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ISSN# 0892-6115

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The Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy (HJHP) is an annual, student-run, nonpartisan review that publishes interdisciplinary works on U.S. Latino politics and policy making. The Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy is published by the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

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CONTENTS

1  Editor’s Remarks
   by Cris Garza

3  Chair’s Remarks
   by James Carr

COMMENTARIES

5  Penny Wise, Pound Foolish? Don’t Sacrifice Our Nation’s Future
   by Janet Murguía
   edited by Liany Elba Arroyo and Leticia Miranda

11 We Are the Leaders We’ve Been Waiting For
    by Arturo Vargas

15 Why Cesar Chavez Led a Movement as well as a Union
    by Arturo S. Rodriguez

SPECIAL CONTENT: VOICES OF THE NEXT GENERATION

23 Changing the Narrative in Arizona
   by Michael Trejo

29 La Culture Cure
   by Emily Goulding

37 My Life as a DREAMer who ACTed Beyond the Barriers: From Growing Up “Undocumented” in Arizona to a Master’s Degree from Harvard
   by Silvia P. Rodriguez Vega

FEATURE ARTICLES

43 In-State Tuition Policies for Undocumented Youth
   by Edward D. Vargas

59 Transnational Stakeholders: Latin American Migrant Transnationalism and Civic Engagement in the United States
   by Ricardo Ramírez and Adrián Félix

83 The Social Implications of Health Care Reform: Reducing Access Barriers to Health Care Services for Uninsured Hispanic and Latino Americans in the United States
   by Mitchell A. Kaplan and Marian M. Inguanzo
INTERVIEWS

93 Putting Educational Attainment First: An Interview with Juan Sepúlveda
Interviewed by Joe Carreón

99 Promoting Change through Art: An Interview with Rebecca Cammisa
Interviewed by Joe Carreón

BOOK REVIEW

103 El Pueblo, Dividido: A Review of The Trouble with Unity: Latino Politics and the Creation of Identity
by Cristina Beltrán
reviewed by Antonio D. Ramirez

IN MEMORIAM

107 In Memorium: Mario Obledo, Godfather of the Latino Movement, 1932-2010
by Kenneth C. Burt
We have witnessed an unparalleled rise in American Latino leadership in the last couple of years, and I would like to begin Volume 23 of the *Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy* by celebrating these achievements. We can all be proud of recently confirmed Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court Sonia Sotomayor, the first Hispanic and third woman to sit on the highest court in the nation. Two Latinos currently serve in U.S. President Barack Obama’s cabinet: Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar as well as Secretary of Labor Hilda Solis, the first Latina to serve in a president’s cabinet. In addition, more Latinos than ever before work within the highest echelons of the White House.

It is also important to note that these accomplishments are bipartisan. Latinos are experiencing success across the political spectrum. Republican Susana Martinez, elected in 2010, is the first Latina governor in the United States and the first female governor of New Mexico. Republican Brian Sandoval was also sent to the governor’s mansion by the citizens of Nevada last November. And all eyes are on rising Republican star Senator Marco Rubio of Florida.

There is indeed much to celebrate in the Latino community that should make all of us smile and hold our heads high.

However, we have also suffered heartbreaking setbacks that make the immediate future uncertain. Comprehensive immigration reform has been set aside once again, and the odds of passage in the 112th Congress are low. The DREAM Act appeared to be gaining momentum in December 2010, but supporters in the U.S. Senate fell short of breaking a filibuster by only five votes. Deportations of immigrants have reached record levels, which translates to record numbers of families wondering when they will see each other again. This vacuum in federal immigration law has been filled in many states by hateful, reactionary policies, such as Arizona’s draconian SB 1070. And all these challenges are exacerbated by the continuing tragic economic pain of the Great Recession. Given these obstacles, it is understandable that some would give up hope and believe that this fight may be unwinnable.

But leave it to our youth to force us to remember our collective history and push us forward into the next decade of the twenty-first century. Perhaps the most inspiring achievement of all has been the rise of the Latino student immigration movement for dignity. These DREAMers have not waited for the torch to be passed to them. They have decided on their own to stand up and tell the nation that they will not live in the shadows of America any longer and that the time for justice is now. It is these inspiring individuals who are living up to the legacy of our families who have crossed deserts, fled civil wars and dictatorships, organized farm workers, and lived the American Dream. Whether we have been here for five days or 500 years, the DREAMers and their allies are proving that our immigrant aspirations are still alive. As Silvia Rodriguez Vega, an undocumented student at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, writes in this volume, “I fight for the youth who are not ready to give up. I fight for the children who cannot defend themselves, and I scream for the millions who remain voiceless. . . . I refuse to let the flame even flicker. I brave the wind, and nothing can stand in my way.” We live in difficult times, and the path forward may be unclear, but our youth
are providing us with a sense of renewal and possibility that should convince all of us that our future is strong.

Volume 23 tries to make sense of this uncertain world around us—and helps us figure out where we should go next. It analyzes critical policy issues that affect Latinos: health care, immigration, civic engagement, and the national debt. It also explores the fluid state of Latino leadership and ethnic unity and reflects on the past leadership of Cesar Chavez and the United Farm Workers. We hear young Latinos’ perspectives on the DREAM Act, SB 1070, and Latino artists. In their own words, two interviewees speak on education policy and an Oscar-nominated documentary. We conclude Volume 23 by memorializing a special human being who has touched so many of our lives and whose spirit will live on forever: Mario Obedo.

I would also like to introduce readers of the Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy to our newly formed Academic Advisory Committee: Carlos Santiago, immediate past chancellor of the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee and the new CEO of the Hispanic College Fund; Maggie Rivas-Rodriguez, an Associate Professor in Journalism at the University of Texas at Austin and director of the Voces Oral History Project on Latinos/Latinas in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam; and Edwin Meléndez, Professor of Urban Affairs and Planning and the Director of the Center for Puerto Rican Studies at Hunter College. They will offer advice and counsel to the editors of the journal as well as work with the editors and members of the Executive Advisory Board to assist and advise the John F. Kennedy School of Government on ways to increase Hispanic representation and awareness. Please join me in welcoming them to the HJHP family.

Finally, I must acknowledge those whose patience, dedication, and intelligence made the process of releasing the call for papers, selecting articles, and editing the journal an intense learning experience as well as a joy. Martha Foley, our tireless publisher, and Richard Parker, our knowledgeable faculty advisor, have helped guide the journal from its brainstorming sessions over the summer through its printing this spring. We owe a great deal of gratitude to them. The Executive Advisory Board members, especially Chair James Carr, have provided all of us on staff with their wisdom and counsel, and their leadership helped ensure the journal’s success. I also want to acknowledge two previous editors-in-chief, Adam J. Gonzales and Gabriela M. Ventura, who gave me personal advice and encouragement. Chris Fortunato, Dean of Students at the Harvard Kennedy School, has also strongly supported the journal and prospective and current Latino students. Lastly, I need to express my sincere thanks to the members of the journal’s staff: your hard work, late nights, positive attitude, and sense of humor are the reason we have such a thought-provoking, inspiring, and outstanding journal.

¡Sí, se pudo!

Please find more information about the Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy at our wonderful new Web site: www.hks.harvard.edu/hjhp.

Siempre adelante,
Crisóforo G. Garza
Editor-in-Chief
Cambridge, Massachusetts
March 2011
CHAIR’S REMARKS
by James Carr

The Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy has now been in existence for more than twenty-five years. It was the brain-child of first editor and current member of the Executive Advisory Board, Henry Ramos. The journal has always addressed issues that have been front and center in our Hispanic community, including voting rights, education and bilingual education, health, employment and jobs, ethnicity and race, citizenship and immigration, and United States-Mexico border relations.

Current census data indicates that four out of ten Texas residents are Hispanic and that Texas will receive four additional electoral votes after reapportionment, at least two of which will be in Hispanic majority congressional districts. Additionally, as Pew Hispanic Center data indicates, “Hispanic voters are nearly three times more prevalent in states that gained congressional seats and electoral college votes in the 2010 reapportionment.” At the national level, we saw a Cuban American elected to the U.S. Senate, as well as several non-Cuban Republicans elected to Congress and to the governorship in New Mexico. As our numbers and influence continue to grow, the Hispanic community can no longer be ignored. Increasingly, the policy issues of Hispanic Americans are the policy issues of the United States.

Recently, we at the journal have been reconstituting our Executive Advisory Board, adding Alfredo Estrada, editor of Latino magazine, as well as Robert S. Nelsen, president of the University of Texas-Pan American, both of whom bring a fresh perspective and unparalleled talent. We have also established an Academic Advisory Committee of distinguished Hispanic scholars, which consists of Carlos Santiago, immediate past chancellor of the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee and the new CEO of the Hispanic College Fund; Maggie Rivas-Rodriguez, an Associate Professor in Journalism at the University of Texas at Austin who has been studying Latinos and Latinas in World War II and who is a member of the National Association of Hispanic Journalists’ Hall of Fame; and Edwin Meléndez, Professor of Urban Affairs and Planning and the Director of the Center for Puerto Rican Studies at Hunter College. These three members, with their strong academic backgrounds, contacts, and commitment to our community, will serve as a sounding board and as informal advisors to the graduate students who edit the journal.

Perhaps the most conspicuous addition to the journal is our new Web site, which includes an online copy of the current issue of the journal as well as copies of past editions. The Web site is expected to include additional policy-driven articles of interest and interviews as well as links to other Hispanic and Latino organizations. Enjoy!

James Carr
Chair
Executive Advisory Board
Call for Papers

ARTICLES  COMMENTARIES  BOOK REVIEWS

Deadline: November 15, 2011

The Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy (HJHP) is currently seeking submissions for its 24th volume. The HJHP is a nonpartisan scholarly review published annually at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

Articles and commentaries should explore policy making as it relates to the political, social, and economic environment affecting Latinos in the United States. Book reviews should critically assess a book of importance to the Latino community. All submissions meeting these criteria are welcome.

SUBMISSION GUIDELINES

Articles must be:
- Original and unpublished
- 15-25 double-spaced pages (7,500-12,500 words)
- All figures, tables, and charts must be submitted as entirely separate files
- Include a 100-150 word abstract

Commentaries must be:
- 5-10 double-spaced pages (2,500-5,000 words)

Book reviews must be:
- 3-10 double-spaced pages (1,500-5,000 words)
- Include full citation for book, including publisher and year of publication

In addition, all authors must observe the following:
- Submissions must be formatted in any version of Microsoft Word.
- Citations must be formatted in the author-date system via running text, according to the guidelines in The Chicago Manual of Style. Footnotes are not accepted.
- Authors must submit a cover letter with the author's name and title, mailing address, e-mail address, daytime phone number, title of submission, and a 100-150 word biography.
- Authors must submit an electronic copy of the submission on CD or by e-mail to hjhp@ksg.harvard.edu by the November 15, 2011, deadline.
- Authors are required to cooperate with editing and fact checking.

HJHP is also accepting content to be published on its Web site. Submissions may include any work of academic or creative merit. Examples of Web content include op-eds, short stories, and photo essays. Please specify that the submission is for Web content.

For more information, please visit our Web site at www.hks.harvard.edu/hjhp.
Penny Wise, Pound Foolish?
Don’t Sacrifice Our Nation’s Future
by Janet Murguía
edited by Liany Elba Arroyo and Leticia Miranda

Janet Murguía is the President and Chief Executive Officer of the National Council of La Raza (NCLR). Since 2005, Murguía has sought to harness the power of the nation’s nearly 50 million Hispanics and improve opportunities for Latino families by strengthening the partnership between NCLR and its network of nearly 300 community-based affiliates, which annually serve millions of people in forty-one states, Washington, DC, and Puerto Rico. In her role as National Council of La Raza’s spokesperson, she has appeared on ABC World News Tonight, CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, NBC’s Today Show, CNN’s Larry King Live, PBS’s NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, CNN’s Anderson Cooper 360°, and CNN’s Lou Dobbs Tonight. Murguía is currently a board member of the American Heart Association, an executive committee member of the Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, and on the boards of the Hispanic Association on Corporate Responsibility and the National Hispanic Leadership Agenda. Murguía began her career in Washington, DC, as legislative counsel to former Kansas Congressman Jim Slattery and subsequently held numerous pivotal nonprofit and academic positions.

The United States has provided generations of its residents with the prospect of advancing themselves through education and hard work, and our leaders have the opportunity to make sure this continues for generations to come. To do so, they
must handle our national deficit in a decisive, thoughtful manner, ensuring a prosperous future for our nation. Addressing the national debt does not require decimating the social investments necessary to ensure the success of our nation’s future workers: Latino children. It is clear that the level of debt amassed by the United States is not sustainable. If serious changes are not made, the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office projects that the federal budget deficit will reach almost $1.5 trillion or close to 10 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) by the end of 2011 (Congressional Budget Office 2011). Not addressing the federal deficit today will saddle future generations with an untenable burden, which could result in diminished prospects for social and economic advancement. However, addressing the federal deficit by curtailing investments in children will be shortsighted and ultimately hurt Latino children, which would hurt the country as a whole. Latino children stand to lose the most in the short-term because of the growth of the population and the challenges they face. However, the long-term future of our nation rests on Hispanic children achieving success as adults. Today’s Latino children are our country’s future workers and taxpayers.

LATINO CHILDREN: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR OUR NATION

Latinos comprise nearly 16 percent of the population, representing 48.4 million individuals, not including residents of Puerto Rico, as of July 1, 2009. The Hispanic population grew by 3.1 percent between July 2008 and July 2009, making it the fastest-growing population in the country. The U.S. Census Bureau predicts that by July 1, 2050, the number of Latinos will reach 132.8 million individuals, constituting 30 percent of the nation’s population (U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division 2010). Latinos will continue to rapidly grow as a percentage of the U.S. population because of two critical factors: their overall young age and their growing share of the youth population.

Latinos are a young population, in their prime childbearing years, with a median age of 27.4 years, compared to 36.8 years for the country as a whole (U.S. Census Bureau 2010b). Immigration will continue to add to the Hispanic population, but most of the growth will come from births. Hispanics represent 22.4 percent of all children under the age of eighteen and nearly 26 percent of all children under the age of five (National Council of La Raza [NCLR] calculations using U.S. Census Bureau n.d.). These

The growth of the Hispanic child population presents this country with incredible opportunities. As other nations face aging populations and threats to their social safety net programs, the growing Latino population ensures the steady supply of future workers and taxpayers needed to maintain the social contract between generations.
Penny Wise, Pound Foolish?

The overrepresentation of Latino children living in poverty corresponds with their overrepresentation in the most under-resourced schools. Latino children represent 46 percent of elementary and 44 percent of secondary school students enrolled in high-poverty schools (Aud et al. 2010b). This is problematic as students attending high-poverty schools are less likely than students attending more affluent schools to succeed academically (Aud et al. 2010b). Furthermore, Latino students also represent a large proportion of the nation’s English language learners (ELLs). Currently, 80 percent of ELLs are native Spanish speakers (Office of English Language Acquisition, Language Enhancement, and Academic Achievement for Limited English Proficient Students 2008). Often, these students do not receive adequate instruction or assistance through their schools, resulting in poor academic outcomes as well (Dolan 2009).

The challenges faced by Latino children obtaining a quality education are reflected in their low high school graduation rate (55.5 percent) (Swanson 2010) and the low number of Hispanics (3.7 million) eighteen years old or older who hold at least a bachelor’s degree. The low educational achievement of Hispanic children does not bode well for their ability to pursue a college education, obtain a high-quality job, and make the corresponding contributions needed to fund our nation’s safety net programs, as well as pay for our national defense and infrastructure.

To perform these obligations, which are needed for a healthy economy and safe communities, the challenges faced by Latino children must be addressed. Hispanic children represent a growing share of children in poverty. A third (33.1 percent) of Hispanic children live in poverty, and their share as a proportion of all children in poverty continues to grow (Miranda et al. 2010). From 1976 to 2009, the share of all poor children who were Latino grew from 7.5 percent to 36.7 percent (Miranda et al. 2010). If nothing changes, Hispanic children could very well represent 44 percent of all poor children by 2030 (Mather and Foxen 2010).

Latino children also face challenges to their health care status. Health insurance is a critical component to achieving good health. In 2008, 19 percent of Latino children did not have health insurance, the highest percentage of all racial and
Not having health insurance puts Latino children at risk for a variety of health issues. Children without health insurance are less likely to have a regular source of care (Hadley 2002), which puts them at risk of more hospitalizations than those with continuous private health coverage (Olson et al. 2005). This could ultimately lead to frequent or increased absences from, and a lack of engagement in, school and can cause lifelong problems affecting their participation in the workforce.

**THE COST OF INACTION**

Absent significant policy changes, the disparities noted above in poverty, educational attainment, and health status will ultimately translate into Latinos being concentrated in lower-skilled jobs associated with lower earnings and higher unemployment. Over a lifetime, lower income has a ripple effect. This has implications for how we fund the programs that serve our children and our older residents. Inaction will also affect the ability of the United States to successfully compete in a global economy.

Educational attainment clearly affects earnings and potential tax revenues. Over a lifetime, NCLR estimates that a Hispanic adult with a bachelor’s degree can expect to earn $1 million more than a Hispanic adult with a high school degree (NCLR calculations using U.S. Census Bureau 2010a). Low educational attainment also influences the likelihood of being employed. In January 2011, the unemployment rate for adults with less than a high school degree was 14.2 percent compared to 4.2 percent for those with a bachelor’s degree (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2010).

There are two major demographic trends happening at once. The percentage of the total American workforce that is Latino is expected to grow from 14 percent in 2010 to 29 percent by 2050 (NCLR calculations using U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division 2008). Over the same time period, the country will age as the percentage of the total U.S. population that is over age sixty-five grows from 13 percent in 2010 to 20 percent by 2050 (NCLR calculations using U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division 2008, Table 12). This translates into each worker shouldering a greater burden in terms of funding the public retirement and health care expenses of an aging population.

Thus, as the nation becomes both older and increasingly Hispanic, it is more important than ever to focus on investments in poverty reduction, education, and health care to ensure that the future Latino workforce can maximize its income and related contributions. It will need to be as productive as possible in order to bear the burden of a graying society and to succeed in a highly competitive global economy. We must ensure that Latino children can achieve success by investing in their future.

**BALANCING THE BUDGET WHILE ENSURING OUR NATION’S FUTURE**

Given the importance of addressing the growing deficit, and in order to guarantee that we support our future workers, any proposals to balance the budget must include a mix of targeted spending cuts and revenue increases. NCLR suggests the following to help secure our country’s future.

First, our leaders should agree to the principle that children must be protected from funding reductions to programs of critical need. Programs that effectively address poverty and improve the health
and educational status of children should not be cut. Decimating successful programs such as Women, Infants, and Children, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, the Children’s Health Insurance Program, and early intervention and education programs will create long-term consequences that will make it more difficult for our nation’s children, particularly the most vulnerable children, to become contributing members of society.

Second, our leaders would serve our nation better by viewing both domestic discretionary and other kinds of major expenditures such as defense spending through the same lens: are they effective and worth our investment? While discretionary spending cuts may need to take place, cuts in defense spending should also be on the table. Securing our homeland is paramount, but we should make every effort to identify and curtail wasteful spending and eliminate that which has not been shown to be effective in strengthening our national defense.

Third, entitlement programs must also be examined. Efforts to restrain medical inflation overall are critical to reducing Medicare costs. Congress and the Obama administration have a responsibility to take steps to make the medical system more efficient and effective by investing in prevention so that the federal budget can manage the increased demand for services as our nation ages. Even though Social Security does not contribute to the deficit, a projected, long-range shortfall should be addressed separately from deficit-reduction discussions. As Social Security and the safety net are strengthened for the long term, we must ensure that we do not make today’s young people bear the entire burden.

Lastly, much of the conversation on Capitol Hill focuses on cutting spending and taxes. However, our nation will never eliminate the federal deficit if reducing spending reductions are the only solutions being discussed. Tax increases must also be part of the equation. While we should always preserve good tax policies that create jobs and keep all hardworking low- and moderate-income families out of poverty, providing more tax benefits to those least in need is spending money the government does not have. All must share in the burden of reducing the national debt while also ensuring that all children in this country have the opportunity to succeed. Our nation’s future depends on it.

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We Are the Leaders We’ve Been Waiting For

by Arturo Vargas

As the Latino community in the United States grows and matures, the inevitable question continues to be asked: who is the leader of this community of 50 million? “Leadership” in the Latino community has been hotly debated for many years. Many decry the absence of the “great Brown hope,” a single leader who can unite the community of 50 million Latinos—however impossible such a task may be. Many compare this imagined person and his or her ability to lead to the likes of such individuals as the late Cesar Chavez and Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.

The 2010 U.S. Census data, of which the first results were released in December 2010 with subsequent, more detailed data trickling out in early 2011, indicates that Latinos are undeniably important to the future of the United States. 2011 is a truly pivotal year for the U.S. Latino community.

Replete with the diversity of national origin, generation, ideology, and geography, Latinos are already the nation’s second-largest population group. In addition to the plurality in New Mexico, the 2010 Census shows that Latinos have become the second-largest population group in California, Texas, New York, Florida, and Illinois.

The story of the 2010 Census, however, will be the rise of the Latino South. While the 2000 Census confirmed the
Among the most powerful new leaders are those whose voices are resonating from within our immigrant Latino communities, including from many of the children.

Movement of Latinos from America’s urban core to the suburbs, the 2010 Census is revealing dramatic Latino population increases in Georgia, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas. Latinos have become a key population group in every state, and the fastest and most significant population increase has been in America’s Deep South.

A question in a 2010 Pew Hispanic Center poll asked Latinos to identify a single Latino leader. When only single-digit percentages of Latinos could name even one person considered a national Latino leader, the debate was further fueled. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor was most frequently named by poll respondents even though she is not an elected leader and has no formal responsibility to lead any group. That in itself is telling about Latinos’ attitudes about leadership. Justice Sotomayor was singled out because of her achievement of becoming the first Latina appointed to the nation’s highest court, not because she has led a movement, a constituency, or a membership organization.

So according to the Pew Hispanic Center report, when asked, Latinos name no single national leader.

So what?

Leadership in the Latino community is not manifested by the anointment of a single individual as the spokesperson for the rapidly growing population of 50 million. It is unreasonable and impractical to expect that the profound diversity that exists among Latinos, which includes national origin differences, U.S. regional differences, and language, generational, and racial differences, would have a single spokesperson.

Just as we embrace the diversity of the Latino community, so must we embrace the diversity of Latino leadership in all its manifestations.

I have had the privilege of serving as the executive director of one of the nation’s most important Latino leadership organizations for the past sixteen years. During this time, I have come to know hundreds of Latino leaders in communities large and small who are making heroic efforts to advance the interests of their constituents.

Their names will rarely become familiar to households across the country because the individuals are not media personalities nor officials in prominent public office; in other words, they are not the kind who would be recorded by national surveys such as that of the Pew Hispanic Center. Rather, these leaders are known and supported by local constituents—both Latino immigrant and native-born—who are enduring unprecedented attacks, largely as backlash to such a growing presence. Among the most powerful new leaders are those whose voices are resonating from within our immigrant Latino communities, including from many of the children.
The effectiveness of immigrant leaders, supported by the power of the Spanish-language media, was front and center in 2006 during mass mobilizations in support of immigration reform that occurred across the country in communities large and small.

America has rarely witnessed such a mass, coordinated, civic mobilization, which rivaled in size the historic mobilizations seen in 2011 in North Africa and the Middle East. These 2006 U.S. mobilizations, largely in response to proposed federal legislation that would have criminalized undocumented immigration status in the United States, were led by authentic leaders who have emerged to lead their constituencies with a new voice.

The millions of Latino immigrants and their supporters who were inspired to take to America’s streets, unified in message and purpose, and who have since been working tirelessly on the immigration reform cause, did not respond to the call from a single national figure. They responded to the calls of hundreds of local organizers, many of whom were using new media and technology to inform and mobilize the community. These local organizers also reached across racial and ethnic lines to unite immigrant and other communities from diverse origins.

Ironically, many of these new voices often have fallen on the deaf ears of mainstream English-language media and are not reflected in national polls that are wildly and inexcusably out of touch with these communities. For example, such disconnectedness became sadly apparent when in September 2006 the staff of the Los Angeles Times was completely oblivious to the largest mass demonstration in the history of Los Angeles being planned literally outside the doors of the newsroom in the heart of the city’s civic center.

A younger generation of Latino leaders has emerged over the past two years as well in the ongoing struggle for passage of the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act, also known as the DREAM Act. In December 2010, the DREAM Act was passed in the House of Representatives but failed in the Senate. This bill would have provided conditional permanent residency to many otherwise deportable students who arrived in the United States illegally as minors and who, among other things, graduated from U.S. high schools, were of good moral character, and had been in

The millions of Latino immigrants and their supporters who were inspired to take to America’s streets, unified in message and purpose, and who have since been working tirelessly on the immigration reform cause, did not respond to the call from a single national figure. They responded to the calls of hundreds of local organizers, many of whom were using new media and technology to inform and mobilize the community.
the United States continuously for at least five years prior to the bill’s enactment. Once these students had completed at least two years in college or in the military, the act would have provided two things: protection from deportation and a pathway to permanent legal residency after a conditional period during which they could work.

While the Latino members of Congress consistently pressured the Obama administration and the Congressional leadership for action on the DREAM Act, the most effective advocacy and leadership on this issue have come from hundreds of young Latinos and Latinas across the country who have taken on the struggle as a personal and community cause.

Whether they organized sit-ins at the offices of U.S. senators and representatives, met with President Barack Obama at the White House, held hunger strikes, or walked hundreds of miles to draw attention to this cause, hundreds of young Latino and Latina leaders led the cause for passage of the DREAM Act.

With few exceptions, the names and stories of these young people are not known to a national audience, yet they are familiar to their local constituencies and supporters. Their names would not be recorded in any national poll asking for the names of national leaders, yet their vision and leadership are helping to inspire and politicize a new generation of Latinos.

The challenge for Latinos across the country is not to find a single spokesperson to unite the many disparate communities and causes found among a people 50 million strong. The challenge is to coordinate these efforts, to build on successes, and to support communities that are most in need—and it can be done.

Such was the case in 2010 when the national Latino community rose in defense and support of primarily Latino immigrants in Arizona who came under attack by a blatant anti-immigrant and xenophobia-driven policy measure known as SB 1070. Proponents and critics alike called SB 1070 the broadest and strictest immigration measure in at least a generation, if not more.

SB 1070 attempted to make the failure to carry immigration documents a crime and required police to question and detain anyone merely suspected of being in the country while undocumented. While most of the law was put on hold by a federal court order, SB 1070 was an open invitation for harassment and discrimination against Latinos regardless of their citizenship status.

Latino leadership will never be found embodied in just one person. It thrives among the women and men, among the old and the young who lift their voices in defense and promotion of their constituents, be they Dominican, Puerto Rican, Cuban American, Mexican American, or Salvadoran American—immigrant or native-born—in South Los Angeles or South Carolina. Leadership for Latinos is organic, it is effective, and it is now.

This is our moment. We are the leaders we have been waiting for.
people. We do that as both a union doggedly organizing the poorest among us and as a movement tackling broader challenges confronting our people outside the workplace.

With all the homage and recognition afforded Chavez since his passing in 1993, it is easy to forget how controversial a figure he was during his lifetime. Chavez and the movement have often been attacked, both then and now. So this look at the past and the present is timely.

There is a passage from the Book of Joel in the Bible that former U.S. President John F. Kennedy was fond of quoting: “Your old men will dream dreams, your young men will see visions.” When Chavez began building what became the United Farm Workers (UFW) of America on his birthday, March 31, 1962, he had a different vision of what a union movement could be. Chavez, Dolores Huerta, and many others who would join him did

Why Cesar Chavez Led a Movement as well as a Union

by Arturo S. Rodriguez

As President of the United Farm Workers, Arturo S. Rodriguez is continuing to build the union founded by Cesar E. Chavez into a powerful voice for immigrant workers by increasing its membership and pushing historic legislation on immigration reform and worker rights. He lives and works at the farm worker movement headquarters in La Paz, CA.

Today’s farm worker movement continues along a different and, to some, a controversial path fulfilling Cesar E. Chavez’s legacy by battling to improve the lives of farm workers and other Latino working
a lot of research, studying why all the attempts to organize farm workers over the previous one-hundred years had failed. Chavez was convinced things had to be done differently if there was any hope of success.

A big part of his strategy was understanding and recognizing that workers are not just workers. Of course, Chavez knew it would take a union to address the economic injustices farm workers suffer at the workplace. Yet in a letter Chavez sent to the head of the California Table Grape Commission in 1969, he cited the crippling obstacles farm workers faced: “The color of our skins, the languages of our cultural and native origins, the lack of formal education, the exclusion from the democratic process, the numbers of our slain in recent wars—all these burdens generation after generation have sought to demoralize us, to break our human spirit.”

THE MAKINGS OF A MOVEMENT

Chavez knew it would take more than a union to overcome these burdens; it would take a movement.

So the work began.

But even the work of the union had to be different, although it closely followed the social unionism that marked the labor movement during the early part of the last century. Then, like today, many workers were also poor immigrants—mostly from Europe—who didn’t speak the language, suffered discrimination, and had many needs outside the workplace. Chavez’s version of trade unionism was forged by consuming books by and about figures such as Mahatma Gandhi and Sidney Hillman, head of the then Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, which during the 1920s established low-cost cooperative housing, unemployment insurance, and a bank for union members. Before he won union contracts, Chavez started organizing by providing services to people. There was a death benefit, a credit union, and a cooperative gas station.

When he first talked about forming a union, Chavez realized what was really holding him back was financial security. Therefore, in 1962, as he was about to found the UFW, he took stock of himself. He was thirty-five. As staff director of the Community Service Organization (CSO), the most effective Latino civil rights group of its day, which Chavez helped build, Cesar was experiencing his first steady job and paycheck since being a migrant farm worker.

Cesar and his wife, Helen, knew the risks and long odds against success. Helen worried about their eight young children. But Chavez saw what he called “the trap most people get themselves into—tying themselves to a job for security.” So Chavez quit his CSO post and moved to

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Founding the UFW was a leap of faith not only because the odds were against him, but also because Chavez still had serious doubts. He didn’t know if he would succeed. But, he did it anyway. He couldn’t live with himself if he didn’t try.
why cesar chavez led a movement as well as a union

cides years before the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency acted.
• The first comprehensive union medical (and later dental and vision) benefits for farm workers and their families through a joint union-employer health and welfare fund, the Robert F. Kennedy Farm Workers Medical Plan, which to date has paid out more than $250 million in benefits.
• The first and only functioning pension plan for retired farm workers, the Juan de la Cruz Pension Plan.
• The first union contracts providing for profit sharing and parental leave.
• The abolishment of the infamous short-handled hoe that crippled generations of farm workers.
• State coverage for farm workers under unemployment insurance, disability, and workers’ compensation, as well as federal amnesty rights for immigrants.

From Gandhi and Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., Chavez adopted historic strategies and tactics that were novel to organized labor. He insisted farm workers strictly adhere to a pledge of nonviolence, and he fasted for twenty-five days in 1968 to rededicate the movement to that principle. Despite skepticism from some labor leaders, Chavez applied boycotts to major labor-management disputes. Millions of people across the United States rallied for La Causa, the farm workers cause, by boycotting grapes and other products, forcing growers to bargain union contracts and agree to California’s pioneering farm labor law in 1975.

the man behind the movement

Chavez embraced a life of voluntary poverty, as did other movement leaders and staff until the late 1990s. During the 1960s and 1970s, Chavez and his

Delano, CA, with Helen and their eight children, ages thirteen to three-and-a-half. On weekends, Helen worked in the fields, along with Cesar and their children, to support the family. Cesar babysat the youngest children as he drove to agricultural towns, recruiting farm workers into his infant union. He would talk to one-hundred workers before finding one or two willing to take the risk.

In 1962, the Kennedy administration offered to make Chavez head of the Peace Corps in part of Latin America. It would have meant a big house with servants and many advantages for the Chavez children. Chavez turned the offer down in exchange for a life of poverty, which lasted until he died.

Founding the UFW was a leap of faith not only because the odds were against him, but also because Chavez still had serious doubts. He didn’t know if he would succeed. But, he did it anyway. He couldn’t live with himself if he didn’t try.

While the next three decades saw their share of defeats, there were also historic victories. Under Cesar Chavez, the United Farm Workers achieved unprecedented gains for farm workers. Among them were:
• The first genuine collective bargaining agreements between farm workers and growers in American history.
• The first union contracts requiring rest periods, toilets in the fields, clean drinking water, hand-washing facilities, the banning of discrimination in employment and sexual harassment of women workers, the requiring of protective clothing against pesticide exposure, the prohibiting of pesticide spraying while workers are in the fields, and the outlawing of DDT and other dangerous pesti-
colleagues made $5 a week plus room and board. Chavez never earned more than $6,000 a year, never owned a house, and when he died at age sixty-six in 1993 left no money for his family. Yet, some 40,000 people marched behind his casket during funeral services in Delano.

Although he was always proud to be part of the labor movement, Chavez was never comfortable with the generous salaries and affluent lifestyles enjoyed by many labor leaders. He sometimes departed from the AFL-CIO and labor allies, even when his stands were not popular among his own constituency. Chavez came out against the Vietnam War in the 1960s and was an early and outspoken supporter of gay rights in the 1970s. The UFW opposed penalizing employers for hiring undocumented workers and championed immigration reform as early as 1973.

His different brand of organizing also spurred opposition from inside the UFW. In 1968, his insistence on nonviolence drew dissent from some union staff and young male strikers frustrated by slow progress of the grape strike and anxious to retaliate against abusive growers. Some strikers and staff left the union during his twenty-five-day fast for nonviolence, but Chavez prevailed. Then Senator Robert Kennedy was there when the fast ended, calling Chavez “one of the heroic figures of our time.”

The 1970s witnessed another internal political fight, this time between those who wanted the UFW to become a conventional business union focused on more money and benefits for its members and others, led by Chavez, who had a different vision for the UFW as that of a movement that produces for union members but also transcends traditional trade unionism to embrace challenges and solutions outside the job site for farm workers and a larger emerging working-class Latino community. Although he was, and continues to be, bitterly attacked by his critics for his position, Chavez won that fight too.

**LA LUCHA SIGUE: THE FIGHT CONTINUES**

Today’s farm worker movement is anchored in Cesar Chavez’s commitment to help farm workers and other poor Latino workers both in the workplace and the community. The UFW’s mission is clear and unwavering: continue organizing and representing farm workers at work.

Recent years have recorded significant UFW organizing and negotiating triumphs. Among them are union contracts in California with one of the nation’s largest employers of strawberry workers (Watsonville-based Dole Food Company), the state’s biggest organic strawberry company (Swanton Berry Farms near Santa Cruz), one of the state’s largest vegetable companies (Salinas-headquartered D’Arrigo Bros.), America’s biggest winery (Gallo in Sonoma County), and 75 percent of California’s fresh mushroom industry. Additionally, the UFW organized contracts in the Pacific Northwest with the biggest dairy in the United States (Threemile Canyon Farms in eastern Oregon), Washington State’s largest winery (Chateau Ste. Michelle), and Beef Northwest Feeders, with cattle feedlots in Oregon and Washington. Union membership is growing, although much work remains to be done.

With an industry still sternly resisting unionization, UFW labor fights often involve two steps forward and one step back. We constantly battle illegal attempts...
The UFW has always accepted the workforce as it exists and always organized and represented everyone in the fields, regardless of immigration status. In the early 1970s, when some called on the UFW to check the legal status of workers at companies under union contract, Chavez refused, saying, “Our job is to represent good, hard-working people whoever they are.”

by growers to get rid of the union. Two years after workers were unlawfully fired in a bid to crush the union, the UFW, with help from a boycott, signed a new four-year contract with Napa Valley’s Charles Krug winery that included reinstatement and back pay.

As John Wilhelm, UNITE HERE international union president, observed, “The UFW’s recent history shows remarkable success in the toughest organizing job in America.”

**LEGISLATIVE ADVOCACY AND REFORM**

Chavez also believed in legislative reforms that improved the lives of all farm workers, whether or not they belonged to the union and directly benefited from collective bargaining. The UFW proudly carries on that tradition with a recent series of breakthrough legislative and regulatory victories. For example, we helped pass laws imposing safety standards on dangerous farm labor vans, won emergency relief and extended unemployment benefits for farm workers hard-hit by citrus freezes, and convinced former California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger to issue the first state heat regulation in the nation, attempting to prevent more farm workers from dying or becoming ill from exposure to extreme heat.

Whenever you hear horror stories of farm worker abuses, growers reply that California has the toughest laws in the nation protecting field laborers. They’re right. But the laws on the books aren’t the laws in the fields. Two big dilemmas are lax state enforcement under both Democratic and Republican governors and a workforce made especially vulnerable to exploitation because of its immigration status.

The world is a very different place than when Chavez started organizing. Agriculture and the agricultural workforce have dramatically changed. In the early 1960s, a small percentage of the California workforce was made up of Anglos, old dust bowlers. There were some African Americans. When I first got involved with the UFW in the late 1960s, there were still significant numbers of Filipino American farm workers. Still, at that time, the majority of farm workers were Latino and were called “Mexicans.” But that group was evenly split between Mexican Americans, who were U.S. citizens, and Mexican nationals, who were mostly legal residents. There were undocumented workers, but very few. Today, the farm labor workforce is
uniformly young, immigrant, Latino, and mostly undocumented.

The UFW has always accepted the workforce as it exists and always organized and represented everyone in the fields, regardless of immigration status. In the early 1970s, when some called on the UFW to check the legal status of workers at companies under union contract, Chavez refused, saying, “Our job is to represent good, hard-working people whoever they are.”

However, too many growers, whose network of foremen and labor contractors recruit and hire workers, understand workers’ undocumented status makes them extremely susceptible to intimidation during organizing campaigns. In 2005, 80 percent of workers at giant Bakersfield-based Giumarra Vineyards Corp., the nation’s largest table grape producer, signed petitions saying they wanted representation by the UFW. Seven days later, the union lost the state-held election with 49 percent of the vote.

California’s farm labor board threw out the balloting results because of gross harassment by the Giumarras, including threatening workers because of their immigration status. The UFW is still engaged in major organizing drives at Giumarra and other companies. But we’re simultaneously pushing for legislative reform.

We won enactment in 2002 of a California law allowing farm workers to bring in neutral mediators to hammer out first-time union contracts when growers refuse to negotiate—the first such protection for workers in the private sector. In the last four years, the UFW persuaded the California Legislature to pass bills letting farm workers vote on union representation in the privacy of their homes or churches instead of via so-called secret ballot elections held on ranch property where they are easy prey to threats and coercion by employers. As industrial workers discovered in recent decades, unscrupulous employers and their union-busting labor consultants have turned secret ballot elections into just another weapon to oppress working people.

During his time in office, Governor Schwarzenegger vetoed all four UFW bills that made their way to his desk. Hundreds of farm workers worked feverishly in the fall of 2010 to help elect California’s current governor, Jerry Brown. If Brown signs a reform bill, California farm workers will have both a genuine right to choose the UFW, free from intimidation, and the ability to negotiate first contracts through the union-sponsored 2002 law. That will mean we enjoy the twin elements of the Employee Free Choice Act that has proven illusive in Congress for the national labor movement.

The UFW’s AgJobs bill in Washington, DC, would free undocumented farm workers, now composing the great majority of the nation’s farm labor workforce, from fear and exploitation by allowing them to earn the legal right to permanently stay in this country by continuing to work in agriculture. It enjoys broad, bipartisan support and is authored by Senators Diane Feinstein (D-Calif.) and Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) and U.S. Representative Howard Berman (D-Calif.).

In June 2010, the UFW kicked off the “Take Our Jobs” campaign, inviting U.S. citizens and legal residents to apply for jobs on farms across the country and helping them find and get trained for those positions. We received millions of
hits on the campaign Web site and more than 8,600 actual inquiries from people interested in field work. But, only a handful actually showed up to work. Stephen Colbert, star of the Comedy Central Colbert Report TV show, featured Take Our Jobs on three of his programs, worked a day himself at an upstate New York vegetable farm, and joined us in testifying before a House immigration subcommittee last September. Take Our Jobs exposed the reality that deporting all undocumented farm workers would cause the collapse of the American agricultural industry as we know it.

The need for AgJobs and comprehensive immigration reform, which the UFW also strongly backs, is given even greater urgency by passage of Arizona’s racist and un-American, anti-immigrant, and anti-Latino law, SB 1070. Would Cesar Chavez be a suspect under that law in the state of his birth? You bet.

REALIZED DREAMS AND PURSUING VISIONS
Chavez knew it would take more than a union to overcome the poverty and discrimination farm workers endure. It would take a movement. So today, the nonprofit Cesar E. Chavez Foundation, also part of the farm worker movement, continues achieving much progress for farm workers and poor Latino working families outside of work. Consider the following:

• More than 4,300 units of new and rehabilitated high-quality affordable housing in four states have been built for farm workers and other low-income Latino families. All feature extensive social services, from early childhood education to programs for seniors.
• Radio Campesina is the movement’s nine-station Spanish-language radio network, with popular regional Mexican music and high-quality interactive educational programming for half a million daily listeners in three states.
• Thousands of farm worker and other Latino children have received after-school and weekend instruction and tutoring to help them be proficient in English and algebra by high school.
• Millions of students learn about Chavez’s work through California’s Chavez holiday law, and many kids learn Chavez’s values by getting involved with service-learning activities in their communities around the country.
• Finally, Chavez’s dream of a place to train future generations of activists is closer to reality with the opening last year of Villa La Paz, a world-class conference and retreat center in the restored mission-style structures that housed the meetings and community gatherings held by Chavez at the movement’s La Paz headquarters in the Tehachapi Mountain hamlet of Keene, CA. The sprawling facility is the latest addition to the National Chavez Center located among the 187 acres of oaks and spectacular rock outcroppings where Chavez lived and worked his last quarter century. Also there is a 7,000-square-foot visitor center hosting Chavez’s carefully preserved office and library, gallery and museum spaces, a multimedia room, and bookstore, plus the beautifully landscaped memorial gardens where Chavez is buried.

Much remains for the farm worker movement to do in a challenging time for our people. But eighteen years after Cesar Chavez’s passing, more than 400 dedicated men and women work hard every day to carry on his vision of what both a union and a movement can become on behalf of the people to whom he dedicated his life.
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- educating the next generation of academics and policy scholars
- ensuring that research and education are closely tied to and draw from politics and practice in the field
- developing working partnerships with the broader policy community

For more than two decades the Malcolm Wiener Center has been an influential voice in domestic policy through faculty work on community policing, welfare reform, youth violence, education, urban poverty, youth and the low-wage labor market, American Indian economic and social development, and medical error rates.

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Special Content:
Voices of the Next Generation

DESCRIPTION:
This year’s Special Content section features the viewpoints of a new generation in the Hispanic community. The section begins with a narrative perspective on how SB 1070 was passed in Arizona and how a different approach in our community’s opposition to anti-illegal immigration forces could be more effective. Building on the idea of narrative, the next article challenges the conventional wisdom about how Latinos have been portrayed—by the very organizations that seek to serve our community—and introduces the work of several Latino artists seeking to redefine our place in the American conscience. Finally, we feature the inspiring personal story of a potential DREAM Act student. She recounts her journey from being undocumented to achieving a Harvard graduate degree in the context of the struggle so many of our young students have endured to earn respect and to have a chance to give back to the country they call home. In all of these articles, we see the effects of public policy and public perception on the Hispanic community and its place in America—and how the next generation plans to seek to change it for the better.

Changing the Narrative in Arizona
by Michael Trejo

Michael Trejo is pursuing his joint Master's in Public Policy and Master's in Business Administration at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and Harvard Business School, class of 2013. A native of Phoenix and the oldest of five children, Trejo graduated in 2009 from Arizona State University (ASU), obtaining a B.S. in economics with honors.

Author: Steve Alfaro
Title: Stand Up Arizona
The political air needs to be cleared, and the narrative about Hispanics in Arizona needs to change, because it has, and will continue to have, implications on the rest of the nation.

At ASU, he was a dedicated student leader, serving as president of the Hispanic Business Student Association (HBSA) and chairman of HBSA’s thirty-fifth anniversary banquet committee. After graduation, he worked in real estate investment banking at Bank of America Merrill Lynch in New York. Since 2007, Trejo has been involved with the Be A Leader Foundation as a scholar and mentor. Currently, Trejo is a Dubin Fellow through the Center for Public Leadership at the Kennedy School and is involved in several organizations at Harvard, including the Kennedy School’s Hispanic/Latino Caucus and Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy and the Business School’s Latino Student Organization.

In April 2010, Arizona passed the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, commonly known as Senate Bill (SB) 1070. The bill provides for the following: (1) that law enforcement officials may inquire about a person’s citizenship status if they have been stopped, detained, or arrested for some other reason and provided that the inquiry is not based on race, color, or national origin; (2) that any individual found unlawfully residing in the state should be referred to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; (3) that any citizen or legal resident can bring suit against a public official or agency that implements any policy that limits or restricts the full enforcement of immigration law, including this bill; fines on state agencies could reach $5,000 for each day that the said policy remains in effect; (4) makes it unlawful to transport an unauthorized immigrant, by any means of transportation “in furtherance of [their] illegal presence.” The bill received national attention, and Arizona Governor Jan Brewer’s signing of the legislation in April 2010 caused uproar in the Hispanic community and a series of economic boycotts.

While it is usually possible to separate politics from reality, SB 1070 will be remembered by a generation of Arizonan Hispanics who felt demonized by the narrative that surrounded its passage. This narrative dictated that the perceived prevalence of undocumented immigration in the Hispanic community not only disrespected American ideals but also exacerbated the state’s numerous problems. Yet the passage of SB 1070 in 2010 resulted more from economic and political circumstances than the actual beliefs of the majority of Arizonans. The political air needs to be cleared, and the narrative about Hispanics in Arizona needs to change, because it has, and will continue to have, implications on the rest of the nation.

STATE IN TRANSITION

Over the past decade, according to the U.S. Census Bureau, Arizona has experienced a population increase of 1.2 million people, three times the rate of the nation as a whole. Areas once perceived as the outskirts of Phoenix and Tucson have suddenly become infill, thereby stretching the capacity of roads and schools.
According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2010), Arizona’s economy is concentrated in construction, retail trade, and finance—industries driven by population growth. However, the rapid population growth that underpinned the state’s economic boom up to the 2008 recession could not be sustained in the long term. During 2009, Arizona’s GDP was estimated to have fallen 3.9 percent (Bureau of Economic Analysis 2010), and the state is second only to Nevada in the proportion of homeowners who are underwater on their mortgage with nearly one out of every two homeowners owing more than the value of their home (CoreLogic 2010).

Demographically, most Arizona residents were born somewhere else. According to the U.S. Census Bureau 2007-2009 American Community Survey, 64 percent of Arizonans were born outside the state compared to a rate of 41 percent nationally. Although Hispanics and other minorities represent a majority of public school students, 80 percent of residents over age fifty-five are non-Hispanic White. Politically, there are significantly more registered Republicans, many of whom live in Maricopa County (Greater Phoenix), hundreds of miles north of the border.

Arizona’s voters fear for their jobs and for their homes. Their neighborhoods have been changing, as much from immigration as from in-migration. They are angry and frightened, and their sentiments are exacerbated by their elected leaders who blame the problems on two sources: Hispanics and Washington, DC.

THE ROAD TO ARIZONA STATE SB 1070
Since 2008, Arizona’s political turmoil has been dominated by a crushing fiscal crisis. The state government is facing a structural deficit in fiscal 2011 projected to be $1.9 billion or 20 percent of the total budget (Arizona Republic 2010a). Both Democrats and Republicans alike share the blame for Arizona’s massive structural budget deficit. The largely Republican state legislature has spent the last twenty years lowering taxes, including a $500 million tax cut in 2006. Also in 2006, Democrats led by then-Governor Janet Napolitano, used surplus government revenue from the housing boom to increase state services such as all-day kindergarten. Arizona now has the fastest-growing and second-highest poverty rate in the nation (Arizona Republic 2010a).

Since the 2008 recession began the state legislature has undertaken painful measures, such as closing down the state’s rest stops, selling the capitol building, and removing certain medical operations from state health insurance coverage. Desperate for revenue, Governor Jan Brewer led the Proposition 100 ballot initiative in early 2010 to raise a projected $1 billion in sales taxes. A Republican governor raising taxes in a small government state is akin to killing a sacred cow. Not only was Governor Brewer facing heat from within the party, but most Arizonans were unimpressed with her ability to lead the state through the crisis. In a March 2010 Rasmussen Reports poll on the upcoming November 2010
As the 2010 campaign season progressed, the rhetoric against Washington grew even more resonant with voters. Arizona’s political leaders started to blame Washington both for immigration problems and for the budget crisis. In her January 2010 State of the State address, Governor Brewer identified three actions that the state had to make to balance its budget: substantial spending cuts, the raising of revenue through taxes, and limitations on the growth of future government (Brewer 2010b). But after the passage of the Affordable Care Act in March 2010, what Republicans called “Obamacare,” her story changed. The law was highly unpopular in Arizona, and Governor Brewer joined a handful of state governors in contesting the law on the basis of budget issues. The governor seized that opportunity to further reframe the state’s budget crisis. In December 2010, the Arizona Republic put together an entire section dedicated to the state’s still unresolved budget crisis (Arizona Republic 2010a). In an op-ed section for the Arizona Republic also in December 2010, Governor Brewer wrote, “if the federal government does not repeal the Obamacare legislation, all other programs in state government are subsequently threatened . . . our financial future pivots on the future of Obamacare” (Brewer 2010a).

DEATH AND POLITICS
The March 30, 2010, death of Robert Krentz became a rallying cry for the supporters of SB 1070. When reports from the crime scene spoke of footprints leading into Mexico, media sources quickly concluded that he had been murdered by undocumented immigrants. Less than six weeks later, the Arizona Daily Star reported that the Cochise Police Department was investigating a suspect in the United States and that the
suspect’s nationality was unknown but they believed the killing was not random (McCombs 2010).

Following the shooting of Arizona’s U.S. Representative Gabrielle Giffords and dozens of others at a Tucson supermarket in January 2011, Pima County Sheriff Clarence Dupnik prematurely declared political rhetoric as the shooter’s motive. Immediately after, editorial pages from the Arizona Republic to the Wall Street Journal were dominated by speculation and defense about the political leanings of the shooter, Jared Lee Loughner. Speculation ensued that Loughner was influenced by heated political rhetoric, such as the crosshairs placed over Giffords’s district during the 2010 election by a Web site affiliated with Sarah Palin. It was later found that Loughner’s actions were not politically motivated.

In May 2009, Shawna Forde and two men brutally murdered Raul Flores and his nine-year-old daughter Brisenia while injuring the child’s mother, Gina Gonzalez, in the family’s home in Arivaca, AZ. Raul and Brisenia Flores were U.S. citizens but Forde’s group believed they were drug smugglers (CNN Wire Staff 2011; Associated Press 2011). Forde and her accomplices were the leaders of Minutemen American Defense, an anti-illegal immigrant group based in Arizona. The alleged purpose of the raid on the Flores home was to finance the group’s operations. The Flores killings did not cause nearly as much backlash as did the death of Robert Krentz.

The killing of Robert Krentz ignited the fiery anger that led to the passage of SB 1070. The shooting of Giffords caused fear among a nation wary of increasingly heated political rhetoric. Raul and Brisenia Flores were brutally murdered in the name of immigration policy. Each death had highly political ramifications, sometimes regardless of the facts. But the deadly nature of politics in Arizona should not be blamed on its voters; responsibility should fall squarely on the narrative crafted by the media and driven by Arizona’s political leaders.

THE NARRATIVE

Arizona’s Republican Party has been enormously successful in adapting the national Republican platform for electoral success. It has redirected blame for the state’s budget crisis from the party to President Obama. It has played upon fear to argue for stricter immigration enforcement and employed the emotional appeal of paralysis in Washington to catalyze urgency. It has also held up the U.S. Constitution as a justification for stripping undocumented immigrants of basic human rights.

The Arizona Democratic Party has failed at almost every juncture to effectively counter the Republicans. The most common response to SB 1070 has been to accuse the bill’s supporters of racism. Although there are parallels between

The deadly nature of politics in Arizona should not be blamed on its voters; responsibility should fall squarely on the narrative crafted by the media and driven by Arizona’s political leaders.
Arizona in the 2000s and Alabama in the 1960s in the racist overtones of the state government, most Arizona voters do not think immigration is a race issue; they think it is about the Constitution—states’ rights and birthright citizenship.

A new narrative for Arizona is warranted. As the debate on SB 1070 progressed, the Hispanic community lost faith in either political party’s ability to defend them. Many pundits believe that the growing Hispanic population will eventually force the hand of elected officials. However, according to the U.S. Census Bureau, Arizona’s population is already 30 percent Hispanic, and legislation is likely to get far worse before demographic projections come to fruition. In January 2011, two Arizona Republican lawmakers introduced a bill to challenge the Fourteenth Amendment’s right to birthright citizenship for U.S.-born children of undocumented immigrants (Beard Rau 2011). The Hispanic community cannot afford additional public policy proposals that position its members as either victims or culprits.

Not everyone in Arizona supports these immigration measures. However, it is the only option being forcefully presented. With an economy struggling to recover, Arizonans felt powerless to control their Southern border and felt that immigration needed to be addressed. But instead of “checking papers,” measures could be taken to bring undocumented immigrants out from the shadows. A poll conducted by the Arizona Republic found that while 55 percent of Arizonans supports SB 1070, 62 percent supports a middle ground that would be more inclusive of undocumented immigrants (Arizona Republic 2010b). As a community, we need to take charge of dictating the narrative about Hispanics in this country. We need to deepen the academic and philosophical basis for our opposition to nativist public policy like SB 1070. We should be upholding the Declaration of Independence and arguing that the spirit of America’s founding was about freedom, not exclusion—that an America without immigrants would still be a British colony. Finally, we cannot let Arizona’s incumbent political leaders get away with blaming their lack of leadership on a combination of Hispanics and Washington. Arizona does not have an immigration problem, it has a government problem. It is time for a change.

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La Culture Cure

by Emily Goulding

Emily Goulding is a cultural activist focused on the intersection of politics and culture. She is currently the Director of Development at GALA Theatre in Washington, D.C. Prior to joining GALA, Goulding raised millions of dollars for community arts and media projects across the Americas and managed the civic engagement work of Voto Latino, cofounded by actress Rosario Dawson. There Goulding project-managed communications campaigns that leveraged partnerships with iTunes, mun2, and other pop culture outlets to reach millions of millennial Latinos. She also spoke on behalf of Voto Latino on ABC World News with Dianne Sawyer, on Radio Bilingüe, and with the Associated Press. Goulding has published numerous cultural criticism articles and is the author of the blog Castiza Notebooks, which provides commentary from a mixed White/Latino perspective. She holds a bachelor’s degree in modern literature from the University of California, Santa Cruz and a master’s degree in journalism from Georgetown University.

“To be Chicano was to say . . . we are not foreigners!”
— Richard Rodriguez, as quoted in the Siqueiros exhibit at the Autry Center in Los Angeles

In the early 1970s, it was not difficult for the American public to identify the Latino civil rights movement and what it stood for. On the West Coast, antiwar activists were leading the Chicano Moratorium against the Vietnam War, and on the East Coast, the Young Lords of New York were setting fire to trash the sanitation department had neglected to pick up in New York’s Puerto Rican (“Nuyorican”) neighborhoods. These were groups demanding to be respected for what they were: hard-working American citizens who deserved equal rights.

It was also not hard to name the cultural and political figureheads of the movement, as they were visible at a mainstream level: Carlos Santana played at Woodstock, and Dolores Huerta collaborated closely with the Kennedys. These cultural and political superstars also inspired a cohort of “grasstops” leadership: for every Santana, there were musicians like Malo and Little Joe y la
Insufficient attention has been given to the cultural actors in our political movement; their lack of visibility detracts from the movement’s saliency and its ability to achieve the goal set out by the original Latino movement: the recognition of Latino civil rights.

Familia. There were even multicultural groups like War, and Dolores Huerta inspired an entire generation of female activists.

Today, only a small percentage of Americans can name a Latino leader (Lopez and Taylor 2010). Although Latinos form a greater percentage of the U.S. population today than they did forty years ago—and much is made of our growing political power (the awakening of the “sleeping giant,” as it’s called)—our visibility in mainstream cultural spaces is less today than it was then. This is partly because insufficient attention has been given to the cultural actors in our political movement; their lack of visibility detracts from the movement’s saliency and its ability to achieve the goal set out by the original Latino movement: the recognition of Latino civil rights.

PERFORMANCE POLITICS
Identity performance is a set of behaviors and traits one uses to convey one’s social identity, and due to a variety of historical factors, Latinos are required to perform their identities in a more elaborate fashion than are other ethnicities in the United States. The performance required of Latinos to be understood as Latino is ornate and borderline arcane: Latinos are largely expected to speak the language of their family’s country of origin and maintain strong emotional ties to that country for four generations or more, something that Irish Americans, Italian Americans, and even Jewish Americans are not expected to do. Myriad elements, which are beyond the realm of this article, from racism to the remnants of Manifest Destiny, demand this performance and relegate Latino life to a permanent outsider status in the American imagination. This idea is so cemented in American consciousness that even the best efforts of the “multiculturalism” movement of the 1980s and 1990s (the culture wars) left this expectation unchanged.

In the media, Latinos are mentioned in relation to immigration at a rate ten times that of other ethnic groups. Only 3 percent of news stories are about Latinos, and among those, the Mexican drug war is one of the top editorial lines (Pew Hispanic Center 2009). Several new Latino media properties, including Vme,
MTV’s Tr3s, Sí TV, mun2, and Corporation for Public Broadcasting’s new LA-FWD, have been formed to compensate but in turn have had the accidental effect of letting mainstream media networks “off the hook” for not covering Latino life in a more complete way.

Due to funding pressures, the Latino nongovernmental (NGO) sector also serves a limited percentage of the U.S. Latino public. Much of the legislative and political focus of the Latino NGO sector, which includes groups such as the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials, the League of United Latin American Citizens, and the National Council of La Raza, is on immigration, especially comprehensive immigration reform (CIR). CIR is not the most effective way to build civic power, though, as more than 60 percent of all U.S. Latinos are native-born U.S. citizens, and 75 percent of Latinos ages eighteen to thirty-four are U.S. citizens, according to the American Community Survey 2009 and 2008 U.S. Census Bureau data. CIR would thus fix some things for the 40 percent of U.S. Latinos who are not citizens, but the day-to-day, quality-of-life challenges for Latinos—housing, jobs, and education—would remain unaddressed. Voto Latino is one of the few organizations to heavily emphasize that jobs and better quality of life are among American Latino policy priorities.

When the Latino NGO sector is singularly focused on immigration reform, it is essentially rendering the Latino activist exercise a multimillion dollar business of preaching to the choir: the base gets excited, but the bill dies on Capitol Hill. CIR is a legislative conundrum, as it asks legislators to prioritize the issues of nonvoters, which legislators are hesitant to do.

Some say we can pass CIR by “convincing the middle” and forging interethnic coalitions through which non-Latinos help advocate for Latino rights, yet our chances of doing so are lessened if non-Latinos can’t even understand that in advocating for Latinos they’re advocating for their fellow Americans.

These crossed signals are a loss for the American political process, as Latinos are the canaries of American democracy: health care, the economy, and housing were crises to the Latino community before they were called the health care debate, the recession, and the foreclosure crisis in the mainstream media. If we don’t listen to what American Latinos have to say about the state of our union, policy makers and activists run the risk of spinning their wheels.

Several new Latino media properties . . . have had the accidental effect of letting mainstream media networks “off the hook” for not covering Latino life in a more complete way.
A few brave artists such as Malverde, Favianna Rodriguez, Luis Alfaro, and Ernesto Yerena are working to cure this culture of misperception. These musical, visual, and theater artists are enacting the legacy of the original civil rights movement by using its original medium—protest art—and disseminating it via twenty-first century new media tools.

These artists are all based in California and are all Mexican American. I use them as a national example not at the exclusion of other locales or Latino subgroups but rather to shed light on important cultural work being done by members of the largest Latino subgroup in a location that is the capitał of the arts and entertainment industry (which is simultaneously the largest Latino market in the United States).

The work of these artists is colorful and visually rich, not unlike the work of Judith Baca, the legendary Chicano movement–era muralist and founder of SPARC (Social and Public Art Resource Center). Their art honors the struggles of marginalized communities for political participation from a class-based, instead of group-based, lens. Their quasi-materialist pedagogy (materialist in the Marxist sense) is one that is inclusive and inspiring, as class-based alliances present greater opportunity for movement building than group-specific ones do: hundreds of millions of Americans cannot understand what it means to be an immigrant, but hundreds of millions of Americans can understand what it means to be poor. Malverde, Rodriguez, Alfaro, and Yerena create spaces for cross-cultural identification and a context in which Americans can reimage their sense of social solidarity.

Their work reexamines agency, nativity, and willpower (ganas). It develops a culture of animo that takes back the politics of responsibility and puts it to work for the majority of our community here in the United States. This is actually a radical paradigm, as responsibility has traditionally been a right-wing concept and fairness (justice) a left-wing concept. Their new paradigm blends both, leading a new path forward for political empowerment.

Malverde is a Chicano hip-hop artist who made the conscious decision to make his art outside the lines of what he calls “hip-pop” hip-hop. He is the son of activists who marched with Cesar Chavez, and his nom d’artiste of Malverde is that of a Northern Mexican Robin Hood–type figure who stole from the rich to give to the poor. Malverde’s music encourages people to get engaged and take action.

Malverde feels he sees a lot of community-based efforts to create awareness amongst Latino artists, yet in an e-mail exchange we had in February 2011, he points out that, “the avenues to prominence on the media side are very limited.”
He sees Latino activists fighting for the same things as they did in the 1970s—better living wages, better education, better health care—but feels the Latino arts community is “not singular and it’s not nearly as unified as it has the potential to be.”

He was originally signed onto Universal Records through Machete Music, its “Latino label,” and is now successfully producing independently through the Maleco Collective, which Latina magazine highlighted in its June 2010 “The Best Latin Music You Don’t Know” series.

Favianna Rodriguez is based in the Bay Area in California, and her work honors the struggles of women, migrants, and working-class communities to claim their rights and be heard. Her work has been used by many prominent NGOs such as Presente.org.

Luis Alfaro is a playwright who has penned key adaptations of Greek tragedies that speak to the issue of choice (agency) in Latino communities. He wrote Electricidad, a remake of Sophocles’s Electra, in 2005 and, in 2011, presented the bicoastal premiere of Oedipus El Rey through the National New Play Network and the National Endowment for the Arts. Oedipus El Rey exposes audiences to a story of gang life in Pico Union, a hard-knock, gang-ridden neighborhood just west of downtown Los Angeles. Alfaro’s adaptation of the Oedipus story puts a clever spin on fatalism in the Latino community; while fatalism frames the Oedipus plot, the chief problem with the characters in Alfaro’s Oedipus El Rey is that they lack ganas. Tiresias, who raises Oedipus as his own, tells Oedipus that although he wanted to raise him to be the new story—the new king—he couldn’t, as fate can’t be changed. “We’re destined to be fucked,” Tiresias proclaims.

The Gran Don of ganas is Ernesto Yerena. He is the new star of the protest art world and is an important member of the renegade Echo Park art scene that made Shepard Fairey famous. Yerena founded the Hecho Con Ganas collective, which seeks to give people the animo needed to accomplish their goals, or in Yerena’s terms, ganas to do what they want. He had a recent exhibition in San Francisco entitled “Ganas 20/20” that featured a fictitious army of empowered citizens rising up in self-expression. Their expression is rage-filled but responsible: one piece features a billboard with the directive, “Control your community with GANAS.”

Yerena also penned the look of the Alto Arizona campaign, the first and most grassroots of the anti-SB 1070 efforts. Alto Arizona was a project of the National Day Laborer Organizing Network and worked closely with Sound Strike, the Zack de la Rocha–led musical boycott.

The Alto Arizona look was used by Malverde’s El Grito event, a music-oriented voter registration event held at the University of Southern California leading up to the 2010 midterm elections. El
We need both Latino and non-Latino societal actors to sign off on new types of identity performance and abandon the old politics of assimilation that deemed “Latino” and “American” to be mutually exclusive.

Grito was one of many events that used young Latinos’ anger about Arizona’s SB 1070 as fuel for registering voters and was successful in doing so. However, the national coverage of these actions didn’t match up with local sentiment; the larger media narrative about SB 1070 mislabeled it as an immigration law instead of a civil rights law and subsequently mislabeled anger about SB 1070 as being about migration instead of racial profiling.

During a time when the entire nation needed to be engaged in dialogue about what the proposition of SB 1070 meant and what the larger civic implications of its introduction were, no mainstream networks agreed to do so. Only NBC Universal’s mun2, its bicultural Latino channel, aired content that addressed it head-on. And while mun2 produces great content, it is only accessible via cable, and not everyone can afford cable.

EL PORQUÉ
While niche media outlets serve an important role in developing new ideas and creating intra-community solidarity, they simply don’t have the viewership that mainstream media outlets have. Therefore, mainstream media networks should revisit our requests from thirty years ago and integrate our realities into their programming. The Latino public affairs sector should also focus on getting what we’ve wanted since the 1970s—a higher quality of life and respect, not just the passage of CIR.

Increasing American understanding of Latino life is a healthy democratic exercise, but it’s also a necessary one. Hate crimes against Latinos have risen 40 percent over the last several years (Potok 2008). One recent hate-crime victim was nine-year-old Brisenia Flores and her father Raul who were shot point blank at the hands of the Minutemen American Defense, led by Shawna Forde (Foley 2011).

The Brisenias of America are the fastest-growing demographic in the country and need to be seen, accepted, and above all, respected by their neighbors. This will require new frameworks and new narratives of nativity. We need both Latino and non-Latino societal actors to sign off on new types of identity perfor-
mance and abandon the old politics of assimilation that deemed “Latino” and “American” to be mutually exclusive.

New, cross-sectoral efforts such as the newly formed Center for Social Cohesion, a joint project of Arizona State University and Zócalo Public Square in partnership with the New America Foundation, will be vital toward this end. The Center for Social Cohesion was founded by writer Gregory Rodriguez and is dedicated to studying the forces that shape our sense of social unity. Initiatives such as these need our praise, but more than anything, they need our viewership.

REFERENCES


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My Life as a DREAMer who ACTed Beyond the Barriers: From Growing Up “Undocumented” in Arizona to a Master’s Degree from Harvard

by Silvia P. Rodríguez Vega

Silvia P. Rodríguez Vega is a 2011 master of arts in education candidate at the Harvard University Graduate School of Education.

“Like a candle braving the wind, I refused to burn out.”
— Samuel Diaz Morales, friend of the author, 2010

My life as a DREAM Act student has never been easy. The DREAM Act, defined as the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act, is an effort to establish a path to citizenship for some children of illegal immigrants. Most of my peers in this situation face endless stress, experience discrimination, and walk on paths with dead ends. My story begins like the thousands of other students who are in my shoes. My parents brought me into the United States when I was too young to remember. In my case, I was two years old and came to the United States with a tourist visa that expired.

I was unable to get a driver’s license or apply for many scholarships because my undocumented status did not permit me to do so.
years later. My mother and father were dreaming of a future for me filled with education and opportunity. They could never have foreseen the events that would happen as I grew into an adult and the suffering our family would endure because of our legal status.

As a child, I never saw myself as any different from my peers. I learned English while watching Barney & Friends and loved sleepovers and pizza parties. I grew up with many mentors and role models who demonstrated that women like me could go on and earn a postsecondary education. Much of my inspiration came from the community service projects I joined when I was ten. I was a peer health leader and became very active in theater and other arts for social change. I wanted to help people, and I knew that to do so effectively and at the highest level would require an education.

However, trying to obtain a driving permit and looking into scholarships for college brought the realization that I was not normal. Unlike my friends, I was unable to get a driver’s license or apply for many scholarships because my undocumented status did not permit me to do so. But I decided not to give up. I applied and was accepted to Arizona State University (ASU), receiving the Maroon and Gold Scholarship.

In 2006, in the middle of my sophomore year, however, Arizona voters passed Proposition 300, which forced undocumented students to pay out-of-state tuition and further made them ineligible for state, federal, and university-based scholarships. I was devastated and thought my dreams were over. Students affected by this proposition—undocumented students and allies—protested, embarked on seven-day hunger strikes, and lobbied members of Congress including then Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, but Prop 300 passed and the DREAM Act was nowhere in sight.

Collaboration between student groups and the university’s administration allowed us to continue for another year, but our scholarships were taken away again due to harassment from the state legislature. I attended a Chicano Latino faculty meeting and told them what was happening to students like me. The following week ASU President Michael Crow met with Chicanos Por La Causa (CPLC), a community development corporation in Phoenix, and CPLC launched the American Dream Fund to help us finance our education. However, students who were freshmen when I was graduating are now without the funds to continue their education because CPLC wasn’t able to meet its fund-raising goals.

Going through these events felt like being seasick, caught in the ups and downs of a political storm.

When I was in my senior year in college and it looked like I was going to make it, my family decided to leave Arizona. The daily harassment and community raids, due both to my efforts to challenge the proposition as well as a general sentiment against undocumented individuals, were
threatening my family, so they moved to the Midwest. This was a very difficult situation for my family. In just one week, my younger brother and sister were pulled from school, and my family had to sell or give away everything for which we had worked so hard over the past eighteen years to acquire. I sold my car and everything but my paintings, some clothes, pictures, and books. I told my mom that I had a place to live and not to worry about me. She did not know that I actually had no place to go. I hid in my friend’s dorm room and then lived with nine different people over the following two years while I finished college as I lacked the funds for room and board.

My family members returned to Arizona for my graduation. While many of my classmates were thrilled and celebratory, I was in a strange stage of emotions. Part of me was happy because I had made it. Yet most of me was sad and frustrated at the uncertainty of my future. I was not sure what I would do after graduation, I had no opportunities for employment due to my status, and I was not even sure where I would live.

After graduation, I continued my community organizing, making art, and working with youth. Yet, I felt like a big part of me was missing. I went to visit Professor Carlos Velez-Ibañez who had been my mentor at ASU. When I told him that I was interested in graduate school and why, he said, “Muchacha, you want six Ph.Ds!” He encouraged me to do some research and come back in a week. When I returned to his office he pointed me to his computer where he described a program that incorporated many of my areas of interest. When I realized it was at the Harvard University Graduate School of Education, I looked at him with eyes so wide open they threatened to fall out of my head. So many questions were running through my mind: You really think I can make it? How will I get in? He looked at me with believing eyes and said, “That’s where you need to go.”

The process to apply was long and exhausting. I focused all my attention, mind, heart, time, and resources on the application. My mentors sponsored my application fees and GRE preparation. I had never worked so hard and prayed so hard. In March 2010 I was accepted. It was just like I had dreamed, pictured, and visualized. It began with a letter saying, “Congratulations.” It took me days to believe it. When I finally did, I truly thought I was going to die because I thought being accepted was the best thing that could ever happen to me. I could not fathom anything better happening to someone like me—pushed out, criminalized, and undocumented—than being offered an education from Harvard.

I moved forward and submitted my application for financial aid. The cost of tuition alone was $40,000; including room, board, and very conservative living expenses, it would be much closer to $70,000 for the one-year program. Harvard could only offer me a $10,000 grant. Without the opportunity to receive financial aid or loans, my worries increased. I would need to raise $60,000 from other sources. However, I was not going to give up that easily. With a group of good-hearted people who called themselves Friends of Harvard, I began a campaign called Harvard Sí Se Puede!—“Harvard, yes I can!”—to raise money to help fund my education.

It has been a miraculous process. People from the most humble walks of life have stepped up to help me get to where I am now—at Harvard. Working with
I was determined to prove that my legal status did not validate or invalidate my humanity. I was simultaneously angry and inspired. But most importantly, I wanted to prove to all undocumented students that any dream could be achieved.

Community groups and churches, we’ve held bake sales, art shows, and other fund-raising events. I applied for every scholarship I could find and received a few. Despite all my efforts, I kept having moments where I could not understand how this could be possible. Nonetheless, I woke up everyday determined to do it not just for myself, but for all the other students who knew my pain. I was determined to prove that my legal status did not validate or invalidate my humanity. I was simultaneously angry and inspired. But most importantly, I wanted to prove to all undocumented students that any dream could be achieved.

I made it to Harvard, despite a funding deficit. I simply had faith that I would make it. I was not sure how I’d manage to get the rest of the money; I only knew that this was bigger than me.

Right when finals began in the fall semester, I got a call from my sister telling me to pray for our mother. I thought my mother had been injured. I called back right away and found out that my sister’s high school was calling U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) on our mother. I was in complete disbelief; I could not understand why or how this was happening.

I dropped everything and flew to be with my mother and sister. My mother was not in custody so when I arrived we decided to leave the house. We drove to a town where we had a relative. As soon as we arrived my mother had a stroke, and we took her to the hospital. She was there a week, and the doctors told me she needed medical treatment and medication, which she had no access to because she could not legally obtain health insurance. As a family we decided that it would be best for my mother to return to Mexico to be with the rest of our family there so she could receive the medical care she needed. She will not be allowed to return to the United States for ten years. Though still in the United States, because my father is sick and my brother is in prison, only my sister will be able to see me graduate from Harvard in the spring of 2011.

Rewinding back to the day my mother and father brought me to the United States, I do not think this is what they pictured when they thought of the “American Dream.” To be honest, our lives have at times felt almost like the American Nightmare.

In December 2010, the DREAM Act failed to pass the U.S. Senate, leaving its future uncertain. Consequently, undocumented youth are dropping out of school in record numbers, and families are being torn apart by xenophobic immigration policy in Arizona. But I keep fighting. I fight for the youth who are not ready to give up. I fight for the children who
cannot defend themselves, and I scream for the millions who remain voiceless.

My goals are to help my sister attend college and to be her mentor and role model like the ones I’ve had in my life; to publish a book from a child’s perspective on immigration and Sheriff Joe Arpaio in Arizona and the effect his raids have had on children whose parents have been detained and/or deported; to obtain a Ph.D.; to help as many students as possible follow their dreams; and to seek justice and create change for future generations and the people of Arizona. One day I hope to run my own school and start my own nonprofit with a focus on community empowerment through the arts and educational advancement for underserved people.

The same fire that burned inside me when I was a child continues to burn today. My mission is to help people, and that is why I refuse to let the flame even flicker. I brave the wind, and nothing can stand in my way.

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I fight for the youth who are not ready to give up. I fight for the children who cannot defend themselves, and I scream for the millions who remain voiceless.
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In-State Tuition Policies for Undocumented Youth

by Edward D. Vargas

Edward D. Vargas is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Public Policy at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. In 2011, he completed his Ph.D. at the School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University Bloomington. His research focuses on various dimensions of poverty alleviation and health disparities through social policy and public finance. Current projects include studying the effects of fear and risk of deportation on program uptake for mixed-status families (a family arrangement where some family members are undocumented and others are U.S. citizens), the economic costs of service provision for mixed-status families, and the effects of education and health policies on the well-being of youth. Vargas applies quantitative research methodology to provide policy makers with well-grounded empirical research in the hopes of improving the living conditions for families living in poverty. On top of his research, teaching, and mentoring, he is actively involved in community service related to youth empowerment and immigrant access to education.

ABSTRACT:
This article is an investigation into why U.S. states have enacted, banned, or continued with the status quo regarding in-state tuition policies for unauthorized youth. Using data from multiple government and nonprofit sources, a series of multinomial logistic regressions are estimated to explain the determinants of state behavior across the country in 2008. This question of why some states pass or ban in-state tuition legislation for unauthorized migrants is important for several reasons. From a public finance perspective, not much is known of the relationship between fiscal and state budgets and the decision of a state to pass legislation regarding undocumented citizens. From an economic stimulus perspective, does poverty or per capita spending in higher education explain this behavior? The findings may help us
understand how fiscal, political, public mood, and demographic indicators affect states’ actions toward in-state tuition policies and why some members of Congress may be pushing for a federal education policy such as the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act.

Research exists showing a positive relationship between states that have passed in-state tuition policies and the enrollment of undocumented Mexican youth (Kaushal 2008). However, though the importance of such laws is clear, to date no research has examined why states make the decision to either pass or ban in-state tuition policies.

State policy on in-state tuition has only emerged as a more mainstream topic in the past couple of years. As the comparison study presented in this article was conducted for the year 2008, the data is taken from what was true at that time. As of June 2007, according to an Education Commission of the States report, approximately thirty-two states had considered legislation that would allow unauthorized migrants to receive in-state tuition rates (Zaleski 2008). Also as of June 2007, only ten states had passed such laws: California, Illinois, Kansas, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, New York, Texas, Utah, and Washington (Zaleski 2008); after passing a law in 2009, Wisconsin, became the most recent state to join these other ten (National Conference of State Legislatures 2011). Of these eleven, California, Texas, and Utah considered bills in 2007 that would have repealed the laws, but the attempts were
unsuccessful. Note that, in 2008, Oklahoma passed legislation to repeal in-state tuition for unauthorized students after first allowing it in 2003. Oklahoma has since amended its law, leaving granting of in-state tuition rates to undocumented students up to the Oklahoma Board of Regents (National Conference of State Legislatures 2011). The Board of Regents currently still allows undocumented students who meet Oklahoma’s original statutory requirements to receive in-state tuition. However, for the purposes of this study, which was conducted in 2008, Oklahoma is coded as having banned in-state tuition policy, and Wisconsin is treated as a state that has not acted on the policy since it adopted an in-state tuition policy in 2009.

At the opposite extreme, as of June 2007, ten states had considered legislation that would have prohibited unauthorized migrants from being allowed to pay in-state tuition; these states were Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Iowa, Michigan, Mississippi, North Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Virginia (Zaleski 2008).

As of February 2011, three states—Arizona, Colorado, and Georgia—prohibit in-state tuition rates for undocumented students, and one state—South Carolina—prohibits undocumented students from enrolling in colleges or universities (National Conference of State Legislatures 2011). This was the same in 2008.

The remaining states that have neither allowed nor banned in-state tuition policies give autonomy to colleges and universities in developing their own guidelines regarding in-state tuition for undocumented students.

This article compares states that—as of 2008—had passed, banned, or not acted on in-state tuition policies on measures of fiscal policy, political ideology, citizen ideology, religion, education spending, and the state poverty rate. The findings of this article may provide us with a better understanding of the determinants of state action on education policies for the undocumented.

**BACKGROUND**

The cohorts of undocumented youth filtering through the U.S. education system naturally give rise to a number of those undocumented students wanting to matriculate into postsecondary institutions. For many undocumented students, the college application process is the first time they ever internalize their illegality, as the applications demand both residency and financial documents. Complicating this process is the distinction colleges and universities make regarding residency, nonresidency, and international status to establish tuition rates.

In-state tuition policies for undocumented students are indirectly tied to the *Plyler v. Doe* 1982 Supreme Court case, which overturned a state statute denying education funding for undocumented school children in Texas. *Plyler v. Doe* stands as the most important legal case for immigrant rights and education in the United States. In this landmark Supreme Court decision, the court struck down Texas’s attempt to deny free (K-12) public education to alien children (Olivas 2008).

Justice William Brennan, in the majority opinion, employed the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause when concluding that, “a state could not enact a discriminatory classification by defining a disfavored group as nonresident” (Olivas 2004).
allow (left-hand side) or ban (right-hand side) in-state tuition policies.

This article examines what is happening across the United States regarding education policy for undocumented youth. Prior qualitative research has discussed the importance of framing (Reich and Mendoza 2008) and coalition building (Dougherty et al. 2010) in the adoption of in-state tuition policies. However, this is the first study to apply a quantitative analysis on state decisions.
stand how fiscal, political, and social indicators affect states’ actions toward in-state tuition policies. This is not an easy policy case to examine. As stated by Michael A. Olivas (1995), “it is an admissions case, an immigration matter, a taxpayer suit, a state civil procedure issue, an issue of preemption, a question of higher education tuition and finance, a civil rights case, and a political case.” In this article, I can only hope to scratch the surface of this extensive policy area.

regarding in-state tuition policies. While Neeraj Kaushal (2008) demonstrates that in-state tuition policies do not crowd out native students, she does not step back and ask why such policies even exist. In addition, not much is known regarding how a state’s fiscal health affects the decision to allow in-state tuition policy. And there are other potential factors. For example, does a state’s political and citizen ideology matter, and does the influence of civil rights advocacy groups help explain state adoption? Evaluating such factors may help us start to understand how fiscal, political, and social indicators affect states’ actions toward in-state tuition policies.

### Table 2 — Credit Ratings, Coding Scheme, and Descriptions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moody’s</th>
<th>Standard &amp; Poor’s</th>
<th>Coding Scheme</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aaa</td>
<td>AAA</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Prime: obligation of highest quality and lowest probability of default; quality management and low-debt structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aa</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>High-quality grade: small margin of protection or larger fluctuation of protective elements than Aaa.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aa1</td>
<td>AA+</td>
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<td>Higher grade: only slightly more secure than prime; second-lowest probability of default</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aa2</td>
<td>AA</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Higher grade: only slightly more secure than prime; second-lowest probability of default</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aa3</td>
<td>AA-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Upper-medium grade: safe investments; strength in local economic base, debt burden, or fiscal balance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Upper-medium grade: safe investments; strength in local economic base, debt burden, or fiscal balance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A1</td>
<td>A+</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Medium grade: safe investment; strength in local economic base, debt burden, or fiscal balance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Medium grade: safe investment; strength in local economic base, debt burden, or fiscal balance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A3</td>
<td>A-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Medium grade: safe investment; strength in local economic base, debt burden, or fiscal balance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baa</td>
<td>BBB+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Medium grade: neither highly protected nor poorly secured; adequate present security but may be unreliable over any great length of time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baa1</td>
<td>BBB</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Medium grade: lowest investment security rating; may show more than one fundamental weakness; higher default probability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, Mikesell 2007
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
To measure why states have adopted in-state tuition policies, various sources of data were identified to create a cross-sectional data set in 2008. Each data source as well as how variables are measured and a theoretical framework of the utility of each measure are discussed. Moreover, because some of the measures may be highly correlated, combinations of the variables are tested to explore how they might contribute to understanding the decision to adopt in-state tuition policies.

Fiscal Health
It is expected that states with healthy financial institutions are more inclined to pass in-state tuition policies for undocumented youth. Since there is no agreed-upon measure of fiscal health in the public finance literature, two measures are used to capture a state’s fiscal health. The first measure takes the ratio of general state revenue minus general state spending to total U.S. spending, measured in the previous year. The figures were obtained from U.S. Census Bureau data on state government finances and tax collections and were lagged for 2007; the formula is as such:

\[
\text{Fiscal Health} = \left( \frac{\text{Gen. Rev}_{\text{state}} - \text{Gen. Exp}_{\text{state}}}{\text{Total Gen. Exp}_{\text{U.S}}} \right)
\]

General revenue and expenditures are a better measure than total revenue and expenditures because they exclude intergovernmental transfers from the federal government. This becomes important since states are prohibited from using federal dollars to subsidize undocumented aliens.

Credit Ratings
A second fiscal health indicator is tested using state credit ratings. Credit rating data was obtained from Standard & Poor’s (S&P) and Moody’s for 2007. Credit ratings take into account financial indicators such as tax rates, spending, and debt burden. Craig L. Johnson and Kenneth A. Kriz (2002) show evidence that a state’s credit rating and its fiscal institutions are in fact correlated.

Credit ratings are important since being assigned a high rating reduces borrowing costs for state and local governments by reducing information asymmetries for investors. In other words, intermediaries such as S&P and Moody’s provide signals to investors that a state will not default and that it will pay back its outstanding debt in a timely manner. In situations in which ratings are split between S&P and Moody’s, the highest credit rating is used. Credit ratings are measured as an ordered variable from low credit ratings to high credit ratings. A low credit rating (3) indicates a low quality of an asset (high probability of default), while the highest rating (8) indicates a very low probability of default. Table 2 provides the credit rating coding scheme and a description of the letter grade. Credit ratings provide a different measurement of the overall fiscal health of a state. Ratings were lagged for year 2007 in the quantitative models since the current year’s credit ratings are a function of the previous year’s rating. Since credit ratings take into account revenue and expenditures, models include either the fiscal health indicator or the credit rating variable but not both.

Political Ideology
To examine how political ideology explains state behaviors regarding adoption of in-state tuition policies, a
political ideology indicator is used to test if a one-party system is more effective in passing or banning in-state tuition policies. If the majority of the state house and senate are of the same party, and the governor is also of the same party, this variable is coded as being a one-party system; otherwise it is coded as mixed-party. Data for political ideology was obtained from the Council of State Governments in 2008. It is expected that a one-party state is more likely to pass in-state tuition legislation.

Citizen Ideology
To understand how citizen ideology affects in-state tuition adoption, William Berry et al.’s (1998) work on representation is used, which assumes that citizen ideology is reflected in how the elected representatives vote. The index ranges from 0 (most conservative) to 100 (most liberal). Citizen ideology is expected to be highly correlated with political ideology, so this indicator will be specified separately from the political ideology variables. The 2008 data was obtained through Richard Fording’s State Ideology online database. It is expected that states that trend to be more liberal are also more likely to pass legislation in support of in-state tuition policies.

Advocacy
In addition to fiscal health measures, political ideology, and citizen ideology, advocacy is expected to have an influence on policy making. Unfortunately, there is not an established construct to measure the influence of advocacy. However, recent work in civic engagement has shown how membership density (Han 2006) can improve public recognition. Membership density is defined as the total number of members in a particular civic organization. Using data from the National Center for Charitable Statistics, I construct the influence of advocacy by taking the total number of registered nonprofit organizations focused on civil rights in 2008 and standardize this figure by the total population in the state. It is expected that as the per capita number of advocacy groups increases in a state, the probability of policy adoption regarding in-state tuition also increases.

Religious Affiliation
Religious affiliation is measured using the share of Catholics and Protestants in each state. This measure is taken from Gallup’s 2009 religious preferences by state poll, which, via phone interview, asked respondents their religious affiliation (Newport 2009). It is expected that states with a higher Catholic population are more inclined to pass an in-state tuition policy.

Demographics
Demographic variables are included to help understand why states are passing in-state tuition policies. The estimated percentage of undocumented immigrants in each state for 2008 provided by the Pew Hispanic Center is included, as well as the percentage Latino in a given state, which was obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau for 2008. It is expected that states with higher per capita undocumented aliens are more likely to both pass and ban in-state tuition. It is also expected that the percentage Latino in a state is positively related to both passing and banning in-state tuition policies. These variables will be specified independently of each other since they are highly correlated.

Education Expenditures
Per capita expenditure on college students is also an important construct that is
tested in this analysis. Per capita expenditure for college students was obtained from the State Higher Education Executive Officers’ database for 2008. Per capita expenditure indicators are expected to be positively associated with adoption of in-state tuition policies. In other words, states that spend more money on education are more inclined to either want to reap the benefits or, alternatively, place more emphasis on long-term benefits of education such as economic growth.

**State Poverty Rate**

The last measure includes the poverty rate for each individual state. This measure was obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau for 2008. It is expected that states with higher poverty rates are more likely to ban in-state tuition policies.

**Outcome Variable**

The adopt indicator is a categorical measure for a state’s action regarding in-state tuition policy in 2008 as follows: 1 = not adopted or banned; 2 = adopted; 3 = banned. This information was taken from the National Conference of State Legislatures (Morse and Birnbach 2010) and was verified in each state’s legislative Web site.

The main question in this article is why states have either adopted or banned in-state tuition policies allowing undocumented children access to postsecondary education. The decision (pass, not pass,
The main question in this article is why states have either adopted or banned in-state tuition policies allowing undocumented children access to postsecondary education.

The outcome variable is categorical (1 = no action, 2 = pass, 3 = ban), this multinomial logistic model will be estimated with a maximum likelihood estimator (MLE). The desirable properties of MLE are its consistency, normality, and efficiency. By estimating a multinomial logistic regression model, the identification assumptions state that (1) the threshold is 0: \( \tau = 0 \); (2) conditional mean of \( \epsilon \) is 0: \( E(\epsilon | x) = 0 \); (3) the conditional variance of \( \epsilon \) is constant: \( \text{Var} (\epsilon | x) = \pi/3 \). The findings are presented using multinomial logistic log-odds plots. The baseline for comparison is states that have not acted on in-state tuition policy. This methodology allows us then to understand how states differ when controlling for various dimensions of fiscal policy, political variables, demographics, religion, and state-specific education and poverty measures.

Table 3 provides a detailed tabulation of the summary statistics used in the final analysis. Every state had a balanced budget in 2007 (recall that both fiscal health variables are lagged one budget year). Credit ratings varied from 3 (A-) to 8 (AAA). In terms of ideology, the average citizen ideology score was sixty-two, which implies that, in general, states are more liberal than conservative. In 2008, states were split half and half with regard to political partisanship between the governor’s party, house of representative’s party, and the senate’s party. With regard to religious preference, in general, citizens are more Protestant than Catholic. There is also a large variation in state per-pupil appropriations for postsecondary education. Per capita education expenditures varied from $3,241 (South Dakota) to $14,816 (Alaska), with an average of $7,359 (in between Florida and Texas). The poverty rate across states also varied widely from 7 percent (New Jersey) to 19 percent (New York) with an average of 12.4 percent (states such as Illinois, Indiana, Nevada, and Massachusetts).

With regard to demographic variables, the percentage of Latinos varies substantially from 1.1 percent (West Virginia) to 45 percent (New Mexico) with an average of 9 percent (Kansas and Washington State). With regard to the estimated undocumented population per capita, this varied from 0.006 (West Virginia) to 0.088 (Nevada) with an average of 0.029 (Massachusetts). Lastly, the proxy for the influence of advocacy ranged from 0.00002 (Arizona) to 0.000075 (North Dakota and Minnesota) with an average
of 0.000041 (Colorado, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, and Kansas).

ANALYSIS/RESULTS
To conduct this analysis, several assumptions must be made. As discussed above, states started formally acting on in-state tuition policies in 2001, and this analysis is based on cross-sectional data for 2008. The first assumption is that in 2008, fourteen states had acted on in-state tuition policies regardless of when that adoption or banning actually occurred. Moreover, as discussed above, Oklahoma first passed in-state tuition policies and later decided to ban the practice before reinstating it again. For the purposes of this study, Oklahoma has been coded as having banned in-state tuition policy, and Wisconsin is treated as a state that has not acted on the policy since it adopted an in-state tuition policy in 2009.

Estimates are first made with the fiscal health indicator using general revenue/expenditures, followed by a model using credit ratings as the indicator for state fiscal health. These models are estimated along with measures of ideology, religion, advocacy, education spending, and poverty. Demographic indicators are then included to examine what happens when the percentage of the population that is Latino is held constant, followed by the percentage of the estimated undocumented immigrants.

Only odds ratio plots are included to examine data patterns among the three state decisions. These plots not only allow us to examine the relationships between states that have passed in-state tuition policy and states that have not acted on the policy but also allow comparisons of states that have passed with states that have banned the policy. In Figures 1-4, the factor change scale is printed at the top of the plot and its corresponding exponential value at the bottom. The relative magnitudes of the effects for each
Figure 2 — Odds Ratio Plot for Base Model (Using Credit Ratings)

Fiscal Health: Credit Ratings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Credit</th>
<th>Std Coef</th>
<th>Factor Change Scale Relative to Category 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divided_Govt</td>
<td>0/1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen_Ideology</td>
<td>Std Coef</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>Std Coef</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educ_Spend</td>
<td>Std Coef</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>Std Coef</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1=No Action, 2=Pass, 3=Ban

Figure 1, which uses the general revenue and general expenditure as the fiscal health measure, shows that both states that pass and states that ban are fiscally healthier than states that have not acted, holding all else equal. This, however, is only statistically significant at the 0.05 level for states that have passed in-state tuition, represented by the absence of a connecting line between 1 (not acted) and 2 (pass). There is then no statistical difference in the fiscal health between states that have passed and states that have banned in-state tuition policy as there is a line connecting category 2 (pass) with 3(ban).

With regard to political ideology, states that have banned in-state tuition policies are more likely to be a one-party system (Democrat or Republican), and this relationship also holds true for states that have passed in-state tuition policies. There is, however, no statistical difference between those states that banned the policy and those states that have not acted on in-state tuition at the 0.05 level. Now turning to citizen ideology, there is evidence that states that have banned in-state tuition policies are, in fact, more conservative than states that both passed and states that have not acted on the policy, statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Remember that the citizen ideology scale ranges from 0 = conservative to 100 = liberal.

With regard to poverty, there is evidence that states that have banned in-state tuition have higher poverty rates, on
average, than those that have passed the policy and states that have not acted on the policy. This relationship is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. There is, however, no statistically significant difference between states that have passed in-state tuition policies and those that have not acted on the policy.

When specifying credit ratings as the fiscal health measure, there are no statistical differences between states that have passed, banned, or not acted on the policy. This relationship is shown in Figure 2. Although states that have banned in-state tuition policy have higher credit ratings than both states that have passed and states that have not acted, this is not statistically different from zero. There remains a steady pattern amongst the additional covariates after controlling for fiscal health using credit ratings. For example, states that have a split electorate are less likely to ban in-state tuition policies. This is statistically significant compared to states that have not acted but is not statistically different from states that have passed in-state tuition. Moreover, we also see the same pattern regarding citizen ideology. States that have banned in-state tuition policy are more conservative than both those that have passed in-state tuition and those that have not acted on the policy, statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

Covariates that changed when using credit ratings to conceptualize fiscal health included religion, education spending, and poverty rates. The general trend is states that have passed in-state tuition have a higher percentage of Catholics, and states that have banned in-state tuition policy tend to be more Protestant. Turning to education spending, states that have banned in-state tuition policies are also less likely to spend more per college-age student. For

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**Figure 3 — Odds Ratio Plot Including Latino Demographic Indicators**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Health: Credit Ratings</th>
<th>Factor Change Scale Relative to Category 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Credit</td>
<td>Std Coef</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divided Govt</td>
<td>Std Coef</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Ideology</td>
<td>Std Coef</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>Std Coef</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educ Spend</td>
<td>Std Coef</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>Std Coef</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1=No Action, 2=Pass, 3=Ban
What happens, then, if demographic indicators such as percentage Latino and the influence of undocumented immigrants are modeled in the equation? From Figure 3, the effects of the Latino community across states are apparent when controlling for the Latino population. There is evidence that as the percentage of Latinos increases, states both pass and ban in-state tuition policies; this is statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

With regard to the poverty rate, states that have passed in-state tuition policies have higher poverty rates than states that have not adopted the policy, which is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. In addition, states that have banned the policy are also statistically different from both states that have passed and states that have not acted on the policy at the 0.05 level.

What happens, then, if demographic indicators such as percentage Latino and the influence of undocumented immigrants are modeled in the equation? From Figure 3, the effects of the Latino community across states are apparent when controlling for the Latino population. There is evidence that as the percentage of Latinos increases, states both pass and ban in-state tuition policies. In other words the presence of Latinos both increases the odds of banning in-state tuition policies and increases the odds of passing in-state tuition policies, compared to not enacting a policy.

While both are statistically different from states that have not acted on this issue,
the effect of Latino presence is larger for states that ban in-state tuition. There are no statistical differences between states that have banned and states that have passed in-state tuition regarding the presence of Latinos; this is true for both models of fiscal health.

If the estimated undocumented immigrants are controlled for, how would the findings change?

After controlling for the percentage of undocumented immigrants and all other covariates (as shown in Figure 4), the effects of fiscal health are larger for states that pass in-state tuition policies versus both states that have banned and states that have not acted on the policy, which is statistically significant at the 0.10 level. In other words, states that have passed in-state tuition are financially healthier, on average, than states that have banned and states that have not acted.

More importantly, this model provides evidence that as the percentage of undocumented immigrants increases, the odds of banning in-state tuition policies also increases, which is statistically significant at the 0.10 level, holding all else constant. There is no evidence that states that have passed in-state tuition policies are statistically different in the percentage of undocumented immigrants compared to states that have not acted in this policy arena.

DISCUSSION
This article is the first quantitative study to examine the behavior of states in the in-state tuition policy arena. The main question in this analysis is, What is it about states that have passed in-state tuition policies that differs from states that have not? After developing and testing several constructs, states are acting on in-state tuition policies because, as the evidence shows, it is in their best economic interest. In general, while states that have acted (passed or banned) in-state tuition policies have healthier fiscal institutions than states that have done nothing, this trend is generally only statistically significant for states that have passed in-state tuition policies.

The influence of demographics also plays a key role in the behavior of states in this policy arena. For example, an increase in the percentage of Latinos both increases the odds for passing and banning the in-state tuition, yet the magnitude is larger for states that ban. In other words, as the Latino population increases, states are acting in this policy arena either by being proactive or, at the opposite extreme, by passing draconian laws. This predicator is interesting if you look qualitatively at the states that have passed versus states that have banned the policy. In other words, as the Latino population increases, states are acting in this policy arena either by being proactive or, at the opposite extreme, by passing draconian laws. This then leads us to ask, Is it the share of Latinos, or is it the share of undocumented immigrants that is shaping state behavior? What is next apparent is that as
From an economic standpoint, it makes intuitive sense to find a way to integrate these children into our formal economy and to find a viable way to change the legal status of the large amount of undocumented youth in the United States.

The findings and policy implications of this analysis reveal that states are passing in-state tuition policies because, ultimately, they understand demographic shifts, the importance of education to economic growth and alleviating poverty, and the vital role immigrants play in sustaining fiscal policy. Research has shown that an educated workforce is vital for job creation and economic stability. This reality is even more important in a global economy, an economy that demands bilingualism, multiculturalism, and resiliency. These attributes are particularly true of undocumented students. While only a handful of these students make it to college, it is these students who are the valedictorians in our public schools, the best of the best, and who should not be punished for their parents’ mistakes. According to a recent 2011 hearing before the Subcommittee on Immigration Policy and Enforcement, it currently costs the U.S. government $12,500 to deport an undocumented citizen at the same time our government spends an average of $6,000 per pupil every year in K-12 education (Committee on the Judiciary 2011). From an economic standpoint, it makes intuitive sense to find a way to integrate these children into our formal economy and to find a viable way to change the legal status of the large amount of undocumented youth in the United States.

the undocumented population increases, the odds of a state banning in-state tuition increases dramatically, compared to states that have not acted and states that have passed this policy, which is statistically significant. There is, however, a difference between states that have passed in-state tuition and states that have not acted on the policy with regard to the presence of undocumented immigrants. In other words, not only does the percentage of Latinos influence banning, the significant distinction is that as the percentage of undocumented immigrants increases, the odds of banning substantially increases.

Spending on education and state poverty rates are also key components of the story. There is evidence that states that ban in-state tuition also tend to appropriate less money per college-age student. This is statistically significant for both states that have passed and states that have not acted on the policy. There is, however, no difference between states that have passed and states that have not acted on the policy. One interpretation is that states that have passed an in-state tuition policy may also value education more and understand the positive relationship between education and economic growth. States that have banned in-state tuition are also more likely to have a higher percentage of their citizens living in poverty, which is statistically significant.
REFERENCES


ENDNOTES

1 Additional cases include Toll v. Moreno (1979) and Leticia A v. Board of Regents of the University of California (1985). See Michael A. Olivas’s extensive body of literature on immigration and education access (www.law.uh.edu/faculty/publications/michaelolivas.pdf).
Transnational Stakeholders: 
Latin American Migrant Transnationalism and Civic Engagement in the United States

by Ricardo Ramírez and Adrián Félix

Ricardo Ramírez is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. His work focuses on the effects of political context on Latino participation, the political mobilization of and outreach to Latinos and other minority groups, and the causes and consequences of increasing diversity among elected officials. He is coeditor of Transforming Politics, Transforming America: The Political and Civic Incorporation of Immigrants in the United States. His most recent writing includes: “Why California Matters: How California Latinos Influence the Presidential Election”; “Political Protest, Ethnic Media and Latino Naturalization”; “Latinos during the 2006 Immigration Protest Rallies”; and “Mobilization en Español: Spanish-Language Radio and the Activation of Political Identities.”

Adrián Félix is currently a postdoctoral associate in Latino Studies at the Center for Latin American Studies, University of Florida. His research interests include México-U.S. migration, migrant political transnationalism, migrant political mobilization, and state-disapora relations. His research has been published in the American Quarterly and the American Behavioral Scientist. He is currently working on a book manuscript tentatively titled Transnational (After)life: Migrant Transnationalism and Engagement in U.S. and Mexican Politics.

Author: Dianne D. Sánchez 
Title: Altar En El Atardecer

Author: Dianne D. Sánchez 
Title: Abuelita Hialeah

Author: Dianne D. Sánchez 
Title: Altar En El Atardecer
ABSTRACT:

In the current period of international migration there is no consensus among analysts regarding the relationship between immigrant transnationalism and civic engagement in the United States. Focusing mainly on the transnational behaviors of Latin American migrants, three views predominate: critics argue that immigrant transnationalism hinders integration, advocates argue that the two are not mutually exclusive, while the skeptics simply contend that transnationalism is the exception rather than the norm among these immigrants. Using data from the Latino National Survey (Fraga 2006), the most comprehensive survey of Latino political attitudes and behaviors in the United States to date, we test models of immigrant transnationalism and engagement in U.S. politics and society to determine which immigrant characteristics are associated with a range of transnational practices and attachments as well as measures of U.S. civic participation. We find that transnational behaviors take on different forms as immigrant settlement occurs and that pessimistic accounts of the negative effects of transnationalism on engagement in the civic life of the United States have been overstated. While transnational attachments persist among those with familial or material ties to the home country, our findings suggest that the barriers to immigrant participation and incorporation in the United States have as much to do with the political predispositions of migrants as with how the host state and society receives them.

TEXT:

What keeps Latin American migrants in the United States attached to the social, cultural, and political life of their country of origin? How do these cross-border connections impact migrants’ involvement in U.S. politics and civil society? A shorthand response to these interrelated questions can be found in the political development of migrant hometown associations (HTAs). From their inception to their dramatic proliferation in recent years, HTAs can be construed as narrowly delimited and parochially driven when it comes to their membership and mission. By and large, HTAs consist of migrant members who hail from the same sending village and are largely dedicated to delivering public goods to that particular community of origin. Over time, however, migrant HTAs have increasingly become involved in migrant affairs on the U.S. side, taking on the banner of larger causes that often cut across national-origin, racial, and ethnic lines. To cite one example, migrant HTAs were an important contingent in the historic migrant rights marches of 2006, which truly became a multicultural, multiracial movement calling for migrant rights in the United States (Gonzales 2009). In this light, HTAs emerge as an important conduit for migrant involvement in both home and host country politics and civil society.

There are competing views regarding the relationship between transnationalism and U.S. engagement and their respective causes and consequences. Drawing on the 2006 Latino National Survey (LNS), this article puts the different perspectives on transnationalism and U.S. engagement to the empirical test (Fraga 2006). We find the view that transnationalism exerts a negative effect on migrant involvement in
transnational stakeholders

reduced the costs for these U.S. migrants to remain engaged in the cultural, economic, and political life of their communities and countries of origin (Wong 2006, especially Chapter 8; Jones-Correa 2001; Jones-Correa 1998; for single-country case studies see: Smith and Bakker 2008; Cornelius et al. 2007; Coutin 2007; Levitt 2001; Laguerre 1999). These activities presumably have an impact on migrant civic engagement and incorporation in the United States. However, the prevalence, nature, and consequences of these behaviors for participation in the United States are not entirely clear.

Among scholars of international migration, there is no consensus regarding the relationship between immigrant transnationalism and civic engagement in the United States. On the one hand, researchers argue that immigrant transnationalism (cross-border activities ranging from sending remittances to voting in the home country) diminishes participation in U.S. politics and society (Portes and Rumbaut 1992). The time, energy, and resources invested in these ventures, the argument goes, are by definition not invested in U.S. associations, civic volunteerism, or elections. Conversely, other scholars argue that immigrant transnationalism and U.S. civic engagement are not mutually exclusive. Participatory behavior in one setting can provide the skills, interests, and sense of efficacy necessary to civically engage in the other (Wong 2006, especially Chapter 8; McCann et al. 2006; Pantoja 2005). Yet another perspective contends that transnationalism is the exception rather than the norm among these immigrants and that neither transnationalism, as a condition of being, nor transmigrants, as a distinctive class of people, are

U.S. affairs (the “zero-sum” hypothesis) to be largely overblown, finding instead greater empirical support for the view that sees engagement in the host and home country as co-constitutive processes (the “transferability” hypothesis). When it comes to cross-border attachments, migrants with a vested moral or material interest (e.g., having a dependent child or owning property) in the home country are more likely to be transnationally engaged. While migrant characteristics are important determinants of cross-border engagements, transnationalism is also influenced by the context of reception that migrants encounter in the United States. Tellingly, perceived discrimination in the United States seems to increase engagement in U.S. and home country affairs.

THE TRANSNATIONALISM DEBATE

In the early twenty-first century, like at the outset of the twentieth century, international migration is presenting challenges and opportunities for American politics and democracy. Given the geographic proximity of the source countries and the sheer volume, migration from Latin America to the United States has been at the fore of a national political debate. Perceived patterns of “immigrant transnationalism” (e.g., cross-border activities, loyalties and ties directed at the country of origin) among Latin American migrants in the United States have led policy makers, analysts, and political observers to question whether these migrants are interested, capable, and willing to participate in American politics and society. Not only does proximity to the home country facilitate transnational ties, but also transformations in communication and travel technologies and an increase in the prevalence of dual nationality laws have
commonly found (Waldinger 2008). In this view, transnationalism is seen as a residual effect of the migration experience, expected to wane over time as settlement in the host country occurs.

**RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

This debate raises a set of related empirical questions. First, who among Latin American migrants is transnationally inclined? What are the factors that keep these migrants tied to the social and political affairs of the home nation, and how do these ties emerge? Second, and more importantly for this article, what are the implications of transnationalism for migrant civic engagement in U.S. politics and civil society? There are two additional questions that are important for understanding the policy implications of migrant transnationalism. First, do unique patterns of immigrant civic participation in the United States and immigrant transnationalism exist for those immigrants who have become naturalized U.S. citizens? Second, are the effects of transnational participation mutually reinforcing where certain transnational behaviors or characteristics (e.g., having dependent children in the home nation) are associated with other transnational activities (e.g., sending money home)? Using data from the Latino National Survey (Fraga 2006), a nationally representative telephone survey of 8,600 U.S. Latinos, this article empirically tests these questions and sorts out the direction and degree of these effects.

After a brief review of existing literature and debates that prompted this research and their attendant hypotheses, we give an overview of the data used, provide the logic for our empirical models, and present the results. Since our dependent variables are binary, we use logistic regression analysis (reported in the appendices). In order to show measurable effects, we report changes in predicted probabilities in the dependent variable given a full range change in each independent variable. In the final section, we conclude by discussing the policy implications of our findings for the prospect of comprehensive immigration reform in the United States.

**RESEARCH ON TRANSNATIONALISM AND ITS LIMITATIONS**

Recent political science research has made important inroads regarding the question of immigrant transnationalism and civic and political participation in the United States (Segura 2007; Wong 2006; Cain and Doherty 2006; DeSipio 2006; McCann et al. 2006). Researchers distinguish between immigrant sociocultural transnationalism and immigrant political transnationalism, where the former focuses on engagement in the social and cultural fabric of the nation of origin, and the latter focuses on involvement or membership in the politics and institutions of the home nation. Some studies have focused specifically on dual nationality—an institution of immigrant political transnationalism—in Latin America and its impact on political participation in the U.S. context (Jones-Correa 2001; Staton et al. 2007; Cain and Doherty 2006). In the case of Bruce Cain and Brendan Doherty (2006), they test whether U.S. citizens with dual nationality are any different from single-nationality citizens in their commitment to civic duties such as voting or in their willingness to take advantage of opportunities to contact or influence elected officials or attend a public meeting or demonstration. Drawing on the standard political science cost model, which holds that participation rates drop as costs increase, the
authors contend that dual nationals bear greater costs of being informed and actively engaged in two countries and therefore find that dual nationals’ rates of voter registration and turnout in the United States are lower than those of single-nationality citizens. Unfortunately, Cain and Doherty focus on only one facet of immigrant political transnationalism—dual nationality—and do so at a time when some Latin American countries only recently had granted membership to their nationals abroad, rendering the authors’ conclusions tentative at best. It is problematic to include an indicator of transnationalism that is nonconstant across nationality groups or has recently changed for some groups (Segura 2007, 13).

In order to test for the assumed inverse relationship between homeland and U.S. political participation, Janelle Wong makes use of the 2000–2001 Pilot National Asian American Political Survey (PNAAPS), the 1999 Washington Post/Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard University National Survey of Latinos in America, and the 1989-1990 Latino National Political Survey (LNPS). She finds that among Asian American immigrants, “the relationship between activity in homeland politics and registration in the United States is not negative but neutral” (Wong 2006, 183). This holds true for her comparable analysis of Latinos. Similarly, James A. McCann, Wayne A. Cornelius, and David L. Leal (2006) question the zero-sum logic and argue that engagement in two political systems can be complementary, with attachments abroad fostering a deeper commitment to U.S. public life. Since certain forms of political participation are known to be habit-forming, the authors argue that immigrants who sustain an interest in politics abroad may use this engagement as a path to political inclusion in the United States. Drawing on the 2006 Mexican Expatriate Study, a panel survey of Mexican migrants interviewed in the United States, McCann, Cornelius, and Leal find that remote political engagement in politics abroad is not a barrier to incorporation in the American context and that it may stimulate interest in U.S. elections. While longitudinal data is ideal to capture the effects of transnational participation, the authors are handicapped by sample size, case selection (San Diego, Dallas, and North-Central Indiana), and inability to generalize from the electoral behaviors of one immigrant group. More robust conclusions regarding immigrant transnationalism and participation can be drawn using the 2006 Latino National Survey, which includes several thousand Latin American immigrant respondents throughout the United States and measures of their participatory activities in the host and home countries.

Louis DeSipio (2006) includes Dominican, Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Salvadoran immigrants in his analysis of transnationalism. Because Cubans in the United States have limited access to the civic and political life of the island-nation, they are excluded from the model. Puerto Ricans on the mainland have the opportunity to establish and maintain transnational ties like other Latin American immigrants in the United States and are thus included (on this point see also DeSipio and Pantoja 2007). DeSipio tests the following hypotheses: whether transnational engagement in the civic and political life of the home country reduces the likelihood of immigrant involvement in U.S. civic life or rates of naturalization; or conversely, whether transnational engagement offers
Today, migrant remittances rival international foreign aid in Latin America, and many of these nations now allow their émigrés to have dual nationality, to vote, and to run for office from abroad.

a resource for immigrants who have engaged in home-country activities, allowing them to transfer the skills, networks, and interests that they have developed to U.S. civic life and naturalization. Because few Latino immigrants are engaged in home-nation electoral or partisan activities, DeSipio concludes that political transnationalism is the exception rather than the rule among most Latino immigrants. Lastly, respondents who reported having experienced discrimination were somewhat more likely to be organizationally involved in the United States, and respondents who reported membership in organizations focusing on the country of origin were more likely to be involved in U.S. organizations. However, a limited sample size prevents DeSipio from separately analyzing citizens from noncitizens. We feel it is important to determine if patterns of transnationalism and U.S. engagement are different for naturalized citizens, and we test for this using the LNS data.

Most recently, Roger Waldinger (2008) discusses the prevalence and determinants of “cross-state” social exchanges and attachments, but unlike DeSipio, includes Cubans and excludes Puerto Ricans from his model. Arguing that transnational activities depend on the degree of immigrant sociopolitical incorporation in the United States, Waldinger reminds us that international migration is not just a social phenomenon but a political phenomenon as well, with states regulating movement across borders and access to membership in the polity. Because not everyone can move from “host” to “home” country and back with equal ease, transnational behavior depends on the degree of migrant sociopolitical incorporation in the host country. Thus, time in the United States, language, settlement, and legal status greatly impact the likelihood of cross-border activities such as visiting or remitting funds to the community of origin. Drawing on a 2002 Pew Hispanic Center survey, Waldinger finds support for the hypothesis that settlement decreases remittances and voting in the home country but increases travel and visits. Citizens are less likely than noncitizens to engage in these cross-border activities with the exception of traveling. Long-established immigrants travel home less frequently but citizens are more likely to travel than noncitizens. In contrast to DeSipio, Waldinger separates U.S. citizens in the model but focuses on registering and voting in U.S. elections. It is unclear why Waldinger shifts focus on what factors impact electoral participation among naturalized U.S. citizens, given that he does not include transnational civic engagement as a possible independent variable. While the extant literature makes clear that naturalized immigrants engage more in the United States, what is less clear is why some individuals maintain transnational ties to their nation of origin and to what effect. In the present analysis, we specify models with
transnationalism as both predictor and as the dependent variable of interest, thus obtaining a fuller empirical picture of this phenomenon.

In sum, while not all immigrants engage in the politics of the home nation and these activities appear to decrease as settlement occurs, it is important not to underestimate the policy implications of such activity. Today, migrant remittances rival international foreign aid in Latin America, and many of these nations now allow their emigrés to have dual nationality, to vote, and to run for office from abroad (for an in-depth case study see Smith and Bakker 2008; see also Fox 2005). What this means for civic participation in the United States is not entirely clear. We know that noncitizen immigrants are more likely to be transnationally engaged relative to their involvement in the United States, and this is consistent with traditional political behavior theory. Migrants with more resources are more likely to be engaged in the United States. In turn, while settled migrants are less transnationally inclined, we focus on those who are engaged in the home country to determine what factors keep them connected to their nation of origin, thus shedding more light on the policy implications of such cross-border activity and attachments.

With regard to U.S. engagement, political behavior theories have long held that individuals with greater resources (e.g., income, education) are more participatory (Verba et al. 1995). We expect immigrants to be no different. More settled and naturalized immigrants should have the interest, skills, and resources necessary to engage in U.S. associational life. We expect that transnational activity will not depress such participation, consistent with the transnationalism literature. Moreover, we build on the idea that migrant engagement in the United States is not only a function of individual characteristics and resources (e.g., age, education, income, etc.) but is also contingent on the political context. Particularly for immigrants, the host country political environment in which they are (re)socialized matters for subsequent political behavior. In order to determine whether naturalized immigrants withdraw politically or exhibit heightened engagement under an immigrant-targeting political climate, we include a perceived discrimination index in our transnationalism model as this is known to mobilize naturalized citizens (Pantoja et al. 2001; Barreto and Woods 2005; Ramakrishnan 2005). Stated differently, under perceived political threat, do migrants channel their civic energies to the public affairs of their home countries, thus pursuing what Reuel Rogers (2006) has identified as the “exit” option? Do they withdraw from host and home country politics altogether? We test these questions and attendant hypotheses using data from the 2006 Latino National Survey, the most recent and extensive survey on U.S. native- and foreign-born Latinos.

HYPOTHESES

Based on the foregoing discussion, we put the following set of hypotheses to the empirical test using data from the LNS.

The Zero-Sum Hypothesis

Drawing on the political cost model discussed above, the zero-sum hypothesis predicts a negative relationship between immigrant transnationalism and U.S. civic participation. This view suggests that migrants who direct their political interests toward the country of origin
will be less likely to engage in American politics (for a summary and critique of this perspective see Wong 2006, Chapter 8).

**The Transferability Hypothesis**
By contrast, the transferability hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between migrant transnationalism and U.S. engagement (or none at all). This view suggests that migrant involvement in home country politics can be transferred to the U.S. context. As Wong states, the “skills and experience [transnational] organizations provide to their members can then be transferred to their U.S. political participation” (2006, 191).

**The Transnational Stakeholder Hypothesis**
In addition to the above two hypotheses drawn from the literature, we propose and test two fairly intuitive hypotheses regarding the determinants of migrant cross-border ties and activities. The “transnational family” and “transnational property” hypotheses hold that migrants with familial or material ties to the home country are more likely to be transnationally inclined compared to their counterparts who lack such connections. Migrants who have dependent family members or own property abroad can be considered transnational stakeholders and likely have a vested interest in the social and political life of their country of origin.

**The Political Threat Hypothesis**
Lastly, we draw on the Latino politics literature and consider the “political threat” hypothesis in our analysis, which predicts that migrants who experience discrimination in the United States are more likely to be civically active therein (Pantoja et al. 2001; Barreto and Woods 2005; Ramakrishnan 2005; Bowler et al. 2006). We also regress perceived discrimination in the United States on migrant engagement in the home country in an attempt to capture what Rogers has identified as the “exit” option (2006).

**DATA AND ANALYSIS**
One of the primary obstacles that has plagued previous efforts to unpack the dynamics of transnational participation by immigrants has been the lack of adequate data. Until recently, there were few surveys that sampled sufficient numbers of racial and ethnic minorities. This has been the case when it comes to exploring the behavior and attitudes of immigrants generally and even more true of determining their attitudes and behavior toward their home country. The 2006 Latino National Survey, which was conducted in fifteen states and the District of Columbia, is a representative survey of Latinos with 8,634 completed interviews. It asks a rich battery of questions about transnational engagement and has the added advantage of being able to compare both citizen and noncitizen migrants. Based on the general consensus in the literature about which activities could be considered transnational engagement, we focused on six activities in which migrants might engage in their home country. We have six models of transnational activity as the dependent variable where “1” indicates that the respondent engages in this behavior and “0” indicates nonparticipation in the transnational activity. These include activities to:

1. Communicate with the home country at least once per year
2. Send remittances to the home country at least once per year
transnational stakeholders
positively predict different forms of cross-border engagement.

In terms of transnational property ownership, this seems to impact the full range of transnational activities—from social to financial to political. Concretely, the likelihood that a transnational property owner will communicate with and visit the home country increases by 4 percentage points. More notably, ownership of property abroad increases the probability of sending remittances and the intent to return permanently by 15 and 20 percentage points, respectively. Finally, transnational property also impacts political transnationalism, increasing the likelihood of self-reported interest in home country politics by 9 percentage points. This is not a negligible effect. In each instance, transnational property ownership has a strong positive impact on the gamut of transnational activities and affinities.

Conversely, having a dependent child in the home country has a noncontinuous impact on transnationalism. While having a dependent abroad increases the probability of sending remittances by 13 percentage points, it decreases the likelihood of expressing interest in the politics of the home country by 5 percentage points. The latter is logical if you consider that U.S.-based migrants with children abroad are likely looking to sponsor that dependent for family reunification in the United States and thus may be less interested in the domestic politics of the home country.

What is clear is that with both transnational property and transnational parenting, migrants have incentives to maintain a foothold on both sides of the border. Whether investing in property abroad to return to upon retirement or

We test the same models seeking to identify the effect of the relevant independent variables on each of these dependent variables using logistic regression.

The regression results are presented in Appendices 1 through 3, and we are able to identify the direction of the effect on the six different transnational activities. However, it is difficult to interpret the substantive significance or size of the relationship based on the coefficients. In order to evaluate the effect of each independent variable, we calculate the change in predicted probability for each variable’s full range change. That is, we are able to capture the effect on the transnational activity as each independent variable goes from the minimum observed value to the maximum observed value, while holding all other variables at their mean. These post-estimation results are presented in Tables 1 through 3. Specifically, Table 1 presents the effects the battery of relevant independent variables has on transnational participation of all migrants; Table 2 focuses only on migrants who are naturalized U.S. citizens; and Table 3 considers the effect on one of the key mechanisms toward immigrant integration, participation in U.S. civic organizations.

All Migrants
Regarding the transnational stakeholder hypothesis, we find that owning property in the home country and having a dependent child in the home country positively predict different forms of cross-border engagement.

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3. Take at least one trip to the home country per year
4. Pay attention to home country politics
5. Vote in home country elections
6. Plan to return to home country to live permanently

We test the same models seeking to identify the effect of the relevant independent variables on each of these dependent variables using logistic regression.

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What is clear is that with both transnational property and transnational parenting, migrants have incentives to maintain a foothold on both sides of the border. Whether investing in property abroad to return to upon retirement or
sending remittances for a dependent abroad with the ultimate goal of reuniting with him or her in the United States, these migrants are bona fide transnational stakeholders.

If ownership of transnational property and transnational parenting are the incentives for maintaining cross-border connections, hometown association membership and Spanish-language media may be the means by which these links are forged and solidified. HTA membership increases the probability of communication abroad by 3 percentage points and the probability of expressing interest in home country politics and voting in home country elections by 14 and 7 percentage points, respectively. HTA membership also increases the likelihood of intent to return to the home country by 11 percentage points. Similarly, those who rely primarily on Spanish-language media are more likely to maintain communication, send remittances, vote in home country elections, and indicate that they intend to return to their home country to live permanently. Again, migrants who have an investment abroad—material, familial, or otherwise—are more likely to remain connected to the country of origin.

However, these cross-border commitments are not solely the function of migrant characteristics and propensities. In his case study of Afro-Caribbean migrants in New York City, Rogers (2006) argues that continued discrimination from dominant U.S. society and institutions can push these migrants to pursue their “exit” option. We test for this effect directly here by including a self-perceived discrimination measure, which has a discernible effect on transnational behaviors. Self-perceived discrimination fully increased the likelihood of sending remittances by 17 percentage points and that of voting in home country elections by 3 percentage points. Clearly, migrant attachments to the host and home country are not the function of their own characteristics and predispositions alone but rather are also influenced by how they are received by U.S. society and institutions.

Naturalized Citizens

Remarkably, the stakeholder effect that is evident among all migrants holds true even for naturalized citizens. That is, owning property in the home country leads to continued transnational engagement even after becoming U.S. citizens. Holding other variables at their mean, naturalized migrants who own property in the home country are 4 percent more likely to maintain some communication and travel to the home country than those who do not own property in the home country. The effects are even larger on the predicted probability of sending remittances (15 percent increase), awareness of home country politics (9 percent increase), and most

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dramatically in the intention to return to the home country to live (20 percent increase). As was the case with all migrants, naturalized Latinos who rely on Spanish-language media for information about public affairs are more likely to engage in transnational activities than those who do not rely on Spanish-language media. They are 7 percent more likely to maintain some communication, keep informed about home country politics, and indicate a desire to return to the home country to live. They are also 12 percent and 4 percent more likely than those who do not rely on this medium to send remittances or to have voted in home country elections, respectively.

The remaining variables exert the effect we would expect across the different models. In general, the greater social integration and improvement in socioeconomic status indicators, the less likely migrants are to engage in home country activities. However, among those who have experienced discrimination, there is a 17 and 3 percent increase in the probability of sending remittances and voting in home-country elections, respectively.

**Civic Engagement**

Thus far, we have focused on the factors that lead some migrants to engage in transnational activities. These involve important relationships between personal characteristics, host country receptivity, and available mechanisms to maintain the transnational ties. We have yet to tackle one of the most contentious aspects of the transnational participation debate: whether transnational activities have deleterious effects on engagement in the United States. Here, we focus on membership in U.S. civic organizations. The reason we focus on this is because some of the other political activities have deleterious or de facto citizenship hurdles. While the citizenship hurdles for participation may only apply to things such as campaign donations and voter registration, many noncitizen migrants are likely to perceive that their voice would not carry the requisite weight in certain activities like contacting elected officials. Membership in civic organizations is less likely to seem exclusive to U.S. citizens.

In general, what is true for all Americans is also true of Latino migrants: those with greater levels of socioeconomic status seek membership in U.S. civic organizations. Interestingly, the mechanisms that facilitate transnational behavior—membership in HTAs and reliance on Spanish-language media—have contrasting effects. Whereas membership in a transnational organization such as an HTA leads to an increased probability of U.S. civic organizational membership, as predicted by the transferability hypothesis, a reliance on Spanish-language media for information about public affairs reduces the predicted probability of membership in U.S. civic organizations. It is also the case that the political threat hypothesis, as evidenced by the effect of discrimination, results in increased engagement in U.S. society. It appears that those who experience discrimination are becoming politicized and engaged in both the home and host country. Equally as important as identifying what affects membership in U.S. civic organizations are those variables whose effects were indistinguishable from zero. After controlling for other variables, there is no country-specific effect on membership in U.S. organizations. The final blow to the zero-sum hypothesis is that none of the transnational activities negatively impacted this first step to the social and political integration of immigrants.
Drawing on our transnational stakeholder hypothesis, we contend that migrant involvement in host and home country affairs should not be viewed as zero-sum but rather as mutually reinforcing.

CONCLUSION: TRANSNATIONAL STAKEHOLDERS AND U.S. IMMIGRATION REFORM

In contrast to the view that there is a wholesale cost of transnationalism on migrant engagement in the United States, our empirical analysis finds variable effects. In fact, taken together, the positive effects of transnationalism outweigh the costs, as previous studies have suggested (Jones-Correa 2001; McCann et al. 2006; Cornelius et al. 2007). In a recent study drawing on the LNS, Gary M. Segura also finds that “the two most patently political measures of transnational ties—HTA membership and respondent self-reported attention to home country affairs—are both positively associated with most measures of U.S. engagement and often with large and powerful effects” (2007, 20). Nevertheless, Segura warns that large-scale transnational political participation may be politically costly for Latinos because of the inevitable backlash (2007, 21). With respect to migrants who are transnationally active, he warns, “while HTA membership is positively associated with most measures of U.S. engagement, it would be premature to suggest that this means it is costless to the Latino political endeavor” (Segura 2007, 21).

We disagree with this interpretation of the empirical evidence and conclude with an alternative policy prescription. Drawing on our transnational stakeholder hypothesis, we contend that migrant involvement in host and home country affairs should not be viewed as zero-sum but rather as mutually reinforcing, shifting from one national context to the other at different political moments, depending on where the stakes are higher, at both macro and micro levels. As our analysis indicates, migrants who own property or have dependent children abroad have a clear stake in the affairs of the home country. However, these cross-border attachments do not necessarily come at the expense of U.S. engagement. As a recent report states: “Once their economic security has been realized, immigrants feel that they are stakeholders in the community, leading to more interest in citizenship” in their new country (Tuman 2009, 32).
REFERENCES


Table 1 — Estimated Effects of Variables on Predicted Probability of Transnational Engagement among Latino Immigrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Min → Max</th>
<th>Communication Change</th>
<th>Sends Remittances Change</th>
<th>Trip to Home Country Change</th>
<th>Attention to Home Country Politics Change</th>
<th>Voted in Home Country Change</th>
<th>Intends to Repatriate Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>0.18 ***</td>
<td>-0.14 ***</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>0.10 *</td>
<td>-0.14 ***</td>
<td>-0.08 *</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>0.11 ***</td>
<td>0.06 *</td>
<td>0.05 ***</td>
<td>0.06 *</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>-0.10 *</td>
<td>0.15 **</td>
<td>0.14 ***</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Puerto Rico</td>
<td>0.02 *</td>
<td>-0.10 **</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Country</td>
<td>-0.11 ***</td>
<td>0.05 ***</td>
<td>0.07 **</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Years in United States</td>
<td>-0.48 ***</td>
<td>-0.22 **</td>
<td>0.36 ***</td>
<td>-0.16 *</td>
<td>-0.4 ***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Immigrated as a Child</td>
<td>-0.09 ***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bilingual</td>
<td>-0.10 ***</td>
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<tr>
<td>English Dominant</td>
<td>-0.02 *</td>
<td>-0.18 ***</td>
<td>-0.07 *</td>
<td>-0.15 ***</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. Citizen</td>
<td>0.16 ***</td>
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<td>0.014 *</td>
<td>-0.14 ***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Applying for U.S. Citizenship</td>
<td>0.06 **</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.24 ***</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Interested in U.S. Citizenship</td>
<td>0.06 ***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.12 ***</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Some High School</td>
<td>0.02 **</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.06 **</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>High School Graduate</td>
<td>0.02 **</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.06 ***</td>
<td>-0.08 ***</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>&gt; High School</td>
<td>0.03 ***</td>
<td>-0.06 *</td>
<td>0.03 *</td>
<td>0.09 ***</td>
<td>0.02 *</td>
<td>-0.09 ***</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>0.16 ***</td>
<td>0.03 *</td>
<td>-0.03 *</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.06 **</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income ($15k - $24k)</td>
<td>0.05 *</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income ($25k - $34k)</td>
<td>0.09 ***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income ($35k - $44k)</td>
<td>0.09 ***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income ($45k - $54k)</td>
<td>0.08 **</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income ($55k - $64k)</td>
<td>0.10 ***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income ($65k)</td>
<td>0.07 **</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income (Refused/Don't Know)</td>
<td>-0.07 **</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.07 ***</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>-0.10 ***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property in Home Country</td>
<td>0.04 ***</td>
<td>0.15 ***</td>
<td>0.04 ***</td>
<td>0.09 ***</td>
<td>0.20 ***</td>
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</table>
Table 1 — Estimated Effects of Variables on Predicted Probability of Transnational Engagement among Latino Immigrants (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communication</th>
<th>Sends Remittances</th>
<th>Trip to Home Country</th>
<th>Attention to Home Country Politics</th>
<th>Voted in Home Country</th>
<th>Intends to Repatriate</th>
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<td>% Change</td>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>% Change</td>
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<td>Married 0.02 **</td>
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<td>One Child</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Interest in Politics 0.02 ***</td>
<td>0.04 **</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.23 ***</td>
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<td>0.10 ***</td>
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<td>0.02 ***</td>
<td>0.06 **</td>
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<td>Linked Fate</td>
<td></td>
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<td>0.02 **</td>
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<tr>
<td>Discrimination 0.17 ***</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.03 *</td>
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<td>Learn English</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain Spanish 0.06 **</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.09 *</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hometown Association 0.03</td>
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<td>0.14 ***</td>
<td>0.07 ***</td>
<td>0.11 **</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intends to Repatriate 0.03 ***</td>
<td>0.11 ***</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.08 ***</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 two-tail test
Change in expected instance of transnational participation produced by change from lowest to highest observed value of a predictor, holding others at their mean. If dichotomy, change in expected transnational participation produced by change from zero to one.
Table 2 — Estimated Effects of Variables on Predicted Probability of Transnational Engagement among Naturalized Latino Citizens and Puerto Ricans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Communication</th>
<th>Sends Remittances</th>
<th>Trip to Home Country</th>
<th>Attention to Home Country Politics</th>
<th>Voted in Home Country</th>
<th>Intends to Repatriate</th>
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<td><strong>Min → Max</strong></td>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>% Change</td>
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<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Guatemala</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
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<td>** 0.12</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>** 0.06</td>
<td>** 0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rico</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>** -0.08</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>** 0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Country</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>*** 0.09</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(≤12 Years)</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
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<td>-0.12</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilingual</td>
<td>0.03</td>
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<td>-0.04</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English Dominant</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some High School</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School Graduate</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; High School</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>* 0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income ($15k - $24k)</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>***</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Income ($25k - $34k)</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>0.04</td>
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<td>Income ($35k - $44k)</td>
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<td>Income ($45k - $54k)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income ($65k)</td>
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<td>Income (Refused/Don't Know)</td>
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<td>*</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property in Home Country</td>
<td>0.06</td>
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<td>0.19</td>
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Table 2 — Estimated Effects of Variables on Predicted Probability of Transnational Engagement among Naturalized Latino Citizens and Puerto Ricans (continued)

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<th></th>
<th>Communication</th>
<th>Sends Remittances</th>
<th>Trip to Home Country</th>
<th>Attention to Home Country Politics</th>
<th>Voted in Home Country</th>
<th>Intends to Repatriate</th>
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<td>0.12 **</td>
<td>-0.42 ***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Child</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;Two Children</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children in Home Country</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>-0.05 *</td>
<td>-0.13 **</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in Politics</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.24 ***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish-Language Media</td>
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<td>***</td>
<td>0.12 **</td>
<td>0.07 *</td>
<td>0.04 ***</td>
<td>0.07 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linked Fate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Discrimination</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>-0.06 *</td>
<td>0.06 **</td>
<td>0.13 *</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain Spanish</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>***</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. Organization</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hometown Association</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.14 **</td>
<td>0.07 ***</td>
<td>0.16 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intends to Repatriate</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>0.13 ***</td>
<td>0.07 **</td>
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<td>1680</td>
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<td>1680</td>
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Notes: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 two-tail test

Change in expected instance of transnational participation produced by change from lowest to highest observed value of a predictor, holding others at their mean. If dichotomy, change in expected transnational participation produced by change from zero to one.
### Table 3 — Estimated Effects of Variables on Predicted Probability of U.S. Organizational Engagement among Latino Immigrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables #</th>
<th>Percent Change (Min → Max)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Years in United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>Immigrated as a Child (&lt;12 Years)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bilingual</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>English Dominant</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Citizen</td>
<td>0.04 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applying for U.S. Citizenship</td>
<td>0.08 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interested in U.S. Citizenship</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some High School</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School Graduate</td>
<td>0.09 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; High School</td>
<td>0.14 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeowner</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property in Home Country</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Child</td>
<td>-0.04 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; Two Children</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children in Home Country</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in Politics</td>
<td>0.07 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish-Language Media</td>
<td>-0.05 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linked Fate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination</td>
<td>0.07 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learn English</td>
<td>-0.12 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain Spanish</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hometown Association</td>
<td>0.13 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intends to Repatriate</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sends Remittances</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trip Home</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Voted in Home Country</td>
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<td>Home Country Political Attention</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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Notes: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 two-tail test

# the model also controlled for home country and income but those were excluded from the table to fit within the margins
Appendix 1 — Predicting Transnational Engagement among Latino Immigrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Communication</th>
<th>Sends Remittances</th>
<th>Trip to Home Country</th>
<th>Attention to Home Country Politics</th>
<th>Voted in Home Country</th>
<th>Intends to Repatriate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.951***</td>
<td>-0.761***</td>
<td>-0.008***</td>
<td>-0.309**</td>
<td>-0.032**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>-0.268</td>
<td>0.472*</td>
<td>-0.732***</td>
<td>-0.349*</td>
<td>-0.306</td>
<td>0.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>0.483</td>
<td>0.227</td>
<td>0.996***</td>
<td>0.287*</td>
<td>0.926***</td>
<td>0.26*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>0.492</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.548</td>
<td>* 0.732**</td>
<td>1.812***</td>
<td>0.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rico</td>
<td>0.455</td>
<td>* -0.416**</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.395</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Country</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>0.112</td>
<td>-0.65***</td>
<td>-0.041*</td>
<td>1.073***</td>
<td>0.301**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years in United States</td>
<td>-0.05***</td>
<td>-0.012**</td>
<td>0.055***</td>
<td>-0.009*</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>-0.023***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrated as a Child (&lt;12 Years)</td>
<td>-0.186</td>
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<td>0.215</td>
<td>-0.111</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
<td>-0.283**</td>
</tr>
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<td>Bilingual</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>-0.441***</td>
<td>0.117</td>
<td>-0.078</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>-0.479***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English Dominant</td>
<td>-0.421</td>
<td>* -0.761***</td>
<td>-0.324</td>
<td>-0.299*</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>-0.627***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Citizen</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>-0.131</td>
<td>1.194***</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.399</td>
<td>* -0.56***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applying for U.S. Citizenship</td>
<td>0.117</td>
<td>-0.062</td>
<td>0.413**</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.502</td>
<td>-0.986***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interested in U.S. Citizenship</td>
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<td>-0.068</td>
<td>0.434***</td>
<td>0.132</td>
<td>0.317</td>
<td>-0.513***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some High School</td>
<td>0.465</td>
<td>** -0.101</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>-0.101</td>
<td>-0.262**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School Graduate</td>
<td>0.476</td>
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<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.288***</td>
<td>0.193</td>
<td>-0.333***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; High School</td>
<td>0.693</td>
<td>*** -0.266</td>
<td>* 0.229</td>
<td>* 0.386***</td>
<td>0.515</td>
<td>* -0.383***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>0.692***</td>
<td>0.183</td>
<td>* -0.146</td>
<td>* -0.159</td>
<td>0.23 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income ($15k - $24k)</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.246*</td>
<td>0.429***</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>-0.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income ($25k - $34k)</td>
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<td>-0.344**</td>
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<td>0.143</td>
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<td>* 0.023</td>
<td>0.193</td>
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**Appendix 1 — Predicting Transnational Engagement among Latino Immigrants (continued)**

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<th>Attention to Home Country Politics</th>
<th>Voted in Home Country</th>
<th>Intends to Repatriate</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homeowner</td>
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<td>0.023 ***</td>
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<td>* -0.176</td>
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<td>0.262</td>
<td>* 0.218 **</td>
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<td>* -0.043</td>
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<td>-0.081</td>
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<td>*** 0.19</td>
<td>** -0.159 *</td>
<td>1.016 ***</td>
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<td>0.394 *</td>
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<td>U.S. Organization</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.246 ***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intends to Repatriate</td>
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<td>0.354 ***</td>
<td>0.234</td>
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Notes: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 two-tail test
## Appendix 2 — Predicting Transnational Engagement among Naturalized Latino Citizens and Puerto Ricans

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<tr>
<th>Communication</th>
<th>Sends Remittances</th>
<th>Trip to Home Country</th>
<th>Attention to Home Country Politics</th>
<th>Voted in Home Country</th>
<th>Intends to Repatriate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>El Salvador</strong></td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.759 ***</td>
<td>-0.578</td>
<td>-0.157</td>
<td>-0.405</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-0.076</td>
<td>0.211</td>
<td>-0.717</td>
<td>-0.493</td>
<td>0.176</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Dominican Republic</strong></td>
<td>1.429 **</td>
<td>0.49 *</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.611 **</td>
<td>1.14 **</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Colombia</strong></td>
<td>0.915</td>
<td>0.179</td>
<td>-0.034</td>
<td>0.594</td>
<td>2.128 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Puerto Rico</strong></td>
<td>0.554 **</td>
<td>-0.317 *</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Country</strong></td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.296</td>
<td>-0.654 *</td>
<td>-0.206</td>
<td>1.30 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-0.003</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(≤12 Years)</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>-0.337 *</td>
<td>0.328</td>
<td>-0.077</td>
<td>-0.262</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Bilingual</strong></td>
<td>0.435 *</td>
<td>-0.358 **</td>
<td>-0.768 ***</td>
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<td>0.0493</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>English Dominant</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Some High School</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Income ($25k - $34k)</strong></td>
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<td>0.901</td>
<td>0.386 *</td>
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<td><strong>Income ($35k - $44k)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Income ($45k - $54k)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Income ($65k-74k)</strong></td>
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<td>0.942 *</td>
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<td><strong>Income ($75k-84k)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Income (≥$85k)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Income (Refused/Don't Know)</strong></td>
<td>-0.205</td>
<td>-0.116</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
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Appendix 2 — Predicting Transnational Engagement among Naturalized Latino Citizens and Puerto Ricans (continued)

<table>
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<th></th>
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<th>Sends Remittances</th>
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<th>Attention to Home Country Politics</th>
<th>Voted in Home Country</th>
<th>Intends to Repatriate</th>
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<td>Homeowner</td>
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<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.358</td>
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<td>**</td>
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<td>0.148</td>
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<tr>
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<td>One Child</td>
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Notes: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 two-tail test
## Appendix 3 — Predicting U.S. Organization Engagement among Latino Immigrants

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<th>Independent Variables #</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<tr>
<td>Male</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Two Children</td>
<td>-0.210</td>
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<tr>
<td>Children in Home Country</td>
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<td>Discrimination</td>
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<td>Learn English</td>
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<td>Maintain Spanish</td>
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<td>Sends Remittances</td>
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<tr>
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<td>4468</td>
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</table>

Notes: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 two-tail test
The Social Implications of Health Care Reform: Reducing Access Barriers to Health Care Services for Uninsured Hispanic and Latino Americans in the United States

by Mitchell A. Kaplan and Marian M. Inguanzo

Mitchell A. Kaplan, Ph.D. CPSP, is a program evaluation and grant writing consultant in private practice in New York City. Kaplan received his Ph.D. in sociology from the City University of New York’s Graduate School and University Center and was the recipient of a two-year postdoctoral research training fellowship from the National Institute on Drug Abuse. He is a certified member of the American Academy of Professional Sociological Practitioners and holds professional certifications in medical sociology, social policy, and evaluation research from the American Sociological Association. Kaplan has worked as a research scientist and professional consultant for a number of nonprofit and local government organizations in New York that provide health care, social, and rehabilitation services to client populations with special needs. Kaplan has also guest lectured in graduate-level courses on psychosocial aspects of disability that are part of Hunter College’s master’s degree program in rehabilitation counseling. He is a regular contributor to professional journals and educational magazines. His articles and reviews have appeared in the Journal of Rehabilitation, Disability Studies Quarterly, Clinical Sociology Review, Journal of Rehabilitation Administration, Journal of Opioid Management, Hispanic Outlook in Higher Education Magazine, Today’s Caregiver, and New Social Worker magazine online. Kaplan is an active member of several professional human service organizations and has been a frequent presenter at national and international professional conferences.
Marian M. Inguanzo, M.S.W. ACSW, is an international social work consultant who specializes in the areas of program development, community organization, advocacy, and social action. Inguanzo received her M.S.W. from Hunter College School of Social Work in New York City. She has worked in the field of professional social work for more than fifteen years, providing mental health, case management, and program development services to a number of nonprofit and nongovernmental organizations that serve special needs client populations with specific chemical dependence, domestic violence, criminal justice, HIV/AIDS, and aging issues. Inguanzo is an active member of several professional social work and human rights organizations and has been a frequent presenter at professional conferences in the United States and abroad. Inguanzo is also the founder of the Tanzania Intergenerational Health Chapter Project, a five-year pilot program that has brought much needed treatment and preventive health services to some of the poorest regions of East Africa.

ABSTRACT:

The U.S. health care system is currently facing one of its most significant social challenges in decades in terms of its ability to provide access to primary care services to the millions of Americans who have lost their health insurance coverage in the recent economic recession. National statistics compiled by the U.S. Census Bureau for 2009 reveal that Hispanics currently comprise 32.4 percent of the nation’s total number of uninsured Americans. The census data estimates that there are presently 15.8 million Hispanics in the country who do not have health insurance (DeNavas-Walt et al. 2010). This article reviews current national data associated with the social access barriers to primary care services that uninsured Hispanic and Latino Americans face and describes specific policy reform measures that can be utilized by government officials to improve access to care.

TEXT:

THE RISE OF THE UNINSURED IN AMERICA

As the U.S. economy continues to struggle to recover from the traumatic effects of the economic recession of 2007, a major public policy issue has become the central focus of considerable political debate: the emerging crisis in our nation’s health care system related to the uninsured. Recent national data compiled by the U.S. Census Bureau reveals that the number of Americans without health insurance rose substantially from approximately 45 million in 2007 to about 46 million in 2008 (DeNavas-Walt et al. 2010). The census data indicates the number of uninsured rose again in 2009 to more than 50 million Americans (DeNavas-Walt et al. 2010). In terms of percentage of the U.S. population, this figure translates to 16.7 percent of Americans being uninsured in 2009. In addition, census data shows that in 2009, 10 percent of children under the age of eighteen, or 7.5 million, were without health insurance (DeNavas-Walt et al. 2010). These dire statistics have been quoted time and again by U.S. President Barack Obama, especially during his 2009 political campaign to get a national health care reform bill passed in Washington, DC. The social problems associated with the rising tide of the uninsured in America have drawn considerable attention from others in the political arena who share President Obama’s insightful concerns about the urgent need
to develop and implement health care policy that has the potential to effectively provide all underserved Americans, including Hispanics, with affordable access to health services. The discussion that follows describes the three most significant reasons why the creation of an effective universal program of health insurance coverage is of such critical importance to government lawmakers.

Documented evidence summarized in statistical reports generated by investigators at the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality in 2010 (Chu and Rhoades 2010) indicates that the plight of the uninsured civilian noninstitutionalized population under the age of sixty-five in the United States represents a major public policy concern to lawmakers for the following three important reasons:

1. Policy makers view health insurance coverage as an assistive measure that helps individuals and families to gain timely access to medical care that protects them from the risk of expensive unanticipated medical events that could impair their quality of life.

2. Policy makers believe that having accurate and reliable statistical estimates of the actual number of insured and uninsured Americans in the U.S. population is essential for them to be able to evaluate current health care expenditures and predict how the projected impact of proposed legislative changes will affect future costs related to the way public and private health insurance programs are funded.

3. Policy makers also believe that the statistical comparison of the social characteristics of insured U.S. populations with those who are uninsured over time will enable them to make informed decisions about legislative steps that need to be implemented to bring about changes in insurance programs that will ensure the best possible care for all Americans regardless of ability to pay.

**PROFILE OF THE UNINSURED**

Data from the Census Bureau reveals a significant correlated relationship between certain social variables, such as race, ethnicity, and income, and lack of health insurance (DeNavas-Walt 2010). For example:

- The number of non-Hispanic White Americans without health insurance has increased significantly from 10.8 percent and 21.3 million in 2008 to 12 percent and 23.7 million in 2009 (DeNavas-Walt et al. 2010).

- The percentage of uninsured African Americans and Hispanics is considerably higher than that of non-Hispanic Whites. The uninsured rate and the number of uninsured for Blacks in 2009 were higher than in 2008, at 21 percent and 8.1 million. Among Hispanics, the uninsured rate and the number of uninsured increased to 32.4 percent and 15.8 million in 2009 from 30.7 percent and 14.6 million in 2008 (DeNavas-Walt et al. 2010).

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- Americans with household incomes of less than $25,000 a year were more likely to be uninsured than were Americans with household incomes of more than $75,000 a year according to the census data for 2009 (DeNavas-Walt et al. 2010). Specifically, 26.6 percent of people in households with annual incomes of less than $25,000 had no health insurance compared to just 9.1 percent of people in households with incomes of $75,000 or more.

Findings from extensive research documented in the health care policy literature clearly reveal that those without health
insurance tend to receive far less health care services and tend to perceive considerably greater barriers to service access compared to those with insurance (American College of Physicians and American Society of Internal Medicine 2000; Hadley 2009a; Hadley 2009b; Monheit 1994). The data indicates that uninsured adults represent one of the most vulnerable populations due to the fact that the prevalence of many serious, treatable medical conditions rises with age. Statistical findings from more than one-hundred scientific studies included in a published report by the American College of Physicians and the American Society of Internal Medicine (2000) reveal that:

- Uninsured adults are three times more likely to be hospitalized for treatable medical conditions like diabetes compared to those with insurance.
- Uninsured adults who are admitted to hospitals are found to have higher rates of mortality than those with coverage.
- Uninsured adolescents between the ages of ten and eighteen are four times more likely not to receive adequate health care services and four times less likely to receive dental care, prescription drugs, and eyeglasses compared to their peers with insurance.
- Uninsured children are 40 percent less likely to receive medical attention for serious physical injury compared to those with insurance.

Research by John Z. Ayanian et al. (2000) reveals similar findings. The study shows that uninsured adults are much more likely to report unmet health care needs especially if they are in poor health. The research also reveals that the uninsured are much less likely to have access to routine preventive care diagnostic services such as breast cancer and hypertension screenings. Findings from other research conducted by J.R. Betancourt et al. (2004) show that adults between the ages of fifty and sixty who are uninsured or intermittently insured are more likely to report significant declines in their overall general health compared to those in the same age group with continuous insurance coverage.

**HISPANIC AND LATINO BARRIERS TO ACCESS TO PRIMARY CARE SERVICES**

As of the time of this writing, the Census Bureau had only released the most recent counts of the number of Hispanics for thirty-three U.S. states (Passel and Cohn 2011). Those partial 2010 Census results show a total of 38.7 million Hispanics (Passel and Cohn 2011); data from July 2009 estimated the total Hispanic population in the United States at 48.4 million (U.S. Census Bureau 2010). From a demographic standpoint, Hispanic and Latino Americans currently comprise one of the fastest-growing segments of the U.S. population. According to the July 2009 Census Bureau data, Hispanics constitute 16 percent of the U.S. population, and it is estimated that, by the year 2050, 30 percent of all U.S. residents will be members of this ethnic group (U.S. Census Bureau 2010). Despite the increase in the number of Hispanics and Latinos living in this country, members of these communities continue to face a multitude of serious challenges that can negatively affect their overall quality of life. One of the greatest of these is lack of adequate access to the primary care services of the American health care system. The lack of insurance coverage represents a major social access barrier to health care services for many working-class Hispanic and Latino families, even
more so than for other underrepresented minority groups.

Pivotal evidence of the unique obstacles that uninsured Hispanics and Latinos encounter when attempting to access primary health care services can be found in the results of a survey conducted by researchers at the State Health Access Data Assistance Center at the University of Minnesota on behalf of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation in 2004. The results from this survey indicate that on a nationwide scale, uninsured working-class Hispanics and Latinos are much less likely to receive the medical care they need in comparison to uninsured members of other racial and ethnic groups.

Among Hispanics and Latinos who participated in the survey, 17 percent of those without health insurance reported considerable difficulties accessing needed health care services compared to only 7 percent of those with insurance. The data further revealed that 70 percent of uninsured Hispanic and Latino adults did not have a primary care physician or other health care provider to take care of their basic health care needs in comparison to just 48 percent of uninsured White adults and 25 percent of Hispanic and Latino adults with insurance. The study also found that uninsured Hispanic and Latino adult men and women were far less likely to receive preventive health care services such as mammograms and prostate cancer screenings than those Hispanics and Latinos with insurance. The data revealed that 40 percent of Hispanic women and 73 percent of Hispanic men over the age of forty who did not have health insurance had received no preventive health services compared to only 24 percent of Hispanic women and 53 percent of Hispanic men who were insured. Finally, the study revealed that when researchers asked Hispanic and Latino respondents to rate their perception of their overall general health, those without insurance were more likely to perceive their health status as being either fair or poor in comparison to those with insurance.

Similar results were found in the report by the American College of Physicians and the American Society of Internal Medicine (2000) that examined the unmet health care needs of the Latino population in America. A review of the epidemiological data in the report indicates that:

- The incidence of end-stage renal disease associated with diabetes was six times higher among uninsured Latinos in comparison to uninsured non-Latino Whites.
- Uninsured Mexican American men and women were found to be three and half times less likely to seek medical treatment to control their hypertension compared to those with insurance in the general population.
- Uninsured Latino women were more than twice as likely to be diagnosed with late-stage breast cancer in comparison to uninsured non-Latino women.
- Uninsured Latino men were four times more likely to be diagnosed with late-stage prostate cancer compared to uninsured non-Latino men.
- Uninsured Latino children with asthma were six times less likely to receive standard medical treatment compared to uninsured non-Latino children with the same medical condition.

Information from the National Council of La Raza (NCLR), the nation’s largest Hispanic and Latino civil rights and advocacy organization, suggests that
Hispanic and Latino immigrants are highly unlikely to be able to access the services of the health care system because of government provisions such as the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, which placed serious restrictions on accessing Medicaid and other public aid programs that provide health insurance and other benefits to those in need. NCLR findings further indicate that many Hispanic and Latino immigrants who do meet the requirements for these public aid programs often do not apply for them because they fear that applying for this type of assistance will endanger their citizenship status.

**RECOMMENDED PUBLIC POLICY REFORM MEASURES**

Growing concern about the problem of health care access faced by the uninsured in Hispanic and Latino communities in the United States has reached the forefront of the public policy agendas of government agencies at both local and national levels. A number of states have implemented research-guided policy initiatives designed to heighten public awareness and institute programs that advocate for the elimination of social access barriers to health care services through the increased participation of Hispanics and Latinos in publicly and privately funded health insurance programs. For example, in states such as Minnesota, which has witnessed a 74.5 percent rise in its Latino population over the past decade, according to recent population data reported in the 2010 Census (Croman 2011), the need for the implementation of an effective system of health care service access for the uninsured in the Latino community is growing. An example of an early statewide research-generated policy initiative in Minnesota can be found in the MinnesotaCare program, which was designed to increase public access to health insurance for the uninsured. Investigators at the University of Minnesota revealed that while MinnesotaCare has been a successful policy tool for increasing public access to health insurance for most uninsured residents in the state, it has not been successful at meeting the unique needs of the state’s immigrant communities (Davidoff et al. 2000). Based on this outcome, the investigators developed a specific series of refinements whose implementation they believed would vastly improve the accessibility of the MinnesotaCare program for uninsured Latinos. Key among these was the establishment of presumptive eligibility for women and children for MinnesotaCare insurance coverage and the implementation of culturally competent enrollment specialists to facilitate the insurance enrollment process.

This and other similar early attempts on the federal level to develop and implement legislative reforms that would bring about the creation of a comprehensive system of affordable care for all Americans laid the groundwork for the system-wide service delivery changes that President Obama put forward when he developed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in the first year of his administration. The next section of this article describes the major provisions of the new health care law and what the enactment of those provisions will mean to the lives of uninsured Hispanics and Latinos as well as other economically disadvantaged Americans.
EFFECT OF HEALTH CARE REFORM LAWS ON UNINSURED HISPANIC AND LATINO AMERICANS

In March 2010, President Obama signed two landmark pieces of social legislation into law that will dramatically transform the way health care services are delivered to patients in the United States. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act are two federal statutes that have become benchmarks of the Obama administration’s political agenda to reform the American health care system. The legislative statutes provide for the extension of health insurance coverage to more than 32 million uninsured Americans and usher in a new era of unprecedented social reform in the American health care system the likes of which have not been seen since congress passed Medicare insurance legislation for the elderly and disabled more than forty years ago.

PPACA is especially important to individuals from economically disadvantaged racial and ethnic groups such as Hispanics and Latinos, who have been shown to constitute one of the largest subpopulations of uninsured Americans in the country. Recent findings from a nationwide survey of 29,000 American adults age eighteen and older conducted by Gallup indicate that the percentage of uninsured Hispanics is more than double that of other racial and ethnic groups in the general U.S. population (Newport and Mendes 2009). The data reveals that 42 percent of Hispanics in the United States are presently uninsured compared to only 20 percent of non-Hispanic Blacks and 12 percent of non-Hispanic White Americans (Newport and Mendes 2009). The survey results suggest there is a strong correlation between household income, age, and insurance coverage. In addition to Hispanics, the two other groups that tend to be the most uninsured are the young and those Americans with household incomes below $36,000 a year.

Further, according to forecast data from the Census Bureau mentioned earlier, the population of Hispanic and Latino Americans is expected to double in percentage in the United States over the next four decades. The rapid growth of the Hispanic and Latino population is going to increase the demand for culturally competent, quality health care services in the years ahead. Like other Americans, Hispanics and Latinos are going to need to find effective ways of accessing the services of the American health care system so that they can get the care they need to fight disease and remain healthy. This is one of the main reasons why health care reform legislation is of such significant importance to these diverse communities.

With this in mind, congressional lawmakers around the country have become increasingly aware of the critical importance of supporting social legislation that has the potential to effectively address key issues associated with the reduction and elimination of health insurance disparities in underserved Hispanic and Latino communities. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is a critical first step toward the achievement of this goal. Democratic leaders like Congressman José Serrano of New York’s sixteenth congressional district and members of the national Congressional Hispanic Caucus who have been major political supporters of Obama’s efforts to make health care reform legislation a reality for all Americans see the passage of the PPACA as a significant social measure that will
vastly improve the quality of life of Hispanics and Latinos in this country by opening the door to greater and more affordable access to health care services. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act will provide uninsured Hispanic and Latino Americans with a number of beneficial options that will substantially increase their ability to access culturally competent services from the American health care system. The provisions in the Obama health care legislation will aid the insured, including Hispanic and Latino Americans, as follows:

- Improve access to health care services for uninsured Americans by giving them the option to purchase health insurance coverage through government-sponsored insurance exchanges that offer sliding-scale financial subsidies to low- and moderate-income families
- Provide small businesses and larger employers that hire large numbers of workers with financial assistance and other incentives that will allow them to purchase health insurance plans at more affordable rates so that they will be better able to offer insurance coverage to their employees and their families
- Provide workers and their family members with 100 percent insurance coverage for preventive health care services such as cancer screenings, diabetes testing, and immunizations
- Improve access to primary care services for low- and moderate-income Americans through government funding of community health centers that are able to offer their patients comprehensive affordable services that are customized to the health care needs of the racial and ethnic minority communities they serve
- Prohibit health insurance companies from denying coverage to individuals who have preexisting medical conditions and will no longer allow companies to revoke coverage when participants in the plan become sick
- Reduce out-of-pocket medical expenses for families to prevent the financial hardship that often accompanies the onset of sudden chronic illness
- Provide new financial incentives for states to improve preventive care and wellness services for low-income individuals on Medicaid
- Eliminate co-payments and provide complete coverage for preventive health care services and annual wellness visits to the doctor for older adults on Medicare
- Provide funding to set up a home visit program based on the Nurse-Family Partnership model to improve the health, well-being, and self-sufficiency of low-income, at-risk, first-time mothers and their children
- Increase federal funding to states, public health departments, clinics, and hospitals to promote the utilization of community health workers who can bridge the gap between health care professionals, community health services, and the hard-to-reach underserved patient populations they serve
- Create educational scholarship and loan repayment opportunities for students from socially disadvantaged backgrounds entering the health care field so that the number of health care providers who are willing to commit themselves to working in medically underserved health care institutions and minority communities can be increased
- Expand the development, evaluation, and dissemination of cultural competency model curricula within health care professional schools and continuing education programs for health care providers
• Extend requirements for the collection of reliable demographic data on race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, health literacy, language, and disability so that accurate assessments of health disparities within U.S. populations can be made by federal health care agencies

• Provide for the formal establishment of the Office of Minority Health within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, which will monitor the implementation and evaluation of all federally funded minority health programs

CONCLUSIONS
In sum, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act makes significant changes that will greatly enhance the health insurance coverage, quality of care, and access to health care services for Hispanics and Latinos as well as other uninsured Americans. The law provides for a number of important system-wide changes that will be phased in over the next four years that will substantially increase access to care for millions of low-income Americans. The economic costs associated with the administration of these new provisional changes to the U.S. system of health care delivery will be offset by the implementation of a variety of taxes, fees, and other cost-saving measures that will be utilized to fund the program. These measures include increases in Medicare payroll taxes for upper-income Americans, cuts to Medicare Advantage programs in favor of traditional Medicare, and new fees on the purchase of medical devices and pharmaceuticals. The legislation will also impose tax penalties on uninsured Americans who do not purchase government-sponsored health insurance coverage. The Congressional Budget Office and the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation estimate that enacting both pieces of the passed Obama legislation will reduce the federal deficit by $143 billion over the next decade (Congressional Budget Office n.d.). The legislation represents a major milestone in terms of the achievement of our ultimate goal: the elimination of racial and ethnic disparities through the creation of more culturally competent, equitable systems of care that will be beneficial to all Americans regardless of their social and economic circumstances.

REFERENCES


Putting Educational Attainment First: 
An Interview with 
Juan Sepúlveda

Interviewed by Joe Carreón

Juan Sepúlveda was appointed by U.S. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan to the position of Executive Director of the White House Initiative on Educational Excellence for Hispanics on May 19, 2009. In this capacity, Sepúlveda is responsible for directing the efforts of the White House Initiative in engaging Hispanic students, parents, families, organizations, and anyone working in or with the education system in communities nationwide as active participants in improving the academic achievement of Hispanic Americans. For the last twenty years, Sepúlveda has been a senior executive, strategist, and advocate in the nonprofit and philanthropic communities, with a focus in community development, capacity building, and transformational management.

Joe Carreón is a graduate student at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Previously, Carreón served as a community organizer in his hometown of Dallas helping coordinate AmeriCorps’s Food on the Move program and working with the Dallas Independent School District. A graduate of Southern Methodist University (SMU), he was an active member of his undergraduate university community, serving as president of SMU’s College Hispanic American Students, as a member of various university president commissions, and as a student representative on the SMU Board of Trustees. As an undergraduate, Carreón also interned in the U.S. Congress and the Dallas mayor’s office.
I am a big believer in the systems approach, which is that you push on a part of the system you know that is interconnected to everything else; as you push on a piece, it impacts something. You can’t just pick one piece, isolate it, and say that solves the system.

HJHP
What inspired you to accept the position as executive director of the White House Initiative on Educational Excellence for Hispanics?

SEPÚLVEDA
I was involved with the [Obama presidential] campaign from the beginning, so I’m very fortunate that I’ve known President Barack Obama going back to the early nineties. While involved, I ended up running the Texas [campaign], so when we won, a number of folks asked me to think about coming into the administration, and I said, “sure I’ll do it.” It was interesting because the president at that time got all of us as state directors on the phone and said, “I need you to do something really hard for me,” and we all joked because we thought we just did that. The president said, “I need you to tell all of your staff thanks, and I need you to tell them thanks again, and then I need you to tell them thanks one more time. And then I need you to do something really hard. I need you to tell them I would love for them to work for us in the administration but only if they are qualified to do it.” I think it surprised a lot of folks because it was not the old game that if you were involved in the campaign you would automatically get a job, and I think some people got frustrated by that. I was one of the one’s saying, “that’s why we signed up, this is about doing it different—change.” I really appreciated when the president said he wanted people with expertise, and I felt fortunate when they started to talk to me about a number of positions. This position seemed to be the right combination because it would allow me to work with our community nationally on, if not the most important, one of the most important issues for our community. For me it was natural to say of all the [positions] I got offered, this was the one that hit my heart, knowing that our community is at the bottom of all communities in terms of educational attainment. That’s why I decided to take this particular position.

HJHP
What role did your parents play in your educational attainment?

SEPÚLVEDA
My father died when I was about a year old, and my mom did not go to college. I was the first one to go to college, but what was interesting to me is that she reminds me of so many of the moms I meet around the country. She didn’t even know what college was like but there was no way that I was not going to go to college. I ask my mom, now that I have kids in college, “how did you do it?” And she says to me, “I always decided I wasn’t going to tell you what to do but whatever you decided you were interested in, I was going to get 100 percent behind you. The
only thing was you had to go to college. That way you will have a better life than we have had.” Although she didn’t know the system, she helped me figure out what it was like to be at Harvard, and she made sure we had the money to come here. I had to rely on others to help me figure out the system but even though she had no clue what college meant, I was going to go.

HJHP

Does solving the issue of Latino parental engagement in education solve a major part of the educational attainment problem?

SEPÚLVEDA

I wouldn’t say it solves a major part of the problem, but it definitely solves a part of the problem. We have to be careful in thinking that just helping parents understand the system is enough. If I understand the system, and the system is not getting me prepared to go to college or for a career or to play a role in the community, it doesn’t matter how well I know the system. There is no doubt that parental involvement is critical in helping our parents understand how the system works and helping them understand which level courses their kids should be taking if they want to be a doctor or go into law. That needs to happen, but if we gave 100 percent to just helping parents feel welcomed at the school and completely understanding the system, that wouldn’t be enough.

HJHP

Does that major part exist? Is there one major piece of the issue that, if fixed, would go a long way in improving Hispanic educational attainment?

SEPÚLVEDA

No. Some people will tell you yes, but I would respectfully disagree with them. You have a couple of challenges. One, you have a number of systems that you have to go through in the education spectrum. There is not one system; there’s an early childhood system, a K-12 system that some could easily argue has subsystems: elementary, middle, and high school. Then you have a higher education system that has community colleges and four-year universities. I am a big believer in the systems approach, which is that you push on a part of the system you know that is interconnected to everything else; as you push on a piece, it impacts something. You can’t just pick one piece, isolate it, and say that solves the system. You have to be smart enough to know that while you push on one piece it impacts something else. We have seen schools that have said “it’s all about parental engagement” and that went from having no parental engagement to now having tons of parental engagement, but because they weren’t thinking about it systematically, the system gets overloaded. Now you have administrators who never had to deal with parents, and because they haven’t prepared for it systematically, there’s an overload on who handles the parents and how to work with the parents. Our notion is to identify the different parts of the system and how they are related to each other. It’s not easy, it’s complicated stuff. That doesn’t mean there aren’t pieces people see as priorities, but you have to really understand the connection to the rest of the system as well.
HJHP
The president has placed an emphasis on early childhood education. What are the challenges the Hispanic community faces in early childhood education and how does your office combat those?

SEPÚLVEDA
We have two big challenges: quality and quantity. On the quantity side, we have the worst participation rates of any group in the country where less than half of our kids are in any kind of early childhood program. The challenge for us is just getting our kids in programs, but the president understands it’s not just about getting into a program—it’s about getting into a high-quality program. The president has said in a number of his speeches that playing a video for kids is not sufficient early childhood education. Unfortunately, some of the early childhood programs in our community are basically babysitting locations. We have to increase the number of programs on the quantity side and bump them up with quality. One of the things the president proposed for the fiscal year 2012 budget is some early learning challenge grants, not unlike Race to the Top, in which we are challenging states to create the best early childhood learning systems. The states that show us the most innovative ideas we are going to give money to [so they can] go do it.

HJHP
Why are so few Latino children in early childhood education programs?

SEPÚLVEDA
It’s a complicated answer. There are lots of pieces to it. One piece is a cultural explanation. Part of what we see is a phenomenon where people feel that putting their kids in early education is like you’re abdicating to someone else raising your kids, so there is a little bit of a reluctance to put them in. That’s part of it. Another part of it is that on the early learning side you have for-profit and nonprofit schools. For-profits tend to go to scale and have bigger operations; they don’t think they can make as much money in our communities. As a result, you see them not really placing early learning into our communities. When you look at Head Start, which is government funded, we make up today a third of all placements, so even though less than half our kids are in early learning, you can see through Head Start and Early Head Start what happens when you have a good government program and it’s affordable—we have success.

HJHP
Any words of advice for young Latinos and Latinas who want to get involved in politics?

SEPÚLVEDA
Do it. We need people to do it. We need people to come to the political system, but we also need people that have a wide range of experiences. I would encourage people to go out and do some nonpolitical work before they jump into the political arena. Sometimes people get so ambitious and they want to come straight in, and that’s great. We want that, but sometimes they lack having life experiences. I encourage people to do other things and then come back because that stuff will make you so much better as an elected official.
**My hope is that with the next generation the question becomes: What is the new leadership style? What is the new way of looking at power that goes beyond the notion of charismatic leadership? We have the technology now to crowd source and put more minds and brains around a problem. The old idea that one guy will solve everything for everyone is the old model.**

**HJHP**

Any further advice for students to keep in mind?

**SEPÚLVEDA**

The Pew Hispanic Center recently did a research paper that said there is no national Latino/Latina leader. In the old days we had Henry Cisneros, Federico Peña, Antonio Villaraigosa, but what I think is interesting is that I think Pew got the question wrong. I think that’s the old question. It’s the old notion that there is one charismatic leader that solves everyone’s problems or you look to him or her. My hope is that with the next generation the question becomes: What is the new leadership style? What is the new way of looking at power that goes beyond the notion of charismatic leadership? We have the technology now to crowd source and put more minds and brains around a problem. The old idea that one guy will solve everything for everyone is the old model. The new model is not even about teams, it’s about crowd sourcing across the planet with people you don’t even know. It’s going to be interesting to watch how the next generation takes advantage of this new notion of crowd sourcing to really solve problems in ways that we haven’t before.
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Promoting Change through Art: An Interview with Rebecca Cammisa

Interviewed by Joe Carreón

Rebecca Cammisa directed and produced the 2010 Oscar-nominated feature documentary Which Way Home, which also received a 2010 Independent Spirit Award nomination for Best Documentary Film, was nominated for four Emmy Awards, and won the News & Documentary Emmy Award for Outstanding Informational Programming. Cammisa was recently awarded a 2010 John Simon Guggenheim Fellowship and the 2010 Robert F. Kennedy Journalism Award’s Grand Prize. She has been the recipient of two Sundance Documentary Fund grants, two NYFA Fellowships, and a 2006 Fulbright Fellowship to Mexico. In 2002, Cammisa codirected, coproduced, and shot the feature documentary Sister Helen, which won the Sundance Film Festival’s Documentary Directing Award and was nominated for both an Outstanding Directorial Achievement in Documentary

Film Award from the Directors Guild of America and an Emmy Award for Outstanding Programming.

Joe Carreón is a graduate student at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Previously, Carreón served as a community organizer in his hometown of Dallas helping coordinate AmeriCorps’s Food on the Move program and working with the Dallas Independent School District. A graduate of Southern Methodist University (SMU), he was an active member of his undergraduate university community, serving as president of SMU’s College Hispanic American Students, as a member of various university president commissions, and as a student representative on the SMU Board of Trustees. As an undergraduate, Carreón also interned in the U.S. Congress and the Dallas mayor’s office.
Tell us about your background.

**CAMMISA**

I was raised in Westchester County, NY. My B.F.A. was in photography, but I was always interested in film, so I always wanted to do film. I studied acting for a brief time and then, after that, I really got into documentary photography. I did some traveling and shooting for long periods of time in different locations, and one of those photography “still stories” became my first film. The subject was Sister Helen Travis and that first film was entitled *Sister Helen*. [The film tells the story of Sister Helen founding a shelter for male recovering addicts.] So I really went from photography into documentary filmmaking, and that’s all I have been doing since.

How was your transition from photography to filmmaking? Was it an easy transition?

**CAMMISA**

For me it was because the subject I found as a stills photographer was a very compelling one, it just wasn’t one for still photographs. My frustration was trying to tell a story, but all I always had were these single pictures that didn’t speak to you. Once I realized Sister Helen’s story needed to be a documentary film, I went out to try to make that happen, and it happened quite quickly. My first foray into documentary filmmaking was pretty effortless.

What led you to the issue of immigration and the story of unaccompanied child migrants?

**CAMMISA**

What led me to *Which Way Home* was actually a friend of mine who called me after the success of *Sister Helen* and said, “I know what your next film should be.” I asked “What?” and he said, “unaccompanied child migrants.” He asked me to read an article that had just come out in the *Los Angeles Times*. After reading the article, I realized that there was no film about this other than *El Norte* at that time [in 2002]. I then wondered if it was film-able. But I had no connection to it, I am not Latina, my family is not in Central or South America, I’m not Mexican. I had no connection to the story whatsoever other than this friend making me aware if it. Then I looked into it, and I thought it would be an incredibly important film to do and an important story because many Americans don’t realize what other Pan-Americans are going through.

Did you have a policy goal in mind when making the film?

**CAMMISA**

Well, before getting to the policy reform, when you look at the history of the United States and Mexico, in and of itself, some decades it was fine to come, then you have the Bracero Program, and now it wasn’t fine to come; there was never a clearly defined functional policy that was designed to work and work in a humane way. It would be great if there was a consistent policy that was created that was functional. But funny enough, what drove me was my anger about what I listened to on the twenty-four-hour cable news cycle.
Tell me about your journey since making the film. How did you change?

CAMMISA
I got older! I didn’t think the film would take seven years to make. I don’t think I really changed. You know, when I started making this film I had all of the same intentions I still have; the only thing that has changed about me is that now I have real information and experiences to base my opinions on as opposed to having to listen to the supposed news gathers to form my opinions. I have been lucky enough to see it firsthand; to really understand what’s going on. That’s what has changed about me, I have become more informed.

HJHP
Do you think this human aspect that you experienced is what is missing from the immigration debate in this country? In other words, if most people in the country knew the story of children like those in Which Way Home, would you have the reform you are looking for?

CAMMISA
No, because unless people are willing to fight for what they want to reform or at least speak out and really urge their senators and their congress people to really create a cohesive humane immigration policy, unless people make their voices heard, those that represent us may not move on the issue. I really think the blockage to progress, quite frankly, from what I see, is the fight between this divisive congress, divisive senate, and the administration; no matter which administration it is... their lack of willpower to do anything because they want to remain in power. Immigration is one of the most hot-button topics. It is unpopular, and if
Just being there was an honor. I think I was the only one from Mexico and I think it was a good thing to have a Mexican perspective on it. It was also nice to have a film that challenged the audience to think about things differently.

HJHP

Any advice for future filmmakers?

CAMMISA

You have to really, really love the story you’re telling because, if you don’t, it’s going to be hard to sell. You have to have the passion for the story. I thought this story would take me two years to do and that it would be easy. It was tough. I experienced all the horror stories that filmmakers go through, but I knew that I absolutely was not going to stop until I got this film made. You have to have the drive to accomplish it no matter what.

HJHP

Lastly, who should have won the Oscar for best feature documentary?

CAMMISA

The funny thing is, and you’re not going to believe me, I was really happy and proud to be with the four other films that got nominated. All had such an important story to tell, and I actually to this day don’t feel that any particular film should have won. We won by getting the nomination.
El Pueblo, Dividido: 
A Review of The Trouble with Unity: Latino Politics and the Creation of Identity
by Cristina Beltrán

(Oxford University Press 2010)
Reviewed by Antonio D. Ramirez

Antonio D. Ramirez grew up in Milwaukee, WI, and has worked as a bilingual history teacher in Milwaukee public schools and an agricultural migrant educator in rural Michigan. Most recently, he was Director of Outreach and Leadership Development at a transnational workers’ rights law center in central Mexico. His work has been published in WireTap Magazine, El Diario NTR de Zacatecas, The Nation, The Progressive, Voces de la Frontera and Change.org. He currently resides in Mexico City.

Cristina Beltrán’s new book, The Trouble with Unity: Latino Politics and the Creation of Identity, is a bold, occasionally confusing leap into the uncharted nexus of political theory and Latino politics. Peering at late twentieth century Latino political participation in the United States through the eyes of democratic and political theory, Beltrán uses three historical moments to reconceptualize a bedrock tenet of contemporary Latino politics: unity. The moments are: (1) the radical Latino movements of the 1960s and 1970s; (2) dialogue around the emergent 1980s Latino population; and (3) the 2006 immigrants’ rights marches.

Is Latino unity an inalienable truth? Does a fourth-generation, English-speaking Mexican American lawyer necessarily share her identity with an undocumented indigenous Guatemalan? Beltrán makes a convincing case that by assuming unity in identity and policy prescriptions as Latino politics’ raison d’être, advocates have glossed over the heterogeneity of U.S. Latinos, limiting possibilities for democratic participation. According to Beltrán, Latino activists, media analysts, and political theorists would do well to reexamine the rhetoric of unity—born in the heady days of radical Chicano and Puerto Rican liberation movements—which, while emancipatory in its intentions, has often quelled dissenting voices.

Is Latino unity an inalienable truth? Does a fourth-generation, English-speaking Mexican American lawyer necessarily share her identity with an undocumented indigenous Guatemalan?
and frowned on political disagreement. Instead, she posits, “Latino” should be conceived as a space whose definition is permanently and consistently contested by various actors. We should imagine “Latino” as “something we do rather than something we are,” she says.

Beltrán begins by examining ways in which the rhetoric of the Mexican American and Puerto Rican radical Left in the 1960s and 1970s—namely the Chicano Movement and the Young Lords—reinforced a collective identity and sense of shared struggle within its membership. Citing personal testimonies and founding organizational documents, she convincingly argues that central to the struggle for liberation was the promotion of group unity, often at the expense of democratic deliberation. Put simply, someone who struggled along with Chicano or Boricua brothers and sisters was expressing correct political formation; anyone who lacked solidarity or questioned basic movement ideology was not.

Movement leadership’s vitriolic response to the rise of feminist challengers within the rank and file in the 1970s provides a particularly poignant example. Openly critical of organizational and linguistic machismo, Chicana and Puerto Rican feminists quickly found themselves victimized by the same unifying rhetoric that had no doubt drawn many into the movement. Accused of weakening their respective communities by allying themselves with “Anglo women’s liberation,” Latina feminists also birthed a debate that aggravated the central tension that often exists both within Latino politics and more generally on the Left: the contradiction between the radical dream of an inclusive democracy and a simultaneous antipathy toward internal dissent. Understanding manifestations of this tension in 1960s and 1970s radical Latino movements, Beltrán says, is critical to grasping why subsequent professional Latino advocates (many of whom cut their political teeth as Young Lords or radical Chicanos) continue to define unity as the U.S. Latino community’s ultimate goal.

Beltrán further problematizes constructions of Latino unity by citing various social and political theorists, particularly Iris Marion Young, who warned of homogenizing and disciplinary forces and emphasized the importance of including marginalized voices in political community formation. Beltrán’s most compelling examples of effective criticism from within the Left come from Third World feminists like Audre Lorde, Cherríe Moraga, and Gloria Anzaldúa who, while active parts of radical organizations, have successfully used their varied experiences of race, gender, and sexuality to expand movement conceptions of political community, coalition, and democratic participation. However, Beltrán also points to contradictions in Young’s and Third World feminists’ critiques of political structures that marginalize oppressed communities like queer feminists of color because, as Beltrán notes, such criticisms fail to admit that these communities are also diverse in their identities and political strategies.

In consideration of these theorists, and as an alternative to battling over unifying a constituency perpetually narrowed by postmodern critiques of identity, Beltrán asserts that Latino advocates should give up defining success by the false binary of “unified” or “not unified”—particularly when working within a growing, increasingly heterogeneous community. Instead, she says advocates should retheorize U.S. Latino political participation in terms similar to those proposed by democratic
A bolder and more revealing tack would have been to take the book’s thesis as a given and dive deep into the intricacies of the various ethnic populations that form the supposed “pan-ethnic” Latino community.

The trouble with unity: Latino politics and the creation of identity

Chapter 4 also begins with an important insight: the eventual post-1970s institutionalization of Latino political organizing involved an ideological shift from political participation in radical grassroots movements to an emphasis on representation, primarily in terms of the “Latino vote,” which, unfortunately, promptly fades away. Here, Beltrán makes a strong case that leadership of the Latino professional advocacy organizations of the 1980s and 1990s increasingly forced a diverse Latino populace into a generalized “pan-ethnic Hispanic” census category in order to respond to the political needs of...
the election cycle. But instead of engaging the flesh and blood of the Latino population’s diversity, she meanders through quotes by Latino civic elites, poll data, and even the Congressional Hispanic Caucus in an attempt to prove that the U.S. Latino community is, in fact, diverse. A bolder and more revealing tack would have been to take the book’s thesis as a given and dive deep into the intricacies of the various ethnic populations that form the supposed “pan-ethnic” Latino community. For example, how did the massive influx of Salvadorans, fleeing civil war throughout the 1980s and currently the nation’s fourth-largest Latino group, influence the political composition of the U.S. Latino community?

Furthermore, while attempting to prove the Latino community’s diversity, Beltrán unwittingly hits on convincing proof (as I had privately wondered since cracking the binding on *The Trouble with Unity*) that although the Latino community is linguistically, culturally, and ethnically diverse, the majority of us are similar in at least one important way: we are liberal. From Honduran farmworkers to Peruvian professors, despite being consistently portrayed as a critical swing vote, Beltrán admits that the majority of Latinos supports the “core elements of a liberal domestic agenda,” with around 65 percent consistently voting Democrat in presidential elections from Michael Dukakis in 1988 to Barack Obama twenty years later.

In Chapter 5, while analyzing the 2006 immigrants’ rights marches, Beltrán claims that marchers “held a wide array of views” on basic immigration policy and erred in their overemphasis on wage labor as an important argument in favor of their inclusion in the body politic, two assumptions that seem questionable at best. Indeed, marchers may have represented diverse experiences and ethnicities in 2006, but, I would argue, all participants seemed to overwhelmingly support the marches’ overarching message—a call for naturalization, immigrant workers’ rights, and scaled-back border militarization. Additionally, both against and in concurrence with Beltrán’s analysis, marchers consistently expressed complicated messages about legal status, work, and the conception that their participation was a new, multifaceted expression of their own political and civic involvement—an idea that closely reflects Beltrán’s concept of the immigrant marches being both “fugitive” and “counterpublic” and practicing forms of “festive anger.”

In the end, true to its claims, *The Trouble with Unity* is an important, unprecedented study that legitimizes the serious examination of contemporary Latino politics by gazing through the lens of political theory. Beltrán has reaffirmed the importance of theory as the foundation of praxis in Latino politics and, in so doing, challenges the tendency of academics to judge an academic work about Latinos by its practical usefulness in the “struggle for liberation.” However, the notion that academic study should have real-world applications that stand firmly on the side of the poor and oppressed is one of the most important and lasting gifts radical Latino movements have given to academia. Ultimately, by an overuse of abstraction, Beltrán’s analysis is an imperfect yet passionate step toward Latino advancement—strikingly similar to the very movements she criticizes.
In Memoriam:
Mario Obledo, Godfather of the Latino Movement, 1932–2010

by Kenneth C. Burt

Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa. He is currently researching the role of Hispanics in national politics during the 1930s and 1940s. He has chapters in five anthologies, and he served as the on-air academic for a PBS documentary on Latino veterans, “Realidades: Los Soldados Americanos,” in 2002. He writes periodically for Hispanic Link News Service. Burt worked for the United Farm Workers prior to attending the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

Mario Guerra Obledo, one of thirteen children born to immigrant parents escaping the violence of the Mexican Revolution, graduated from law school on the cusp of the John F. Kennedy presidency that inspired a generation. He was a giant in the Mexican American civil rights movement. He died in August 2010 at the age of seventy-eight.

“I was a real idealist,” recalled Obledo, then a twenty-seven-year-old veteran of the Korean War. “I was going to try to defend the rights of the people.”

Obledo kept his promise. He cofounded, led, or nurtured a host of organizations that sought to improve the lives of Hispanics in the United States, such as the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF), League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), Hispanic National Bar Association, Southwest Voter Registration Education Project, and National Coalition of Hispanic Organizations. He was also a teaching fellow at Harvard Law School and chaired the National Rainbow Coalition.

When former President Bill Clinton awarded him the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1998, the citation said Obledo had “created a powerful chorus for justice and equality.”

Mario G. Obledo Papers, Special Collections, University of California, Davis

Kenneth C. Burt is the political director of the California Federation of Teachers and a visiting scholar at the University of California at Berkeley. Burt helped diversify the California State Legislature and was the architect of the successful 2010 voter initiative that made it easier to pass a state budget by requiring a majority vote instead of two-thirds. Burt is the author of The Search for a Civic Voice: California Latino Politics, with a foreword by Los Angeles
Obledo’s activism started in the mid-1950s. While an undergraduate at the University of Texas at Austin, he formed a campus LULAC chapter. “I went to the state convention in 1955 in Lubbock, Texas, and I recall at the general session I raised my hand and pledged that I would devote part of my life for the rest of my life to help in my community,” he told an oral historian at the University of California at Davis. He never forgot that pledge.

He graduated from the University of Texas at Austin with a degree in pharmacy and later from St. Mary’s University School of Law in San Antonio. In 1965, after working in the private sector, Obledo went to work for the attorney general of Texas in Austin. While there he discussed the idea of creating a Mexican American legal group along the lines of the well-established NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund.

In 1968, MALDEF became a reality, and Obledo became its first general counsel. The trailblazing litigator overturned ingrained discrimination that for too long had been accepted in the United States. Cases ranged from companies that refused to hire Hispanics to cities that refused to allow Mexican Americans to use swimming pools.

Then California Governor Jerry Brown hired Obledo in 1975, taking him away from his teaching post at Harvard, to serve as his secretary of health and welfare. There Obledo oversaw a budget that was larger than that of forty-six states. Obledo’s proudest achievement was the diversification of many state departments. He also encouraged Brown to make a record number of Hispanic appointments.

Obledo resigned as secretary to make a run for California’s Democratic nomination for governor in the early 1980s. It was yet another first in the modern era—a time when Hispanics accounted for nearly a quarter of the state population but had limited sway politically. At the bilingual press conference announcing the Obledo candidacy, then United Farm Workers Vice President Dolores Huerta stated, “Obledo is doing us a favor because he is demonstrating that the Hispanic community has the qualified people for this kind of job.”

Even though Obledo did not win the race, he was still a trailblazer. Following the gubernatorial run, Obledo returned to his organizational roots: he assumed the national LULAC presidency. From the vantage point of this enduring organization, he was able to assess the tremendous strides made by Hispanics even as he sought to ensure greater opportunity for all.
Steve Alfaro is an artist/activist from Los Angeles, CA. As an art student he interned as a motion graphics designer at LATV, a bilingual music and entertainment network. After graduating from art school, he went on to work at SiTV, a leading cable channel for bicultural Latinos. At SiTV, he did branding for reality shows such as Jammin’, Model Latina, and the Crash the Parties political reporting contest that was honored with two Webby Award official recognitions. In 2008, Alfaro moved to Washington, DC, to work for Voto Latino, a nonprofit organization founded by actress Rosario Dawson and Maria Teresa Kumar. He has overseen the design of Voto Latino’s award-winning civic engagement initiatives for the past three years. Alfaro also continues to make his own creative work, and in 2009 participated at the MANIFEST HOPE gallery exhibit held before the inauguration of U.S. President Barack Obama.

Alfaro’s artwork can be seen in Changing the Narrative in Arizona, page 23; My Life as a DREAMer who ACTed Beyond the Barriers: From Growing Up “Undocumented” in Arizona to a Master’s Degree from Harvard, page 37; The Social Implications of Health Care Reform: Reducing Access Barriers to Health Care Services for Uninsured Hispanic and Latino Americans in the United States, page 83; and Putting Educational Attainment First: An Interview with Juan Sepúlveda, page 93.

Dianne Sánchez, raised by Colombian American parents in Idaho and Florida, was inspired to become an artist and art educator by her own experiences as a photography student at Nampa High School. While studying arts education (with a concentration in photography) at the University of Utah on the Gates Millennium Scholarship, she also liked to use her artistic talents to do research in community-based arts, collaborate with other artists on mural projects, and develop photography programs for underserved communities. Before coming to the Harvard Graduate School of Education, Sánchez had exhibitions in art galleries nationwide, using many of the art mediums she learned during her undergraduate career. Although she is currently preoccupied with her graduate studies, she still finds joy in picking up a film camera to photograph the wonders of Boston.

Sánchez’s artwork can be seen in Transnational Stakeholders: Latin American Migrant Transnationalism and Civic Engagement in the United States, page 59; and Promoting Change through Art: An Interview with: Rebecca Cammisa, page 99.
Favianna Rodriguez is a visual artist and new media organizer who has helped foster resurgence in political art locally and internationally. Hailed as “visionary” and “ubiquitous,” Rodriguez is renowned for her vibrant posters dealing with issues such as war, immigration, globalization, sustainability, and social movements.

Rodriguez’s artwork can be seen in Penny Wise, Pound Foolish? Don’t Sacrifice Our Nation’s Future, page 5; Why Cesar Chavez Led a Movement as well as a Union, page 15; La Culture Cure, page 29; and In-State Tuition Policies for Undocumented Youth, page 43.
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