1207 funds.”
45 Ibid.
50 Nigro, “The Department of State and Strategic Integration,” 260-261.
51 Project on National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield (Arlington, VA: Center for the Study of the Presidency, November 2008), 40.
52 Condoleezza Rice, quoted in Project on National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield, 40.
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63 Ibid., 4.

64 Ibid., 5.

65 Project on National Security Reform, Turning Ideas into Action, 116.


67 Marcella, “Understanding the Interagency Process,” 15. See also Christopher L. Naler “Are We Ready for an Interagency Combatant Command?” Joint Force Quarterly (no. 41, 2nd Quarter 2006), 27.


71 Michael Donley, Rethinking the Interagency System, Occasional Paper #05-01 (McLean, VA: Hicks & Associates, March 2005), 5. Michael Donley is currently the Secretary of the Air Force. Donley’s 30 years of government service have included positions as a professional staff member on the Senate Armed Services Committee, five years on the National Security Council Staff, and positions in both the Department of the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. While on the NSC staff, Donley coordinated White House policy on the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act and both conceived and
organized the President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management. While serving as a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Defense Analyses, he was a senior consultant to the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces and participated in two studies on the organization of the Joint Staff and the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. United States Air Force, “Biography, Michael B. Donley,” http://www.af.mil/information/bios/bio_print.asp?bioID=11336&page=1.


73 Donley, Rethinking the Interagency System, 9.

74 Ibid., 3.


77 Donley, Rethinking the Interagency System, 4.

78 Project on National Security Reform, Turning Ideas into Action, 110. In April 2009, NCTC Director Michael Leiter asked PNSR to conduct a comprehensive analysis of NCTC’s Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning and offer recommendations “for removing barriers to enhanced mission effectiveness.”

79 Project on National Security Reform, Turning Ideas into Action, 54.


81 Project on National Security Reform, Turning Ideas into Action, 53-54.

82 Ibid., 115-116.

Chapter 4

The Need for Improvement

The previous chapters provided background on how the U.S. has organized to facilitate strategic and operational civil-military coordination and unity of effort. This chapter will now describe several regional missions which require civil-military unity of effort with a goal of understanding how well the U.S. is meeting its regional civil-military foreign policy and security objectives before we turn in the next chapter to proposed options for reforming the system.

This chapter looks at three main foreign policy and security categories requiring civil-military unity of effort at the regional level: peacetime theater engagement, humanitarian relief operations in the wake of a disaster, and finally military operations. Under peacetime theater engagement, this chapter describes both Theater Security Cooperation and counterterrorism engagement. The disaster operations section briefly describes the response to the 2004 Asian tsunami. Finally, under military operations, this chapter looks at five cases, from the Vietnam War, through two relatively small interventions in Latin America and the Caribbean, to the two major U.S. operations today in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Peacetime Theater Engagement

Theater Security Cooperation

Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) is the term used for programs conducted between the U.S. and partner nations – either bilaterally or on a regional basis – to shape the future security environment in ways favorable to U.S. interests. TSC activities promote partner nation military interoperability with U.S. forces, build and strengthen defense partnerships, build more capable and professional militaries in friendly countries, enhance U.S. influence with the partner nation, and provide access for U.S. forces in or through the partner nation, when required. The Secretary of Defense identifies TSC objectives; the OSD staff, Joint Staff, service staffs, and GCCs develop regional and country-specific TSC plans; and the GCCs largely take the lead in executing the program, with support from the State Department’s Political-Military Bureau and the interagency U.S. embassy country teams.¹ Albert Zaccor at the Atlantic Council of the United States cautions that TSC objectives and programs should be strictly limited to “specific enumerated defense and security objectives and assistance to foreign establishments playing a role in national security or defense” to avoid the temptation to define TSC so broadly that it becomes “a surrogate for foreign policy.”²

In addition to the TSC objectives identified by the Secretary of Defense, the GCCs may execute additional peacetime theater engagement activities under the heading of “Phase Zero” or “shaping” activities. This refers to the military’s planned phases for a military operation, which, according to current Joint Doctrine, are: Phase 0 – “shape,” Phase I – “deter,” Phase II – “seize the initiative,” Phase III – “dominance,” Phase IV – “stabilization,” and Phase V – “enabling civil authority.”³ The word “shaping” has come to mean almost any activity which might prepare the U.S. for a future contingency operation, leading to both perceived and real overlaps
with State’s diplomatic and USAID’s developmental goals and programs. Programs under the
heading of “Phase Zero” activities should in theory be limited to activities which are specifically
spelled out in approved operational plans and should be coordinated with the State Department at
both the Washington and Embassy levels, but for reasons of operational security, this is not
always done, leading to some theater engagements taking place outside the interagency TSC
model.

The TSC program was initiated in 1997 by President Clinton and Defense Secretary William
Cohen, evolving during the period of “strategic ambiguity” after the Cold War, while the concept
of “shaping” under Phase Zero of a military operational plan (OPLAN) dates to evolutions in
U.S. joint military doctrine sometime after 2001. In the early years of the program,
coordination between State and Defense was severely limited – DoD’s TSC plans were not
shared outside DoD until they had been reviewed and approved by the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense – offering no opportunity for unity of effort in the
development of the plans. This has improved in recent years as the Geographic Combatant
Commands have developed mechanisms to get earlier interagency input in the TSC planning
process, as described in Chapter 2.

The funding for TSC activities traditionally comes from two sources: Title 10, U.S. Code,
which funds military activities, and Title 22, U.S. Code, which funds programs controlled by the
State Department but administered by the DoD’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency
(DSCA). A broad range of activities is funded by Title 22, including foreign military sales (the
largest security assistance program in terms of funding), foreign military financing, foreign
internal defense, international military education and training, and peacekeeping operations. The Government Accountability Office says the proportion of foreign assistance funded by the
State Department and executed by DoD increased from 7% of official development assistance in 2001 to an estimated 20% in 2006.9

Thomas E. Johnson Jr., a Foreign Service Officer who served as a USAID program officer in Kabul, says, “The military’s ‘mission creep’ into the Foreign Service lanes seems to be happening without sufficient thought, planning or coordination.”10 For example, the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), “intended to enable commanders to ‘respond to humanitarian relief and reconstruction within their areas of responsibility by carrying out programs that will immediately assist the . . . population’” is instead often used for long-term projects, which, together with the other challenges described in the previous chapter, impedes USAID’s ability to maximize unity of effort in developmental assistance.11

Beginning in fiscal year 2006, Congress provided an additional source of TSC funding directly to DoD called “Section 1206” funding, named after Section 1206 of the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act, which gave DoD both the funding and authority to train and equip foreign police forces and militaries at the direction of the President, requiring only that DoD “coordinate” with State in the implementation of these programs.12 In 2009, the GAO reported that DoD and State “had developed a coordinated process for jointly reviewing and selecting project proposals,” noting that while coordination between the Geographic Combatant Commands and U.S. embassies “did not occur consistently” in 2007, “officials reported better coordination in the formulation of fiscal year 2007 proposals.”13 In 2006, this Section 1206 funding was $200M, increasing to $300M in 2007 and 2008, and to about $350M in 2009 and 2010, with an administration request for $490M in 2011.14 This Section 1206 funding further increases the proportion of U.S. foreign assistance provided to countries by DoD rather than State, which puts an increasingly military face on U.S. foreign assistance.15
A 2006 Senate Foreign Relations Committee report finds the additional funding for military involvement in theater engagement has led to increased U.S. military presence in embassies and elsewhere in partner countries. This leads to increased personnel support requirements on an already overburdened embassy and contributes to blurred lines of authority between State and Defense that can hamper interagency unity of effort at the country level. At the same time, State Department funding and personnel were cut for several years, leading to capability gaps which “a well-funded DoD” stepped in to fill. Additionally, some host countries have expressed concern over the increased role of the U.S. military in addressing non-military problems, such as building schools and drilling water wells. Ethiopia, for example, ordered a U.S. military civil affairs team that had been conducting just such development projects out of the country to prevent any perception the U.S. military was taking sides in regional disputes, possibly leading to cross-border hostilities. Testimony on the creation of AFRICOM during Congressional hearings in the summer of 2007 echoed many of the same concerns.

However, while there are concerns the military is taking the lead role in security-related engagements, current organizational structures focus the State Department on bilateral relationships, while the military’s Geographic Combatant Commands lead DoD to take a more theater-level perspective. DoD argues this regional-level perspective is often key to ensuring U.S. interagency unity of effort and coordination with other U.S. partners working toward compatible goals in the host countries throughout the region. Looking at EUCOM as an example, Rear Admiral Hamlin Tallent, who was then serving as EUCOM’s Director of Operations, testified to Congress in 2005, “EUCOM’s TSC strategy is derived from regional priority and policy themes stated in the Secretary of Defense’s Security Cooperation Guidance."
EUCOM has taken a *regional* approach that links individual country objectives to *broader theater goals*” (emphasis added).19

Some examples of regional initiatives conducted by EUCOM include the Africa Clearinghouse, which “brought thirteen African countries together with NATO, the United Nations, and the European Union;” the Southeast Europe Clearinghouse which “is open to all NATO, European Union, and partner countries (Russia and Ukraine specifically) that have engagement programs in Southeastern Europe” (the former Yugoslavia); and the South Caucasus Clearinghouse which “focuses on defense reform, energy security, maritime security, disaster response, peacekeeping, and training and education” and which provides “a forum for EUCOM, our European partners, and international organizations like NATO and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to coordinate security cooperation programs with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.”20 All of these Clearinghouse activities are run from EUCOM’s headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. Taking the Africa Clearinghouse as an example, Rear Admiral Tallent testified that EUCOM created the clearinghouse because “we were finding . . . when we were down in Africa we [the U.S. and its European allies] were fumbling around over each other. We would go in and train a group in Ghana, let us say, only to find out the French had trained them the year before, the same group, so we were duplicating efforts. It was just insane.”21 As part of the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative, EUCOM in late 2004 or early 2005 brought together the chiefs of defense from the African countries in the Trans-Sahara region, which according to Rear Admiral Tallent, “was the first time they had ever met each other.”22
Counterterrorism Engagement

Another key area of security engagement between the U.S. and partner nations is in the area of counterterrorism, particularly after 9/11. U.S. counterterrorist engagements involve many interagency players – State, Defense, USAID, law enforcement and intelligence agencies, Commerce, Treasury, and others. In 2005, U.S. Representative Edward Royce, who chairs the House International Relations’ Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation, stated:

While [military] train and equip programming is important, combating terrorism requires many tools, including development assistance and diplomacy. The potential implications of security assistance include its impact on the rule of law and on human rights, and these need to be constantly considered. . . . A good public relations campaign must be waged, too. When we are sending troops into countries, even just to train, it is critical that we couple it with a very good explanation, an explanation that will resonate with the locals, of what we are doing and why we are doing it.23

One example of a U.S. counterterrorist engagement program is the interagency program to counter terrorism in the Trans-Sahara region of northern Africa called the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. The State Department’s regional Bureau of African Affairs is the USG’s program lead, and other key players include USAID, DoD, and other elements of the State Department. However, interagency unity of effort remains a challenge. In a 2008 study, the GAO concluded that these agencies “had not developed a comprehensive, integrated strategy for the program’s implementation.”24 The GAO found, “The State Department, USAID, and DoD had developed separate plans related to their respective program activities that reflect some interagency collaboration . . . however, these plans did not incorporate all of the desirable characteristics” for interagency unity of effort.25

The GAO also found that “roles and responsibilities—particularly between the State Department and DoD—were unclear with regard to authority over DoD personnel temporarily
assigned to conduct certain program activities in African countries.” For example, in 2007 the DoD suspended most of its counterterrorist activities in Niger after the U.S. ambassador limited the number of DoD personnel who could enter the country. While the DoD was highly critical of the ambassador’s ruling, the ambassador was considering the larger diplomatic issue of the country’s fragile political environment, as well as the small U.S. embassy’s lack of ability to support the large DoD contingent.

Additionally, the GAO found interagency coordination between State and the U.S. law enforcement community was also lacking, saying:

[T]he State Department office responsible for coordinating law enforcement agencies’ role in combating terrorism had not developed or implemented an overarching plan to use the combined capabilities of U.S. law enforcement agencies to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. Additionally, the national strategies related to this effort lacked clearly defined roles and responsibilities.

In one unnamed country the GAO visited while conducting its study, “Lack of clear roles and responsibilities led two law enforcement agencies, which were unknowingly working with different foreign law enforcement agencies, to move in on the same subject. According to foreign and U.S. law enforcement officials, such actions may have compromised other investigations.” The GAO also reported, “Because the national strategies related to this effort did not clarify specific roles, among other issues, law enforcement agencies were not being fully used abroad to protect U.S. citizens and interests from future terrorist attacks.”

The State Department office in Washington responsible for ensuring interagency coordination in developing, coordinating, and implementing U.S. counterterrorism policy is the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. Mr William Pope, Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism, told Congress in March 2005, “In Washington, the Secretary of State, with assistance from my office, must continue to coordinate overseas counterterrorism assistance. In our missions
overseas, the more nuanced work of ensuring collaboration among various members of the
country team is and must remain the responsibility of the Chief of Mission.” However, the
necessary coordination is often not occurring. EUCOM’s Admiral Tallent told Congress at the
same March 2005 hearing that whole-of-government cooperation on counterterrorism is “one of
the greatest challenges we have. . . . A sanctuary that we offer [terrorists] is our inability to work
in an interagency approach in the time required to get the job done.” Admiral Tallent noted
that there are a number of challenges to effective civil-military unity of effort in counterterrorism
engagement, saying the “State Department does not have the same mechanisms and doctrine for
planning that we have.” Admiral Tallent continued, saying, “There are some culture problems.
There are some tool/equipment problems. There are procedural problems. All of this together is
stifling our ability, I think, to do very quick interagency agreed-upon plans in this fight on
terrorism.”

Response to Disaster or Humanitarian Crisis

After the Cold War, when deterrence of the Soviet Union was no longer the U.S. military’s
primary raison d’être, the military’s evolution to other missions led to an increasing emphasis on
using the military in the U.S. response to a foreign disaster or humanitarian crisis. Over time, the
U.S. military has developed a great deal of institutional expertise in humanitarian relief, and
many of the military’s exercises, such as PACOM’s bilateral Cobra Gold exercise with the Thai
military, have humanitarian relief components. In 1995, the military began leading a series of
interagency exercises and discussions in an attempt to create a standing U.S. concept for
interagency response to such events, but no such consistent model has been developed.

Media reporting on any recent U.S. response to a disaster or humanitarian crisis tends to
focus on the military portion of the response, despite the fact that USAID’s Office of Foreign
Disaster Assistance is the lead U.S. agency for responses to such events. However, the military is frequently the first U.S. responder on the scene and responds with vastly more personnel and equipment than any other agency, so it is often the most visible “face” of the U.S. response.

The U.S. response to the 26 December 2004 Asian tsunami provides a good example of the interagency’s current semi-coordinated response to humanitarian crises. The Asian tsunami was a natural disaster which stretched across South Asia and the coast of Africa and required “the largest humanitarian relief and recovery operation the world has ever seen in the wake of a natural disaster.” The U.S. response to the disaster began within hours of the tsunami, though the U.S. government lacked a coherent, formalized, interagency approach, so USAID, the State Department, the military, and other federal agencies each began responding individually, using their own procedures.

The military response to the Asian tsunami disaster came from PACOM, which quickly put its Joint Operations Center (JOC) on 24/7 operations and established a joint task force it called Combined Support Force (CSF) 536 to conduct military humanitarian response operations. While “Combined” in a unit designation generally refers to a coalition military operation, CSF 536 never exercised operational control over other countries’ military forces responding to the disaster in the region, though much of the international military effort relied on the robust command, control, and communications capabilities provided by the American CSF. CSF 536 in turn established subordinate Combined Support Groups (CSGs) for each country in which the U.S. responded with significant military forces, and each CSG supported the ambassador and U.S. country team in that country. At the peak of the operation, over seventeen thousand U.S. military personnel, seventeen ships, and over 170 aircraft participated.
Because many disasters substantially disrupt local transportation and communication infrastructure, one of the most urgent tasks of the relief effort is providing logistics, transportation, and communication. The CSGs executed search and rescue operations, transported and distributed relief supplies, provided emergency transportation, and contributed to the overall assessment of the disaster. As the logistics and transportation infrastructure begins to recover after a disaster, and as the local government, NGOs, and other non-military agencies responding to the disaster reach increasing capability, the military requirement ends relatively early in the response, while other agencies may be engaged for many months or even years.  

USAID also responded quickly to the tsunami. USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance sent Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) to the affected countries, together with “culturally-proficient experts” to act as liaisons with the host government and local population. The first mission of the DARTs was to assess the impact of the disaster in each country so relief assistance could be tailored for each country’s needs and to the ability of the local infrastructure to receive the aid. Because of the vast size of the affected area, OFDA provided some training to U.S. military special operations forces and Marine units so they could augment the DARTs. Additionally, OFDA sent a two-man team to PACOM to act as a liaison between PACOM, OFDA’s headquarters in Washington, and the DART teams in the field.  

In each affected country, the U.S. ambassador acted as the overall coordinator of the U.S. efforts in that country. The embassies had a disaster contingency plan in place for many of the affected countries, which gave the State Department a starting place for their response. When the disaster occurred, the embassies developed disaster relief coordination mechanisms with the host government, other diplomatic missions in the country, and local NGO and international-organization representatives, and the U.S. military. The embassies established Status of Forces
Agreements with the local governments, established smooth flows of information between the U.S. and the host nation, and facilitated the flow of U.S. relief supplies through customs. In each country, the embassy played a leading role in tailoring the U.S. response to the particular requirements of that country, both in terms of the needed response and the method in which the local government would accept foreign assistance.\textsuperscript{40}

To coordinate interagency policy efforts in Washington, the State Department, USAID, and PACOM formed an ad hoc cooperative arrangement, though interagency coordination in Washington was assessed to be less effective in meeting the operational needs of the U.S. response than regional-level coordination. At the regional level, PACOM attempted to provide interagency coordination by establishing a JIACG specifically for the disaster response and separate from PACOM’s standing JIACG (see Chapter 2). The two-man liaison team sent by OFDA to PACOM initially worked in this disaster response JIACG but quickly moved to the PACOM JOC, where they were in a much better position to provide situational awareness to the military and serve in their liaison role with Washington and the OFDA teams in the field. The disaster response JIACG experiment was unsuccessful, as the emergency relief phase was largely over before the new JIACG could get organized. However, the OFDA liaison team was very successful in fostering a high degree of mutual confidence among the U.S. interagency participants and thus led to extensive interagency cooperation in the response operations.\textsuperscript{41}

In summary, the U.S. response to the 2004 Asian tsunami is generally considered a success. The U.S. interagency coordination process worked well at the country level in the various embassies, the regional military response was effective, and USAID’s OFDA played its key role, though coordination of these efforts across the region was ad hoc. For single-country disasters, this may be good enough, but disasters which affect several countries should be addressed with a
regionally-coordinated response. While there is no formal interagency doctrine, process, or organization above the embassy level for U.S. disaster response operations, PACOM’s long experience of humanitarian relief planning, exercises, and operations – many times in concert with local partner countries and other U.S. agencies – in this case provided a starting point for the ad hoc regional interagency response to the disaster.42

**Military Operations**

This study next describes civil-military coordination and unity of effort, or lack thereof, in five conflict operations – the Vietnam War, the 1989-1990 regime change operation in Panama, the 1994 regime change operation in Haiti, and the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. All but the first example took place after the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 brought the military services together in a joint team, and thus provide the best examples of how the current civil-military system works during conflict operations. The Vietnam case is included because of lessons offered by the unique civil-military structure devised to facilitate unity of effort in the counterinsurgency operation.

**Vietnam – 1964-1973**

The initial U.S. involvement in Vietnam occurred entirely within individual agency (as well as individual military service) “stovepipes.” The U.S. military focused first on providing advisors and training to the South Vietnamese military and then on direct military operations. Meanwhile, U.S. civilian agencies – including the State Department, CIA, USAID, Department of Agriculture, and U.S. Information Service – each separately pursued their various agendas, which grew to include many programs we would today call reconstruction and stabilization, as well as counterinsurgency activities such as “pacification.” Each agency operated separately in
Washington, at the military headquarters and the embassy in Saigon, and at the provincial level across South Vietnam. Though the ambassador was nominally in charge of the civilian agencies operating in South Vietnam, he did not have the span of control to effectively supervise and coordinate all the activities which were underway, with their separate agency budgets, lines of authority, and divergent institutional cultures. While the commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command-Vietnam (MACV) met regularly with the ambassador, coordination between the military and civilian efforts was frequently lacking, and neither the MACV Commander nor the ambassador had full authority over U.S. efforts in the country.43

As U.S. involvement continued to expand, programs grew in size and complexity and the initially poor interagency coordination got even worse. In response, the President, Secretary of Defense, and Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that unity of command was required, so in 1967 the U.S. created the Office of Civil Operations and Revolutionary (later “Rural”) Development Support (CORDS).44 The civilian director of CORDS held ambassadorial rank equivalent to a four-star general and exercised control over all interagency assets involved in the counterinsurgency effort. In a significant organization innovation, the CORDS Director was dual-hatted as the MACV Deputy to the Commander for CORDS, placing this civilian third in the U.S. military chain of command in Vietnam, behind the MACV commander and his military deputy.45

This construct represents the first time a U.S. ambassador ever worked in the chain of command under a general officer, and it not only brought together the civilian counterinsurgency operations under a single leader, but it integrated the civilian and military counterinsurgency efforts. Additionally, because of the CORDS Director’s position in the military chain of command, it provided the civilian counterinsurgency leader with regular access to the military
commander and provided the U.S. civilian counterinsurgency effort with access to military personnel, logistics, equipment, and funding. Indeed, the CORDS structure, from the headquarters down through the provinces and hamlets, was an integrated civil-military organization. Richard Stewart, Chief Historian of the U.S. Army Center for Military History, writes:

Military personnel were . . . put in charge of civilians [and] civilians were . . . put in charge of military personnel to create a truly mixed, interagency team based on skills and abilities, not agency loyalty. . . . When a senior civilian was assigned to a key . . . position, almost invariably he had a military assistant reporting to him and the reverse was true when a military officer was in the principal slot. This blending of military and civilian authority included the use of the power of personnel evaluation or rating authority.

While the creation of the integrated civil-military counterinsurgency organization vastly improved interagency unity of effort, developing and maintaining the organization faced significant bureaucratic hurdles. While the military was generally supportive of the CORDS construct, civilian agencies were less so. Stewart writes:

Presidential leadership proved vital in overcoming the single greatest obstacle to mission success—the reluctance of Washington officials and senior leaders in the field to relinquish control over field operations. The State Department . . . resisted the idea that any of its development or pacification assets should fall under a military chain of command, even one headed by a civilian. Even after several broad hints from the [Johnson] administration, a presidential intervention was needed to change their minds.

Once CORDS was established, the CORDS Director had to continually fight Washington-based, bureaucratic attempts to reduce its funding, shrink its structure, limit its scope, and keep additional programs from coming under its control. This bureaucratic resistance to formal interagency command structures is probably the reason we have not seen more structures like CORDS in the decades after Vietnam. While CORDS produced unity of effort through unity of command and solved the problem of resource asymmetries between military and civilian
agencies by providing the civilian agencies with access to military resources as part of the combined organization, the civilian agencies were never comfortable with the arrangement.\textsuperscript{51}

**Panama – Just Cause and Promote Liberty – 1989-1990**

The 1989-1990 U.S. regime change operation against Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega illustrates a lack of unity of effort, particularly in coordinated planning for post-conflict operations. Beginning in 1987, SOUTHCOM developed two contingency plans for Panama, a combat plan (Operation Just Cause) and a post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization plan (Operation Promote Liberty). These plans underwent extensive revision and military analysis in 1988 and 1989, but they were not coordinated with other U.S. agencies.\textsuperscript{52} According to a study by the Defense Science Board, the SOUTHCOM Commander focused his attention on the combat plan, while the post-conflict plan received little attention from senior military officers in either SOUTHCOM or Washington.\textsuperscript{53}

Post-conflict operations primarily involve activities such as law enforcement, re-establishment of civil government, and other important reconstruction and stabilization tasks that are largely outside the military’s core competencies, yet for reasons of operational security, SOUTHCOM prohibited military planners from discussing the Promote Liberty post-conflict plan with the U.S. embassy in Panama, even though the military envisioned that the embassy would take the lead role in post-conflict operations, assuming the U.S. military would run operations in Panama for thirty days after removing Noriega, then turn operations over to the Embassy.\textsuperscript{54} However, as tensions between the U.S. and Panama increased prior to the invasion, the State Department reduced the embassy staff “to a single chargé d’affaires and a couple of clerks,”\textsuperscript{55} but because of the lack of planner-level coordination, the military did not know this.\textsuperscript{56}
Strangely, when the Secretary of State was informed of the post-conflict timeline three days prior to the invasion, he did not object.57

Immediately after the 20 December 1989 invasion, civil authority in Panama collapsed and looting and civil disorder were rampant. On the day of the invasion, the SOUTHCOM Commander placed a SOUTHCOM Civil Military Operations Task Force under control of the U.S. chargé d’affaires at the embassy to try to get the embassy’s country team operational again, but with little immediate effect.58

In January 1990, two meetings were held involving eighteen USG agencies to build the civilian interagency contribution to post-conflict operations in Panama, but the meetings failed to produce an effective plan or significant contributions from these agencies because they “resented being called in after the fact to solve what they saw as a self-induced ‘military’ mess.”59 The new U.S. ambassador to Panama arrived in country two weeks after the initial assault with few resources and no effective interagency plan for stabilizing the country, so on 17 January 1990, SOUTHCOM established a military team called the Military Support Group (MSG) and gave it to the ambassador to act as part of the country team. MSG’s charter was to conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities, including restoring public services, establishing internationally-recognized standards of justice, and ensuring democracy.60

In February 1990, two months after the invasion, SOUTHCOM tasked the MSG to produce a coordinated interagency post-conflict plan. The plan went through two rounds of coordination with all appropriate agencies and went into execution under embassy control as the first coordinated interagency plan for Panama since planning began in 1987. However, while there was now an agreed interagency plan, only the military had the resources in place in Panama to execute it. It did not become a truly interagency effort until six months after the invasion, and it
took a full year after the invasion before USAID began to fulfill its agreed role. The delay was partially caused by Congress, which approved only half of the funds requested for the post-conflict effort in Panama,\textsuperscript{61} and partly caused by the timing of other international events, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall, which distracted U.S. foreign policy actors. As a result, many of the planned infrastructure, financial, and agricultural reforms never occurred, leading to the new Panamanian government’s loss of faith in U.S. commitments.\textsuperscript{62}

There are several lessons from this operation. The military must not allow operational security concerns to exclude other key elements of the interagency from the planning process, particularly from post-conflict planning. By the same token, the rest of the interagency, which in this case was aware an operation was coming, if not its details, must not be allowed to disengage and let the military do all of the planning. Finally, the coordinated planning must start enough before the operation to allow the rest of the interagency players time to get their tactical plans, teams, and resources together, or the military will be alone in the country.


The lessons from Panama seemingly went unheeded as the interagency embarked on the 1994-1995 regime change operation in Haiti to restore the elected President and government to power after a military coup. The military’s Geographic Combatant Command responsible for Haiti (which was the U.S. Atlantic Command at the time) began planning in October 1993 for a military intervention in Haiti. Similar to Panama, the plan included a forcible entry phase followed by post-conflict operations. Also similar to the planning for the 1989-1990 Panama operation, the military planners at the Geographic Combatant Command excluded other agencies from planning, claiming security concerns. Some limited interagency coordination took place at the strategic level in Washington, but operational-level planners were unaware of interagency
agreements at the strategic level. The first comprehensive interagency coordination of the plan at the operational level occurred in September 1994, just one week prior to the execution of Operation Uphold Democracy.\(^{63}\)

A last-minute diplomatic effort eliminated the need to conduct the forcible entry operation, but once the U.S. re-installed the elected Haitian President, civil order collapsed and the Haitian military began conducting violent actions against Haitian civilians. Despite the lessons from Panama just five years earlier, neither the U.S. military nor civilian agencies had planned for the dissolution of the Haitian security forces and the collapse of civil order. The U.S. military was again surprised when civilian agencies were not immediately ready with state-building programs to strengthen the Haitian government and restore civilian law enforcement, so the emergency restoration of essential services again fell to the military, who were the only U.S. actors on the scene. On the civilian side, development planners were upset that the military did not wish to accept responsibility for the state-building efforts – responsibility for which had been assigned to the military during strategic interagency discussions in Washington but not communicated to the operational military planners at the combatant command.\(^{64}\) That said, despite some increased planning by key civilian agencies such as USAID and the Department of Justice, civilian agencies were slow to build up the resources necessary to conduct their agreed-upon development operations, and often expected more support from the military than the military had planned to provide.\(^{65}\)

In sum, while there was more strategic-level interagency coordination for Haiti than the previous operation in Panama, interagency planning did not occur at the operational level and the U.S. once again embarked on a complicated post-conflict operation without an integrated interagency plan. Once operations began, the military wanted very little to do with post-conflict
operations, but civilian agencies were again slow to arrive with the necessary capabilities. Little had changed in the interagency culture in the years since Panama.

**Afghanistan – Enduring Freedom and NATO ISAF – 2001-Present**

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the U.S. led invasion of Afghanistan after 9/11, provides an example, at least initially, of what happens to interagency unity of effort when the U.S. has almost no time to plan for operations – combat or post-combat. It also shows the additional challenges of bringing together the U.S. interagency with a larger alliance structure, in this case the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Finally, more than eight years of U.S. operations in Afghanistan have provided the U.S. an opportunity for a slow evolution of thinking about the need for more effective, formal coordination of the civil-military counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign.

As OEF commenced in October 2001, the initial coordination was only between the military and the intelligence community (primarily the CIA) for the rapid planning and execution of operations against al-Qaida and the Taliban-led government of Afghanistan with minimum use of U.S. forces. After the Taliban regime was toppled and U.S. forces were on the ground in Afghanistan, initial coordination between the military and the development and diplomatic communities was largely non-existent, as well.

On the diplomatic front, the establishment of the international coalition for operations in Afghanistan was hampered by the different, uncoordinated approaches of Defense and State. State’s diplomats set out to build the broadest coalition possible, to develop the greatest possible international support and legitimacy for the operation, while military planners were only interested in militarily-effective partners rather than symbolic contributions. Failure to coordinate meant potential international partners received different messages based on whether
they were talking to Defense or State representatives, leading to frustration and reluctance of some potential partners to participate in stabilization efforts.66

On the development front, the military planners at CENTCOM were concerned about an immediate crisis – the possibility of famine – so they established a Coalition Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF), collocated with the U.S. military headquarters in Afghanistan and with a liaison cell at CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa, to provide a means of coordination between the military and humanitarian aid organizations. The CJCMOTF established a humanitarian affairs working group which included coalition military partners, USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, an NGO umbrella organization called InterAction, and the UN. The CJCMOTF also established several humanitarian liaison cells in Afghan cities to conduct tactical-level liaison with USAID and NGO representatives. While this provided some field-level coordination between the military and development communities, there was no effective strategic or operational-level coordination between CENTCOM headquarters in Florida and USAID’s headquarters in Washington.67

Once the U.S. re-established an embassy in Kabul and sent the first post-invasion U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan in 2002, there was an opportunity for increased civil-military coordination and unity of effort, but this opportunity was largely wasted as the embassy pursued developmental efforts and the re-establishment of the government of Afghanistan, while the U.S. military under Lieutenant General Dan McNeill and Lieutenant General John Vines focused on the counterterrorist mission. General Vines was emphatic that the U.S. military mission was counterterrorism and not counterinsurgency or nation-building, going so far as to prohibit those under his command from using the word “counterinsurgency” to describe their efforts.68
U.S. civil-military coordination in Afghanistan greatly improved in 2003-2005 under the next U.S. team in the country, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and Lieutenant General David Barno. General Barno believed in the importance of civil-military coordination to achieving U.S. goals in Afghanistan, so he moved his living quarters to the U.S. embassy compound in Kabul, established an office next to Khalilzad’s in the embassy, and attended daily country team meetings with Khalilzad. General Barno also provided the ambassador with five military planners to work with embassy personnel to form an Embassy Interagency Planning Group and produce a coordinated U.S. strategy for Afghanistan. The resulting civil-military strategy shifted the U.S. focus from counterterrorism to counterinsurgency and nation building, creating two regional headquarters to direct all coalition actions in each region and successfully conducting elections, reducing violence, and beginning reconstruction.69

However, the Khalilzad / Barno civil-military coordination was personality driven and was in no way formalized or directed by either legislation or Presidential executive order. In 2005, when Ambassador Khalilzad and General Barno were replaced by Ambassador Ronald Neumann and Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, the previous civil-military cooperation effectively ended. General Eikenberry returned the military’s focus to counterterrorist kill-or-capture operations, which led to an increasing number of civilian casualties and consequently a steep decline in Afghan popular support for the U.S.70 Political scientist and Afghanistan expert Seth Jones concluded that this “effectively shatter[ed] the military-civilian coordination Khalilzad and Barno had painstakingly fashioned during their tenure together,”71 and Senator John McCain said that “Between late 2003 and early 2004, we were moving on the right path in Afghanistan,”72 but “rather than building on these gains . . . we squandered them. Beginning in
2004, our integrated civil-military command structure was disassembled and replaced by a balkanized and dysfunctional arrangement.”

In 2007, the Ambassador Neumann / General Eikenberry team was replaced again, this time by Ambassador William Wood (2007-2009) and General Dan McNeill (2007-2008), followed by General David McKiernan (2008-2009). During this period, civil-military relations continued largely as they had under Neumann and Eikenberry, with the military primarily focused on kinetic counterterrorism operations and training the Afghan National Army, while civilian agencies worked independently on diplomatic and developmental goals. In early 2009, late in General McKiernan’s tour, the U.S. began moving once again toward more civil-military coordination with the creation of an Executive Working Group (EWG), which each month brings together the in-country principals from State, USAID, and the military to discuss U.S. civilian and military plans and operations and attempts to synchronize interagency efforts in Afghanistan. The high-level EWG is supported by a working-level interagency staff called the Integrated Civilian Military Action Group (ICMAG), which is staffed by State Department personnel from S/CRS, USAID personnel, and U.S. military personnel from the Regional Command East and ISAF.

Many have been critical of the ad hoc nature of U.S. civil-military coordination in Afghanistan. An April 2008 report from the House Armed Services Committee said, “Rather than depending exclusively on personalities for success, the right interagency structures and processes need to be in place and working.” A former senior U.S. military commander in Afghanistan said in early 2009 that the most serious challenge the U.S. faces in Afghanistan “[is] not the Taliban. It's not governance. It's not security. . . . It's the utter failure in the unity of effort department.” In April 2009, shortly before Secretary of Defense Robert Gates fired
General McKiernan, he expressed his lack of satisfaction with McKiernan’s civil-military coordination efforts, saying the NATO ISAF commander needed to focus on “cooperation between civil and military efforts.”

In 2009, the U.S. leadership in Afghanistan changed again, with retired Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry becoming ambassador on 29 April 2009 and General Stanley McChrystal becoming the NATO ISAF and U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A) commander on 15 June 2009. Under direction from Washington, the new team quickly set out to develop an integrated civil-military plan. They assembled a planning team led by planners from State’s S/CRS and including other U.S. civilian agencies as well as the U.S. military from both USFOR-A and ISAF, and on 10 August 2009 released the “Integrated Civil-Military Campaign Plan” for Afghanistan under both of their signatures.

Under the new plan, the U.S. has created an integrated civil-military decision-making structure at all levels in Afghanistan. At the national level in Kabul, the U.S. has established several interagency groups. The Principals Group (the ambassador and the Commanding General of ISAF and USFOR-A) are responsible for final coordination and decision making. The Executive Working Group (with interagency members from the U.S. Embassy, USFOR-A, and U.S. forces from ISAF) is a deputies-level body to make policy and decisions. There is also a National Level Working Group for each “Transformative Effect” in the campaign plan, and these interagency groups will monitor and assess progress toward each desired effect in the plan. The Pol-Mil section of the embassy will provide planning and assessment support for the Executive Working Group and National Level Working Groups. In addition, the civilians at the embassy have re-organized along functional, rather than agency, lines.
In the field, the U.S. has created Civilian Lead positions at the two regional commands, at each sub-regional U.S. brigade task force, and for each province. These Civilian Leads coordinate the activities of all U.S. civilians in Afghanistan at their level and subordinate levels who are operating under the ambassador’s authority and also serve as the civilian counterpart to the military commander at that organizational level. This dual role as the leader of U.S. interagency civilians and counterpart to the U.S. military commander is intended to produce civil-military unity of effort at each level. In addition, each region has established an organization called the Regional Integrated Team, composed of the Regional Command Commander, the U.S. Special Operations Forces commander for that region, the Civilian Lead, and representatives from the U.S. agencies operating in the region. Each regional command also has a Civ-Mil Fusion Cell which is responsible for maintaining a common operating picture of the region. Similar civil-military entities operate at the sub-regional, provincial, and district levels. While these civil-military entities are currently U.S.-only, the campaign plan indicates these structures could be expanded to include non-U.S. military forces and civilian participants.80

While this parallel civilian-military organizational structure is the closest civil-military coordination the U.S. has produced in more than eight years of operations in Afghanistan, it still falls short of the truly integrated CORDS structure the U.S. employed in Vietnam. Dr Christopher Lamb, Acting Director of the National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies, and Dr Martin Cinnamond, who worked in a number of UN positions in Afghanistan in 2007 and 2008, call the new coordination structure “insufficient,” saying, “It calls for parallel chains of command with coordination at every level. Historically, however, the way to ensure civil-military cooperation is to formally integrate the military and civilian chains of command.”81
Iraq – Iraqi Freedom – 2003-Present

Finally, this chapter examines the interagency lessons offered from U.S. experience in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), from 2003 to the present. Unlike in Afghanistan, the U.S. controlled the timing of the Iraq invasion and should have had plenty of time to develop a coordinated post-conflict plan. However, politics between DoD and other U.S. agencies (and lack of Presidential orders to do so) prevented this. Planning for post-conflict operations in Iraq should have begun as early as 1998, when Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act, declaring that “it should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power.” CENTCOM began planning for military operations long before this, while the State Department began post-conflict planning in October 2001 and USAID in September 2002.

However, the post-conflict plan which was actually implemented came from the Department of Defense in Washington, which laid some groundwork on its plan shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, but did not really start planning for post-conflict operations until 20 January 2003, just two months before the start of OIF, when President George W. Bush assigned DoD the lead in post-war planning and execution for Iraq. That same day, DoD created the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and named retired U.S. Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner to head the office. Garner and his staff – initially three or four people, increasing to nearly 200 by mid-March – developed the post-war plan. Several sources indicate that senior DoD leaders deliberately rejected interagency planning and coordination and prohibited ORHA from using the State Department’s post-war plan as part of its effort, nor were they permitted to hire personnel who had been part of the State Department’s planning process.

Garner and the interagency ORHA team arrived in Baghdad on 20 April 2003 and began implementing their post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization plan. Organizationally, ORHA
was subordinate to CENTCOM’s Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) in Iraq, so the military forces in Iraq and the interagency post-conflict team were in the same chain of command. However, almost immediately after ORHA’s arrival in Baghdad, Washington determined that ORHA’s post-war plan was inadequate for the situation on the ground, so the organization and its leader were quickly removed and replaced with a more robust interagency organization led by a diplomat rather than a retired general.

On 12 May 2003, President Bush appointed Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III as a Presidential Envoy to lead the new interagency reconstruction and stabilization effort in Iraq, called the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which both led the reconstruction and stabilization operation and acted as the U.S. occupation government in Iraq until the U.S. returned sovereignty to Iraq in 2004. While many observers at the time saw the replacement of a retired general with an ambassador as an indication that influence over the occupation was shifting from DoD to State, CPA continued to fall under DoD.85 However, instead of falling under CENTCOM’s military forces in Iraq, CPA bypassed both the military commander on the ground and the CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa, reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Director Mitch Daniels told Congress this change meant CENTCOM now supported CPA’s reconstruction efforts, rather than ORHA working in support of CENTCOM’s efforts.86

However, in practice, CPA and the military operated in a largely uncoordinated dual reporting chain, eliminating the unity of command which had briefly existed when ORHA was subordinate to CENTCOM’s CFLCC. Further complicating matters, because Bremer was a Presidential Envoy, he also had lines of communication to the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and National Security Advisor.87 Because CPA and the military reported
separately to the Secretary of Defense, they often proceeded with different goals and assumptions. Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez focused on counterinsurgency operations and the hunt for Saddam Hussein rather than stabilization and reconstruction, and CPA focused on stabilization and reconstruction while often lacking access to military resources required to get the job done. During the year CPA was in Iraq, Ambassador Bremer and General Sanchez, “met often but never established procedures for anything more than ad hoc policy coordination.” The lack of coordination caused delays in security and logistics which meant CPA lacked a significant presence outside Baghdad for many months in the critical early phase of the occupation, leaving military commanders across Iraq to fill the void by developing their own policies on governance and other civilian matters in their areas of operation. This made CPA’s job even more difficult, because the CPA had to reconcile the various systems established and promises made by local military commanders into a single coherent policy.

Interagency coordination in Iraq was also problematic below the level of the senior military and State leadership in Baghdad. Foreign Service Officer James Stephenson, who headed USAID’s Iraq Mission, said:

During the first year of post-conflict operations, military-civilian coordination in civil affairs at the policy level was virtually nonexistent. U.S. forces had [adequate funds]. Accordingly, commanders had less incentive to approach executing agencies for assistance. Although [USAID] reached out to the civil affairs commander at [Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7), later Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I)], and he to us, meaningful cooperation was ad hoc and generally occurred only at the operational level.

Even when the military in the field did attempt better coordination with civilian agencies, CPA sometimes didn’t respond. For example, Major General Peter Chiarelli, commanding general of the U.S. Army’s 1st Cavalry Division, with responsibility for Baghdad, wanted a close working relationship with USAID. Stephenson and Chiarelli met with Ambassador Bremer to gain the necessary funding, but, while Bremer “enthusiastically supported” their plans, CPA
took no action to provide the necessary funding for a coordinated military-USAID program in Baghdad.\textsuperscript{92}

On 28 June 2004, the U.S. transferred sovereignty back to the Iraqi government. At that time, the CPA was disbanded and replaced with a U.S. embassy and interagency country team led by Ambassador John Negroponte, who took over leadership for civilian-run stabilization and reconstruction operations in Iraq. At this point, the interagency effort was led by the embassy and reported to the State Department, while military operations, now under U.S. Army General George Casey, continued to report to DoD through CENTCOM. Ambassador Negroponte’s and General Casey’s offices were collocated and they put effort into coordinating their actions and those of their staffs, but they continued to report to separate cabinet secretaries with neither subordinate to the other.\textsuperscript{93} However, even with collocated offices and a desire to coordinate efforts in Iraq, Washington politics sometimes intruded. For example, in March 2005, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was furious with General Casey because Casey had shared his strategy to accelerate the training of Iraqi army and police with Ambassador Negroponte and the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, who shared it with the State Department in Washington, before Rumsfeld received it for his approval through DoD channels.\textsuperscript{94}

In the summer of 2005, General Casey tasked a colonel on his staff to produce a study grading the Iraq war effort to date. The study said the military commander in Iraq needed control of all aspects of the counterinsurgency campaign, including economic and political development, to succeed, recommending a model similar to the CORDS structure used in Vietnam, in which the civilian in charge of development was dual-hatted as a deputy to the military commander. General Casey shared the suggestion with CENTCOM commander General Abazaid and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld but decided not to pursue it, saying, “I made
the judgment that it was going to take an awful lot of energy to get it done and the likelihood of success was low.”95 At that time, the State Department was proposing to deploy a few hundred Foreign Service Officers to Provincial Reconstruction Teams to conduct development work in each of Iraq’s eighteen provinces. Casey decided this was a reasonable first step and his goal was to get the State Department to do more rather than take control of the economic and development aspects of the counterinsurgency.96 Since 2005, the U.S. has maintained essentially the same parallel structure in Iraq, with the military commander reporting to DoD through CENTCOM and the ambassador leading the interagency country team and reporting to the Secretary of State, while the commander and ambassador coordinate in an ad hoc manner.

OIF demonstrates that even with plenty of time available for interagency planning, the lack of a formal, mandated interagency planning process allows bureaucratic politics to prevent unity of effort, or even rudimentary coordination, during the planning process. During the nearly seven years of post-conflict operations, the U.S. has maintained separate civilian and military chains of command, hampering unity of effort. Michael Donley97 concluded:

The status of interagency decision makers (such as Ambassador Bremer in Iraq) complicates the authority of senior departmental and agency officials in Washington and the reporting chain of departmental personnel operating in the field. For example, when the U.S. creates an organization such as the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), originally established under DoD but ultimately composed of officials from across the U.S. government, are the key decision makers in the agency reporting to the President, to the head of a “lead department,” or to their own agency head? To what extent can the head of such an agency coordinate and direct the use of all U.S. resources? This problem is especially important for the State Department, in which the U.S. ambassador is supposed to be the President’s senior representative in a given country; and for DoD, which has a well-defined military chain of command which does not include ambassadors.98

In a 2009 study, the Government Accountability Office assessed that, “Multiple U.S. agencies—including the State Department, USAID, and DoD—led separate efforts to improve the capacity of Iraq’s ministries to govern, without overarching direction from a lead entity to
integrate their efforts.”

The GAO concluded that, “The lack of an overarching strategy contributed to U.S. efforts not meeting their goal of key Iraqi ministries having the capacity to effectively govern and assume increasing responsibilities for operating, maintaining, and further investing in reconstruction projects.”

As these peacetime theater engagement, humanitarian relief, and wartime cases demonstrate, the U.S. can generally claim success in its interagency foreign endeavors, but these successes are often costly in resources, time, and often in foreign goodwill as the various elements of the interagency fail to work together in a synchronized manner. The next chapter describes several potential ways to reform the interagency system at the regional level to produce better unity of effort.

Notes


4 Rhatican, Redefining Security Cooperation, 5-6.

5 Ibid., 17-18.


7 Rhatican, Redefining Security Cooperation, 6.

8 Ibid., 7.
Notes


11 Ibid.


15 Lieutenant Colonel Thomas P. Galvin, U.S. Army, writing in *Joint Force Quarterly*, takes the other side of the TSC debate, arguing the military needs more authority and more focus on this area. Galvin notes, “Unity of effort suffers due to a number of factors . . . including budgetary restrictions, lack of interagency transparency, mismatched authorities and responsibilities, slow responsiveness, and outmoded legislation.” Additionally, Galvin criticizes the military “cultural mindset that relegates TSC . . . to secondary status behind traditional military [activities].” He contends that DOD has given TSC and Phase Zero responsibilities to the COCOMs, but they lack the necessary authority because the State Department “controls most of the resources under Title 22 through the Foreign Assistance Act.” Galvin says another problem is the lack of a “peer regional authority” to the COCOM at State “to discuss and solve regional disputes.” Yet another problem is Congressional legislation which “interferes” with TSC planning and execution. Galvin praises Section 1206 funding and recommends that Congress continue to expand this funding line for TSC activities. See Thomas P. Galvin, “Extending the Phase Zero Campaign Mindset: Ensuring Unity of Effort,” *Joint Force Quarterly* (no. 45, 2nd Quarter 2007), 46-50.


20 Ibid., 21.

21 Ibid., 30.

22 Ibid., 24.

23 Ibid., 2.


25 Ibid., 13-14.

26 Ibid., 14.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

Notes

32 Ibid., 32.
33 Ibid., 33.
36 Ibid., 194, 202.
39 Ibid., 195, 204.
40 Ibid., 196, 198, 203.
41 Ibid., 195, 203.
42 Ibid., 194-195, 200.
45 Coffey, Improving Interagency Integration at the Operational Level, 19, 24.
48 Coffey, Improving Interagency Integration at the Operational Level, 28-29.
50 Ibid., 106.
52 Mark L. Curry, The Interagency Process in Regional Foreign Policy (Ft Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 5 May 1994), 23.
54 Curry, The Interagency Process in Regional Foreign Policy, 23.
56 Ibid.
57 Curry, The Interagency Process in Regional Foreign Policy, 24.
58 Ibid., 27-28.
59 Ibid., 28.
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60 Ibid., 24-25; 28.
61 Ibid., 28-29; 31-32.
62 Ibid.
63 Stephen A. Clark, Interagency Coordination: Strengthening the Link between Operational Art and the Desired End State (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 8 February 1999), 10-11.
64 Ibid., 12-13.
70 Christopher J. Lamb and Martin Cinnamond, “Unified Effort: Key to Special Operations and Irregular Warfare in Afghanistan,” Joint Force Quarterly (no. 56, 1st Quarter 2010), 44.
71 Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires, 150.
72 Lamb and Cinnamond, “Unified Effort,” 43.
73 Ibid., 44.
75 United States House of Representatives, House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Agency Stovepipes vs. Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan (Committee Print 8, April 2008), 32.
76 Greg Bruno, Afghanistan’s National Security Forces (Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, 16 April 2009), n.p.
80 Ibid., 28-30.
81 Lamb and Cinnamond, “Unified Effort,” 50.
Notes


84 Ambassador Barbara K. Bodine, U.S. Department of State, interview by the author, 9 February 2004. Ambassador Bodine served as the senior State Department member of ORHA from January-May 2003. Ambassador Bodine stated, “One reason for not much on planning for OHRA is there wasn’t any, . . . there was no planning, to be blunt. The issue is more complicated, and depressing than that, however. There was a significant amount of planning – 18 months or 2 years, $5 million dollars. It was chaired by State – the Project for the Future of Iraq – and managed by a gentleman named Tom Warrick. It was interagency, private sector, think tanks, NGOs, etc. It exhaustively examined what needed to be done, how to do it, etc. It involved 250 Iraqis – none with political ambitions. Problem is – OSD wanted nothing to do with it. So, it isn’t that we didn’t have a plan it is we ignored the plan, and the planners.” See also Fallows, “Blind into Baghdad,” 72, and David Rieff, *Blueprint for a Mess,* *New York Times Magazine* (2 November 2003), n.p. (online).


88 There are several examples in Bremer’s book, *My Year in Iraq.* See, for example, pg 150.

89 Bensahel and Moisan, “Repairing the Interagency Process,” 106.


91 Ibid., 58.

92 Ibid., 56, 58.


95 Ibid., 201-204.

96 Ibid.

97 Michael Donley is currently the Secretary of the Air Force.


Notes

New Fiscal Challenges and Strengthen Interagency Partnerships,” Speech before the National Defense University (Washington, DC, 6 January 2010), n.p.

Chapter 5

Options for Improvement

Since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, there have been over a hundred major studies, books, articles, and professional military education (PME) student papers on the topic of improving interagency unity of effort. Many of these studies, particularly in the earlier years, focused on problems and solutions at the strategic interagency level in Washington. After the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, many of the papers focused on problems and solutions particular to the counterterrorism mission. After the 19 March 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, many of the papers focused on stabilization and reconstruction operations and counterinsurgency warfare.

The most significant prior studies include the 2001 Hart/Rudman Commission phase three report by a panel of DoD-chartered outside experts, the 2004 Defense Science Board summer study by another panel of DoD-chartered outside experts, the 2004 9/11 Commission report by a Congressionally-chartered bipartisan panel, the 2005 Beyond Goldwater-Nichols phase two report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) think tank, the 2007 State Department in 2025 study by an assembled panel of State Department-chartered experts, and the 2008 Forging a New Shield and 2009 Turning Ideas into Action reports from the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), which were produced as a requirement of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, which mandated a study of the interagency national security system.
by an independent, bipartisan organization. However, relatively few studies have looked at whole-of-government unity of effort at the operational level of foreign policy planning and execution across the spectrum of conflict.

**A Typology of Interagency Reform Options**

The first step in understanding the universe of interagency reform proposals which have been put forth over the last two decades is to establish a simplifying typology. This study proposes a typology broken into three levels: the strategic or national level in Washington, the operational level across a region, and the operational level in a country during crisis operations. Within these three levels, the reform proposals at each level break out into three or four major categories. At the strategic level, reformers have proposed putting responsibility for coordinated interagency planning and execution in an interagency organization outside the National Security Council, within the NSC under expanded authorities, or with a lead cabinet-level agency operating within the current NSC structure. At the regional level, proposed structures include a regional interagency organization, putting the State Department in charge, putting the military in charge, or using a parallel structure with no one in charge. Finally, at the country level during crisis operations, the options include an interagency organization, a State Department-led organization, a military-led organization, or a parallel structure. These options are summarized in Table 2.

With this typology, it is possible to put together $3 \times 4 \times 4 = 48$ different structures, with variations possible within each of the types. This accounts for much of the variety in the reform proposals reviewed for this study. However, instead of trying to describe all of the 48 possible structures, this study will instead briefly describe the three or four possible reforms at each organizational level separately, with examples from the literature. Because this study focuses on
the operational level, rather than at the strategic level, this chapter examines only the regional-level and sub-regional / country-level reform options. The strategic-level options and their relevance to the operational-level models are briefly described in Appendix B. The next chapter will then analyze the reform options at the regional and sub-regional levels, applying the thirteen criteria described in Chapter 1 to select the most suitable structure at each level, and finally describe the proposed optimal operational-level interagency (IA) system.

Table 2. A Typology of Interagency Reform Options

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<th>Strategic / National</th>
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<th>Operational / Country – Crisis Operations</th>
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<td>2 NSC Leads</td>
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<td>3 Lead Agency</td>
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<td>4 Parallel Structure</td>
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Reform Options at the Regional Level

This study now examines reform options for the regional-level interagency coordination of foreign policy and national security planning and execution, the level which is currently dominated by the military’s Geographic Combatant Commands. This section will consider four possible general structures: (1) a new regional-level interagency organization, (2) a structure in which the State Department leads at the regional level, (3) a structure in which the military leads at the regional level, and (4) a parallel structure in which the military and the State Department
operate as equals in the region, coordinating their activities in the region to some degree but reporting separately to their parent agencies.

As the previous chapters have demonstrated, the U.S. government does not currently have a strong structure or process for interagency coordination and unity of effort at the regional level. Because of this, the military has stepped into the breach and has developed a series of mechanisms, including JIACGs, Foreign Policy Advisors, and even combatant commands with organizational structures designed more for non-combat interagency operations than for military-only combat operations. However, the military-driven structures are all “coalitions of the willing,” since the military has no authority to compel interagency participation in planning or to direct the actions of other agencies during mission execution.

A Regional Interagency Organization

The first type of regional-level interagency reform model envisions creating a new interagency organization in each region which would have the responsibility and authority to coordinate interagency planning and lead interagency execution. In some models, the Geographic Combatant Command would be subordinate to the new interagency organization, while in other versions, the GCC is absorbed into the new interagency organization. The most prominent proponents of this reform option include the CSIS Beyond Goldwater-Nichols study team and the Project for National Security Reform (PNSR), as well as many other books, journal articles, and PME student papers. A review of the literature does not find any proposals of this type prior to 2005, indicating that the challenges of the increasingly complex mission in Iraq likely inspired many of the authors of these proposals.

Proponents have identified several advantages of this model. First, it would be expected to lead to improved regional interagency coordination in both planning and execution among
members of a collocated staff working together on a daily basis. Second, placing responsibility for regional interagency coordination in an organization outside Washington would allow Washington to focus on strategic and global issues. Third, the creation of regional interagency organizations would likely lead to the development of increased regional expertise across the participating agencies. Fourth, a regional organization with directive authority over the U.S. embassies across the region would provide a mechanism to coordinate the embassy’s country plans across the region. Finally, a regional interagency organization would address the regional power imbalance which is currently overwhelmingly tilted toward the military.

However, there are also a couple of disadvantages to this model. First and foremost, if the leader of this organization does not come from the State Department, it would further dilute State’s role and could reinforce perceptions around the world that the State Department is not really in charge of U.S. foreign policy. Second, many issues cross regional boundaries, requiring regional organizations to coordinate horizontally with one another, as well as vertically with Washington and the U.S. actors at the country level. Finally, Washington would have to guard against the tendency of these regional interagency organizations to become powerful fiefdoms operating independently of Washington.

The first proposals found in the literature of a true interagency organization at the regional level come from a pair of February 2005 Naval War College papers. U.S. Navy Lieutenant Peter Halvorsen recommended creating unified interagency staffs at the regional level including all relevant executive branch agencies, either augmenting or replacing the Geographic Combatant Commands. The commander of this organization could be military or a skilled professional from any department or agency, subject to Senate confirmation. These new regional interagency commanders would have directive authority over all U.S. activities in their region. The new
regional commands could be structured along traditional military J-staff lines (renaming them I-staffs for Interagency, rather than J for Joint), or they could organize functionally, with components for military, intelligence, diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, etc. ³ Similarly, U.S. Marine Corps Major J. D. York proposed the creation of Regional Interagency Directors with authority and responsibility for directing and coordinating all interagency activities at the regional level. These regional directors would have command authority over the agencies assigned to them and would also have authority over the U.S. ambassadors in each country or multilateral IGO in the region. The Regional Interagency Directors would be Senate confirmed and would report directly to the President. ⁴

In April 2005, the U.S. Marine Corps Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities (CETO) proposed a less ambitious regional interagency model. Rather than creating full interagency regional commands, CETO recommended creating smaller Crisis Management Groups (CMGs), which would be standing interagency bodies to integrate civil-military planning and execution of major contingency operations, ⁵ making them more like a JIACG under independent control, rather than subordinate to the Geographic Combatant Command.

In July 2005, the CSIS Beyond Goldwater Nichols study team recommended emulating the success of the military’s Geographic Combatant Commands across the interagency, better integrating day-to-day policy execution across the regions. The CSIS team proposed to do this not by establishing an interagency entity in each region, but by tasking the existing regional Senior Directors on the National Security Council Staff to lead interagency coordination for the region, both at the strategic level in Washington and at the regional level by convening regular summits of senior U.S. officials with the responsibility for policy execution in the region. However, in the longer term, the CSIS team recommended establishing regional interagency
organizations called Regional Security Councils to bring together the senior representatives of all agencies executing U.S. policy in the region to facilitate day-to-day unity of effort.⁶

In the Autumn/Winter 2005 issue of *American Intelligence Journal*, Jeffrey Gardner further fleshed out the interagency organization proposal by recommending creation of a Regional Interest Bureau (RIB) in each region to fully integrate the planning and activities of all U.S. agencies operating in the region. Each RIB would be led by a Presidential Envoy (like those described in Chapter 3) with the “full authority of the President” to “direct the efforts of all executive agencies in the region.”⁷ In this construct, Washington agencies would make policy and serve as force providers while personnel from each agency, including the Geographic Combatant Commander and staff, would work together at the RIBs to implement these policies, much as the military services currently provide trained and ready forces to the combatant commanders.⁸ Gardner’s construct is shown in Figure 9.

In the Winter 2005/2006 edition of *Parameters*, Mitchell Thompson, an instructor at the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Joint Military Attaché School with experience as a Middle East Foreign Area Officer and advisor to CPA Administrator L. Paul Bremer, proposed transforming the military’s combatant commands into truly interagency regional organizations with the responsibility and authority to conduct the full spectrum of U.S. foreign policy and national security operations in their regions. Each transformed organization would be led by a senior civilian with a long and distinguished career in executive branch agencies involved in foreign policy and national security, nominated by the President and reporting to the National Security Advisor. Each would have a four-star military deputy, functionally-aligned directors from across the interagency, and an interagency staff, as well as assigned military forces. While Thompson says the civilian director of this organization would carry the rank of ambassador, that individual...
would report directly to the President through the National Security Advisor rather than through the State Department, thus placing the NSC rather than State in charge of U.S. activities abroad. Thompson envisions this as essentially the CORDS model elevated to the regional command level and reversed to put the senior civilian rather than the military commander in overall command.⁹

![Diagram of Regional Interagency Model – The Regional Interests Bureau](image)

In a 2nd Quarter 2008 *Joint Force Quarterly* article, Dr James Carafano at the Heritage Foundation proposed disbanding the Geographic Combatant Commands in some regions and replacing them with standing regional interagency structures he called Joint Interagency Groups. Carafano described these new regional structures as the expansion of the successful JIATF
concept to the level of the regional, operational headquarters. These Joint Interagency Groups could be led by either a military officer or a civilian, based on the predominant U.S. goals and missions in each region (which could send an alarming and probably unintended signal to countries in regions which find themselves hosting an Interagency Group with a U.S. military leader in charge). Carafano does not describe the non-military components which would presumably be present on the staff, but he does say the organization would have a military staff “tasked with planning military engagements, warfighting, and post-conflict operations” and which could be detached from the Joint Interagency Group to form the nucleus of a Joint Task Force (JTF) in the event of military operations in the region. Carafano does not specify how this new regional interagency organization would relate to the U.S. ambassadors in the region, or to the NSC and the cabinet departments and agencies in Washington.

In a 4th Quarter 2008 Joint Force Quarterly article, National Security Agency analyst Dennis R.J. Penn recommended establishing new interagency organizations in each region to eliminate “all vestiges of militarized foreign policy” and produce unity of effort across what he calls three equal pillars of U.S. engagement – diplomacy, development, and defense. These new organizations would be separate from the Geographic Combatant Commands and would be led by “a forward-deployed National Security Council-level representative,” meaning this leader would probably hold the rank of under secretary or perhaps assistant secretary and would report back to Washington via the National Security Advisor and NSC staff, rather than to a cabinet agency.

PNSR’s November 2008 and September 2009 studies also considered how to improve interagency coordination at the regional level. The team studied several models and ultimately recommended establishing Regional Issue Teams at Regional Offices located in each region.
These Regional Issue Teams would be composed of senior representatives at the under secretary or assistant secretary level from across the interagency. They would replace the regional Interagency Policy Committees (IPCs, formerly called Policy Coordinating Committees or PCCs) at the National Security Council and would report to higher-level interagency teams on the NSC in Washington, while the U.S. ambassadors and country teams in the region would report to the Regional Issue Team, defining a clear interagency chain of authority from the President through the regional level to the country level.15

PNSR considered but rejected a much more robust regional interagency organization they called an Integrated Regional Center (IRC), which is worth briefly describing here. Each IRC would preferably be collocated with the corresponding Geographic Combatant Command and would act as the interagency headquarters for the planning and execution of U.S. national security policy in the region. Each would be staffed with personnel with regional expertise from across the interagency, and would be organized based on U.S. goals in the region. PNSR believes each IRC would need a staff of 500-1,000 people.16 Each IRC would be led by a Presidentially-appointed and Senate-confirmed Regional Director, who could come from any national security-related agency or even from outside of government (i.e. a political appointee rather than a government professional, as is the case with about one third of U.S. ambassadors and many cabinet secretaries, under secretaries, and assistant secretaries). The Regional Director would have both the responsibility and the authority to execute U.S. foreign policy in the region, including directive authority over U.S. ambassadors accredited to countries or multinational organizations in the region.17 The Regional Director would also have some authority over the Geographic Combatant Commander during peacetime, providing direction on security cooperation activities. The Regional Director would have no authority over U.S. military forces
conducting combat operations (though the IRC and GCC would maintain a coordinating relationship during combat operations), but would provide direction for U.S. forces conducting post-conflict operations as part of a larger interagency effort.\textsuperscript{18}

Rather than adding another layer of bureaucracy, the IRCs would replace the regional Interagency Policy Committees at the NSC and regional policy would be delegated out of Washington to the IRCs in each region, freeing Washington to concentrate on global issues and long-range strategy.\textsuperscript{19} The NSC would establish broad guidance and goals, set strategic direction, provide national security strategy and policy, develop budget guidance, identify cross-regional issues, and deconflict IRC requests for departmental resources and support, while the IRCs would translate national security policy into interagency plans and oversee the execution of those plans.\textsuperscript{20} Under this proposed system, cabinet secretaries would retain the ability to influence and challenge policies via the NSC process, but once an issue was assigned to an IRC rather than to a lead cabinet agency, the IRC would have the authority to refine policy and direct execution using assigned personnel and resources from across the interagency.\textsuperscript{21}

The most recent version of this type of regional-level reform model comes from a 1st Quarter 2009 \textit{Joint Force Quarterly} article by U.S. Army Brigadier General Jeffrey Buchanan, U.S. Navy Captain Maxie Davis, and U.S. Air Force Colonel Lee Wight.\textsuperscript{22} Buchanan, et al. recommended disbanding the Geographic Combatant Commands and creating standing interagency organizations in each region which would report to the President through the NSC and which would have responsibility for all aspects of U.S. foreign policy in their respective regions. Each regional organization, which they call a Joint Interagency Command (JIACOM), would be led by a civilian, possibly with a four-star military deputy, and would be staffed with representatives of all agencies executing aspects of U.S. foreign policy in the region, including
the military. The JIACOM Director would have true directive authority for all U.S. activities in
the region, including the military and ambassadors and their country teams. Similar to the
GCCs, the JIACOMs would have joint military forces assigned to them based on U.S.
requirements in the region. Operational level activities would be conducted by establishing
subordinate Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs), making the operational activities both joint
and interagency and providing command authority over all assigned interagency forces from the
tactical level, through the JIATF commander, to the JIACOM director, to the President through
the NSC.

State Leads at the Regional Level

The second type of regional-level interagency reform model puts the State Department in
charge of the interagency at the regional level. The versions of this model vary from relatively
modest proposals focused on strengthening the authority of the Assistant Secretaries of State in
the regional bureaus to robust interagency organizations as described in the previous section,
though the organizations would be headed by a State Department representative and would
report to the Secretary of State rather than directly to the President or an element of the NSC.
The major difference, then, between this and the previous interagency models, is that it clearly
places the State Department in charge of regional foreign policy. The most prominent proponent
of this reform option is the 2007 State Department-chartered “State Department in 2025”
working group, though its proposal is relatively modest. A 2006 SAMS paper by Major Brett
Sylvia provides the best description of the robust option, and while a 1994 SAMS paper by
Major Mark Curry provides a third variant of this model.

In 1994, School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) student U.S. Army Major Mark Curry
proposed putting the State Department’s regional bureaus in charge of all non-combat
interagency operations in their regions. Under the current system, the regional Assistant Secretaries of State lead Interagency Working Groups at the NSC which are supposed to coordinate interagency actions in the region, though the system often falls short of its goal. Curry would attempt to strengthen the State Department regional bureau’s ability to direct regional interagency activities by moving the Regional Assistant Secretary and a small staff from Washington to the region, possibly collocated with the Geographic Combatant Commanders, while the regional Deputy Assistant Secretaries and the country directors would remain in Washington to maintain their focus on policy formulation. It is not clear from Curry’s description whether the Assistant Secretary would have additional authority to direct the actions of other agencies in the region. Absent stronger authority in the hands of the Assistant Secretary, this model is more likely to place the Assistant Secretary of State in a de facto subordinate role to the Combatant Commander and his much larger staff, while a lower-ranked Deputy Assistant Secretary of State remaining in Washington would have even less authority in leading interagency coordination via IAWGs in Washington.

In a 2006 SAMS paper, Major Brett Sylvia proposed establishing Regional Interagency Consulates (more appropriately called Regional Interagency Missions), led by a State Department civilian with ambassadorial rank with a military deputy that is dual-hatted as the Geographic Combatant Commander and a robust interagency staff organized along functional lines with functional divisions headed by Assistant Secretaries from relevant agencies. The Regional Ambassador would report to the Secretary of State, but like country-level ambassadors would also be the President’s personal representative in the region, so he also would be able to report directly to the President as required. The military deputy would report to both the Regional Ambassador and through traditional military channels to the Secretary of Defense.
While the State Department would be the lead agency for this regional organization, interagency disagreements that could not be resolved within the Mission could be elevated to the NSC for adjudication.\textsuperscript{30} Because the Combatant Commander would work for the Regional Ambassador, the ambassador would have access to all the military personnel, logistical, and communication resources to execute other U.S. activities in the region.\textsuperscript{31} This structure effectively creates an embassy country team at the regional level, with a diplomat from the State Department directing all efforts. It is similar to the regional interagency structures described in the previous section in most ways, but in this model the State Department is in charge, reinforcing the State Department’s statutory lead role in foreign policy and making the organization more attractive to partners in the region who would prefer to deal with a diplomat. Sylvia’s proposed structure is shown in Figure 10.

The “State Department in 2025” Working Group in 2007 recommended a more modest proposal, with the State Department as the lead agency only for regional interagency planning. To increase State’s regional presence and capabilities, the Working Group recommended that each State Department Regional Bureau should establish a new Deputy Assistant Secretary to represent the bureau in the region and lead all regional interagency planning efforts, staffing the position with a senior career diplomat with prior ambassadorial experience. Outside the planning arena, however, this individual would be subordinate to the Geographic Combatant Commander, becoming the Combatant Commander’s Foreign Policy Advisor and senior civilian deputy. Indeed, aside from the leading role in interagency planning, this is effectively a military-led model, and is similar to the current structures in AFRICOM, EUCOM, and SOUTHCOM, where the command’s civilian deputy to the commander comes from the State Department and oversees the JIACG’s role in interagency coordination.\textsuperscript{32}
The Military Leads at the Regional Level

The third type of regional-level interagency reform model designates the Department of Defense as the lead agency for regional interagency unity of effort and puts the military’s Geographic Combatant Commands in charge. Some versions of this model argue that the current JIACG construct either fills the bill or can do so with only minor tweaks, while more ambitious models would significantly increase the interagency representation at the GCC headquarters, all while maintaining a flag-rank military officer in charge and reporting through military channels to the Secretary of Defense. Significantly, those who have proposed that the military should lead the interagency at the regional level have all either been military officers or researchers at
military schools. Proponents argue that the Combatant Command is the only effective organization present in the region and that it has already taken great steps since 2001 to facilitate interagency coordination, so the U.S. should continue to build on this track record of success. However, this model does nothing to alleviate concerns that the military plays too large a role in U.S. foreign policy.

In a 1997 paper from the Center for Strategic Leadership at the Army War College, Colonel Michael Pasquarett and James Kievit proposed creating a set of interagency planning teams at each Geographic Combatant Command. These Operational Planning Groups (OPGs) would focus on a specific mission, be built around a core of planners from a wide variety of U.S. government agencies, NGOs, and coalition partners, and increase or decrease in size as the intensity or scope of the operation required. Depending on the mission, an OPG could be led by either a military flag officer or an ambassador. In some cases, the planning group could become the core of an interagency task force during mission execution. Pasquarett and Kievit stated that these changes would “establish interagency operations as a focal point throughout the training, planning, and execution cycles” of U.S. activities and operations in the region.

After the 2001 establishment of JIACGs at the Combatant Commands, several military officers, including U.S. Navy Lieutenant Commander Chris Herr, U.S. Marine Corps Colonel Matthew Bogdanos, U.S. Army Major David Doyle, and Armas, et al. at the National Defense University’s Center for Technology and National Security Policy either argued that the JIACG is already sufficient or proposed further strengthening the JIACG to serve as the Combatant Commander’s primary tool to lead interagency coordination in the region. However, it is clear that the JIACGs as currently structured are not able to achieve full interagency coordination at the regional level. Neither the Combatant Commanders nor their JIACGs currently have the
authority to compel interagency participation in coordinated planning or execution, nor can the
interagency members of the JIACG commit their agencies to any particular position or course of
action. Furthermore, the mere existence of the JIACGs can leave the impression that the
military is responsible for all executive branch interagency coordination for planning and
executing interagency operations in the region.

In a 2006 *Joint Force Quarterly* article, U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel Christopher
Naler proposed the idea of an “interagency combatant command” which looks similar to the
structures now used by AFRICOM, EUCOM, and SOUTHCOM. In Naler’s model, the
combatant command would be an integrated civil-military organization with interagency
representatives integrated into key leadership and staff positions. The organization would have
both a military and a civilian deputy commander, with the deputy drawn from the State
Department. The civilian deputy would be both the ranking State representative and the JIACG
director. The interagency representatives on the staff would provide their interagency
perspective throughout planning, operations, and exercises, and would also maintain contact with
their parent agencies, communicating relevant information between the combatant command and
those agencies. Naler’s model is shown in Figure 11.

In a 2007 Naval War College paper, U.S. Navy Lieutenant Commander William Whitsitt
proposed a more unified, whole-of-government reorganization of AFRICOM, which might also
be extended to the other Geographic Combatant Commands. In Whitsitt’s model, AFRICOM
would continue to be led by a military officer. However, the command would have a single
deputy commander, who would be a State Department ambassador, unlike the current
AFRICOM structure which has a military flag officer serving as a second deputy commander.
Below the command section, the staff would be inherently interagency and organized more like a JIACG, with the military J-staff working as a supporting effort to the main interagency staff.\textsuperscript{45}

![Figure 11. Regional Military-Led Model – The Interagency COCOM\textsuperscript{46}](image)

Finally, in a 2009 Air Command and Staff College paper, U.S. Air Force Major Brian Schafer proposed a reform to create a more robust planning organization for the Geographic Combatant Commander. This organization, called a Joint Planning Group (JPG), would combine the command’s J-5 Plans Directorate, the JIACG, and a Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT), bringing together the GCC’s standard military planning organization (the J-5) with the interagency (through the JIACG) and foreign partners in the AOR (through the MPAT).\textsuperscript{47} In this construct, Schafer proposed that the J-5 Director would lead all
planning efforts across the interagency and with coalition partners. The JIACG would be led by a military officer “so the military can guide the interagency partners through the military planning cycle and expertly inject their civilian expertise into the planning process as needed,” while a deputy director from a non-DoD agency “would have the necessary authority over its members to make things happen with no legal issues arising.” Within the combined organization, the J-5 would take the lead for combat operations, the JIACG would take the lead for interagency-heavy non-combat contingency operations, and the MPAT would take the lead for multinational crises and humanitarian operations, in each case with the other two parts of the organization in support.

**A Parallel Regional Structure**

Finally, some reformers propose a fourth type of regional-level model in which the GCC and a regional civilian interagency organization both exist, with neither having authority over the other and each reporting to different agencies in Washington. Like the military-centric regional model, all the proponents of this reform proposal found in the literature were members of the military, who tend to view the Combatant Command as a successful template and look to the civilian side of government to create something similar to balance power and capabilities between the military and civilian sides of government at the regional level without diminishing the effectiveness or independence of the GCC. However, it is not clear that any of these proposed models produce regional unity of effort, since the parallel civilian and military organizations report to separate bosses in Washington.

In a 2005 Naval War College paper, U.S. Navy Lieutenant Commander Darin Liston proposed creating an operational level of government for all U.S. civilian agencies equivalent to the military’s Geographic Combatant Commands. To do this, the State Department’s Regional
Assistant Secretaries and staffs would relocate to the regions and become the equivalent of a civilian government “commander” for the region, with all non-military U.S. agencies in the region falling under their authority, including the ambassadors. The Regional Bureau Chief (RBC) and his staff would collocate with the Geographic Combatant Commander to facilitate civil-military coordination and a close working relationship, but the RBC and GCC would be peers, with neither having authority over the other and both reporting to their separate agencies in Washington.51

In a 2005 Policy Review article, U.S. Marine Corps Major Sunil Desai notes that the military has effective regional structures, while the State Department expects nearly 200 ambassadors to report directly back to Washington. To enhance the power of the State Department at the regional level, where the Combatant Commander currently has the most prominent role, and to create a more manageable span of control over smaller groups of ambassadors, Desai recommends creating U.S. Regional Ambassadors, who would be senior to country ambassadors, providing a strong parallel State Department chain of command to coordinate with the regional leaders of other U.S. agencies.52 Like Liston’s model, the Regional Ambassador and Geographic Combatant Commander would be peers, with neither having the authority or responsibility to achieve civil-military unity of effort.

In a 2005 Small Wars Journal article, U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel Harold Van Opdorp proposed creating a “Regional JIACG Headquarters,”53 (HQ) which again would be a regional organization to centralize all non-military U.S. agencies in the region. This organization’s director would be appointed by the NSC, likely from the State Department, and he would report directly to the NSC, rather than a lead agency. The Regional JIACG HQ director would integrate planning at the regional level across the interagency, including the Geographic
Combatant Commander, though again the relationship between the Regional JIACG HQ and the COCOM would be that of equals, with neither having directive authority over the other.54

Further developing this model in a 2008 American Diplomacy article, U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Shannon Caudill, U.S. Army Major Andrew Leonard, and U.S. Marine Corps Sergeant Major Richard Thresher recommended the State Department create a Regional Chief of Mission (RCM) in each region to lead the region’s non-military elements of U.S. power, be responsible for developing an interagency strategic plan for the region, integrate interagency activities in the region, and act as the primary American voice in the region. This diplomatic post would be on par with the military’s Geographic Combatant Command, and a joint interagency planning cell between the RCM and the GCC would facilitate civil-military coordination for planning and execution. Caudill, et al., argue that this construct would “lower the profile, but not the effectiveness, of the . . . regional combatant command.”55 The regional parallel structure model is shown in Figure 12.
Reform Options at the Country Level during Crisis Operations

This chapter now examines interagency reform options at the sub-regional or country level. There are two conditions to consider at the country level – normal operations and crisis operations.

During normal, peacetime operations, the U.S. ambassador leads the country team of all interagency personnel assigned to the embassy and other missions in the country. Few of the interagency reform proposals in the literature take issue with this construct. However, many authors note the ambassadors’ de facto authority is much weaker than their de jure authority, as expressed in Title 22 U.S. Code and the ambassador’s letter of appointment from the President.
To enhance the de facto authority of the ambassadors, the “State Department in 2025” working group recommended that the President issue an Executive Order codifying the ambassador’s authorities, which are currently carried in the Presidential letter, and further recommended that the ambassador be the rater for all of the other agency heads in the country, so the other agencies would truly work for the ambassador.⁵⁹ Along similar lines, the PNSR study team recommended improving the language in the President’s letter “to reinforce the de jure authority provided in Title 22 USC Section 3927, and establish procedures for ensuring that country teams are, in fact, true interagency teams rather than a collection of individuals pursuing independent departmental/agency agendas.”⁶⁰ Additionally, the PNSR team recommended providing each ambassador “control over the assignment, evaluation, and rewards for any official assigned to an embassy or mission staff,”⁶¹ including all military personnel not executing missions for the combatant commander under Title 10 U.S. Code, who would report to the ambassador through the Senior Defense Official in the embassy as defined in DoD Directive 5105.75, issued 27 December 2007.⁶²

During crisis operations, however, there is more need for reform, and several authors have proposed various structures to enhance interagency unity of effort at the country level. This final section of the chapter considers four possible general structures: (1) an interagency organization, (2) a State Department-led organization, (3) a military-led organization, or (4) a parallel structure. As currently practiced, the closest structures the U.S. has to sub-regional interagency organizations are the JIATFs at SOUTHCOM and PACOM, which combine military, law enforcement, and intelligence community personnel in a unified structure. There are no current or recent examples of State Department-led sub-regional interagency organizations. On the other hand, there are several recent examples of military-led sub-regional interagency organizations,
including the MACV/CORDS structure in Vietnam and ORHA in Iraq. Finally, there are parallel structures today in both Iraq and Afghanistan, with the embassy and military Joint Task Forces coordinating with one another, but with neither formally subordinate to the other. There have been similar parallel structures during humanitarian response operations, with the military and USAID coordinating but with neither subordinate to the other, such as the response to the 2004 Asian tsunami.

**An Interagency Structure**

The first type of sub-regional reform model envisions creating an integrated interagency task force for crisis operations, unifying interagency civilian and military efforts and command structures. Many of these proposals are similar to the current JIATFs at PACOM and SOUTHCOM, though with increased command authorities. The most prominent proponents of this reform model include the Defense Science Board’s 2004 summer study and the Project on National Security Reform.

The 2004 Defense Science Board summer study recommended establishing Joint Interagency Task forces composed of the leaders operating in the country or sub-region of interest, including the ambassador, the USAID country director, the CIA Chief of Station, and other senior agency representatives, and augmented with DoD personnel as needed, to coordinate planning with higher organizational levels and ensure coordinated action by all U.S. players.63

In a 2005 Naval War College paper, U.S. Navy Lieutenant Commander Darin Liston recommended establishing Joint Government Task Forces (JGTFs) for interagency contingency operations, led by either the military or a civilian agency, based on which agency’s core competency most closely aligned with the primary mission of the task force. This means a civilian could have command of assigned military forces.64 Connecting this to his regional-level
parallel structure recommendation described previously, the JGTF would report to either the GCC or the Regional Bureau depending on whether the commander was military or civilian. Liston’s proposed JGTFs would have stronger command arrangements than the current counternarcotics JIATFs at SOUTHCOM and PACOM. In JIATF-S and JIATF-W, the task force commander has only tactical control of the participating units, while operational control remains with the parent agencies. Liston recommends delegating operational control to JGTF commanders, similar to a military-only Joint Task Force. Liston would also align the two current JIATFs, and any future standing JIATFs, under the stronger JGTF model.\textsuperscript{65}

U.S. Marine Corps Major Sunil Desai, in his 2005 *Policy Review* article, recommended developing interagency task forces as needed for specific missions. These integrated task forces would be led by a Presidential Special Representative who would report directly to the President and would have an integrated headquarters staff of representatives from all relevant agencies. Desai does not specifically address how the civilian and military components would relate, but presumably they would all fall under this integrated task force. The major concern with this model is the proposal to have the task force leader report directly to the President; a handful of integrated task forces responding to crises around the globe could quickly overload the President.\textsuperscript{66}

In a 2005 Air Force Fellows paper, U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Ted Uchida recommended creating and deploying ad hoc interagency task forces (IATFs) for crisis operations. These IATFs would be task-organized to accomplish specific missions using the combined capabilities of the interagency and would have operational control and command authority over all forces assigned for planning, exercises, and mission execution.\textsuperscript{67}
In their 2008 and 2009 reports, the PNSR study team recommended creating integrated interagency Crisis Task Forces (CTFs) to conduct crisis operations at the sub-regional or country level. Unlike the parallel structure currently in use in U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the CTFs would have an integrated civil-military chain of command, as shown in Figure 13.68

A CTF would have a single director, a clear mission, resources, and authority commensurate with assigned responsibilities. The CTF director could be either military or civilian, depending on the security situation, and would be supported by an interagency staff.70 To connect with PNSR’s overall interagency reform recommendations, which does not envision a significant interagency presence at the regional level, the CTF director would report directly to
the President through the National Security Advisor for “large and important” crises and to the
director’s respective department (i.e. a lead agency) for less prominent crises. Once again, this
reporting structure appears to have the potential to overload the President. To ensure the CTF
director has the necessary level of authority, the PNSR study team says CTFs should be
authorized by Congress and chartered by the President.⁷¹

Most recently, Buchanan, et al., in a 2009 *Joint Force Quarterly* article, recommended
establishing Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs), subordinate to their proposed regional
interagency organization, to make operational-level crisis operations both joint and interagency
and provide command authority over all assigned interagency forces from the tactical level,
through the JIATF commander, to the regional JIACOM commander (per their regional-level
proposal), to the President through the NSC.⁷²

**State Leads**

The second type of sub-regional reform model for interagency crisis operations would put
the State Department in charge of the interagency task force. Interestingly, this study found no
incidences in two decades of interagency reform literature proposing this model, not even by
State Department-affiliated authors. However, the model is worth considering, for completeness
if nothing else.

In a State Department lead-agency model, the U.S. would create an Interagency Task Force
similar to those described in the previous section, but the leader of the IATF would always be
from the State Department. In countries with a functioning U.S. embassy and Ambassador, the
Ambassador would be the logical choice to lead the IATF, since he already has the responsibility
to lead all U.S. interagency activities in the country except for military forces involved in “major
military operations.” For cases in which there is no functioning U.S. embassy, as is often the
case immediately after an invasion or in a failed state which does not have diplomatic relations with the U.S., the President could designate a Special Envoy who would then report to the President through State Department channels, rather than directly to the President or National Security Advisor. This model is shown in Figure 14.

![Figure 14. Country Level: State-Led Interagency Task Force](image)

Under this model, the MACV/CORDS model in Vietnam would have been reversed, with the civilian CORDS director in overall charge of the U.S. effort in Vietnam and the MACV commander subordinate to him and providing military support to the overall U.S. effort. Similarly, in the first year after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, CPA Administrator and Presidential Special Envoy L. Paul Bremer would have been in charge of the overall U.S. effort in Iraq, with the military CJTF in support, rather than the uncoordinated parallel structure that existed. The
rationale for this proposal is that in complex operations, such as counterinsurgencies or post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction, the desired end state is political, not military. While security is a necessary part of the overall effort, the years of frustration during America’s efforts in Vietnam, Panama, Iraq, and Afghanistan demonstrate that great military effort is often expended to achieve little in the way of overall strategic goals if the military effort is not firmly directed toward the larger U.S. goals. This model would aim to put the right senior civilian with the right understanding of broad U.S. goals in charge of the response.

**The Military Leads**

The third type of sub-regional reform model for interagency crisis operations would put the military in charge of the interagency task force, as the U.S. did with the MACV/CORDS structure in Vietnam. Again, it is interesting to note that there has been almost no discussion in the literature about using this model, despite the fact that many historians and military analysts have praised the CORDS structure in Vietnam.

The only proposal of this type identified in the literature comes from a 2006 School of Advanced Military Studies paper by U.S. Army Major Ross Coffey, who believes a CORDS-like construct is still a good model. Coffey recommended that the State Department’s S/CRS should create a CORDS-type civilian interagency organization that would be a subordinate part of a military Joint Task Force, as was done in the MACV/CORDS construct in Vietnam. The military-led structure is shown in Figure 15. Coffey contends that this would be better than the current JIACG and JIATF models, which try to achieve unity of effort without unity of command, and would also be better than the parallel structure which is usually used today. He argues that the parallel structure mirrors the unsuccessful structure the U.S. used in Vietnam prior to the establishment of CORDS. 73
Finally, the fourth type of sub-regional reform model for interagency crisis operations would use a parallel civil-military structure with neither in overall charge of the effort. Currently, when the U.S. has both an embassy and a large military presence in a country, the formal chain of command over U.S. personnel in the country is usually split between the ambassador and the Joint Task Force Commander, with the Ambassador supervising non-DoD personnel while the JTF Commander commands the DoD personnel. The currently-used parallel structure is shown in Figure 16. The most significant proponent of this structure is the CSIS “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols” study team; few others have proposed this model. The PNSR study team contends that
these “dual civilian and military chains of command in the field complicate unity of purpose and effort.”

U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel Harold Van Opdorp, in a July 2005 *Small Wars Journal* article, proposed a classic parallel structure, creating a “deployable JIACG” which would unify the civilian interagency presence in a country under a single organization, which would operate in parallel with the military’s JTF. Depending on the situation either the deployable JIACG or the JTF would be the supported command, with the other acting in support. During major combat operations, the JTF would be the supported command, while during a humanitarian response operation, the deployable JIACG would most likely be the supported command. Van Opdorp notes that many operational plans incorporate phases, and the
supported/supporting relationship between the deployable JIACG and the JTF could change as the campaign phases change, for instance passing the leading role from the JTF to the deployable JIACG during the transition to post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction operations.\textsuperscript{78}

The CSIS study team proposed a much more integrated task force structure, but which at the end of the day still has two leaders reporting in two separate chains of command to Washington, albeit with an integrated staff and a great deal of coordination. The CSIS team recommended establishing an Interagency Task Force (IATF) to integrate the day-to-day efforts of all U.S. agencies participating in a crisis operation. The IATF would deploy to the field and would be jointly led by a military Joint Task Force commander and a civilian Special Representative appointed by the President.

The President’s Special Representative, who could be the U.S. ambassador to the country or another senior civilian of comparable stature, would be responsible for achieving the overall U.S. objectives for the mission and would have directive authority over all U.S. government civilians deployed to the field for the operation. The Special Representative would report to the President through the Secretary of State. The JTF commander, who would be a senior military officer, would be responsible for military operations. He would have operational control over all U.S. military forces deployed to the field for the operation and would report to the Geographic Combatant Commander, leaving the traditional military chain of command unbroken. While the Special Representative would have no direct authority over the JTF Commander, he would be able to raise disagreements to the National Security Council or the President for resolution.

Both the Special Representative and the JTF Commander would be supported by a single, integrated interagency staff, composed largely of military personnel under the command of the JTF commander, plus civilian personnel detailed from various agencies to work for the Special
Representative. For those occasions in which a functioning U.S. embassy exists, the integrated staff would augment the existing Country Team, which would then become the support staff for the operation.  The structure proposed by the CSIS team is shown in Figure 17.

Figure 17. Country-Level Parallel Structure Model – The Interagency Task Force

As this chapter has demonstrated, reformers over the years have proposed four main types of interagency reform at the regional level and four types of reform at the sub-regional, crisis operations level, each with several variations. The next chapter will analyze the four main types of models at each level, using the criteria presented in Chapter 1, and recommend organizational improvements at both the regional and sub-regional levels.
Notes

1 There are over 100 such references in the bibliography to this study.
2 Peter Halvorsen, Reforming the Interagency at the Operational Level (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 14 February 2005), 2.
3 Ibid., 14-16.
4 J. D. York, Militarizing the Interagency (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 14 February 2005), 16.
8 Ibid.
10 Gardner, “Fight the ‘Away Game’ as a Team,” 57.
14 Ibid., 77-78.
15 Project on National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield (Arlington, VA: Center for the Study of the Presidency, November 2008), 517-518.
16 Ibid., 441, 492-493, 500.
17 Ibid., 498-499, 501.
18 Ibid., 493, 501-502.
19 Ibid., 442.
20 Ibid., 492, 496-497.
21 Ibid., 501.
22 Buchanan, et al., “Death of the Combatant Command?” At the time of their 1st Quarter 2009 article in Joint Force Quarterly, Brigadier General Jeffrey Buchanan, U.S. Army, was Deputy Commander for Operations, Multi-National Division – Center, Iraq; Captain Maxie Y. Davis, U.S. Navy, was Deputy, Information Technology and Information Resource Management for Deputy Chief of Navy Operations, Communication Networks; and Colonel Lee T. Wight, U.S. Air Force, was Commander, 52nd Fighter Wing, Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany. An even more recent, though very brief, description of a reform proposal along these lines comes from Patrick Cronin and Kristin Lord, who advocate for “civilian-led equivalents of military combatant commands that can unify our diplomatic, development, public engagement and defense efforts,” which “may mean creating regional or subregional hubs, regional equivalents of
embassy country teams.” Patrick Cronin is a senior advisor and senior director at the Washington, DC think tank called the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) and a former Assistant Administrator for Policy and Program Coordination at USAID. Kristin Lord is vice president of director of studies at CNAS and a former special advisor to the U.S. Under Secretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs. Patrick Cronin and Kristin Lord, “Deploying Soft Power: Restructured, Larger Civilian Force Needed for Crises,” Defense News (12 April 2010), 53.

26 Mark L. Curry, The Interagency Process in Regional Foreign Policy (Ft Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 5 May 1994), 11-12.
27 Ibid, 35-36.
28 “Consulate” is the wrong word to use for Sylvia’s regional construct. According to the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, consular functions generally consist of protecting the interests of (in this case U.S.) persons and corporations in the host country and furthering commercial and economic relations between the two countries. The construct Sylvia describes would be better termed a Regional Interagency Mission. See United Nations, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (24 April 1963), and United Nations, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (18 April 1961).
29 Sylvia, Empowering Interagency Capabilities, 54-55.
30 Ibid., 56.
31 Ibid., 59.
33 Sylvia, Empowering Interagency Capabilities, 55.
35 Ibid., 35.
38 David S. Doyle, Interagency Cooperation for Irregular Warfare at the Combatant Command (Ft Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 14 April 2009), 56-57.
39 Arnas, et al., Harnessing the Interagency for Complex Operations, 16.
Notes

41 Karen D. Stoff, Strategic Planning and Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Command and Staff College, April 2006), 4-5.


43 Ibid., 26-28.

44 This COCOM construct with a civilian deputy commander and no military deputy commander would require that the civilian deputy have the authority to command military forces in the Combatant Commander’s absence. The U.S. already practices civilian control of the military, with the President and Secretary of Defense in charge of the military during both peace and war, and the civilian secretaries of the military services in charge of each service’s organize, train, and equip (i.e. peacetime) mission, so placing a civilian in charge of the military at the regional level is not without precedent, but would probably require Congressional legislation. Absent such legislation, AFRICOM, SOUTHCOM, and EUCOM have a military deputy commander as well as the civilian deputy, to preserve the military chain of command.


46 Naler, “Are We Ready for an Interagency Combatant Command?” 28.


48 Ibid, 13.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid, 14.


54 Ibid., 4-5.


56 Ibid., n.p. This is the author’s best interpretation of Caudill, et al.’s difficult-to-read figure.

57 The only study found in the literature which focuses on problems and proposed solutions for the embassy country team for both normal and crisis operations is Ambassador Robert B. Oakley and Michael Casey, Jr., “The Country Team: Restructuring America’s First Line of Engagement,” Joint Force Quarterly (no. 47, 4th Quarter 2007), 146-154. Oakley argues that the country team needs to be improved by enhancing the de facto authority of the Ambassador, giving the Ambassador the latitude to restructure the embassy country team as he sees fit, and creating a better interagency personnel system to develop better Ambassadors and agency heads.

Notes

59 Blechman, et al., *Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy*, 22.
61 Ibid., 20.
62 Ibid., 29.
64 As stated in note #41 of this chapter, this would likely require legislation.
65 Liston, *In the Interagency Process, Mere Coordination Is Not Enough*, 13, 15-16.
66 Desai, “Solving the Interagency Puzzle.”
68 Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 526.
69 Ibid., 538.
71 Project on National Security Reform, *Turning Ideas into Action*, 57.
74 Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 243.
75 Ibid., 538.
77 Ibid., 5.
78 Ibid., 6.
80 Ibid., 49.
Chapter 6

Analysis and Recommendation

Armed now with an understanding of (1) the military’s current structures for interagency coordination from Chapter 2, (2) U.S. civilian agency structures for interagency unity of effort from Chapter 3, (3) several examples of less-than-ideal U.S. interagency unity of effort in both peacetime and crisis from Chapter 4, and (4) the various interagency reform models proposed at the regional and sub-regional/country levels from Chapter 5, this chapter analyzes the reform options at the regional and sub-regional levels and describes the resulting model.¹ The analysis begins by deciding on the evaluation criteria. From the many criticisms brought against the current interagency structure and the identified problems in both recent and ongoing operations, this study proposes thirteen criteria by which to judge the proposed interagency reforms. Ideally, a better interagency structure would accomplish thirteen things, as described below.

First and foremost, this study argues that the military’s role in interagency foreign policy is too large, and a reform must be found that increases the ability of the State Department to lead U.S. foreign policy across the interagency. This is particularly important externally, where several potential international partners would like to engage with the U.S. but are wary of being associated with the U.S. military.² It is also a key element of strategic communication – the U.S. cannot easily promote strong civilian-led democracy abroad if the message is delivered by a uniformed officer.
Second, the reform must produce better coordinated planning at the strategic and operational levels than is now achieved. This study has demonstrated numerous examples, such as the U.S. interventions in Panama, Haiti, and Iraq where lack of coordination between agencies during the planning phase led to significant problems during execution, particularly when the military perceived it was time to hand over responsibility for the operation to another agency.

Third, the reform also must produce interagency unity of effort during execution. Uncoordinated actions are wasteful in time and resources, and can make it more difficult to accomplish U.S. goals. For example, if the Army Corps of Engineers builds a school, but USAID doesn’t assist with funding for teacher training, the effort to build the school was wasted and may even be counterproductive if it leads the local population to doubt U.S. abilities or commitment.

Fourth, reform should not be done only for reform’s sake. Any move to reorganize interagency structures and processes must lead to a system which is more effective, and also hopefully more efficient, than the various agencies each working alone, without the extra bureaucratic and resource overhead associated with interagency coordination. Increased effectiveness is absolutely required or the reform is counterproductive. Improved efficiency, while not required, is generally desirable. The PNSR study team notes that the current system “militate[s] against efficiency and effectiveness by undermining cooperation and collaboration, . . . [in which competition] and information hoarding between agencies and their personnel is often standard behavior.”

Fifth, the reform should task leaders at each level with clear responsibilities and give those leaders the necessary authority to carry out those responsibilities. Prominent management theorist Lyndall Urwick coined the Principle of Authority, which says there should be a clear line
of authority from the top of a management structure to every individual, and the Principle of Correspondence, which says a leader must be given authority commensurate with assigned responsibility. He argued that, no matter how complex an organization is, these principles should be observed.\textsuperscript{5} Too often, today’s system of interagency coordination assigns responsibility but does not clearly define a chain of command or provide a leader with the needed level of authority over personnel, resources, or processes of other agencies.

Sixth, the decisions made by the leader or leaders at each level must be perceived as legitimate by participants outside the leader’s home agency. Michael Donley notes, “Lack of complete authority and murky, unclear divisions of responsibility mean that legitimacy in decision making will be challenged.”\textsuperscript{6} This is often the case in today’s system, where decisions by a leader from one agency are not perceived as binding by another Executive Branch agency.

Seventh, the leaders of the interagency process at each level must have access to the necessary financial, personnel, and material resources from other agencies to be successful in their assigned mission. For example, the State Department or USAID is often tasked to accomplish a diplomatic or developmental mission which they cannot achieve without the logistical or security resources provided by the military. In some cases, this issue will require Congressional changes, as budgets are provided by Congress to individual agencies and the Executive Branch has limited authority to realign resources among agencies.

Eighth, the leader and organization at each level must have a clear chain of command to the President, who is the ultimate decision maker on foreign policy and national security issues. This is again Urwick’s Principle of Authority, which requires a clear line of authority from the top of a management structure to every individual. Structures which report generically to “the NSC” or in which multiple country-level or regional-level leaders report to different strategic-
level leaders in Washington lead to either undefined or multiple competing chains of authority to the President, violating this principle.

Ninth, the structure must not overburden the President and his national security advisory team, who need to be focused on strategic goals and policies rather than crisis decision-making. The PNSR study team notes, “White House centralization of interagency missions . . . risks creating an untenable span of control over policy implementation.”7 This “tends to burn out National Security Council staff, which impedes timely, disciplined, and integrated decision formulation and option assessment”8 and “almost guarantees an inability to do deliberate, careful strategy formulation.”9 Any reform of the interagency system “must free the president and his advisors for strategic direction by providing effective mechanisms for decentralizing national security issue management.”10

Tenth, the reform should fix the imbalance of bureaucratic power and prestige between the Departments of State and Defense. The additional power is required to ensure State’s voice is heard during interagency deliberations, and additional prestige is required for State to be able to obtain increased funding and personnel from Congress. Even Defense Secretary Gates has argued that the State Department needs additional resources and capacity to participate in the interagency process, saying whole-of-government approaches “can only be done if the State Department is given resources befitting the scope of its mission.”11

Eleventh, for the coordinated interagency system to improve its capabilities over time, personnel from across the participating agencies need both training and experience working with other agencies. Reform options that routinely place working-level personnel from different agencies in contact with each other are more likely to produce this than stovepiped agencies working in parallel or achieving coordination only through small interagency cells.
Twelfth, any changes to the interagency system should minimize the financial, personnel, and material costs required to establish the new system. The federal budget has limits, and advocating any reforms to Congress and the various interests in Washington will be much easier if costs are minimized.

Finally, changes to the interagency system should attempt to minimize culture shocks in the participating agencies. Much has been written about the different cultures in the various organizations, particularly between the military and the State Department. Reforms will be easier to advocate and implement if the working-level personnel in the participating agencies do not perceive the new procedures as threats to their careers or their sense of self. Cultures can be transformed, but it takes a great deal of time and effort to do so.

In summary, then, the thirteen evaluation criteria for interagency reform are:

1. Provide a non-military voice and face for U.S. foreign policy
2. Produce fully-coordinated planning
3. Produce unity of effort during execution
4. Be more efficient and effective than agencies working alone
5. Give the leader authority commensurate with his responsibility
6. Provide legitimacy to the leader’s decisions
7. Enable the leader to access necessary resources
8. Provide a clear chain of command to the President
9. Avoid overburdening the President with operational or crisis matters
10. Balance the power and prestige of the Departments of State and Defense
11. Develop interagency expertise among working-level personnel
12. Minimize the financial, personnel, and material costs of reform
13. Minimize agency culture shocks resulting from the reform.

The following sections will apply these thirteen evaluation criteria to the types of proposed interagency structures at the regional and sub-regional levels. In the analysis, each organizational structure in the typology developed in the last chapter receives a plus (+), a zero (0), or a minus (-), based on whether it is judged as good, neutral, or bad in meeting each criterion. Then the plusses are added and the minuses subtracted for each model to give a final
Despite the production of a numeric score for each model, this evaluation scheme is highly qualitative and arguably subjective on the part of the evaluator. Additionally, this model weights all the criteria equally, though it could be argued that some of the criteria are more important than others. However, given the qualitative and subjective nature of the evaluation against each criterion, it was not deemed prudent to further complicate the evaluation with a weighting scheme. Reversing the structure of the previous chapter, this chapter will build upward from the sub-regional/country level to the regional level.

**Country Level during Crisis**

In the previous chapter, this study described four general types of structures to reform the interagency for crisis operations at the sub-regional or country level: (1) an interagency organization, (2) a State Department-led organization, (3) a military-led organization, or (4) a parallel structure. The previous chapter described a range of possibilities under each structural type. To evaluate these structures, this study will consider the most robust versions of each structure – the interagency model described by the PNSR study team, Liston, and Buchanan, et al.; the State-led model described by this author; the military-led model described by Coffey; and the parallel structure model described by the CSIS study team. These four structures are assessed against the thirteen evaluation criteria in Table 3. Based on this analysis, the interagency task force is the best structural model for crisis operations at the sub-regional level.

Against the first criterion, the State Department-led interagency task force was judged as best able to guarantee there would be a non-military voice and face leading the sub-regional task force. The interagency organization was judged as neutral on this criterion, as this structure permits either a military or a civilian task force leader. Similarly, the parallel structure has both a civilian-led structure and a military-led structure, so it is also neutral against this measure.
Finally, the military-led task force is judged as negative on this measure, since it will never have a non-military leader.

**Table 3. Analysis of Country-Level Reform Models**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Criteria</th>
<th>Interagency Organization</th>
<th>State Leads</th>
<th>The Military Leads</th>
<th>Parallel Structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-military voice and face for U.S. foreign policy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fully-coordinated planning</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity of effort during execution</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More efficient and effective than agencies working alone</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader’s authority commensurate with responsibility</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy of leader’s decision making</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader can access necessary resources</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clear chain of command to the President</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not overburden the President</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance of power and prestige between DoD and DoS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develops interagency expertise</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform minimizes cost in money, personnel, and material</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform minimizes agency culture shocks</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td>+9</td>
<td>+6</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For the second criterion, the interagency organization, State-led organization, and military-led organization were all judged as able to produce fully-coordinated interagency plans at the sub-regional level. The parallel structure was judged as neutral because, with separate military and civilian leaders and no mandate for collaboration, the model would produce coordination when enforced by the two leaders, but could drift into uncoordinated stovepipes if the leaders and their staffs choose to work in traditional, comfortable channels rather than coordinating. These arguments are similar for these four models’ abilities to produce unity of effort during execution and to be more efficient and effective than the various agencies working separately, leading to the same evaluations for the third and fourth criteria.

For the fifth criterion, the interagency organization is judged to be able to provide the leader with authority commensurate with his responsibility, as this authority would need to be spelled out when establishing the task force. The leaders of the State-led and military-led models would likely have slightly less authority delegated to them since they would report to a lead agency, potentially limiting some of their authority over resources from other agencies. The parallel structure is judged negatively against this criterion, because while each of the leaders would have authority over their piece of the organization, there is no one in overall charge of the mission with the ability to enforce decisions on the other side of the organization.

For the sixth criterion, the interagency organization is judged to be able to provide the leader with the greatest legitimacy, since it would be specifically granted by the President and should not be seen as partial to any particular agency. The decisions of the leaders in the parallel structure will also be seen as legitimate by their subordinates, since the military is working for a military officer and the civilians are working in a traditional country team structure. The State-led and military-led task forces are judged as neutral against this criterion because, despite
enhanced authority being invested in these individuals, some personnel from other agencies may still perceive the leader’s decisions as biased toward their parent agencies.

For the seventh criterion, the interagency organization is judged to be best able to access the necessary resources from other agencies, again due to the leader’s status as a Presidential Representative. The State-led, military-led, and parallel structures, with the right authorities granted to the leaders, should all do reasonably well against this criterion, but the agency-specific nature of the leaders would probably lead to some occasional problems in accessing resources from outside the leader’s parent agency.

For the eighth criterion, the interagency model and both lead-agency models are assessed to provide clear, unambiguous chains of command from everyone in the task force, through the task force leader, up the chain to the President. The parallel structure model fares poorly against this measure because there is not a single leader at the sub-regional level, leading to multiple chains of command in the country and at higher levels all the way up to the President.

For the ninth criterion, the interagency model is judged as best able to keep non-strategic decisions from being routinely elevated to the President and his team of advisors for decision, as the interagency task force leader would have the authority and legitimacy to make most decisions at the lower level. The lead-agency models are assessed as neutral against this measure, since the leaders have most of the authority of the interagency leader, but slightly less legitimacy, likely leading to more calls for the President to adjudicate interagency disputes. The parallel structure model is judged as poor against this measure, since the lack of a single decision authority in the country means many more decisions will be elevated to higher levels for adjudication.
On the tenth criterion, the State-led model is best able to balance power and prestige between the Defense and State Departments. The interagency task force is judged as neutral because it may or may not increase State’s power and prestige depending on whether the task force leader and many of its staffers come from State. The military-led and parallel structures are both judged as poor against this measure, as both either maintain the current power balance or shift it further toward the military.

Against the eleventh criterion, all three single-leader task forces are assessed as likely to expose a sizable number of working-level personnel from different agencies to the interagency environment. The parallel structure is less likely to do so because coordination between the two organizations may be handled only by key leaders or a small coordination cell.

For the twelfth measure, the parallel structure is judged as the least costly to implement, as it essentially uses pieces that already exist. The other three structures are judged as neutral on this criterion, as they will all require some additional staff to implement, but they will again primarily be formed around personnel and resources that would have been used by the individual agencies in their response to the crisis.

Finally, for the last criterion, the parallel structure is judged to have the least impact on agency cultures, as the parallel structure is the way things are largely done today. The military-led and interagency structures are judged as neutral against this criterion because these models would culturally only be small shifts from the current way of doing business. However, the State-led model is judged as negative against this criterion, since it would take a substantial cultural shift in the State Department to be able to produce the leaders for these interagency crisis task forces.
Regional Level

Turning now to the regional level of organization, this study applies the evaluation criteria to the four general structures for regional interagency reform described in the last chapter: (1) a new regional-level interagency organization, (2) a structure in which the State Department leads at the regional level, (3) a structure in which the military leads at the regional level, and (4) a parallel structure in which the military and the State Department operate as equals in the region, coordinating their activities to some degree but reporting separately to their parent agencies. As with the country-level models, the previous chapter described a range of possibilities under each structural type. To evaluate these regional structures, this study will again consider the most robust versions of each structure – the interagency structures described by Gardner and by Buchanan, et al., and the robust Integrated Regional Center described by the PNSR study team; the State-led model described by Sylvia; the military-led models described by Naler and Whitsitt; and the parallel structure models by Desai and by Caudill, et al. These four structures are assessed against the thirteen evaluation criteria in Table 4. Based on this analysis, the State Department-led structure is the best model for integrating interagency foreign policy and national security at the regional level.

Against the first criterion, only the State-led model can guarantee a non-military voice and face for U.S. foreign policy at the regional level. The interagency structure was assessed as neutral on this measure because the leader could come from State or another agency. The parallel structure was also judged as neutral, because while the creation of a new regional-level State Department organization would certainly raise its profile in the region, the military’s Geographic Combatant Command would be engaging in the region at the same time. Finally, the
military-led solution was judged as negative against this criterion since it by definition puts a military face on U.S. regional engagement, one of the very problems this study set out to address.

Table 4. Analysis of Regional-Level Reform Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Criteria</th>
<th>Interagency Organization</th>
<th>State Leads</th>
<th>The Military Leads</th>
<th>Parallel Structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-military voice and face for U.S. foreign policy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fully-coordinated planning</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity of effort during execution</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More efficient and effective than agencies working alone</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader’s authority commensurate with responsibility</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy of leader’s decision making</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader can access necessary resources</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clear chain of command to the President</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not overburden the President</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance of power and prestige between DoD and DoS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develops interagency expertise</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform minimizes cost in money, personnel, and material</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform minimizes agency culture shocks</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>+6</strong></td>
<td><strong>+8</strong></td>
<td><strong>+1</strong></td>
<td><strong>-5</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
On the second measure, the interagency organization would be expected to produce fully-coordinated planning at the regional level, as the organization’s leader would have the authority to accomplish this. Similarly, the State-led model would be expected to do well in producing coordinated regional plans, because the organization is effectively identical to the proposed interagency regional organization, only with a leader from the State Department. The military-led model is judged neutral on this measure, because the current COCOM-led, JIACG-enabled model has not always produced coordinated regional plans. Finally, the parallel structure is judged as negative because, while the COCOM would have a regional peer with which to coordinate, there is no mechanism or single leader to enforce coordination between the two headquarters. The arguments are similar for producing regional unity of effort during execution, so the third criterion receives identical marks.

For the fourth criterion, the three single-leader models would be more efficient and effective than the agencies working individually, while the parallel structure is judged as neutral because the agencies are less closely tied together.

For the fifth measure, the interagency and State-led organizations are judged as best able to provide the leader with authority commensurate with his responsibilities, since this would be part of the charter for these organizations. This measure is judged neutral for the COCOM, since this study has demonstrated that the COCOM does not have the authority to compel interagency action, though he is often able to produce some amount of interagency unity informally. The parallel structure is judged as negative on this measure, since neither leader would have the authority to compel action from the other organization.

Against the sixth criterion, the interagency organization is judged to be best able to endow the leader’s decisions with legitimacy, as the leader would be perceived as representing the
President rather than a specific agency. The other three models are all judged as neutral against this criterion, because, while they would all have strong authority, the perception that the leaders primarily represented their parent agencies would decrease their legitimacy in the eyes of some personnel from other agencies.

On the seventh criterion, the interagency organization is assessed as able to access the necessary resources across the interagency, due to the interagency nature of the organization. The State-led regional organization is assessed similarly, as it is effectively an identical interagency organization, but headed by a leader from State. The military-led organization is assessed neutral, as it is less able to access resources from outside the DoD because the military-heavy structure is seen as less inherently interagency. The parallel structure is also judged as neutral because, while each leader would have access to resources from the agencies in their organization, the ability to share resources between organizations may be less than complete.

Against the eighth measure, the interagency model and the two lead-agency models are all assessed to have a clear chain of command to the President. The parallel structure is judged negatively against this criterion because the two leaders would report through separate chains of command in Washington.

On the ninth criterion, the State-led organization, organized as a regional-level “country team” and reporting to the Secretary of State rather than directly to the White House, is judged as the model best able to avoid overburdening the President with regional-level interagency policy disputes. The interagency organization is judged as neutral because it would report directly to the White House, requiring more of the President’s attention. The military-led model is also judged neutral because history has shown many agencies appeal to the White House when they dispute the combatant commander’s decisions. The parallel structure is judged as worst against
this criterion, because there is no decision-maker at the regional level, forcing all interagency decisions back to Washington, many of which would likely end up in the White House.

For the tenth measure, the State-led model and the parallel structure would both enhance the power and prestige of the State Department, because both would create a State-led presence in the region (or outside the region but focused exclusively on regional issues, as is the case with all the GCCs except EUCOM) which is currently lacking. The interagency organization is judged as neutral against this criterion because the organization may or may not be led by someone from State. The military-led model is judged as negative on this measure, as it would perpetuate DoD’s regional power and prestige.

On the eleventh measure, the regional interagency organization and the State-led organization would both create a new interagency headquarters with both a substantial civilian and military presence, leading to the assessment that these structures would do the most to develop a cadre of personnel with interagency expertise. The military-led model is judged as neutral on this criterion, as it creates only a small cadre of non-DoD civilians with experience on the COCOM staffs and a small number of military personnel who routinely work interagency issues with non-DoD personnel. The parallel structure is judged as negative on this criterion, because the civilian and military organizations would exist separately with only minimal contact opportunities, predominately by senior leaders and those in the coordination cell.

Against the twelfth criterion, only the military-led model is judged as a low-cost reform option, since it has already been implemented across the COCOMs. The other three structures would all involve creating a new headquarters, requiring substantial funding and new personnel resources.
Finally, against the thirteenth measure, the parallel structure model would have the least impact on agency cultures, as it looks very similar to current practice at the country level. The military led model is judged as neutral because, while it has already been largely implemented, it continues to cause cultural dislocations among some interagency personnel assigned to work with the COCOMs. The other two models are judged as negative against this measure, as both would require a significant change in State Department career paths and the development of State Department personnel capable of leading large regional interagency organizations or directorates within them.

**The Recommended Reform Model**

**The Model**

Assembling the sub-regional and regional pieces, this study recommends a new interagency structure at the regional and sub-regional levels. The above analysis points toward an interagency structure with a regional headquarters led by the State Department. This regional headquarters would conduct sub-regional operations by creating interagency task forces, which would be headed by a leader from the department or agency most appropriate to the mission.

Drawing on the regional-level recommendations from the previous chapter, this study recommends that the U.S. establish a U.S. Regional Mission (USRM) for each region. Each USRM would be led by a Regional Chief of Mission (RCOM), who should be a Foreign Service Officer with prior experience as an ambassador or Deputy Chief of Mission, or a politically-appointed ambassador. Because of the great deal of power and importance vested in this leader, the individual should be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Presidential nomination would allow this individual to carry the rank of Presidential Envoy or
Presidential Special Representative, as well as Ambassador at Large, to convey the importance of the position and its role as the region’s senior diplomat and overall senior Executive Branch representative, as well as the personal representative of the President. To ensure unambiguous State Department control over the organization, the deputy chief of this regional mission should also be a senior Foreign Service Officer, so the top leader would always be a State representative, even if the RCOM is travelling. The RCOM to the region would be supported by a robust interagency staff similar to the interagency country team at the country level. The Geographic Combatant Commander would remain the senior military officer in the region and would report to both the RCOM and through traditional DoD channels. To improve the USRM’s interagency capabilities, parts of the GCC’s staff would transfer to the interagency organization, including elements of the J-4 (Logistics), J-5 (Plans, Policy, and Strategy), and J-6 (Communications) to provide logistics, planning, and communication capabilities to the USRM. In addition, the GCC’s Theater Security Cooperation program would largely transfer to the USRM, as would the interagency coordination elements, such as the JIACG, since the USRM would lead interagency coordination for the region.

During crisis operations, the USRM would establish sub-regional or country-level Interagency Task Forces (IATFs). Drawing on the country-level recommendations from the previous chapter, each IATF would have a single director, a clear mission, resources, and authority commensurate with assigned responsibilities. The IATF director could be either military or civilian, depending on the security situation and which agency’s core competency most closely aligned with the primary mission of the task force. The IATF director would be supported by an interagency staff using an integrated civil-military chain of command. The task force would be provided with the necessary personnel and material resources from across the
interagency, including the military, and the IATF director would have operational control over all assigned forces. The recommended model is shown in Figure 18. This IATF model could also be used to strengthen the authorities of the existing counternarcotics JIATFs (JIATF-S and JIATF-W) by transforming them into IATFs and providing their directors with operational control over their assigned personnel and resources.

![Diagram of Recommended Regional and Sub-Regional Interagency Structure](image)

**Figure 18. Recommended Regional and Sub-Regional Interagency Structure**

The State-led U.S. Regional Mission with subordinate Interagency Task Forces could successfully plug into any of the three types of national-level structure listed in the three-level interagency reform typology listed in Table 2 in the previous chapter. In a national model with the State Department as lead agency, the RCOMs would report directly to the Secretary of State and would receive strategic-level staff support from the State Department’s Regional Bureaus in
the same way the Geographic Combatant Commanders receive strategic-level staff support from
the Joint Staff at the Pentagon. Interagency disputes which could not be settled by the Secretary
of State could be taken to the NSC, where they could be adjudicated by the Deputies Committee,
Principals Committee, or by the President, when necessary. Because the RCOM would also
carry the rank of Presidential Special Representative, he could also take issues directly to the
President for those, hopefully rare, cases in which he believed the Secretary of State was not
faithfully conveying his concerns in Washington.

In a national model with an interagency coordinating organization outside the NSC, the
RCOMs would report to the Secretary of State for administrative support and State-specific
staffing assistance from the Regional Bureaus, and to the director of the interagency organization
for interagency issues. Again, the RCOM would be able to access the President directly on those
few occasions when it was required. A national model with an enhanced NSC conducting
interagency coordination would work similarly, except the RCOM would take interagency issues
to the appropriate person or committee in the enhanced NSC structure. Appendix B provides a
more detailed description of the national-level interagency reform options proposed in the
literature.

Applying the Model

This study next describes how this new organizational structure would work in practice, by
applying it to the cases from Chapter 4, including peacetime theater engagement, response to
disaster or humanitarian crises, and both simple and complex military operations.

Under this new construct, the U.S. would continue the successes of the Geographic
Combatant Commands in both bilateral and regional security cooperation activities. However,
leadership and oversight of these activities across the region would now fall under the RCOM,
placing these engagement programs under the guidance of a senior diplomat, and planned and executed by an interagency USRM staff with representatives from State’s Political Military Bureau, USAID, and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, as well as the military. Under this model, all theater engagements would be sure to meet overall U.S. goals and not just military goals. Additionally, the personnel participating in the programs would come from the correct mix of agencies, ensuring a civilian, diplomatic face on a mission when necessary, leveraging USAID developmental expertise when such expertise is important to the engagement, etc.

For regional counterterrorism engagements, which require expertise from State, USAID, law enforcement, intelligence, Commerce, Treasury, and other agencies, as well as the military, moving the planning and supervision of these activities from the military’s Geographic Combatant Command to the U.S. Regional Mission would once again facilitate the correct interagency planning inputs and interagency participation during execution. Enduring regional counterterrorism engagements such as the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership could be executed by an Interagency Task Force established and supervised by the USRM. In all cases, overall authority over these engagements would fall under a senior diplomat, who would be able to harmonize these counterterrorism activities with broader U.S. policies and interests in the region. The centralized interagency planning would reduce the wasted efforts of uncoordinated agencies working in parallel, as sometimes happens today. Similarly, regional counternarcotics initiatives under SOUTHCOM and PACOM should be moved to the corresponding USRM, re-casting JIATF-S and JIATF-W as Interagency Task Forces (IATFs) with operational control over assigned assets, working under the supervision of the RCOM and a truly interagency regional headquarters.
For humanitarian responses to disasters such as the 2004 Asian tsunami or the 2010 Haitian earthquake, the USRM would combine the military’s logistical and communication capabilities, as well as its large pool of personnel, with the disaster response expertise of USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and the diplomatic skills of the State Department both to plan and coordinate the operation, and to execute the U.S. response. The response could be conducted as an IATF led by a senior USAID OFDA expert. The task force would initially have a large military component to provide search and rescue, logistics, and communication, but the military component would diminish over time, leaving OFDA in charge of the remaining interagency response, which could last for months or even years depending on the magnitude of the disaster and the capacity of the affected country or countries to recover.

For those military actions in which U.S. goals are fulfilled by the military alone – such as the 1986 Operation El Dorado Canyon bombing attack on Libya, cruise missile attacks against terrorist targets, hostage rescue missions, etc. – these would be planned and executed by a military-only Joint Task Force (JTF) under the command of the Geographic Combatant Commander. The RCOM would be kept informed, but the larger USRM staff would have little involvement. However, most military missions are much more complex and involve U.S. goals which are much larger than the military can accomplish on its own – goals such as creating stable, democratic governments in South Vietnam, Panama, Haiti, Afghanistan, and Iraq. These more complex missions with more ambitious goals should be planned by the interagency staff at the USRM and should be executed by an Interagency Task Force.

In Vietnam, the MACV/CORDS structure could have been designated an IATF as it was, with the civilian development element subordinate to the military effort, or it could perhaps better have been structured with the development director in overall command, while the military
commander executed those military missions which advanced the larger U.S. development goals in South Vietnam. Similarly, the 1989 intervention in Panama and the 1994 intervention in Haiti would have been planned by the USRM staff, ensuring interagency involvement from the very beginning rather than after U.S. military forces were on the ground. The missions would then have been executed by an IATF which would combine the military’s JTF headquarters and assigned forces with an Ambassador-designee for that country from the State Department and an interagency staff, elements of which would form the Ambassador’s country team once the U.S. embassy reopens. These elements would form an integrated IATF under the overall leadership of the future Ambassador.

The model would also work for today’s operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and would likely have avoided many of the problems the U.S. has faced in years of disjointed operations in both countries. In Afghanistan, given the limited time available for the response to the 9/11 attacks, the planning for the initial military operation may not have changed much, but there should have been parallel interagency planning at the USRM staff to determine how to get to the overall desired U.S. end state in Afghanistan, beyond the military’s initial plan to remove the Taliban from power and hunt for al-Qaeda terrorists. From the time the U.S. reopened the embassy in Kabul, U.S. forces in Afghanistan would have been an Interagency Task Force under overall supervision of the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, with the commander of U.S. military forces in Afghanistan as the Ambassador’s military deputy, producing unity of effort through unity of command, rather than personality-driven parallel structures which have existed through most of the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan. Similarly in Iraq, all U.S. elements would have operated under an IATF, with the military deputy initially leading the invasion, then the civilian director
of the task force – L. Paul Bremer – taking overall control of all U.S. actions in Iraq and ensuring all actions led toward a coherent end state.

**Requirements for Implementing the Reforms**

Finally, this chapter considers the requirements to implement the recommended interagency reforms. These requirements include overcoming bureaucratic resistance, obtaining the diplomatic endorsement of the rest of the world to accept these new constructs, choosing locations for the new U.S. Regional Missions, aligning the regional boundaries across the various U.S. departments and agencies, minimizing the cost of the reform and finding a way to pay the costs, addressing issues of agency culture and trained interagency personnel, and finally the requirements for Congressional action.

**Bureaucratic Resistance**

One issue to address when implementing any reforms in USG executive agencies is the entrenched power of bureaucracies and their desire to preserve the status quo. While the military has many proponents of various interagency reforms, relatively few of these proposals come from the State Department. This may be an indicator that those who hold bureaucratic power at State are not be in favor of reform along the lines advocated in this study. For example, the CORDS interagency construct used during the Vietnam War was largely supported by the DoD but opposed by non-DoD agencies, which continually tried to reduce the funding, personnel, and mission assigned to CORDS.\(^\text{16}\) Similarly, today there are those in the State Department – particularly in the Bureau of African Affairs and at U.S. embassies across Africa – who do not support the establishment of the military’s new U.S. Africa Command.\(^\text{17}\)
One group at the State Department which may be particularly resistant to the proposal to create a new State-led regional interagency organization is the Assistant Secretaries of State who currently lead the six regional bureaus. As the proposed new Regional Chiefs of Mission assume greater power over interagency planning and execution at the operational level, as well as some authority over the U.S. embassies in their respective regions, the regional Assistant Secretaries in Washington will almost certainly lose some power and resources. To make this reform more palatable for these Assistant Secretaries, their role as strategic-level leaders of foreign policy development and coordination should be maintained and codified. Additionally, if more resources are directed toward the State Department as part of the reform (which would almost certainly be the case), some of these additional resources could go to the regional bureaus to ensure the Assistant Secretaries have the necessary manpower and funding to fulfill their strategic-level mandate.

Another group which may resist this reform is the American Foreign Service Association – the bargaining organization which protects the interests of America’s Foreign Service Officers. FSOs may be concerned about their career paths as a result of these reforms, such as whether serving as a U.S. ambassador to a country is as prestigious under the new model, or whether service in interagency organizations will derail their careers. These concerns could be addressed by clearly describing the new career tracks for FSOs and offering suitable promotion, monetary, or other incentives for accepting the new career paths.

Outside the State Department, other non-DoD agencies may also resist this new interagency construct, because their personnel will report to leaders from another agency when serving at the new USRMds or IATFs, which would be perceived by many leaders in these agencies as a diminution of their power. As with the regional Assistant Secretaries of State and FSOs,
addressing the concerns of these non-DoD, non-State leaders could include providing them with additional personnel and funding, clarifying and codifying their roles and authorities under the new system, and clearly delineating career paths in these agencies which will lead to senior levels of leadership.

**Diplomatic Endorsement**

Perhaps the greatest challenge in creating the new U.S. Regional Missions is obtaining the diplomatic acceptance and endorsement from the rest of the world for this new U.S. foreign affairs construct. Around the world, today’s diplomatic relations are predominantly bilateral, and most countries are likely to prefer to continue their bilateral relations with the U.S. via reciprocal embassies in each nation’s capital, rather than relating to a new U.S. regional diplomatic construct. However, these U.S. Regional Missions will not change the way countries relate to the U.S., because the U.S. embassies will still be there, and the U.S. ambassadors will still have plenipotentiary powers to directly represent the U.S. in that nation. Indeed, the new U.S. regional missions should actually improve bilateral relations, because the country-level ambassadors would be supported by a regional-level pool of interagency resources to aid the ambassadors in their country-level activities. The Regional Chief of Mission would only be expected to redirect the actions of a country-level U.S. ambassador in those cases in which broader regional or global U.S. interests require a change of approach at the country level. In today’s age of rapid global communication, U.S. ambassadors are not truly independent and isolated representatives of the U.S. to their country – the Secretary of State provides guidance to U.S. ambassadors as needed – so occasional inputs from the new RCOM should not fundamentally change an ambassador’s latitude to execute his bilateral diplomatic function.
The U.S. would need to exercise caution to ensure countries did not start bypassing the U.S. ambassador to their country in favor of the new RCOM. In the same way that some foreign leaders “follow the money” and choose to deal increasingly with the Geographic Combatant Commander rather than the local U.S. ambassador to their country, the presence of a new RCOM could produce a similar temptation. One way to minimize this problem would be for the RCOM to have relatively little direct interaction with senior foreign leaders, instead working primarily with the U.S. actors in the region and back in Washington.

It is not envisioned that the new U.S. Regional Missions would be accredited diplomatic representatives to any particular regional multilateral counterpart. This means there would be no expectation for the regions of the world to create a counterpart organization to the U.S. Regional Missions or to provide a reciprocal regional representative in Washington. The Regional Chief of Mission would be an Ambassador at Large and Presidential Envoy, meaning the RCOM would represent the President and U.S. interests in the region, but would not be accredited to any particular foreign government or regional multilateral organization.

The new U.S. Regional Missions would not replace the current multilateral U.S. Missions to the EU, OSCE, OAS, AU, ASEAN, and NATO, which would continue to be led by U.S. ambassadors accredited to these multilateral organizations. Instead, the new USRMs would provide additional support, when required, to these multilateral missions, in the same way they support the bilateral U.S. embassies.

When establishing these new USRMs, the U.S. would need to exercise great care to ensure the new organizations are not perceived as imperial proconsulates or neo-colonial entities. This could be accomplished with energetic diplomacy, strategic communication, and judicious choice of location for these new entities. The intent of these new civilian-led regional organizations is
to establish entities which are more acceptable to foreign perceptions than the current military Geographic Combatant Commands, with their Areas of Responsibility which span the globe. As the USRM coordinates U.S. interagency activities in the region, the GCCs should become less visible, placing the face of a diplomat rather than a military officer on U.S. actions in the region.

At the sub-regional, crisis-action level, achieving diplomatic acceptance of the new Interagency Task Force (IATF) structure should be much less challenging. When the U.S. is conducting non-combat actions such as disaster relief, it should be more acceptable to many host nations to work with a U.S. IATF headed by a senior USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance representative, for example, than one headed by a military officer. Similarly, in complex reconstruction and stabilization operations, host nations would probably perceive a U.S. IATF headed by a senior diplomat or reconstruction and stabilization specialist, rather than a military officer, as more of an offer of assistance and less of a threat to their country’s sovereignty. In those, hopefully few, cases of U.S. military action in a non-permissive environment, the IATF would likely be led by a military officer, at least initially, which would be welcomed by threatened governments in the region, while the perceptions of the target nation would be largely irrelevant.

**Locating the U.S. Regional Missions**

Choosing suitable locations for these new U.S. Regional Missions would be an important factor in both their diplomatic acceptance and their effectiveness. While it is perhaps desirable to locate these new USRMs in their respective regions (to decrease travel time to the countries in the region, if nothing else), it is not required. Currently only one of the GCCs is in its respective region (EUCOM is in Stuttgart, Germany), while the others are outside their region or in the U.S. (AFRICOM is also in Stuttgart, Germany; CENTCOM is in Tampa, Florida; SOUTHCOM is in
Miami, Florida; and PACOM is in Honolulu, Hawaii). The USRMs corresponding to CENTCOM, SOUTHCOM, and PACOM could be collocated with the GCCs, which would be possible without finding a willing host nation for a new U.S. mission and make it easier for the RCOM to leverage the GCC’s logistical, planning, communication, and personnel resources.

It is also possible that countries in one or more regions would be interested in hosting these new USRMs, perhaps for a stronger relationship with the U.S. or for regional prestige, or because it makes sense to collocate these new USRMs near other multilateral diplomatic entities. For example, the USRM for Europe might find a suitable home in Brussels, Belgium (home of NATO and the EU’s European Council) or Vienna, Austria (home of many global IGOs under the auspices of the UN). The USRM for Africa might be invited to locate in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, with the headquarters of the African Union, or perhaps in Vienna, which is the location of many Africa-focused UN agencies. Similarly, the USRM for the Pacific region might one day be invited to locate in Jakarta, Indonesia, with the headquarters of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (though the history of U.S.-Indonesian bilateral relations makes this unlikely anytime soon). By this reasoning, the USRM for the Americas and the Caribbean might best be located in Washington to be near the headquarters of the OAS. For the Middle East and Central Asia, a minimal U.S. footprint in the region probably best suits U.S. diplomatic goals in the region, so the USRM for this region would probably be best located near CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa, or elsewhere in the U.S. Ultimately, the locations of these new U.S. Regional Missions are less important than their existence and their acceptance to nations in the region.
Regional Boundaries

The major agencies involved in foreign policy each draw different regional boundaries. While the military currently divides the world into six regions (including NORTHCOM), none of the other agencies and departments involved in foreign policy divides the world the same way, making direct coordination between agencies challenging.\textsuperscript{18} The State Department divides the world into six regions with different boundaries. The CIA uses seven regions. Even the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) divides the world into four regions, choosing a scheme different from its combatant commands.\textsuperscript{19}

If the State Department, the military, and other agencies are going to work more closely together at the regional level, it makes sense for the agencies to agree on a common map of regional boundaries. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a set of U.S. Regional Missions with subordinate Geographic Combatant Commands and personnel from other agencies, all supported by various staff structures in Washington, working at all if the various parts do not all use a common map. For example, if the current map boundaries were used, the USRM for South and Central Asian Affairs (aligned with the State Department’s regional bureau of the same name) would have to supervise the work of two combatant commanders – PACOM and CENTCOM. However, PACOM would also report to the USRM for East Asia and Pacific Affairs and CENTCOM would also report to the USRM for Near Eastern Affairs. Similar problems exist elsewhere between the State Department and GCC regional maps, and the problem gets worse once the regional maps of other agencies are considered. There may be diplomatic reasons for a small number of exceptions (for example, Canada for many years wanted the State Department to include it in its Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs rather than its Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs),\textsuperscript{20} but exceptions should not be made for the convenience of various U.S. agencies.
Several of the reform proposals – including the Project for National Security Reform (PNSR) and the CSIS “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols” studies – have recognized the problem and recommended establishing a common regional map across the interagency. Several other authors have also proposed fixing this issue, including one School of Advanced Military Studies student who devoted an entire paper to the topic.\textsuperscript{21} President Obama’s National Security Advisor, General (Retired) James L. Jones, has also affirmed the need for unified regional boundaries across the interagency, saying, “We are going to reflect in the NSC all the regions of the world along some map line we can all agree on.”\textsuperscript{22}

**Cost**

Any reform of the interagency system will become more difficult, or even impossible, as the projected cost of the reform increases. While it is beyond the scope of this study to conduct a detailed assessment of the costs of this reform, some ballpark estimates can be offered for the country-level IATFs and the regional-level USRMs.

The sub-regional level reforms would cost relatively little, since the envisioned IATFs would mostly be military-heavy organizations like today’s JTFs and JIATFs, predominantly using the same personnel and equipment used by today’s organizations. However, a modest number of additional personnel from other agencies would be required which are not already present today; as few as ten or twenty for a small operation to as many as a few hundred for a large, complex operations like CPA’s administration of Iraq prior to returning sovereignty to the Iraqi government. At any given time, from two to ten IATFs would probably be active around the world, leading to a surge requirement of perhaps 100-1,000 non-DoD personnel across the interagency, which would cost in the neighborhood of $10-100 million in annual salaries, plus training, pensions etc.\textsuperscript{23} However, if legislation were to shift this number of personnel billets
from the DoD to the other agencies, this could be cost-neutral except for the additional training. Shifting the billets would make sense, since the increased presence of the interagency in these operations would be expected to reduce the workload on the military.

The new U.S. Regional Missions on the other hand, could potentially drive a much larger bill. Each USRM would require a headquarters building, office equipment, and an operating budget, as well as perhaps 200-500 staff personnel from across the interagency. This could be a bill of perhaps $5-25 million for each facility, $10-30 million for the operating budget, and $20-50 million for the personnel. Assuming five regions, this would drive a bill that includes five headquarters buildings, five operating budgets, and 1,000-5,000 personnel; perhaps an upfront cost of $25-125 million and annual personnel and operating costs of $150-400 million. Some of the USRM staff would be military personnel reassigned from the combatant command or elsewhere in the DoD. The other staffers would have to come from non-DoD agencies, but billets could again be transferred from the military to non-military agencies, potentially driving down the costs. Additionally, if the USRMs are collocated with the current GCCs, they may even be able to share office space (because the GCC staff should shrink as the USRM assumes some of its functions), driving down some or all of the facility costs.

The USRMs may achieve some modest savings in personnel cost by centralizing at the USRM some of the low-density, high-demand interagency personnel from some of the country teams, making these scarce experts available for use across the region. The Regional Chief of Mission, the U.S. bilateral ambassadors, and the various Executive Branch agencies would have to carefully examine each such expert and determine whether the individual would be best used in a regional or a bilateral capacity.
Personnel and Culture

While funding for the new model may not be difficult to arrange, actually recruiting and training the necessary 1,100-6,000 new personnel for the non-DoD agencies could be much more challenging, since the skill sets in these agencies tend to require much more initial education than the average entry-level military position. It might take a period of several years to recruit the necessary personnel and run them through the Foreign Service Institute, National Defense University, or other interagency schools. In the interim, the new organizations could be temporarily over-staffed with military personnel and DoD civilians, who would be returned to the DoD as the non-DoD personnel become available.

Of perhaps greater importance than recruiting and training new personnel is developing a true interagency career path. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) concurred, saying that interagency operations would be strengthened by establishing a National Security Officer career path.26 The 2010 QDR also addressed this issue, recommending that the USG “allocate additional resources across the government and fully implement the National Security Professional (NSP) program to improve cross-agency training, education, and professional experience opportunities.”27

The Goldwater-Nichols act created the joint military, in part, by requiring that all flag-rank military personnel have experience in a qualifying joint position. Beyond this requirement, the existence of the regional and functional combatant commands, the joint staff, and the many joint task forces provides plenty of opportunities for military officers to gain experience working in the joint military environment at multiple points in their careers. While mandated interagency experience may not be required for senior leadership positions, the new system of interagency organizations would have to offer opportunities at several points in an individual’s career to gain interagency experience at the working level, line supervisory level, and directorate level if the
U.S. hopes to create a cadre of experienced interagency professionals. The creation of interagency professionals would also benefit from opportunities to attend professional interagency education, analogous to professional military education (PME), at one or more points in an interagency civilian’s career. This would drive bills both for the cost of a school and instructors and for enough surplus personnel in the small agencies involved in national security and foreign affairs so some could be away from their agencies attending school while all critical billets were still filled.

A further step beyond creating enough personnel for the non-DoD agencies and devising an interagency career field, is making service in interagency organizations an acceptable and even valued part of each participating agency’s culture. Today, many professionals in the non-DoD agencies are strongly partial to their agency’s culture and would prefer to work only within their own agency. Over time, this cultural isolation would need to change. A defined interagency career path and opportunities to attend school with personnel from other agencies would help, but most of all, this change will simply take time to evolve.

**Legislation**

Large changes to the national security system, above the level of a single agency or department, would almost certainly require the action of both the President and Congress. Some have argued that a Presidential Executive Order would be sufficient to enact the proposed reforms, but this is almost certainly not the case. While an Executive Order might serve to change the interagency system during that President’s administration, history indicates it would be unlikely to remain the same under the next President. For example, President Clinton’s proposed PDD-56 reforms did not outlast his presidency (nor were they followed while he was in office). Additionally, an Executive Order does not presuppose any support from Congress,
which funds the national security system. Because political power in Congress is often strongly tied to the large sums of money associated with the defense budget, Congress will certainly want to be involved in any reforms that change the national security structure. The CSIS “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols” study team notes:

The role of Congress in the process is the most crucial determinant of the prospects for a reform effort. The recommendations that flow from congressionally-mandated groups, commissions, or blue ribbon panels are more likely to lead to lasting changes than efforts launched exclusively at the executive branch level.\(^30\)

Enduring change comes from legislation. Examples include the 1947 National Security Act which created, among other things, the National Security Council and the Department of Defense; the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act which created the joint military; the 2002 act which created the Department of Homeland Security; and the 2004 act which created the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the National Counterterrorism Center. Proper resourcing also comes from legislation. Michael Donley argues that, if a new interagency structure is established in statute, “Congress has a more visible obligation to provide supporting institutional resources.”\(^31\) The CSIS study team states that, “Legislation could also provide the basis for realigning agency authorities and resources to ensure that each agency has the capabilities it needs to execute its assigned tasks.”\(^32\)

Additionally, legislation would be required to place new interagency civilian leaders, such as the Regional Chief of Mission or a USAID OFDA expert leading a disaster-response IATF, in command of military forces. The U.S. already practices civilian control of the military, with the President and Secretary of Defense in charge of the military during both peace and war, and the civilian secretaries of the military services (Air Force, Army, and Navy) in charge of each service’s organize, train, and equip (i.e. peacetime) missions, so placing civilians in charge of the military at the regional or sub-regional levels is not without precedent.
Obtaining legislation for the new reforms would not be easy. Previous reforms have largely been in response to significant lessons learned from World War II, the failed hostage rescue mission in Iran, and the 9/11 attacks. This study has demonstrated that there are significant lessons available over more than two decades since Goldwater-Nichols that could serve to motivate the necessary reforms, but these lessons have not yet been enough to influence the President or Congress to devote political capital to a reform effort. Attempting changes across multiple agencies is particularly difficult in Congress because authority over the various agencies is distributed across multiple committees in the House and Senate, requiring not only the action of many different committees but the understanding that power in the committees will shift based on the reform. For example, the reforms proposed in this study would likely significantly strengthen the House and Senate Foreign Relations committees, while diminishing some of the power of the Armed Services committees.33

There is at least some interest in Congress in assessing and addressing the lack of interagency unity of effort. On 30 April 2009, Representative Randy Forbes (R-VA) sponsored the “Interagency Cooperation Commission Act,” which would “establish a commission to examine the long-term global challenges facing the United States and develop legislative and administrative proposals to improve interagency cooperation.”34 However, the bill has no co-sponsors, and has been stalled in the House Oversight and Government Reform committees Subcommittee on Government Management, Organization, and Procurement since 26 July 2009, with no plans for further action on the bill.35 Given the many other significant issues facing Congress at the time of this writing, coupled with the U.S. drawdown in Iraq this year and the anticipated drawdown in Afghanistan before the end of President Obama’s first term, there may
simply not be enough Congressional attention or interest to tackle a reform of this magnitude in the near future.

**What if There’s No Appetite for Interagency Reform?**

Assuming Congress is uninterested or unwilling to address interagency reform, and assuming that reform by Executive Order would have no lasting effect, is there anything the individual agencies can do within their existing budgets and authorities that would help? Currently, the State Department is very small in both budget and personnel and is already struggling to meet its current taskings, so there is little chance the State Department will take the initiative to implement the parts of this model that would fall within its jurisdiction.

The Defense Department, on the other hand, has a much larger budget and personnel pool, and also has more motivation to improve interagency coordination, since it is often the military that is asked to take on an inherently interagency task when there is simply no one else in government who can get the job done. However, the military has already done much of what it can do by itself to create interagency coordination and unity of effort. Additional, feasible steps in this direction could include continuing to evolve the Geographic Combatant Commands along the lines of SOUTHCOM, AFRICOM, and EUCOM, with civilian deputies to the commander from the State Department and robust partnering structures in their headquarters. Making increased use of the JIATF construct in areas like the Horn of Africa, Iraq, and Afghanistan would bring more interagency unity of effort and coordination to sub-regional missions. The DoD could also increase its current personnel exchange programs with the interagency, placing more officers in the State Department, USAID, and other agencies where civil-military contact will enhance working relationships and understanding on both sides. Finally, the DoD could fund additional billets at its professional military education schools like the Command and Staff
Colleges, the War Colleges, and National Defense University, to provide more opportunities for interagency personnel to get to know their military counterparts and experience a common national security curriculum.

**Notes**

1 For completeness, this study also applied the thirteen evaluation criteria to national-level interagency reform models proposed in the literature, but this set of evaluation criteria did not produce a clear recommendation for national-level reform. The details of the proposed national-level models and the (inconclusive) analysis are in Appendix B.


5 Dereck S. Pugh and David J. Hickson, *Great Writers on Organizations: Third Omnibus Edition* (Hampshire, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007), 149. Lyndall F. Urwick (1891-1983) had experience of both industry and the British Army, was director of the International Management Institute in Geneva, and subsequently devoted himself to lecturing and writing about management.


7 Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, viii.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid., 445.


12 “Leader” here refers to the leader of whatever organizations are constructed at the regional or sub-regional levels.

13 Increasing the prestige of the State Department relative to the Defense Department could also increase the relative prestige of other agencies, such as Commerce, Treasury, etc., but that is beyond the scope of this study.

14 The term “U.S. Regional Mission (USRM)” is proposed by the author to replace Sylvia’s misnamed “Regional Interagency Consulate (RIC),” which requires a new name since the proposed organization does not perform a consular function as defined by the *Vienna Convention on Consular Relations*. United Nations, *Vienna Convention on Consular Relations* (1963).

15 The Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) is the number two diplomat assigned to an embassy or mission and serves as the deputy to the Ambassador. While the Ambassador is often a
Notes

political appointee with no background in the Foreign Service, the DCM is nearly always a career Foreign Service Officer.


19 Ibid.

20 Dr Edwina Campbell, Professor of National Security Studies, Air Command and Staff College, and former Foreign Service Officer, correspondence with the author, 16 April 2010.


23 Based on a rough order of magnitude (ROM) cost of $100,000 in salary per person.

24 ROM cost based on an internet survey of 20,000-75,000 square-foot office buildings for sale in Miami and Honolulu, two of the regional current combatant command locations.


27 United States Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (February 2010), 71. The National Security Professional Development (NSPD) program was initiated by President George W. Bush by Executive Order in 2007; see President George W. Bush, Executive Order 13434, “National Security Professional Development,” (22 May 2007). According to the Congressional Research Service, the NSPD program has accomplished little, and E.O. 13434 excludes the military, the Foreign Service, and the intelligence community from the program, citing concerns the program would detract from these agencies’ already-established education and training paths. The CRS recommends Congressional legislation and oversight to improve the NSPD program. See Catherine Dale, Building and Interagency Cadre of National
Notes


Project on National Security Reform, Turning Ideas into Action, 19.

Murdock and Flournoy, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, Phase 2 Report, 147: “Executive-driven reforms often lack staying power . . . . The executive branch in the 1990s often sought to use existing agencies for new purposes through the exercise of executive fiat rather than seeking broad, bipartisan reforms. The result was the ‘bending’ of legacy institutions to new missions, often using Presidential directives and executive findings. . . . These executive-driven innovations had their uses . . . but rarely carried over into successive administrations.” See also J. D. York, Militarizing the Interagency, (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 14 February 2005), 13.

Murdock and Flournoy, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, Phase 2 Report, 146.

Donley, Rethinking the Interagency System, Part 2, 8.

Murdock and Flournoy, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, Phase 2 Report, 34.


RAND and the Army also note the prudence of this approach. In their “Integrating the Interagency in Planning for Army Stability Operations” project, the RAND team wrote, “The Army has a great interest in . . . a ‘whole-of-government’ approach to [Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction] operations, but the Army also has low leverage over the process. In addition, the DoD and the Army are in a position of trying to move the interagency collaboration process forward and simultaneously planning in case it fails.” Thomas S. Szayna, Integrating Civilian Agencies in Stability Operations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), xiv.
# Appendix A

## List of Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>Advance Civilian Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF</td>
<td>Bureau of African Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFF</td>
<td>Air Force Fellows</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>United States Africa Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATF</td>
<td>Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>Air University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4I</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBP</td>
<td>Customs and Border Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF</td>
<td>Command Collaborative Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>United States Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERP</td>
<td>Commander’s Emergency Response Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CETO</td>
<td>Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFLCC</td>
<td>Combined Forces Land Component Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIEG</td>
<td>Commander’s Interagency Engagement Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJCMOTF</td>
<td>Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJTF-HOA</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMG</td>
<td>Crisis Management Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMC</td>
<td>Combatant Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORDS</td>
<td>Office of Civil Operations and Revolutionary (or “Rural”) Development Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Coalition Provisional Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPITF</td>
<td>Contingency Planning and Integration Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>Civilian Response Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRC-A</td>
<td>Civilian Response Corps – Active</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRC-R</td>
<td>Civilian Response Corps – Reserve</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRC-S</td>
<td>Civilian Response Corps – Standby</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRSG</td>
<td>Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSF</td>
<td>Combined Support Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSG</td>
<td>Combined Support Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Center for Strategic and International Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>Counterterrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTF</td>
<td>Crisis Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>DART</td>
<td>Disaster Assistance Response Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Deputies Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCM</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCMA</td>
<td>Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities</td>
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HQ  Headquarters
IA  Interagency
IACG  Interagency Coordination Group
IAG  Interagency Action Group
IAHQ  Interagency Headquarters
IATF  Interagency Task Force
IAWG  Interagency Working Group
ICE  Immigration and Customs Enforcement
ICMAG  Integrated Civilian Military Action Group
ICPT  Interagency Crisis Planning Team
IGO  Intergovernmental Organization
IMS  Interagency Management System
IPC  Integration Planning Cell
IPC  Interagency Policy Committee
IRC  Integrated Regional Center
ISAF  International Security Assistance Force
J-1  Directorate of Manpower and Personnel
J-2  Directorate of Intelligence
J-3  Directorate of Operations
J-4  Directorate of Logistics
J-5  Directorate of Plans, Policy, and Strategy
J-6  Directorate of Communications
J-7  Directorate of Training, Exercises, and Engagement
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J-8</td>
<td>Directorate of Resources and Assessments</td>
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<td>J-9</td>
<td>Directorate of Partnering or Outreach</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCP</td>
<td>Joint Campaign Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFCOM</td>
<td>United States Joint Forces Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>JGTF</td>
<td>Joint Government Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIACG</td>
<td>Joint Interagency Coordination Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIACG/CT</td>
<td>Joint Interagency Coordination Group for Counterterrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIACOM</td>
<td>Joint Interagency Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIATF</td>
<td>Joint Interagency Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIATF-CTAP</td>
<td>Joint Interagency Task Force for Counterterrorism in the Asia-Pacific Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIATF-I</td>
<td>Joint Interagency Task Force – Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIATF-S</td>
<td>Joint Interagency Task Force – South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIATF-W</td>
<td>Joint Interagency Task Force – West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOC</td>
<td>Joint Operations Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>Joint Publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>JPG</td>
<td>Joint Planning Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF-5</td>
<td>Joint Task Force – 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>MACV</td>
<td>Military Assistance Command – Vietnam</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNF-I</td>
<td>Multinational Force – Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPAT</td>
<td>Multinational Planning Augmentation Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSG</td>
<td>Military Support Group</td>
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</table>
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCTC National Counterterrorism Center
NEA Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs
NGO Nongovernmental Organization
NIACCG National Interagency Contingency Coordinating Group
NIEOC National Interagency Emergency Operations Center
NORTHCOM United States Northern Command
NSA National Security Agency
NSC National Security Council
NSP National Security Professional
NSPD National Security Professional Development
OAS Organization of American States
ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence
OEF Operation Enduring Freedom
OFAC Office of Foreign Assets Control
OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom
OMA Office of Military Affairs
OMB Office of Management and Budget
OPG Operational Planning Group
OPLAN Operational Plan
ORHA Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OSD  Office of the Secretary of Defense
OTI  Office of Transition Initiatives
P   Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
PACOM United States Pacific Command
PC  Principals Committee
PCC Policy Coordination Committee
PDD Presidential Decision Directive
PM  Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
PME Professional Military Education
PNSR Project on National Security Reform
POLAD Political Advisor
PRSC Prevention, Reconstruction, and Stabilization Cell
PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team
QDR Quadrennial Defense Review
RBC Regional Bureau Chief
RCM Regional Chief of Mission
RCOM Regional Chief of Mission
RIB Regional Interest Bureau
SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SAMS School of Advanced Military Studies
SCA Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs
S/CRS Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
SDE Senior Developmental Education
SES Senior Executive Service
SJFHQ Standing Joint Force Headquarters
SOUTHCOM United States Southern Command
TSB Target Synchronization Board
TSC Theater Security Cooperation
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
USAF United States Air Force
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USFOR-A United States Forces – Afghanistan
USG United States Government
USRM United States Regional Mission
WHA Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
Appendix B

Interagency Reform at the National Level

While this study focuses on the regional and sub-regional levels of U.S. interagency foreign policy planning and operations, many authors have also proposed reforms of the interagency system at the strategic, national level. The following sections briefly describe three types of reform proposals at the national level and then apply the thirteen analysis criteria used in this study to these models. The analysis reveals that these criteria are not sufficient to select one of the three types of national-level interagency structures. However, as the previous chapter argues, the regional and sub-regional reforms proposed in this study would work regardless of which national level reform was chosen, or if no national-level reform occurred at all.

Reform Options at the National/Strategic Level

There are three general types of interagency reform models for the national/strategic level proposed in the literature. Authority and responsibility for leading interagency planning and coordinating execution of foreign policy and national security missions could be assigned to (1) a new interagency organization outside the National Security Council, (2) within the NSC under expanded authorities, or (3) with a lead cabinet-level agency (most likely either the State Department or the Defense Department) operating within the current NSC structure.

Many studies have argued that the U.S. government does not currently have a consistent structure or process for interagency coordination and unity of effort at the strategic level. At
times, all three strategic-level models have been used to some extent, while sometimes there is no coordination between agencies at all and each agency executes what it perceives as its part of the mission in isolation, using its preferred processes. Some examples of previous activities which have used some variation of the three strategic-level models include:

(1) **New Interagency Organization**: The Department of Homeland Security, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the National Counterterrorism Center, among other organizations, were created to produce interagency coordination and unity of effort outside the NSC, in response to perceived failures of the NSC system to produce the desired level of coordination. Similarly, one presidential envoy currently reports directly to the President, bypassing the NSC system (see Table 1).

(2) **NSC-Centric**: Two presidential envoys report to the National Security Advisor and strive to provide interagency unity of effort in their mission areas. However, absent special means like a presidential envoy, the NSC-centric system has often failed to produce the desired level of interagency coordination. As stated previously in this study, former CENTCOM Commander and Presidential Envoy General (Retired) Anthony Zinni stated, “In Washington, there is no one place, agency, or force that directs interagency cooperation,”¹ and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Vice Chairman General Pace said, “There is no one below the President ensuring the agencies work together.”²

(3) **Lead Agency**: The regional Assistant Secretaries of State chair Interagency Working Groups under the NSC to direct, coordinate, and supervise all interagency activities in their regions. However, this mechanism sometimes fails in practice to produce the desired level of interagency unity of effort. The creation of S/CRS at the State Department was another lead-agency attempt to empower the State Department to lead interagency activities related to
stabilization and reconstruction operations, though there is little information to indicate the new office has appreciably improved interagency unity of effort for this mission. Additionally, four presidential envoys report to the Secretary of State, which places their interagency staffs (for those who have such supporting staffs) under the State Department as the lead agency. Across the Potomac, the Department of Defense has also been the lead agency for some issues, such as planning for the 2003 invasion of Iraq and execution of the first year of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction in Iraq under ORHA and the CPA.

A National Interagency Organization outside the NSC

This first national-level interagency reform proposal envisions creating a new interagency organization in Washington which would have the responsibility and authority to coordinate interagency planning and execution, task cabinet-level agencies and other executive branch departments, and resolve interagency disputes. Proponents of this reform option include the 9/11 Commission and General (Retired) Anthony Zinni, who served as both a combatant commander and the Presidential Envoy to Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

A new national-level organization for interagency planning, operational direction, and oversight separate from the NSC could be created either inside or outside the Executive Office of the President (EOP). If the new organization were created within the EOP, it would keep the interagency coordination function close to the President and provide additional capacity for interagency planning and direction in the EOP while leaving the NSC staff free to concentrate on its role of developing policy and advising the President. However, this approach would create two similar national security staffs in the EOP, which could potentially complicate both coordination and oversight. If the new strategic-level interagency organization were created
outside the EOP, it would have some independence from the White House, potentially distancing the organization from politics.³

Whether inside or outside the EOP, the new organization would have the authority and resources necessary to lead integrated interagency planning and coordination for both steady-state and crisis activities, rather than relying on ad hoc or personality-driven arrangements. However, it would be expensive in personnel from across the relevant executive branch agencies, requiring the manning of a second national security-related staff. It could also be financially very expensive; for example the new Department of Homeland Security costs $30 billion annually in administrative overhead above the cost of running the twenty-two previously separate entities which were centralized under the new department.⁴ Additionally, this new organization would create a new layer of government between the President and his national security-related agencies and departments, which could create additional bureaucratic costs. Finally, unless the new organization were established in a suitably strong statute, the very powerful Secretaries of Defense and State, as well as others, might simply choose to work around the new agency.⁵

In one of the earliest proposals of this type, U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel James Bartran in a 2000 Army War College paper proposed creating a National Interagency Emergency Operations Center (NIEOC) in Washington with the responsibility to execute coordinated U.S. interagency responses to crises around the world. This organization would have a standing professional staff representing all relevant members of the interagency community and would be headed by a Presidential appointee who would have direct tasking authority over all government agencies designated in support of a crisis response. According to Bartran, the NIEOC director
could either report directly to the President (which puts the model in this outside-the-NSC category), or it could potentially fall under the NSC.\textsuperscript{6}

In 2004, the 9/11 Commission’s report identified the failure of interagency coordination as one of the causes of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and recommended creating new interagency institutions inside the EOP but separate from the NSC which would be empowered to coordinate interagency information sharing, jointly plan operations, and oversee the execution of interagency operations. The 9/11 Commission believed this structure would put a leader in charge to ensure unity of effort and improve efficiency, while leaving the NSC to focus on policy direction and advising the President. These recommendations led to the creation of the National Counterterrorist Center (NCTC) and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), which performs the interagency information sharing and oversight functions for counterterrorism and intelligence, though the NCTC lacks formal authority over the participating agencies and the ODNI is located outside the EOP.\textsuperscript{7}

Also in 2004, retired U.S. Marine Corps General Anthony Zinni, who served as both CENTCOM commander and presidential envoy, proposed creating an independent interagency organization to coordinate civil-military planning for complex contingency operations, saying, “The new organization should not be at the Cabinet level or within an existing government body, but instead should have representatives from different departments and agencies and make recommendations to the National Security Council.”\textsuperscript{8}

In a 2005 Naval War College paper, U.S. Marine Corps Major J. D. York proposed the creation of a unified interagency authority analogous to the creation of the joint military by the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. In York’s model, this new agency would replace the National Security Council and would be led by a Senate-confirmed director with a staff representing all
government agencies active in foreign policy. This director would replace the National Security Advisor as the principal advisor to the President for interagency foreign policy, would review interagency contingency plans, and would provide oversight of interagency operations.9 However, since the NSC no longer exists in this model, with its policy formulation and Presidential advisory functions subsumed by the new organization, one could argue that this is actually a model which places interagency coordination under the NSC, albeit with increased authority and a new name. U.S. Army Captain Timothy Hsia made a similar recommendation in a 2008 *Foreign Service Journal* article, calling for the establishment of a Foreign Policy Director, unaligned with either the State Department or the Defense Department, to be analogous to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the interagency to “orchestrate all the instruments of national policy.”10

In what is perhaps the most thorough description of this model, the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) in 2008 recommended creating within the EOP a Director for National Security (DNS) with “super-cabinet”11 authority. The National Security Advisor and NSC staff would remain, but the staff would be reduced to forty to fifty people and would only provide advice to the President. The DNS would help the President determine which issues should be assigned to lead agencies and which are inherently interagency. For interagency issues, the DNS and his staff would have the legal authority to supervise interagency teams working the issues and providing direction on the issues to all other executive branch agencies and departments, including directing mission execution. Under the supervision of the DNS, the PNSR study team recommends creating “empowered interagency teams”12 as needed to work on specific issues, and which would have the authority to direct the activities of executive branch departments and agencies within the scope of their mandate.13 However, in 2009, the PNSR study team issued a
new report which backed away from creating an interagency organization separate from the NSC and instead recommended performing the function within an NSC with expanded authorities and capabilities; this new recommendation is described in the next section.\textsuperscript{14}

**The NSC Leads**

The second type of interagency reform structure at the strategic level is the NSC-centric model, in which the NSC structure itself coordinates interagency planning and unity of effort. Proposals to strengthen the NSC’s authority and capability to provide strategic-level interagency coordination are the most common interagency reform recommendations at the strategic level. Structures in this model include those in which the NSC and staff directly conduct interagency coordination, those in which a permanent office subordinate to the NSC does so, and those in which ad hoc organizations are created for short-term issues or crisis operations and later disbanded. Prominent proponents of this reform model include the Defense Science Board, the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols study team at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the Project on National Security Reform.

Broadening the NSC’s responsibility to include the coordination of operational-level interagency planning and execution would make the NSC’s existing interagency committees responsible for these roles in addition to policy development and strategic-level interagency coordination. This approach has a couple of key advantages. First, if the policy developers are also responsible for oversight of execution, then addressing operational requirements, resources, command arrangements, and other implementation issues will become a natural extension of policy development, which would both produce a better-executable policy and help the NSC more fully advise the President on the implications of various courses of action. Additionally, this model provides an unambiguous chain of authority to the President. However, this approach
could divert the NSC’s attention from its primary policy development and Presidential advisory functions, leaving these roles incompletely accomplished as urgent operational issues crowd out strategy development. The Hart/Rudman Commission agreed, recommending the National Security Advisor and NSC staff focus on policy coordination and avoid becoming involved in planning, oversight of execution, or in any way becoming operators. The 9/11 Commission echoed this, saying operational planning and direction at the NSC overwhelms the staff and causes them to focus too much on day-to-day issues at the expense of advising the President on larger policy issues – another failure the Commission says contributed to the 9/11 attacks.

In 1993, U.S. Atlantic Command commander U.S. Navy Admiral Paul David Miller proposed the creation of ad hoc Interagency Action Groups (IAGs) under the NSC to coordinate interagency planning and execution for specific missions, such as counternarcotics or humanitarian assistance. IAGs would implement policy, facilitate and expedite interagency coordination, and adjudicate interagency issues during execution. IAGs would be established by Presidential decision and would report to the NSC. Each IAG would operate under the sponsorship of a lead agency, and the director of an IAG would be the deputy director of that lead agency or his immediate subordinate. A committee of senior representatives from the member agencies would advise and assist the director, and all relevant executive branch agencies would contribute working-level personnel. The IAG director would determine the capabilities and functions required, including personnel and budget from participating agencies, to meet the policy objective and task the organizations possessing the needed capabilities. Each participating department or agency would then use its own established procedures to execute its assigned functions. Upon mission completion, the IAG would be disbanded. This model contains many of the elements of today’s Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs), though
Miller’s IAGs operate at both the strategic and operational levels, while JIATFs today exist only at the operational level.

In 1997, the U.S. government came close to implementing an NSC-led process at the strategic level when President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56), which codified a process by which the NSC would lead interagency coordination, planning, and the monitoring of execution for “complex contingency operations.” As a result of interagency friction during the planning and execution of Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in 1992-1993 and Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti in 1994, President Clinton saw the need for a more systematic approach to interagency planning and execution for these types of complex contingency operations. PDD-56 sought to formalize an interagency process for these operations. Under PDD-56, once a crisis was declared, the NSC’s Deputies Committee would task the appropriate functional or regional Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) to lead the interagency coordination process for the contingency. The tasked PCC would then develop the “Pol-Mil Plan” – the strategic-level, interagency plan for the contingency – and the director of the PCC (an individual at the deputy assistant secretary level) would become responsible for policy development, planning, day-to-day oversight, and implementation of the Pol-Mil Plan across all executive branch agencies. However, President Clinton never used the PDD-56 process, instead preferring a less formal process, and in 2001, President George W. Bush rescinded PDD-56, so the NSC-centric process it described was never used.

In 1998, RAND analyst Bruce Pirnie described an NSC-led process specifically focused on interagency coordination of complex contingency operations that shares many features with PDD-56. In Pirnie’s model, the NSC’s standard system of committees would work together with a Presidentially-appointed Special Representative or Presidential Envoy to provide leadership for
the mission. The NSC’s Principals Committee would set the policy and strategy for the mission and the Deputies Committee would task a mission-specific NSC Executive Committee and the Special Representative to develop and coordinate an integrated political-military plan to meet the policy goals. The National Security Advisor would authenticate the completed political-military plan and the Special Representative would then lead the U.S. government’s execution of the plan, while the NSC’s tiered system of committees and interagency meetings would continue to revise policy and make day-to-day policy decisions. Pirnie’s addition of the Presidentially-appointed Special Representative is a significant new feature over the PDD-56 model. The Special Representative would provide sustained, personal leadership for the mission below the level of the President without assigning the leadership role to the National Security Advisor – a role which could both overload the advisor and cause him to be seen as having a vested interest in the mission and thus less of an honest broker during ongoing interagency policy development and any interagency disputes about the mission that the NSC would need to resolve.

In 2004, the Defense Science Board (DSB) recommended another variation of the NSC-centric model, this time focused on stabilization and reconstruction operations. The DSB stated, “The management discipline used by the military services to plan and prepare for combat operations must be extended to peacetime activities . . . across the government” and recommended creating a set of Contingency Planning and Integration Task Forces (CPITFs) under the NSC to direct the interagency planning effort and ensure interagency unity of effort for stabilization and reconstruction operations. Instead of waiting for a crisis requiring a stabilization and reconstruction operation to occur, CPITFs would be proactively established for all countries in which the NSC assessed that the risk of U.S. intervention leading to stabilization and reconstruction operations was high. The DSB believes there would be anywhere from two to
ten CPITFs in existence at a time, each staffed with personnel from all relevant executive branch agencies and all supported by a small permanent cadre on the NSC staff to provide continuity and expertise.\textsuperscript{27}

Also in 2004, Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson at the National Defense University’s Center for Technology and National Security Policy proposed a model similar to that in the 2004 DSB Summer Study. Binnendijk and Johnson advocate the creation of National Interagency Contingency Coordinating Groups (NIACCGs) under the NSC to plan and coordinate post-conflict operations. Each NIACCG would have representatives from all relevant executive branch departments and would provide strategic guidance and coordinate planning for a post-conflict operation. To coordinate national-level interagency planning with regional-level military planning conducted by the combatant commands, the NIACCGs would make use of the JIACGs at each Geographic Combatant Command.\textsuperscript{28}

In a 2005 Air Force Fellows paper, U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Ted Uchida recommended creating an Interagency Headquarters (IAHQ) in Washington.\textsuperscript{29} In this model, the NSC would organize and staff a single, national-level IAHQ with representatives from all executive branch agencies with a role in overseas crisis operations. This IAHQ would have both geographic and functional sub-directorates representing, as the Defense Science Board said, areas “where U.S. interests are very important and the risk of intervention is high.”\textsuperscript{30} The leader of the IAHQ would be nominated by the President, would not require Senate confirmation, and would report directly to the President and National Security Advisor. As needed, the IAHQ could create and deploy ad hoc interagency task forces (IATFs), which would be task-organized to accomplish specific missions using the combined capabilities of the interagency.\textsuperscript{31}
Also in 2005, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) released phase 2 of their *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols* study, led by Clark Murdock and Michèle Flournoy (who is now the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and who served in the Clinton Administration as both the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy), which offered one of the most comprehensive descriptions of the NSC-centric model, though again their model is specific to just complex contingency operations. The CSIS team recommended broadening the NSC beyond its traditional role of preparing policy decisions for the President to include a more active coordination and oversight role, ensuring Presidential intent is reflected in U.S. government actions, particularly for complex contingency operations. However, the CSIS team cautioned the NSC should not get involved in the actual conduct of operations and no NSC staffer should have directive authority over any executive branch agency or department.\(^\text{32}\)

To implement the NSC’s expanded role, the study team recommended making more use of the NSC staff by establishing a new Senior Director for Strategic Planning and a Senior Director for Complex Contingency Planning, each with support offices.\(^\text{33}\) Like PDD-56, in the CSIS model the strategic-level interagency process for a complex contingency operation would begin with a decision by the NSC Principals Committee or Deputies Committee, who would task the Deputy National Security Advisor to guide the development of planning guidance and oversee interagency planning. An NSC Executive Committee, composed of under secretaries or assistant secretaries from the relevant departments, chaired by the new NSC Senior Director for Complex Contingency Planning, and supported by the office of Complex Contingency Planning, would determine the desired strategic end state, the roles and responsibilities of the participating agencies, and the mechanisms to be used to achieve interagency unity of effort, and oversee the
operation on a day-to-day basis, while the NSC Deputies Committee would be the primary interagency decision-making body.\textsuperscript{34}

To connect the strategic-level, interagency planning and coordination in Washington with operational-level military planning at the Geographic Combatant Command, the NSC Executive Committee for the operation would assign personnel from their respective agencies to serve on an Interagency Crisis Planning Team (ICPT), which would be led by the NSC staff’s Senior Director for that region (positions which currently exist on the NSC staff) and which would deploy to the GCC headquarters as early as possible in the planning process to integrate civilian planning at the NSC with military planning at the GCC, reaching back to the NSC and their respective agencies as needed. The ICPT would be the supported planning agency, with the GCC planners supporting their efforts. Any disagreements between the ICPT and military planners would be elevated directly to the National Security Advisor, who would act as an “honest broker”\textsuperscript{35} and who could further elevate issues to the Deputies Committee as the “court of appeals.”\textsuperscript{36}

In a 2006 Air Command and Staff College paper, U.S. Air Force Major Karen Stoff recommended creating an NSC-level strategic planning cell, composed of senior members of executive branch departments who are trained in planning and have the authority to commit their departments to the resulting plan.\textsuperscript{37}

In a 2007 \textit{Joint Force Quarterly} article, Nora Bensahel at RAND and U.S. Air Force Colonel Anne Moisan at the Institute for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University proposed another NSC-centric model for interagency coordination of stabilization and reconstruction operations. They recommended creating a Prevention, Reconstruction, and Stabilization Cell (PRSC) under the NSC to monitor potential conflicts around the world which
might require a U.S. stabilization and reconstruction mission, develop coordinated interagency plans for those conflicts which emerge, and build international coalitions with potential future partners for stabilization and reconstruction operations. The PRSC director would report to the National Security Advisor and the PRSC would be staffed with 10-15 core personnel from State and Defense, who would be permanent NSC staff employees rather than detailees whose loyalties might lie with their parent agencies. The NSC would designate a lead agency for mission execution, but policy oversight and strategic direction would remain in the PRSC.\textsuperscript{38}

Finally, as stated in the previous section, the 2009 report from the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) rejected their 2008 recommendation to establish an interagency coordinating body outside the NSC and ultimately decided in favor of an interagency coordination system under NSC leadership. In their revised proposal, the National Security Advisor would retain his role as advisor to the President and would receive additional authority to manage the end-to-end national security interagency process but would not have the authority to direct the actions of executive branch agencies and departments. The interagency teams from the 2008 proposal would report to the National Security Advisor, preserving several of the features of the earlier recommendation, but significantly reducing the authority of the interagency leader below the President.\textsuperscript{39}

A Lead Agency

The third type of interagency reform structure at the strategic level is the lead agency model, in which the National Security Council would retain its traditional policy coordination and Presidential advisory functions and would delegate strategic-level planning and interagency coordination of foreign policy and national security issues to an existing cabinet-level agency.
Depending on the model, the NSC might assign all planning and coordination to the same agency, or the lead agency might change depending on the issue addressed.

There are two key advantages of the lead agency model. First, this model “builds on the fact that departments and agencies have operational responsibilities, capabilities and resources that policy making bodies such as the NSC do not.”\textsuperscript{40} Second, it “frees the NSC staff to concentrate on high level policy issues.”\textsuperscript{41} However, there are also some disadvantages. First, while the Department of Defense has robust capabilities to lead an interagency process, it is not clear that other agencies, such as the State Department, have the resources or institutional culture to be an effective lead agency. Second, it is not certain that other executive branch agencies would follow the lead of a peer agency, which may be perceived to have different agency priorities and goals.\textsuperscript{42} The 9/11 Commission expressed concerns over the lead-agency model, saying that coordination during execution often suffers because the lead agency lacks the authority to direct the activities of other executive-branch agencies.\textsuperscript{43} Additionally, the CSIS study team considered both the NSC-centric and lead-agency approach to strategic level interagency coordination and assessed the NSC-centric model to be superior, saying the lead-agency approach is often insufficient because bureaucratic agencies resist taking direction from one another and “only the NSC can play the role of the honest broker in coordinating the planning and oversight of interagency operations at the strategic level.”\textsuperscript{44}

There are fewer lead-agency reform proposals in the literature than there are for the other two strategic-level reform options. The most prominent studies which propose a lead-agency model are the Hart/Rudman Commission and the State Department in 2025 Working Group, both of which propose designating the State Department as lead agency for interagency coordination of foreign policy at the strategic level. While the DoD has often been either the designated or the
de facto lead agency for several issues at the strategic level, there were no identified reform proposals in the literature which would assign the DoD as lead agency.

In a 1994 School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) paper, U.S. Army Major Mark Curry proposed giving the regional Assistant Secretaries of State directive authority for all interagency programs in their region, including peacetime engagements by the combatant commander, but excluding combat operations. This would also include formal authority over the ambassadors in the region, preventing the ambassadors from reporting directly to the Secretary of State or the President (though this seems highly unrealistic). As stated in Chapter 3, the regional Assistant Secretaries are technically chartered to issue direction to the U.S. embassies in their region. However, the U.S. ambassadors leading these embassies are appointed by the President with plenipotentiary powers to represent the U.S. in their assigned country, and generally prefer to deal directly with the Secretary of State or the President, bypassing the regional Assistant Secretary.

In 2001 the Hart/Rudman Commission recommended increasing the importance and authorities of the regional bureau leaders at the State Department by upgrading the positions from assistant secretaries to under secretaries. These more senior strategic-level leaders of regional foreign policy would then chair interagency working groups within the NSC “to develop regional strategies and coordinated government-wide plans for their implementation.” This would “position the State Department to play a leadership role in the making and implementation of U.S. foreign policy.” Additionally, the Hart/Rudman commission recommended that the State Department Regional Under Secretaries meet at least twice a year with the ambassadors and military combatant commanders in their regions to improve coordination between the strategic and operational levels.
The 2007 report from the State Department in 2025 Working Group also recommended casting the State Department as the lead foreign affairs agency within the interagency structure. In this model, the State Department, working in support of the NSC, would lead the periodic interagency development of a Global Affairs Strategic Plan, which would translate the U.S. National Security Strategy into a set of specific interagency goals and plans, with the designation of a lead agency to accomplish each goal, and performance objectives to assess attainment of the goals. This State-led planning process would provide strategic coherence to U.S. engagement and operations overseas, “create close collaboration on key strategic issues, highlight vulnerable gaps and seams, and foster a culture of unity across the government.”51 The Working Group believed the State Department was the correct lead agency for this task because State “is already accountable to the President for ensuring that all USG efforts overseas support American foreign policy objectives.”52

**Analysis**

This section now applies the thirteen evaluation criteria to the three general structures for interagency reform at the national level. As with the country-level and regional-level models, there are a range of possibilities under each structural type. To evaluate these national structures, this study considers the most robust versions of each structure – the PNSR super-cabinet model for a new interagency organization, the CSIS description of the NSC-centric model, and the lead-agency description offered by Curry and the Hart/Rudman Commission. These three structures are assessed against the thirteen evaluation criteria in Table 5. Based on this analysis, the lead-agency model with the State Department as the lead agency comes out slightly ahead. However, the scores for the other two models are very close to the score for the lead-agency model, so this study concludes that this analysis does not offer a clear recommendation at the national level.
### Table 5. Analysis of National-Level Reform Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Criteria</th>
<th>IA Org not in NSC</th>
<th>NSC Leads</th>
<th>Lead Agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-military voice and face for U.S. foreign policy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fully-coordinated planning</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity of effort during execution</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More efficient and effective than agencies working alone</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader’s authority commensurate with responsibility</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy of leader’s decision making</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader can access necessary resources</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clear chain of command to the President</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not overburden the President</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance of power and prestige between DoD and DoS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develops interagency expertise</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform minimizes cost in money, personnel, and material</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform minimizes agency culture shocks</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>+6</strong></td>
<td><strong>+5</strong></td>
<td><strong>+7</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the first measure, the lead agency model with State as the lead agency would slightly improve State’s role as the non-military voice and face for U.S. foreign policy, though this has never been much of a shortfall at the national level. The other two organizational models would
do less to enhance State’s role as the foreign policy lead, but they wouldn’t really put the military more in charge, either.

On the second measure, all three reforms are judged as equally likely to provide fully coordinated interagency planning at the national level, because this is precisely what these reform models were designed to do.

On the third measure, the non-NSC interagency model is judged to be best able to produce interagency unity of effort during execution, for two reasons. First, the interagency organization is independent of all cabinet agencies, so it would be viewed as an honest broker by the participating agencies. Second, because the organization is outside the NSC and would presumably have a robust staff focused on interagency planning, execution, and assessment, it is more likely than the NSC process itself to focus the necessary time and personnel on achieving unity of effort. The other two models are assessed as weaker against this criterion, but not negative.

Against the fourth criterion, all three models are assessed as equally likely to be more efficient and effective than the cabinet agencies working without any coordination.

On the fifth, sixth, and seventh criteria, the lead-agency model is assessed as slightly weaker than the other two models in its ability to provide the leader a level of authority commensurate with his responsibility, provide legitimacy to the leader’s decisions, and facilitate the leader’s access to resources because of the perceived biases that come from a lead agency directing the efforts of other cabinet agencies. The interagency and NSC-centric models are assessed as equally likely to produce good results in these areas.

On the eighth measure, all three models produce an equally clear chain of command to the President. However, on the ninth criterion, the cabinet-level lead-agency model is believed to be
the least likely to overburden the President, as most decisions would be made outside the White House. The interagency organization is judged as neutral against this criterion, as its closeness to the White House may or may not drive increased Presidential attention, while the NSC-centric model is judged worst against this measure, since the NSC process would raise many more decisions to the President and would occupy much of the NSC staff’s time that would otherwise be spent formulating policy and advising the President.

Against the tenth criterion, the State Department as lead agency model would enhance the power and prestige of the State Department, while the other two models would have neither a positive or a negative effect.

On the eleventh measure, the interagency organization would be expected to offer the most opportunities to develop personnel with interagency experience, as this new organization would require a robust interagency staff to do its job. The other two models are judged as neutral against this criterion, because fewer new personnel would be exposed to the interagency environment.

On the twelfth measure, the lead-agency model is assessed as the least costly to implement, since it would require only a modest augmentation of the State Department’s staff. The NSC-centric model is assessed as neutral because it would take several more staffers to enable the NSC staff and NSC system to fulfill the interagency coordination role for planning and execution. The new interagency organization is judged as the most costly option, because a large staff would have to be created from scratch and a new facility would likely be required, as well.

Finally, on the thirteenth criterion, the lead-agency and NSC-centric models are judged as having a minimal impact on agency cultures, while the new interagency organization would have
a relatively large impact as it was staffed from across the interagency and as career paths were altered to account for this new organization.

Notes


4 David A. Meyer, Normalizing Executive Department Boundaries: A Timely First Step to Improving Interagency Coordination (Ft Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 21 March 2007), 15.


6 James R. Bartran, PDD-56-1: Synchronizing Effects; Beyond the Pol/Mil Plan (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 10 April 2000), 12-14.


9 J. D. York, Militarizing the Interagency (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 14 February 2005), 14-15.


11 Project on National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield (Arlington, VA: Center for the Study of the Presidency, November 2008), 384. PNSR’s November 2008 Forging a New Shield report “represents the culmination of more than two years of work by more than three hundred dedicated U.S. national security executives, professionals, and scholars.”

12 Ibid., xi.

13 Ibid., xi, xii, 441, 482, 516, 599.


15 Donley, Rethinking the Interagency System, Part 2, 6-7.


Notes

18 Admiral Miller was the Combatant Commander of the U.S. Atlantic Command (since renamed the U.S. Joint Forces Command) at the time of this writing.


20 Thomas M. Lafleur, Interagency Efficacy at the Operational Level (Ft Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 26 May 2005), 17.

21 Ibid., 18-19.
22 Ibid., 21-22.
23 Donley, Rethinking the Interagency System, 5.
25 Ibid., 43.


30 Ibid., 96-97.
31 Ibid., 97.
32 Murdock and Flournoy, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, Phase 2 Report, 7; 50.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid., 45-46.
36 Ibid., 46-47.
37 Karen D. Stoff, Strategic Planning and Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Command and Staff College, April 2006), 24.
38 Nora Bensahel and Anne M. Moisan, “Repairing the Interagency Process,” Joint Force Quarterly (no. 44, 1st Quarter 2007), 107-108. Dr Bensahel is a Senior Political Scientist at RAND. U.S. Air Force Colonel Moisan at the time of this writing was a Senior Research Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University.

39 Project on National Security Reform, Turning Ideas into Action, 16, 18, 23.
40 Donley, Rethinking the Interagency System, Part 2, 9.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., 9-10.
43 Donley, Rethinking the Interagency System, 7.
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45 Mark L. Curry, *The Interagency Process in Regional Foreign Policy* (Ft Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 5 May 1994), 34-35.

46 Ibid., 9, 17.


48 Ibid., 62.

49 Ibid., 59.

50 Ibid., 63.


52 Blechman, *Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy*, 19.
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