Why are Mexican mayors getting killed by traffickers? A model of competitive corruption

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Abstract

This is a paper about how organized crime and politicians interact, and the way in which political institutions and market dynamics impact this relationship. Recent years have seen the transformation of Mexican drug traffic organizations (DTOs) into highly violent political actors. Just in 2010, 15 mayors have been killed by organized crime, a sharp contrast with a history of complete absence of political violence. I present a formal model of corruption dynamics to understand these outcomes and show that, if mayors are getting killed is not because traffickers are more powerful—as traditional accounts of corruption would argue— but because of (a) political decentralization, and (b) changes in the structure of the illegal-drug industry (i.e. higher competition, and a recently open domestic drug market). My conclusions are drawn from an extensive fieldwork in Mexico’s drug war zone.
Well, first I pray to God every day and at every moment. Then, I do not denounce, I do not see, I do not listen... Besides, I do not even have the [constitutional] mandate to prosecute drug traffickers! Finally, at my home, I talk to God again.  

Recent years have seen the mutation of Mexican organized crime into a politically violent actor. In 2010 elections, Mexican drug traffickers made clear that organized crime was not going to be a simple political spectator anymore. They attempted to change political preferences by prohibiting the press to cover stories or by openly funding their favorite candidates; they tried to reduce electoral turn out via blatant intimidation; they succeeding selecting candidates either by assassinating the opposition, or by terrifying politicians until they withdrew from the competition. If the previous actions were not effective, they just killed politicians. Political violence became the norm. In 2010, 15 mayors were assassinated, at least 126 more were death threatened, 8 journalists were killed or disappeared, and 411 policemen were murdered (CPJ 2010, Milenio XX). Some political parties were unable to compete in local elections because of “a lack of braveness (El Universal 2010)” of the potential candidates. Complete towns remained without de facto authorities, as mayors and policemen frequently ran out of office, terrified.

Yet, just recently Mexican drug traffic organizations (DTOs) were commonly referred as the counter-case of political Colombian DTOs. Mexico’s organized crime was notoriously disinterested in politics (Resa Nesateres, 2006). Under this traditional narrative, Mexican kingpins were portrayed as unsophisticated but clever dealers who knew what was good for business (Bunker and Sullivan 2001). They did not want people fighting in the streets, neither did they want to take visible positions in politics; they were there for the money. Mexicans were not politically involved criminals, they were businessmen.

In this paper, I provide an explanation for the abrupt change in the relationship between criminals and politicians. This is a paper about how organized crime and politicians interact. I challenge the traditional "silver-or-lead" approach to understand the political/criminal nexus –according to which as traffickers become more powerful, they also become more politically visible, and they increasingly force politicians to decide between accepting bribes (silver), and being assassinated (lead). I show that criminals’ political violence does not necessarily come from an increase in the power of traffickers versus politicians. My story is able to explain why Mexico’s corruption outcomes have changed even if, as I show, traffickers have actually become weaker.

My main argument is that political violence can only be understood if we analyze government institutions, and illegal-drug markets. I present a formal model to show the different ways in which corruption works under centralized and decentralized political institutions. Decentralization changes corruption from a single-agent game to a multiple-agent game affecting in this way (a) the price of bribes, (b) government’s incentives to enforce the law, and ultimately, (c) political violence.

The paper is divided in three sections. I begin by presenting my model of corruption with different levels of government; this section can be skipped for the non-technical readers. Then, I present some

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1Mayor of Pueblo Nuevo, Durango, when asked what he do to keep himself alive (Abrego 2010)
comparative statics to show the expected results that the model would predict. The main testable implication of my model is that political violence will only happen in decentralized corruption systems, and will be targeted towards the weakest level of government. Finally, I analyze Mexico’s history of political violence from 1998 to 2010, and show how the results of my model can be used to understand why, even if politicians and traffickers have long engaged in dangerous corruption interactions, it is only recently that politicians are getting killed.

1 The model

This is a model of corruption in which a trafficker “buys” impunity from the government. Impunity allows the trafficker to sell drugs in a territory as monopolists and without being prosecuted. Corruption occurs when the government sets the price of the bribes to maximize his utility given by his expected revenues from bribes and the costs that he will have to pay for not enforcing the law. Costs are determined by how much politician values honesty and how much he cares about getting the favor of the electorate. The trafficker demands (“buys”) some level of corruption depending on the price of bribes and its expected profits from trafficking.

Once the government receives the bribes, it decides whether to “cooperate” and deliver corruption —paying the costs of not enforcing— or “cheat” and getting the benefits of the bribes without eliminating enforcement. If government cheats, trafficker decides between killing the politician (revenge), or keeping business as usual (“swallow”). This is a decision between two bads. Swallowing requires accepting losing what the trafficker paid in bribes, and killing requires accepting the cost of killing. The cost of killing a politician depends on how important the politician is within the political system.

The government has two levels, each with different enforcement capacities. The top level is officially in charge of trafficker’s prosecution with control over federal police forces; the lower level controls local police forces which cannot prosecute traffickers but can oversee their actions and alert federal forces of suspicious activities. As in any federal system, there is a single top-level government for the whole national territory, and many local-level governments, one per district.

The two levels of government may interact in a centralized or decentralized political system. Under a centralized political system, the top level is in control of all security policy decisions having lower level politicians as their employees. Local politicians are considered part of the top political elite and their political careers depend upon it. Under a decentralized political system, security policy decisions are taken by both the top and lower levels of government, and local politicians are independent of the federal political elite. Their political careers are not resolved by top level decisions.

Note however that, because of the different enforcement capacities of each government, the type of security policy decisions taken by each level of government are different. The top level decides whether to prosecute or not while the lower level only decides whether to tell the federation about suspicious activities or not. It is the top level the one who take the ultimate decisions about enforcement. Enforcement may happen even if the lower level did not tell the federation anything, just because the top level decided. The top level may also decide not to enforce even if the bottom level tell them about
suspicious behavior.

The basic question this formal model is meant to answer is how different political systems (centralized/decentralized) affect (a) the price of bribes, (b) the motivation of the government to enforce, and ultimately, (c) how many politicians get killed by traffickers (political violence).

Let $a$ be the returns on drug trafficking, normally distributed with a media of $\alpha$, and a variance of $\sigma$. Think on $\alpha$ as determined by how favorable a district is for traffickers (a district with a lot of drug consumers, or useful for drug production, will always have a larger $\alpha$) $\sigma$ as determined by random factors (e.g. how good the harvest was) and by the reputation of politicians. A ”well reputed” politician is one that delivers what he promises (i.e. if trafficker paid for corruption, corruption will happen).

Accessing to $\alpha$ depends on the payment of a bribes $B$ for top level politicians and $b$ for $n$ lower level politicians. Traffickers’ total demand for bribes is given by:

$$Q = \alpha - 2B + \sum b_i$$

$$q = \alpha - 2\sum b_i + B$$

Where $Q$ is the total demand for top-level bribes, and $q$ is the total demand for lower-level bribes. Note that $B$ and $b$ are not perfect substitutes but differentiable goods.

Governments’ utility for corruption can be modeled as:

$$U(B) = Q(B - c)$$
$$U(b_i) = q(b_i - c)$$

Where $c$ is the cost of not-enforcement, determined by how much politician cares about honesty and about getting the favor of the electorate. The electorate may care of not about enforcement depending on how much trafficking affects their day to day lives. No morality restrictions.

Once governments set a bribe $B^*$ and $b_i^*$, traffickers pick a demand $Q^*$ and $q^*$, and pay. Total bribe revenue for politicians is given by $R = B^* \times Q^*$ and $r_i = b_i^* \times q^*$, respectively.

Government must then decide between delivering corruption getting a total utility of $U(B^*)$ and $U(b_i^*)$, or ”cheating” and getting an expected utility of

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2If bribing the top level is too expensive, traffickers will indeed demand more corruption from the lower level yet, bribing both levels is always required.
\[
U(B)^{\text{cheat}} = (U(B^*) + Q^*c)(1 - k)(f(\sigma)) - (k)(\omega(R)) \\
U(b_i)^{\text{cheat}} = (U(b_i^*) + q^*c) - (1 - K)(f(\sigma)) - (K)(\omega(r_i))
\]

Where \( k \) and \( K \) is the probability of top and lower politicians to be killed by the traffickers in revenge for cheating, \( f(\sigma) \) are the costs to politicians’ reputation, and \( \omega \) is the value they place in being alive, which is a function of, among other things, their bribe revenue. Because local politicians are less central to the political system than top ones, I assume \( K > k \).

Traffickers always want revenge unless the expected costs of killing the politician are higher than losing the money trafficker already paid him in bribes, \( T \).

In equilibrium incentives are given such that any positive \( K \) or \( k \) will completely deter politicians from cheating. Dying is such a bad outcome for politicians that even a reduced probability of traffickers daring to kill politicians, will completely inhibit cheating. If \( K = 0 \), politicians may cheat depending on how much their cheating will affect \( \sigma \) and ultimately the demand for corruption. A bad reputed politician has not demand for corruption and thus, loses all his potential bribe income.

Centralized corruption

In a centralized political system top level politicians decide the price of federal bribes but low-level politicians may still decide to secretly charge an extra-bribe to traffickers. Federal politicians are first-movers price settlers and local politicians set their price in a second move. The extra-bribe changed by local politicians does not reduce enforcement (under centralization all security decisions are taken at the top level) but instead provides traffickers with some “extra help.” Corrupted local politicians do not tell the federation about all the suspicious activities that the trafficker is performing in their district, allowing traffickers to conduct a share of their business without having to pay bribes to the federal government. If we think on bribes as taxes, corrupted local governments can be thought of as allowing “informality” to go on in illegal-drug markets.

Top-level government and lower-level government are involved in a standard principal-agent problem. To demotivate lower-level politicians to charge extra-bribes, top politicians threat them with reducing its career prospects \( \psi \). If a local politician is caught getting a bribe, the federal government takes the bribe and reduces its chances of political advancement. The probability of local politicians to be caught is given by a function \( p \), which depends on the capacity of the federal politician in monitoring local governments.

If local politicians charge an extra bribe, the price of it will be given by the solution to a standard maximization problem:

\[
\max_b (1 - p)(b_i - c)q + (p)(-\psi b_i - cq)
\]
The first order condition shows that the optimal price of the extra bribe charged by a lower-level politician will be given by

$$b_{i}^{extra} = \frac{(1 - p)(\alpha + B) - p\psi}{2(1 - p)(n + 1)}$$

The top-level government can make local-level politicians to be indifferent between charging an extra bribe or not if the following incentive compatibility constraint is followed:

$$q^{extra} = \frac{p\psi}{1 - p}$$

For no extra bribes to be charged, top-level government should the set $B^*$ to be incentive compatible (IC). Given that $q^{extra} = \alpha - 2nb_{i}^{extra} + B$, we know that such incentive compatible bribe price will be given by:

$$B^{IC} = \frac{2}{(n + 2 + pn)}(\frac{p\psi}{1 - p} - \alpha)$$

Local politicians won’t charge extra bribes if $B^* \leq B^{IC}$.

If the top-level government is the only bribee, $B^*$ will be given by the solution to a standard monopolist profit maximization problem, where top-level politicians satisfy the demand for corruption at both levels of government:

$$\max_b *\max_b (B - c)(\alpha - 2B + B)$$

Results in equilibrium will be given by:

$$B^I = \frac{\alpha + c}{2}$$
$$Q^I = \frac{\alpha - c}{2}$$
$$R^I = \frac{(\alpha + c)(\alpha - 2c)}{4}$$

Where the roman number $I$ as superscript makes clear that these results refer to equilibrium results for a centralized corruption with only 1 bribee. With $B^* = B^I$, $b_{i}^*$ will always be zero unless $B^I > B^{IC}$. If $B^I > B^{IC}$, top-level politicians will pick $B^*$ to be equal to $B^{IC}$, such that $b_{i}^*$ remains being zero.

There may be cases in which making $b^*$ to be zero is not possible. From equation (1) we know that if $\alpha > p\psi(1 - p)^{-1}$ because either (a) the career benefits $\psi$ that the federal government can give to
local politicians are very few, or (b) the probability of local politicians to be caught charging an extra bribe $p$ is very low, there won’t be a $B^*$ capable to deter lower-level politicians to charge an extra bribe.

If deterrence is not possible, top-level politicians will still pick the price of their bribes as monopolists but the final demand for top-level corruption will be reduced due to local politicians satisfying the demand for local corruption themselves. In this case, equilibrium results will be given by

$$b^I_i = b^\text{extra}_i$$

$$q^I_i = \frac{4\alpha + 2c - 8nb^\text{extra}_i}{4}$$

$$r^I_i = b^\text{extra}_i((1-p)q^I_i - p\psi))$$

$$B^I = \frac{\alpha + 2c}{4}$$

$$Q^I = \frac{\alpha - 2c}{2} + nb^\text{extra}_i$$

$$R^I = \frac{(\alpha + 2c)(\alpha - 2c)}{8} + \frac{b^\text{extra}_i n(\alpha + 2c)}{4} + pn^I_i$$

Total bribes paid by traffickers in a centralized political system will depend on whether top politicians are the single bribees $T^I$, or local politicians act as a second bribee without top-politicians being able to stop them, $T^II$.

$$T^I = R^I$$

$$T^II = R^I + \frac{b^\text{extra}_i n(\alpha + 2c)}{4} + nr^I_i$$

Because $T^II > T^I$ we should expect traffickers to be more willing to kill when top-politicians are not able to control other levels of government. With more than one bribee traffickers pay more bribes and thus, are more motivated for revenge because the losses that they face when politicians cheat on them are higher. Having a single powerful bribee, as would be the case of authoritarian regimes where the federal political elite controls the political careers of all local politicians, should in general reduce the amount of killings. Those traffickers that need to bribe more districts to get their business done (higher $n$) will also be more willing to kill.

Killings are not only determined by how much traffickers are paying in bribes but also by how costly it would be to kill a politician. In general, we can think on local politicians as more susceptible to be victims of political violence yet, three characteristics of centralized systems reduce assassinations. First, in centralized systems with total control, local politicians do not charge extra bribes. They are irrelevant for trafficking purposes; they do not get corrupted and do not die. Second, even if total control is not achievable, the extra bribes collected by local politicians are very small. Because top-politicians are the one who charge the main price of the bribe, they extract almost all of trafficker’s revenue for themselves, leaving very few left for local politicians. Finally, in centralized systems local
politicians are considered part of the top-political elite, and they are protected by it. Killing a local politician is very costly for traffickers because doing so will trigger retaliation from top-government officials.

The reason why even very powerful politicians –those whose assassination would trigger significant retaliation-abstain from cheating is to be found in their reputation. As the model showed, even if $K = 0$ cheating on traffickers will still have negative consequences for politicians. Cheating affects the reputation of politicians ultimately reducing the demand for their corruption services. If powerful politicians would cheat regularly on traffickers, traffickers will just stop demanding corruption and will go out of business. “Integrity” is needed for corruption to keep going in the long term.

**Decentralized corruption**

In a decentralized equilibrium both levels of government are simultaneous price-settlers. The federal government loses its ability as first mover because it does not control the political careers of local politicians anymore. Without $\psi$ to threat lower-level politicians, local politicians lose their incentives to keep loyal to the top and charge bribes openly.

Both levels of government set bribe prices to maximize their utility a la Bertrand. Profits for the government won’t equal marginal cost because bribes from federation and locals are not perfect substitutes (see equations (1) and (2)). In equilibrium, results will be given by:

\[
B^d = b^d_i = \frac{\alpha + 2c}{3} \\
Q^d = \alpha + \frac{(\alpha + 2c)(n - 2)}{3} \\
R^d = \alpha \left( \frac{\alpha + 2c}{3} \right) + (n - 2) \left( \frac{\alpha + 2c}{3} \right)^2 \\
q^d = \alpha + \frac{(\alpha + 2c)(1 - 2n)}{3} \\
r^d_i = \alpha \left( \frac{\alpha + 2c}{3} \right) + (1 - 2n) \left( \frac{\alpha + 2c}{3} \right)^2
\]

where the subscript $d$ makes clear that these are decentralized outcomes.

Total bribes paid by traffickers in a decentralized political system $T^d$ will be given by:

\[
T^d = R^d + nr^d_i
\]

Because $T^d > T^{II} > T^I$ we should expect traffickers to be even more politically violent when lower-level politicians become independent bribees. Decentralization is bad for traffickers because it makes corruption more expensive.
Political violence will also increase because decentralization makes a share of the politicians to be relatively weaker. Decentralization creates a whole new layer of politicians, the lower level government, which lack of political relevance but are relevant for corruption. This does not mean that top-level politicians may necessarily become weaker when centralization happens. Actually, the federal political elite may still retain a good amount of political relevance even in decentralized systems. After all, killing a president will always be problematic, even if he is not an absolutist monarch. What the model shows is that traffickers become relatively stronger because now they face two types of politicians: top-governments (costly to kill, just as before) and local politicians (new independent figures, relevant for corruption and less costly to kill).

Note that unlike the centralized system, now killing politicians is actually possible for traffickers. Lower-level politicians face a positive probability (even if very small) to be killed if they cheat. In equilibrium, lower-level politicians will never cheat because they will be afraid of dying, top-level politicians –those powerful enough as to face a zero probability be killed– may still cheat if they do not care about their reputation.

2 Political violence as a result of political decentralization

Political-criminal interactions and outcomes have abruptly changed in recent Mexico. Drug traffickers, previously known for their relative distance from politics, have become increasingly politically violent. Traffickers have become active electoral participants by killing candidates, intimidating voters, and assassinating journalists.

Political assassinations -which were pretty rare in Mexican history- have recently become alarmingly common. Local governments, in particular mayors, have taken most of the burden. Just in the first eleven months of 2010, 15 majors were killed; a considerable figure if we note that from 1999 to 2003 not even a single one was executed (See figure 1).

In this section, I present a detailed analysis of the causes behind each of the 28 political assassinations that have happened in Mexico since 1999. My case by case study shows how the theoretical implications of my model of corruption are able to make sense of the observed trends in violence.

Getting to know the reasons why traffickers have killed politicians has not been an easy task. The following are the results of an extensive fieldwork during which I conducted over a hundred interviews in Mexican cities known by their strong presence of illegal trafficking -Ciudad Juarez, Nuevo Laredo, Tijuana, to name a few. Accompanied by the most renowned journalists covering Mexico's drug traffic -most of them already threatened by traffickers-, I repeatedly visited each city, slowly gaining the confidence of local journalists, citizens and politicians to speak their first-hand experience on the mafia/politics relations. My fieldwork was complemented by the brave reporting of Mexican local newspaper journalists. Local journalists are well informed sources which have a fair amount of corruption stories that remain unknown due to their lack of national relevance. I went over the local
and national press myself, reviewing and corroborating data that anonymous oral sources told me. This was a dive jump into Mexican corruption mechanics.

Sometimes though, even the most tenacious research efforts were unsuccessful. “You cannot know that much,” an important human rights advocate with first hand information on DTOs once told me (XX -confidencial). I humbly agree. I cannot claim that I know the exact reasons why mayors are killed but I can claim that, to the best of mine and my sources knowledge, what I present here is a fair portrait of Mexico’s corruption dynamics. However, this is a research topic that will always have some degree of speculation. The key, I believe, is to accept what we do not know, and work creatively with what we know.

The reason why, if Mexican organized crime has long been in business, it is just now that it has become politically violent, cannot be found by using the traditional Silver-or-lead narrative. Such theory, which assumes that bribes (silver) and political violence (lead) are substitutes, can only make sense of recent political violence trends by arguing that traffickers have become relatively more powerful over time, which has lead to substitute bribes for killings. This thesis is highly contestable. Mexican DTOs are currently more powerful than a couple of decades ago but, if anything, during the last five years, when political assassinations have increased, DTOs have weakened.

Mexicans indeed get a larger share of illegal revenues than during the eighties –when illegal drug production and distribution was controlled by Colombians. Colombians weakened when the US set up “Plan Colombia,” an important policy to provide that Latin American country with about 1.5 billion dollars a year to fight drug production and transportation. Intensive drug eradication, a clever policy to promote voluntary surrender (i.e. no extradition, shorter sentences for confessed traffickers), and higher surveillance over the Caribbean diminished the power of Colombian DTOs, and consequently empowered Mexicans (UNODC 2010).

Empirically testing the Colombia-Mexico shift is not easy but evidence on the relationship between the press and organized crime can give us an insight. Mexican DTOs, for example, have become increasingly violent against the press at the same time at which Colombian’s have become more pacific (Figure 2) 3.

[Figure 2 about here]

Matching this trend, drugs have become increasingly available in Mexico as Mexican traffickers have taken over. Using deaths caused by illegal drug consumption to proxy for the presence of DTOs in Mexico, figure 3 shows how in the late nineties, Mexico stopped being a mainly opium producer and entered the cocaine business. The industry of illegal drugs changed, Mexico became a cocaine producer, and the relative importance of Mexico as an opium producer diminished versus Afghanistan and China. The entrance into the cocaine business –and the small but stable business of marihuana that Mexican DTO’s already had– supported Mexicans as their relative importance as opium producer

3Other variables, such as (a) the number of asylum petitions to the US, as well as (a) the number of criminals caught at American territory, follow the same negative correlation.
diminished. In 2004, Mexican DTOs were at the peak of their power selling a fair amount of opium and marihuana, transporting cocaine into the US, and booming in the methamphetamine business.

[Figure 3 about here]

Figure 3 though, also shows how Mexico’s organized crime faced a large decrease in its power starting in 2005. It is 2005, the year when a large territorial battle between Sinaloa DTO and Golf DTO emerged. The battle has as a goal to get control of Nuevo Laredo, the main port of entry of legal merchandise into the US. This year, marks the beginning of a drug war that still remains alive and that has taken the live of at least 26,739 individuals in the last three years (Figure 4). The territorial war between Golf and Sinaloa DTO was triggered, among other things because of a temporal instability in Golf’s leadership caused by the imprisonment of the head of Golf organization, Mr. Osiel Cardenas (Ravelo 2009). The war was further increased when Mexico’s Federal government launched, in 2007, the most important offensive against drug trafficking that the country has seen. Mr. Felipe Calderon, elected president of Mexico in 2006, called during his first month in office for a “war on drugs,” and sent troops to control the most important trafficking points. This increase in enforcement reduced the ability of traffickers to keep doing business as usual, and further weakened DTOs by destabilizing the internal dynamics of DTOs when drug lords were captured and extradited.

[Figure 4 about here]

Changes in the power of organized crime are compared with changes in the capability of the Mexican government to prosecute in Figure 5. State capacity is here measured as the number of law enforcement officials working at the Federal Agency of Investigations (Agencia Federal de Investigaciones, AFI), and the number of active elements in the army and the military (Secretaria de Defensa Nacional (Sedena) and Secretaria de Marina (Semar)). This measure is imperfect as it only measures capacity, not capability/willingness to enforce. Other aspects, such as leadership, coordination, training, and physical resources may be more important to determine the real power of the government. Yet, even if these figures were not completely accurate, there is no doubt that, at least since Felipe Calderon took office in 2007 enforcement against drug traffickers has increased in Mexico.

[Figure 5 about here]

To summarize, this is not the story of an increasingly powerful Mexican organized crime that became more violent. This is the story of an organized crime that boomed quietly, and weakened loudly. If anything, during the years where political violence has increased (2004 and on), Mexican DTOs have diminish their power as a result of intra/inter DTO’s territorial battles and increases in law enforcement. Empirical shows a Mexican government that has systematically increased its human resources to fight drug traffic, and (since 2007) its willingness to do it. Political violence thus, has increased as

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4 Power is defined here as violence capacity. The assumption is that higher sales increases traffickers’ ability to be violent because higher revenues can be invested in improving killing technology.

5 Using statistics on detentions and drug seizures though, is not recommendable as those figures are endogenous to the size of DTOs.
traffickers have become less powerful, a result at odds with traditional understandings of corruption. Mexican politicians seem to be increasing their capability to get silver, at the same time that they are getting more lead

My model of corruption can yield some insights into the reasons for this puzzling result. Mayors were not killed before 1999 and until 2003 because during the strongly centralized PRI-regime there was no necessity to corrupt local politicians. Local politicians were largely irrelevant for trafficking. Mayors are killed because unlike before, under current decentralized political systems, traffickers work with them.

First, the decentralization of Mexican government has increased political violence because it opened a new source of corruption supply (the sub-national supply). The rupture of the hegemony of PRI as the dominant party shifted the balance of power from the national to the sub-national level. The PRI, which ruled Mexico for more than 70 years, had a very centralized form of government. All policy decisions were taken at the center and were not questioned by state politicians, mainly because a well instituted system of political clientelism was in place. All the political careers of state-level politicians were determined by direct appointments coming from the national level. Beginning in the late eighties this started to change. State politicians became increasingly independent when the first victories of the opposition broke the ability of the federation to keep political clientelism working. The recent independence of sub-national figures made sub-national corruption a possibility.

If mayors are being killed more now, is not because traffickers are more powerful than before, because they are not, it is because mayors now have the political power to influence the trafficking business by endorsing or rejecting federal policies. The number of mayors assassinated has increased with decentralization because with decentralization mayors acquired political relevance.

The case of Mr. Alfonso Pea, the mayor of Tepehuanes, a municipality of Durango where poppy has long been grown, is an example of the power of the mayors. In 2008, just a couple of months after Mr. Pea took office, his entire police department renounced. His police had five members, all of them renounced. They were scared because traffickers had killed one policeman, kidnapped another, and wounded one more. After the massive resignation nobody in the municipality wanted to be a policeman anymore. Mr. Pea decided to become the police himself. With his armored Hummer and his brother as company, he patrolled Tepehuanes for a month until help, brought from the federal government, arrived town. Traffickers did not liked this. “Allow us to work bastard, and take out the military or do you want to lose your head?” were the type of calls that Mr. Pea started getting (Almazan 2010). Mr. Pea disappeared on July 26th, 2010 (Hernandez 2010). There is little hope for him to be alive.

Even if Mr. Pea lacked of a real enforcement capacity himself (he had five policemen), he had the

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6An alternative explanation is that of general disorder. Current drug war may have diminished the cost of killing because homicides have increased overall. Authorities are not able to punish homicides, and impunity has increased. Indeed, political assassinations have increased following national homicide rates. I doubt of the explanatory power of general disorder theories because (a) mayors have not been assassinated in the most violent municipalities, (b) neither during the peak of violence of their states or municipalities.
possibility to call the federation for support. This possibility would not have been an option during the PRI hegemony because back then all enforcement decisions were taken at the center; mayors lacked voice. It is the recent capacity of Mr. Pena to supply corruption (by deciding whether to work or not with the federation), what made him (and other mayors \( ^7 \)) a target of traffickers.

Second, mayors are being killed more because changes in DTOs target consumers and products have increased the benefits of corrupting officials. Corruption has become a better business for traffickers because they gain more out of it. As Figure 6 shows, Mexican DTO’s have shifted from being drug exporters only, to be drug dealers inside Mexico. The exporting business only requires control of highways and ports of entry into the US—which are all federally regulated. Domestic sales though, require a tighter control of local authorities; drugs have to be sold at street corners and local policemen have to agree with it. Corrupting mayors in more profitable because by gaining control over a territory, DTOs can both use the highways to introduce drugs into the US (old consumers) and sell to Mexican consumers (new consumers).

[Figure 6 about here]

Furthermore, Mexican DTOs have also become multiproduct firms. Mexicans became methamphetamine producers at the beginning of the 00s. The production of synthetic drugs requires building laboratories which significantly increase the value of corruption agreements with local authorities. The laboratories have to remain clandestine. Out of all laboratories that have been discovered by the federation, 56% of them were located in politically violent states, even though these only represent 34% of all the states.

The puzzle has not been completely resolved though. As the model showed, even if indeed political assassinations are expected to be more common in decentralized systems with valuable returns to corruption, as Mexico is, the model also showed that in equilibrium politicians will never cheat if they are susceptible to be killed. Mexican mayors know they are weak and are not protected by the federal PRI-government anymore. Why then are mayors dishonoring their agreements to allow traffickers to sell and transport drugs through Mexico without being prosecuted and without competition?

The answer is simple. They are not. Corrupted mayors are as loyal to traffickers as they have always been. Prosecution has increased not because mayors are giving information to the federal authorities about suspicious activities but because the federation has unilaterally increased enforcement against traffickers. Mayors have nothing to do with it. The reasons why top-level government has found enforcement more attractive are not to be discussed here but are related, among other things to (a) higher degree of accountability brought by democracy, and (b) reduction in bribe revenue for the federation. With decentralization the total bribe revenue for federal politician is reduced because local politicians serve part of the demand for corruption. With less bribe revenue, incentives for politicians

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\( ^7 \) Mr. Luis Carlos Ramirez, mayor of Ocampa, Durango, was assassinated on July 1st, 2009 for denouncing traffickers to federal authorities. As the mayor of Pueblo Nuevo, another municipality of Durango, candidly acknowledged: “[he] was killed because he denounced an armed group […], the mayor of El Mezquital, I do not know what [he did to] bother them [traffickers], but they killed him [too]” (La Loncheria, 2010).
to enforce increases because not enforcing has costs, even more in democratic and accountable systems, like Mexico has recently became.

Traffickers observer higher enforcement but do not know if it increased because of the unilateral decision of the federation or because mayors called the federation into their territory. They do not care. If the federation cheated, there is nothing they can do about it. Killing federal politicians is too costly. If local politicians cheated, they can kill them. High chances are lower-level politicians did not cheat; traffickers know they are too scared to do it. Yet, allowing enforcement to keep going in territories where corruption pacts were done, without punishing anybody, will increase the incentives for politicians to cheat. Local politicians will realize that they can cheat, and that traffickers will place the guilt upon the federation thinking that local politicians are just too scared to have done it. Cheating will flourish. Traffickers have to kill politicians in places where enforcement is done to show to potential cheaters that they never give for granted that local politicians are scared. This is a strategic game to keep corruption affordable in the long term.

Another form of cheating comes from allowing other trafficker organizations to work in the same territory. The same logic applies. Even if mayors are loyal, which they are, traffickers have to kill them when other DTOs work in the region to set an example.

My fieldwork supports the logical results presented by my model. Figure 7 shows the detailed causes of mayor assassinations. From the 28 cases of assassinated mayors from 1999 to September 2010, 24 were done by traffickers. Out of those, I could find the reasons for 20 cases. As expected, political assassinations happen in territories where another DTO got into business or where enforcement measures were taken.

First, a total of 9 cases were revenges for enforcement. Enforcement measures happened but it is very improbable that they were taken because of mayor’s orders. Vague accusations of incarcerating traffickers or giving information to federal police forces are done.

Second, when a territory goes from being a single DTO monopoly to being a competitive market, mayors get accused of “helping” other DTOs and are killed. About 8 cases are explained by this dynamic. Historically, we can see how the number of mayors assassinated has increased as the number of competing DTOs in Mexico has increased. The first rupture of a drug monopoly happened in December of 2004, the exact year in which the first two mayors in Mexican history were assassinated. Since then, inter-DTOs conflicts have increased rapidly. While in 2007 there were only four DTOs competing (Sinaloa vs. Tijuana; Sinaloa vs. Juarez, Sinaloa vs. Golfo-Zetas, and La Familia vs. Zetas), in 2010 the number has doubled (Sinaloa vs. Tijuana, Golfo vs. Juarez, Sinaloa vs. Golfo, La Familia vs. Zetas, Sinaloa vs. Beltran Leyva, Sinaloa vs Linea, Golfo vs. Zetas, and PACIFICO Sur vs. La Barbie) (Guerrero et al 2010 complemented by author).

[Figure 7 about here]

An interesting result is that as mayors have become aware of the negative consequences that (a)
increased DTO’s competition and (b) increased federal enforcement are bringing to them, corruption has diminished. Mayors prefer not to make deals with traffickers such that they won’t be accused of cheating. Political violence is a vaccine against corruption. When the mayor of (XX-confidential) took office in 2007, he received as a gift a briefcase full of money. He rejected it because he knew that under the strong competition that the municipality faced, any deal done with a DTO would immediately put him in danger to be killed by the other. The only viable solution for mayors ruling in competitive municipalities is to reject bribes and not prosecute. Enforcing is twice as dangerous when two enemies are being fought.

The mayors of Durango, a state where seven mayors have been killed since 2004 –three in a row at the municipality of Otaez–, have been very explicit about their approach to corruption. First, “pretend to be stupid” claimed one of them (XX-confidential). Second, never enforce “Nooo!” said the mayor of Santiago when asked whether he prosecuted traffickers, “I never bother anybody. My police do not prosecute drug traffickers, they only arrests boozers and petty thieves.” Third, better avoid becoming a mayor. “This job of being a mayor is not recommendable anymore” concluded the mayor of Guacevi. The advice, given by the Mayor of Poanas, to those that already have the job was “to trust in God” (Almazan 2010)

Note that assassinations will only happen when mayors get trapped in a bad equilibrium. When they took office competition was not in place, which allowed them to made explicit arrangements with one DTO. Unfortunately, later during his period another DTO came into the territory. The only chance to remain alive if such thing happens is to run away. Yet, even running away is difficult because traffickers can still take revenge against whoever remains in town (i.e. family, friends). In the words of the mayor of Pueblo Nuevo: “if I leave now, they [drug traffickers] will think that I’m guilty.”

3 Conclusion

The simplicity through which drug-trafficking and mafia-related corruption has been understood by current literature oversimplifies the decisions, interactions and strategies available for the actors. We have not been able to get a complete understanding of corruption outcomes because we have failed to consider how institutions and market changes affect the dynamics of corruption.

In this paper I showed a simple model of corruption and political decentralization to explain the way in which bribing and killing has changed over time in Mexico. The main results of the model show that decentralization increases the total amount of bribes that traffickers pay, increases political violence, decrease the bribes collected by the federal government and increases the ones collected by local politicians. Local politicians become the main targets of political violence because they are weak enough as to be killed without many consequences for traffickers, and because under decentralization lower-level politicians become relevant for corruption. Traffickers need them.

In centralized political systems the federal government sets the price of the bribe to maximize its bribe income and to make other levels of government indifferent between charging an extra bribe or not. If aligning the incentives of other levels of government is not possible because the federation cannot
monitor the behavior of local politicians or because it has nothing valuable to offer to them in exchange for their loyalty, then local politicians charge an extra bribe of low value. Even if charging a bribe, political violence is expected to be low because all politicians are protected by the center, because local bribes are too small to be worth the hassle of killing, and because all enforcement decisions are taken at the center. The model also shows that centralization increases the incentives of the government to enforce because its relative bribe revenue diminishes.

Interestingly, the model shows that politicians will never cheat on traffickers is the probability if them to be killed is difficult. Only those politicians which cannot be killed (like federal ones) and who does not care about setting a “good” reputation with traffickers, will cheat. This will only happen at federal governments because local politicians know they are weak and can be killed.

Drawing on my own fieldwork experience in Mexico’s drug war zone, I use the results of my model to explain political violence. The reasons for such radical change, I argue, are not to be found in increases in the power of traffickers –as traditional narrative would argue– but in analyzing political institutions and features of the illegal-drug industry. Mayors are being killed because as the country has decentralized a market for sub-national corruption has emerged. These changes have made mayors’ killings more prevalent because mayors have increased their relevance as political actors, bribes have become more expensive, and signaling has become more valuable.

Corruption is a complex game where signals, beliefs and expectations play a large role in determining outcomes. Bribing and getting bribed are actions subject to many subtleties. One side has to avoid to get killed; the other has to keep a fragile equilibrium between killing, and not killing; both sides cannot get too powerful or too weak. Power sometimes hurts, and weakness sometimes benefits. The game of corruption is without any doubt a difficult one to play. In the words of Mr. (XX -closed source), local politician: “I do not know [what one has to do to remain alive], one just has to be very, very clever.”
References


Rios (2010a). Overdoses deaths registered by the Mexican Minister of Health (Secretaria de Salud, SSA), as compiled by Census Office (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Geografia e Informatica, INEGI), using World Health Organization (WHO) international classification standards (i.e. CIE9 (1990 – 1997) and CIE10 (1998 – 2008)). Data available per municipality, year and drug.

Mexican press has been increasingly assassinated by organized crime, as trafficking has moved from Colombia to Mexico (See Appendix 2 for a complete list of assassinated Mexican journalists assassinated during the last four years by name, media and place).

Note: Not counted are other seven journalists which have disappeared in Mexico since 2007. The direct implication of DTOs has not been officially proved in all instances given that most of the judicial cases are still open.

Source: Lauria and Mike O'Connor (2010) complemented by author.
Figure 3: Mexican DTOs presence, by drug type (1990 – 2008)

Mexican DTOs' presence increases from 1990 to 2004, and sharply decline from 2005 to 2007. Profits from opium have diminished over time, marihuana was profitable only during the late nineties, and cocaine experienced a boom from 1998 until 2005. Profits from hallucinogens (not pictured) and other synthetic drugs, boomed in the early 2000-2003.

Note: I use number of overdoses deaths in Mexico as a proxy of DTOs presence (Rios 2010a). I rely in two assumptions: (a) overdoses happen with a fixed probability among consumers, and (b) the correlation between domestic and international profits is positive and fixed over time.

Source: Author compilation based on Mexican census information (Rios 2010a).

Figure 4: Drug-related deaths (2007 – August 2010)

Figure 5: Strength of Mexican traffickers versus the state (1995 – 2009)

 Traffickers were more powerful than the state in the late nineties, and the period immediately before the drug battles exploited. Mayors have been assassinated the most in the periods where drug traffickers have been the least powerful.

 Note: The strength of drug traffickers was calculated using drug consumption measures (see Table 4). State capacity to investigate was measured as the number of law enforcement officials working at the Federal Agency of Investigations (Agencia Federal de Investigaciones, AFI). State capacity to prosecute was measured as the number of active elements at the army and the military (Secretaria de Defensa Nacional (Sedena) and Secretaria de Marina (Semar)). All measures were normalized for comparison. Figures for 2009 are linearly projected, based on monthly averages.

 Source: Guerrero et al (2010) and author compilation based on Mexican census information (Rios 2010a).

Figure 6: Size of Mexican domestic illegal-drug market (1990 – 2008)

 Note: A domestic market is considered to be opened when at least one overdoses fatality happened in the municipality. This measure underestimates consumption for municipalities with fewer population.

 Source: Author compilation based on Mexican census information (Rios 2010a).
Figure 7: Mexican mayors assassinated by cause (1998-2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>DTOs in territory</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>José Manuel Soto Ortiz</td>
<td>Otaez**</td>
<td>Durango</td>
<td>July 8, 2004</td>
<td>Another DTO got into territory</td>
<td>Sinaloa vs Linea</td>
<td>Accused of helping Sinaloa DTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homero Lorenzo Rios</td>
<td>Ayutla de los Libres</td>
<td>Guerrero</td>
<td>September 25, 2008</td>
<td>Another DTO got into territory</td>
<td>Yes (not specified)</td>
<td>PRD says that groups linked to PRI are guilty; others argue he was linked to trafficking but no evidence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claudio Reyes Nuñez</td>
<td>Otaez</td>
<td>Durango</td>
<td>February 6, 2009</td>
<td>Another DTO got into territory</td>
<td>Sinaloa vs Linea</td>
<td>Revenge for assassination of previous mayor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manuel de Jesus Angulo</td>
<td>Topia*</td>
<td>Durango</td>
<td>June 3, 2009</td>
<td>Another DTO got into territory</td>
<td>Sinaloa vs Linea</td>
<td>Revenge for helping Sinaloa DTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hector Ariel Meixuere</td>
<td>Namiquipa</td>
<td>Chihuahua</td>
<td>July 14, 2009</td>
<td>Another DTO got into territory</td>
<td>Sinaloa vs Linea</td>
<td>Revenge for helping the Linea DTO or because her daughter was dating a trafficker.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marco Antonio Leal</td>
<td>Hidalgo</td>
<td>Tamaulipas</td>
<td>August 28, 2010</td>
<td>Another DTO got into territory</td>
<td>Golfo vs Zetas</td>
<td>Revenge for helping Zetas DTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Octavio Carrillo</td>
<td>Vista Hermosa</td>
<td>Michoacan</td>
<td>February 24, 2009</td>
<td>Enforcement</td>
<td></td>
<td>Revenge for firing a policemien linked to trafficking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luis Carlos Ramirez</td>
<td>Ocampo</td>
<td>Durango</td>
<td>June 1, 2009</td>
<td>Enforcement</td>
<td></td>
<td>Revenge for denouncing trafficking to federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raul Mendivil Sotelo</td>
<td>Guadalupe y Calvo</td>
<td>Chihuahua</td>
<td>February 17, 2010</td>
<td>Enforcement</td>
<td></td>
<td>Signaling to federal government. He was killed just a couple of hours after meeting with president Calderon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manuel Estrada</td>
<td>Mezquital</td>
<td>Durango</td>
<td>February 22, 2010</td>
<td>Enforcement</td>
<td></td>
<td>Signaling to governor. He was very close friend of him.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edelmiro Cavazos Leal</td>
<td>Santiago</td>
<td>Nuevo Leon</td>
<td>August 18, 2010</td>
<td>Enforcement</td>
<td></td>
<td>“He was interfering with business”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander Lopez Garcia</td>
<td>El Naranjo</td>
<td>SLP</td>
<td>September 8, 2010</td>
<td>Enforcement</td>
<td></td>
<td>Revenge for denouncing trafficking to federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gustavo Sánchez</td>
<td>Tancitaro</td>
<td>Michoacan</td>
<td>September 28, 2010</td>
<td>Enforcement</td>
<td></td>
<td>Revenge for firing 60 policemen linked to trafficking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gregorio Barradas Miradete</td>
<td>Juan Rodriguez Clara**</td>
<td>Veracruz</td>
<td>November 8, 2010</td>
<td>Enforcement</td>
<td></td>
<td>Revenge for incarcerating a policeman linked to trafficking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alfonso Peña Peña</td>
<td>Tepehuanes*</td>
<td>Durango</td>
<td>July 26, 2010</td>
<td>Enforcement, and another DTO got into territory</td>
<td>Sinaloa vs Linea</td>
<td>Revenge for denouncing trafficking to federation, and for helping a DTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esteban Estrada Corral</td>
<td>Otaez</td>
<td>Durango</td>
<td>October 5, 2004</td>
<td>Extortion</td>
<td></td>
<td>Revenge for not paying his debts or for helping Sinaloa DTO, both motives were investigated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fernando Chavez Lopez</td>
<td>Buenavista</td>
<td>Michoacan</td>
<td>July 8, 2005</td>
<td>Extortion</td>
<td></td>
<td>Refused to pay extortion quota to Golf DTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvador Vergara</td>
<td>Ixtapan de la Sal</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>October 4, 2008</td>
<td>Extortion</td>
<td></td>
<td>Refused to pay extortion quotas to La Familia DTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raul Delgado Benavides</td>
<td>Cuauhtitlan de GB</td>
<td>Jalisco</td>
<td>July 16, 2006</td>
<td>Not-drug related</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not-drug related</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oscar Venancio Martinez</td>
<td>San Jose del Progreso</td>
<td>Oaxaca</td>
<td>June 19, 2010</td>
<td>Not-drug related</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not-drug related</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicolás Garcia Ambrosio</td>
<td>Sto Dom de Morelos</td>
<td>Oaxaca</td>
<td>June 30, 2010</td>
<td>Not-drug related</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not-drug related</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>City</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Cause of Death</td>
<td>Opponents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
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<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter Herrera Ramirez</td>
<td>Huimanguillo</td>
<td>Tabasco</td>
<td>November 16, 2006</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Milenio vs Valencia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcelo Ibarra Villa</td>
<td>Villa Madero</td>
<td>Michoacan</td>
<td>June 1, 2008</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernardo Mecinas Lopez</td>
<td>Animas Trujano</td>
<td>Oaxaca</td>
<td>February 19, 2010</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jose Santiago Agustino</td>
<td>Zapotitlan Tablas</td>
<td>Guerrero</td>
<td>April 28, 2010</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisciliano Rodriguez</td>
<td>Doctor Gonzalez</td>
<td>Nuevo Leon</td>
<td>September 24, 2010</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Golfo vs Zetas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaime Lozoya Avila</td>
<td>San Bernardo****</td>
<td>Durango</td>
<td>November 5, 2010</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Sinaloa vs Linea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saúl Vara Rivera</td>
<td>Zaragoza</td>
<td>Coahuila</td>
<td>January 7, 2011</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Mayors began to be killed/disappeared in 2004; 28 have been killed until September 2010, 24 in relation with drug trafficking; I found the cause of the murder for 20 of the 24 drug-related cases.
* disappeared, ** elected but had not taken office yet, ***not directly killed but died out of a heart attack when being threatened; the DTO to which the killing was attributed is underlined.
### Appendix 3: Mexican journalists murdered

#### (a) Motive confirmed

**Journalists slain in direct relation to their work:**
1. Rodolfo Rincon Taracena, Tabasco Hoy, January 20, 2007, Villahermosa
2. Amado Ramirez Dillanes, Televisa and Radiorama, April 6, 2007, Acapulco
3. Alejandro Zenon Fonseca Estrada, EXA FM, September 24, 2008, Villahermosa
7. Bladimir Antuna Garcia, El Tiempo de Durango, November 2, 2009, Durango
8. Valentín Valdes Espinosa, Zocalo de Saltillo, January 8, 2010, Saltillo

#### Media support workers slain in the course of their duties:
9. Flor Vasquez Lopez, El Imparcial del Istmo, October 8, 2007, between Salina Cruz and Tehuantepec
10. Mateo Cortes Martinez, El Imparcial del Istmo, October 8, 2007, between Salina Cruz and Tehuantepec
11. Agustin Lopez Nolasco, El Imparcial del Istmo, October 8, 2007, between Salina Cruz and Tehuantepec

#### Journalists missing
14. Maria Esther Aguilar Cansimbe, El Diario de Zamora and Cambio de Michoacan, November 11, 2009, Zamora
15. David Silva, El Manana and La Tarde, March 2010, Reynosa
16. Pedro Argüello, El Manana and La Tarde, March 2010, Reynosa
17. Miguel Angel Dominguez Zamora, El Manana, March 2010, Reynosa
18. Ramon Angeles Zalpa, Cambio de Michoacan, April 6, 2010, Paracho,

#### (b) Motive unconfirmed

**Journalist possibly slain for their work:**
19. Saul Noe Martinez Ortega, Interdiario, April 2007, Nuevo Casas Grandes,
20. Gerardo Israel Garcia Pimentel, La Opinion de Michoacan, December 8, 2007, Uruapan,
21. Mauricio Estrada Zamora, La Opinion de Apatzingan, February 12, 2008, Apatzingan,
22. Teresa Bautista Merino, La Voz que Rompe el Silencio, April 7, 2008, Putla de Guerrero,
23. Felicitas Martinez Sanchez, La Voz que Rompe el Silencio, April 7, 2008, Putla de Guerrero,
24. Miguel Angel Villagomez Valle, La Noticia de Michoacan, October 10, 2008, between Lazaro Cardenas and Zihuatanejo,
25. Jean Paul Ibarra Ramirez, El Correo, February 13, 2009, Iguala,
26. Carlos Ortega Samper, El Tiempo de Durango, May 3, 2009, Santa Maria del Oro,
27. Juan Daniel Martinez Gil, Radiorama and W Radio, July 28, 2009, Acapulco,
28. Jose Emilio Galindo Robles, Radio Universidad de Guadalajara, November 24, 2009, Ciudad Guzman,
29. Jose Alberto Velazquez Lopez, Expresiones de Tulum, December 22, 2009, Tulum,
30. Jose Luis Romero, Linea Directa, January 2010, Los Mochis,
31. Jorge Ochoa Martinez, El Sol de la Costa, January 29, 2010, Ayutla de los Libres,
32. Evaristo Pacheco Solis, Vision Informativa, March 12, 2010, Chilpancingo