NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
AND GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION:
The Emergence of the Alterglobalization
And Antiwar Movements In Japan

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<tr>
<td>ATTAC</td>
<td>Association for the Tobin Tax for the Aid of Citizens</td>
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<td>BSE</td>
<td>Bovine spongiform encephalopathy</td>
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<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women</td>
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<td>CRC</td>
<td>Convention on the Rights of the Child</td>
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<td>EPA</td>
<td>Environmental Partnership Agreement</td>
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<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
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<td>GM</td>
<td>Genetically modified</td>
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<td>GMO</td>
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<td>ICB</td>
<td>International Criminal Bar</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>INGO</td>
<td>International nongovernmental organization</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>LDP</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party</td>
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<td>MAI</td>
<td>Multilateral Agreement on Investment</td>
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<td>MOFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>MSA</td>
<td>Mutual Security Act</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental organization</td>
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<td>NPO</td>
<td>Nonprofit organization</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Overseas Development Assistance</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<td>RENGO</td>
<td>Japan Trade Union Confederation</td>
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<td>SDF</td>
<td>Self-Defense Forces</td>
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<td>WPN</td>
<td>World Peace Now</td>
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<td>WSF</td>
<td>World Social Forum</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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Watashi wa wasurenai (I will not forget)

Words by Goro Sugi
Music by Munehiko Ichino
Translation by Hiroko Hara

“While I wash my face
While I walk on a street corner
I continue living with the constitution today
My thoughts on hope for peace, equality, and justice
In the spring night
And in the summer morning
I will not forget

“While I cut vegetables
While I write letters
I continue living with the constitution today
My feelings for peace, equality, and justice
In the fall night
And in the winter morning
I will not forget

“Our sky spreads far and wide
Let our voice spread over the world
Our feelings for peace, equality, and justice
Our voice coming from a small town far away”
INTRODUCTION
THE ALTERGLOBALIZATION MOVEMENT
AND GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION IN JAPAN

In March 2004, a few hundred Japanese consumers from the No! GMO (genetically modified organisms) Campaign went to Canada and the United States to protest against the imminent approval of genetically modified (GM) wheat by the Canadian federal government and the North Dakota state government. The petition, signed by 414 organizations representing 1.2 million Japanese people who did not want to eat imported GM wheat, seemed to have made an impact. Two months later, Monsanto announced its suspension of all development of GM wheat. Eight months after this, a coalition of 54 Japanese nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and labor unions, together with 52 Korean counterparts, protested in front of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) in their campaign against the Japan-Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The following month, an emergent alterglobalization movement organized the first Social Forum in Japan. More than 400 Japanese activists converged in Kyoto under the general banner of “another world is possible.”

This paper looks at the new phenomenon of internationally linked Japanese nongovernmental advocacy networks that have grown since the 1990’s in the context of three conjunctural forces: neoliberalism, militarism, and nationalism. It connects three disparate literatures on the global justice movement, Japanese civil society, and global citizenship education. On the one hand, the burgeoning literature on the antiglobalization movement since Seattle has mostly focused on the Anglo-Saxon neoliberal model and its opposition by North
American as well as European social movements. The role of Japan as an economic superpower pushing for a free trade agenda and its opposition by Japanese social movements remains largely unknown. On the other hand, while Japanese civil society has attracted increasing scholarly attention, little is known about internationally oriented advocacy networks that have emerged since the 1990’s to monitor a variety of issues in global governance and their local impact on Japan. This paper raises five questions:

1. What are these groups in terms of their genesis and issue focus?
2. What are their critiques of and alternatives to neoliberalism, militarism, and nationalism?
3. How are they connected internationally, regionally, and nationally?
4. What are their relationships with the Japanese government? and
5. How do they contribute to global citizenship education in Japan?

Global Governance Legitimation Crises and the Emergence of a Global Justice Movement

A coherent international economic policy framework emerged after World War II to prevent economic collapse by avoiding balance of payment problems (the International Monetary Fund, IMF), promote economic development through international lending (the World Bank), and facilitate international trade through tariff reduction (GATT [the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]). Many factors, however, have dramatically changed to create the social, economic, and political landscapes in which this postwar multilateral policy framework finds itself today: the end of a fixed exchange rate system; the availability and rapid growth of

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1Mertes 2004; Fisher and Ponniah 2003; Stiglitz 2002; Bove and Dufour 2001; and Shiva 2000.
2Pharr and Schwartz 2003; Osborne 2003; Pekkanen 2004; and Yamamoto 1999.
international capital flows; debt and financial crises; the scope and patterns of international trade; the institutionalization of international human rights norms; and transnationalization of social movements. Postwar multilateral institutions have either not evolved fast enough, e.g., in matters such as debt relief or human rights, or gone beyond their original mandates, e.g., in international lending for national institutional reforms.

Since the early 1980’s, the “Washington Consensus” (the pact among the U.S. Congress, senior members of the U.S. administration, economic agencies of the U.S. government, the Federal Reserve Board, think tanks, and international financial institutions) that emerged in the Thatcher and Reagan era based on pro-market policies including financial and trade liberalization, public expenditure cuts, deregulation etc., has symbolized a dominant Anglo-Saxon neoliberal economic model worldwide. Embodied in the policies of the World Bank and IMF as well as the trade agreements of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Washington Consensus has come under increasing attack not only from diverse social movements, but also from agencies of the United Nations (U.N.) and the World Bank’s inner circles.6

The discontents generated by neoliberal globalization have come to the political fore in the past decade, whether that anger is visible in anti-summit protests in Seattle or Cancun; local, regional, and world social forums in Porto Alegre; or the growing literature on resistance to globalization. The multiple critiques that have arisen against an inherited global governance structure that supports a neoliberal agenda can be summarized into two interrelated concerns: democratic deficits and market fundamentalism (ignoring human development and the

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4Williamson 1993.
7Sholte 2003; Teivainen 2002; Bello 2002; and Falk 1999.
environment).\textsuperscript{8} From the perspectives of diverse social movements that constitute the alternative globalization movement, what is needed is more than a question of additional funds through multilateral and bilateral Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), but a fundamental reconfiguration and practice of multilateralism and global democracy according to the principles of subsidiarity, ecological sustainability, common heritage, economic and cultural diversity, human rights, food security, etc.\textsuperscript{9}

The literature on alternative globalization and global governance reforms has almost exclusively focused on the United States and the European Union in pushing for a free trade agenda and opposition movements either in the developed West (North America and Europe) or the developing South (in particular, Latin America). Hence we know about Public Citizens, a U.S.-based group that played a pivotal role in bringing down the 1998 Multilateral Agreement in Investment (MAI);\textsuperscript{10} ATTAC, a Paris-based international network that lobbies for the Tobin Tax on currency transactions;\textsuperscript{11} the San Terra (landless) movement in Brazil, etc.\textsuperscript{12} Much lesser known are social movements across Asia despite the fact that the Asian financial crises in 1997, subsequent austerity measures imposed by the IMF, as well as active negotiations on FTAs in the

\textsuperscript{8}UNDP 2002 and 1999; Charter 99 2000; Group of 77 1997; South Centre 1996; Commission on Global Governance 1995; and Childers and Urquhart 1994.

\textsuperscript{9}Cavanagh and Mander 2004. “Accountability is central to living democracy… The principle of new democracy means creating governance systems that give those who will bear the costs the vote when decisions are being made (79-80).” Subsidiarity “respects the notion that sovereignty resides in people… whatever power can reside at the local level should reside there (84).” “We believe that there are three categories of common heritage resources. The first category includes water, land, air, forests, and fisheries on which everyone’s life depends. The second includes culture and knowledge that are collective creations of our species. Finally, more modern common resources are those public services that governments perform on behalf of all people to address such basic needs as public health, education, public safety, and social security, among others (87-88).”

\textsuperscript{10}Wallach 2000.

\textsuperscript{11}Cassen 2003.

\textsuperscript{12}Mertes 2004.
region have ignited strong national and regional antiglobalization movements. In Korea, for example, NGO networks such as Korean People's Action against FTA and the WTO have begun to connect with antiglobalization NGOs in Japan.

A common perception of Japanese nongovernmental groups is that they are predominantly local in terms of activities and issue focus. The transnationalization of social movements and the institutionalization of an international human rights regime in the 1990’s, however, have helped put the issue of the democratic deficit of the current global governance structure in the forefront. International summits hosted by the Japanese government, such as the Tenth International Conference on AIDS in Yokohama in 1994, the APEC summit in Osaka in 1995, and the Third World Water Forum in Kyoto in 2003, became catalytic events for domestic NGO networking. By 2005, a loose coalition of Japanese NGOs focusing on global governance from the perspectives of environment, development, labor, consumers, HIV/AIDS, women, minority, and youth has developed in Japan. Groups such as AM-Net, People’s Plan Study Group, ATTAC Japan, No! WTO – Voice from the Grassroots Group, Labor Net, and No! GMO Campaign have sprung up throughout Japan.

While antiglobalization activists have traditionally targeted summits involving international trade and financial institutions, they have increasingly joined hands with the global antiwar movement. After September 11, 2001, the Diet passed a series of amendments and special measures allowing for more flexibility in the dispatch of Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in emergency and war situations. In December 2003, the Koizumi Cabinet approved the dispatch of the SDF to Southeastern Iraq, the first time in postwar history that heavily armed

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13 The five main themes of the Fourth World Social Forum in Mumbai in January 2004, for example, were imperialist globalization, patriarchy, militarism and peace, communalism, and casteism and racism. See <www.wsfindia.org>. For a conceptual analysis, see Hardt and Negri 2004.
Japanese troops were sent to a war zone.\textsuperscript{14} The renewed militarism, in addition to the longstanding issues of Japan’s war responsibility as well as the presence of American military bases in Japanese territory, and, in particular, in Okinawa, has revived a broad-based peace movement connected to global antiwar protest movements. Networks such as No to Constitutional Revision! Citizen Network, the Grassroots Movement to Remove U.S. Bases from Okinawa and the World, World Peace Now, the Asia Peace Alliance, and the Asia-Pacific Peace Forum have developed to aim at national, regional, as well as global mobilization.

\textbf{Theoretical Framework: A Postnational and Postmodern Reconception of Citizenship in Japan}

The past decade has seen a growing literature on retheorizing citizenship in Japan. Scholars point to a “citizenship gap”\textsuperscript{15} between the predominant state narrative of a homogenous Japan on the one hand and the historical making of modern Japan as well as the contemporary realities of migration on the other.\textsuperscript{16} Despite the fact that many second- and third-generation Korean residents were born in Japan and, in many cases, only speak Japanese, they continue to be treated as permanent residents, unable to exercise basic citizenship rights. Ainu and Okinawans, while having Japanese citizenship, are denied their status as indigenous peoples of Japan. Meanwhile, the \textit{burakumin} (a social minority group that has suffered from severe discrimination), despite their Japanese nationality, are treated as second-class citizens.\textsuperscript{17} Women

\textsuperscript{14}Japan Civil Liberties Union 2005.

\textsuperscript{15}Brysk 2002.

\textsuperscript{16}Murphy-Shigematsu 2002; Douglass and Roberts 2002; Ryang 2001; Lie 2001; Suzuki 1998; Weiner 1997; Siddle 1996; and Denoon et al. 1996.

\textsuperscript{17}Miyazaki 1999; Tominaga 1999; and Neary 1997 and 1989.
in Japan, particularly *burakumin*, Korean, Ainu, and Okinawan women, as well as non-Japanese women married to Japanese men, continue to struggle for their citizenship rights vis-à-vis health, education, employment, public office, etc.\(^\text{18}\) People living with HIV/AIDS and, in particular, illegal migrants who do not have access to national medical insurance, are demanding their basic right to accessible AIDS treatment. In the context of agricultural liberalization, corporate restructuring, and militarism, consumers lobby for their right to food self-sufficiency and safety; workers claim their basic right to decent work and livelihood. In the post-September 11 context, regular citizens claim their right to peace and physical security.

This research builds on this new body of citizenship theorizing in Japan, but adds two important dimensions through the focus on, first, “global” citizenship, and, second, global citizenship “education.” Traditional notions of national citizenship based on a myth of homogeneity are being increasingly challenged not only from a postcolonial, gender, race, caste, and migrants’ perspective, but also through international human rights norms. As issues in the environment, HIV/AIDS, and food and educational trade etc. defy the limits of the nation-state, the boundaries of democracy are continually being redrawn. In a postnational conception of democracy, people exercise “multiple citizenships” in overlapping communities that affect them and their fellow human beings.\(^\text{19}\)

Further, this study emphasizes the educational component of global citizenship. Despite emergent interests in the concept and practice of global citizenship, its educational foundation and component – that is, how global citizens are actually made – is rarely highlighted. Similarly, most studies of Japanese social movements have focused on their political efficacy, ignoring

\(^{18}\)Japan NGO Network for CEDAW 2004.

\(^{19}\)Held 1999.
their civic and educational functions.\textsuperscript{20} In contrast to the existing literature on global citizenship that focuses on the acquisition of skills and competences,\textsuperscript{21} I propose a postmodern concept of global citizenship based on performativity\textsuperscript{22} and conversability.\textsuperscript{23} It emphasizes the end of a sovereign Japanese subject known as the “national citizen” and, in lieu of this, a multiplicity of truth claims and contesting narratives surrounding citizenship. These narratives emerge out of performance based on daily acts of local, regional, and global civic participation by diverse social movements, and the narratives are situated in webs of ongoing conversations. These narratives not only become new bodies of knowledge, but also constitute new subjectivities, redefining “who we are, how we view the world, how we interact with each other.”\textsuperscript{24} Recognizing and providing space for the “right to narrate,” to “tell stories that will bind us together,” has become a central task in global citizenship education.\textsuperscript{25}

Through the narratives of 49 activists, this paper explores how the alterglobalization movement in Japan constructs a new identity of Japanese as global citizens through participation, knowledge production, and the construction of public space for civic engagement.
Methodology

Social movement and international relations scholars have been, in the words of Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink, “myopically domestic” and “myopically state-centric.” On the one hand, studies of global civil society continue to be constrained by “methodological nationalism” that has prevented us from grasping the complexity and significance of the multifaceted and multileveled phenomenon of grassroots globalism. On the other, studies of Japanese civil society continue to be framed largely in a national context and, in particular, focus on its (limited) impact on the Japanese state.

This paper attempts to go beyond a domestic and state-centric approach to look at the connections between the global justice movement and civil society in Japan. The findings of this paper are based on 49 semi-structured interviews with members of Japanese nongovernmental networks, including labor unions, in the antiglobalization, antiwar, and antidiscrimination movements in Japan. I conducted these interviews in Tokyo, Nagoya, Kyoto, and San Francisco between November 2004 and March 2005. Interview questions clustered around: 1) personal background; 2) founding and activities of an NGO or network; 3) relationships with the government, other NGOs, and international organizations; and 4) issues, concerns, and challenges. The groups were carefully chosen to allow comparisons across time; issue; size; gender, race, and youth representation; and degree of national, regional, and international networking. With the exception of five groups that can be considered as local chapters of international networks where international linkages are expected (A Seed Japan, ATTAC Kyoto,

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27Ezzat 2005.
Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines, Disabled Peoples’ International, and the Japan Civil Liberties Union), this paper focuses on homegrown advocacy networks.28

The interview data are further supplemented by primary research materials as well as my participant observation at seven international conferences and summits between 2000 and 2004 where Japanese NGO networks were present: the U.N. Beijing-Plus-Five Conference in New York in June 2000; the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery in Tokyo in December 2000; the World Conference Against Racism in Durban, South Africa, in September 2001; the Anti-G8 Summit in Evian, France, in June 2003; the Anti-World Trade Organization meeting in Cancun, Mexico, in September 2003; the World Social Forum in Mumbai, India, in January 2004; and finally the Kyoto Social Forum in November 2004.

Before I continue, let me provide some definitions and state my caveats. In this paper, I use antiglobalization, alterglobalization, and the global justice movement interchangeably, since the movement is not against globalization per se. It aims at alternative models of globalization based on transparency, democracy, and participation. The “new” in the new social movements being discussed refers to the multiple movements that have emerged since the 1970’s beyond the traditional class focus of the Japanese Left. In the ensuing analysis, “advocacy” not only means the process of using information strategically to change policies, but also the strengthening of structures that foster the empowerment of the disadvantaged. Finally, this paper focuses on a specific subset of groups – internationally linked advocacy NGOs – within Japanese civil society and does not argue that they are representative of Japanese civil society as a whole or consequential in Japanese politics. The aim of the study is to introduce new social movements in

28All groups and networks are based in Japan except one – the International Criminal Bar (ICB) – which is based in the Hague. The Japanese activist involved is a board member of the ICB as well as a member of the local Japan Network on the ICC. It is included in this collection to demonstrate not only increasing Japanese participation, but also leadership in global civil society.
Japan from their perspectives. It will be the scope of a separate project to examine their claims from the perspectives of other actors. This paper provides a snapshot not only of Japanese civil society as it is experienced by various activists and the issues they represent in their larger socio-political background, but also the nature of democratic participation in their quest for an alternative Japan and world.

The rest of this study is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 looks at labor discontent in Japan under structural reforms from the perspectives of four NGOs – on homelessness, women’s labor participation, migrant workers, and a labor network – and two labor unions including the Japan Trade Union Confederation (RENGO) and the All Japan Water Supply Workers’ Union. Chapter 2 examines the alterglobalization movement from the perspectives of farmers and consumers on agricultural liberalization and GM foods. Chapter 3 focuses on the recent antiwar movement in Japan and its connections to the alterglobalization movement. Chapter 4 then analyzes the critiques of and alternatives to neoliberalism, militarism, and nationalism articulated by the alterglobalization and antiwar movements in Japan. Chapter 5 discusses issues in global, regional, and national networking. Chapter 6 looks at the contentious issue of “partnership” among NGOs, nonprofit organizations (NPOs), and the government. Finally, I conclude with reflections on grassroots globalism, new social movements, and global citizenship education in Japan.
CHAPTER 1
WHEN THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS ARRIVED IN TOKYO:
STRUCTURAL REFORMS AND LABOR DISCONTENTS

Until the 1990’s, Japan was hailed worldwide as an economic model. For almost four postwar decades, economic development in Japan had been characterized by high growth rates, full employment, technological innovation, and market leadership. Its “developmental state model,”29 in particular, gave the nation the illusion that somehow Japan might be immune from the adverse impact of economic globalization. As economic recession has continued beyond the 1990’s, unexpected restructuring has led to a stable unemployment rate of nearly 5-6 percent (about 3 million people) and a suicide rate of approximately 35,000 per year. The dramatic increase in part-time labor in the past decade (including contract and dispatch workers, now constituting about a third of the entire labor force, on the order of 12.6 million in 2003), appearance of homelessness (with an estimated population of about 30,000 in large cities alone), and widespread angst among the working populace present new challenges for Japanese politicians, labor unions, the women’s as well as migrant workers movements.

Under the banner of “employment diversity” (koyo tayosei), corporate and labor restructuring has become a key pillar within the Koizumi Cabinet’s overall policy of structural reforms since 2001. In 1995, Nikkeiren (Federation of Employers’ Associations) released a report on “Employment Patterns of a New Japan,” announcing the new era of non-regular employment. As GDP growth rates remain low and even negative (minus 2.8 percent in 1998, for example, only the second time in the postwar period that the economy registered negative

29Johnson 1982.
growth), Japan has been confronted with the challenge of balance between competitive pressures from globalization and the tradition of a “people-oriented” economy, that is, the search for “a market economy with a human face.” One week after Koizumi won the Lower House elections in April 2001, he announced that he would revisit the system centered on lifelong employment, relaxing rules for dismissal and the use of dispatch workers for lengthier periods. In 2002, Nikkeiren released a position paper entitled “Promoting Structural Reform to Overcome the Crisis” and wrote:

For the sake of a bright future for the economy in the 21st century, thorough restructuring is needed to rectify the high domestic cost structure, stimulate creativity in science and technology, and achieve sustained economic growth based on these changes, which will allow us to contribute to the progress of the global economy. Where global mega-competition is concerned, it is important to clearly define the roles of the government, labor, and the private sector and establish a private sector-led economy. Reducing the high cost structure through a private sector-led economy is the most important goal of structural reform. The most desirable labor market for Japan should have the following four characteristics: mobility, flexibility, specialization, and diversity. In particular, Japan's labor market is highly regulated, and regulatory reform is urgently needed. In the case of agencies dispatching temporary workers, limits on the length of employment contracts should be eliminated, a shift made from a permit to a notification basis, and the prohibition on dispatching of manufacturing workers and health care personnel lifted.

In 2003, both the Labor Standards Law and the Manpower Dispatching Business Law were revised, making dismissal less cumbersome for employers and expanding the sectors where dispatch workers can be used. In the 2004 mid-term report of the inter-ministerial Deregulation

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30Nikkeiren 1999 and 2000. 4 November 2005


33Haken Rodo Nettowaaku 2004.
and Privatization Promotion Council, the Koizumi Cabinet further laid out 14 key points in introducing “market tests” and privatization of public services in a variety of sectors including medical services, childcare, education, and social insurance. Among the main targets of privatization are the airports at Narita and Haneda, the Japan Highway Public Corporation, the Japan Oil Corporation, the Urban Development Corporation, and the Housing Loan Corporation, along with postal services, which hold the world's largest pool of savings, and state-run universities.

If corporate and labor restructuring has been taking place across the developed world and is painful everywhere, the phenomenon seems to hit particularly hard in Japan, due to four factors. First, it is often argued that Japan practices a kind of capitalism that is different from either the neoliberal Anglo-Saxon model or the European social democratic model. 34 The traditional social safety net has largely been provided by corporate Japan rather than public social welfare. When corporate restructuring occurs, not only employment issues but also the general social fabric, if not national identity, are necessarily in the mix.

Second, the corporate-based structure of Japanese unions with their basic stance of “cooperationism” makes it difficult for RENGO to formulate an effective response. The confederation has, for example, traditionally focused exclusively on large Japanese companies (roughly 40 percent of the labor market) where lifelong employment is the norm. It is now being forced to articulate a response to the labor crisis in both small and medium-sized enterprises and the ever-increasing non-regular labor market (both constituting 30 percent of the labor market), since the trend of using non-regular workers constitutes a direct threat to full-time workers.

34 Hall and Soskice 2001.
Further, compared to its Western counterparts, RENGO takes a much more conciliatory approach to trade liberalization under the WTO and to bilateral FTAs between Japan and a number of countries including Singapore and Mexico since 2002 and under negotiation or preparation with Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia. According to RENGO’s Position on FTAs and Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) (2004):

RENGO has concluded that Japan’s efforts to successfully negotiate FTAs/EPAs are vital if Japan is not to be isolated and is to play an active role in establishing rules for fair dealings, taking into account that slow progress at GATT/WTO and the reality that conclusions of FTAs/EPAs have been expanded in most parts of the world. RENGO argues that, in order to avoid disadvantages of FTAs/EPAs such as harmful impact on employment and environment… RENGO will request the government to work for shaping a web of quality FTAs/EPAs.

Although it emphasizes that ILO core labor standards and OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises should be incorporated in trade and investment rules and that there should be mechanisms for information disclosure and public consultation, RENGO, unlike smaller community unions and other social movements, focuses more on increasing its negotiation power than challenging the trade liberalization policies of the Japanese government.35

Third, women have traditionally dominated the part-time labor market in Japan. Recent waves of corporate restructuring ushering men into this domain further complicate existing gender labor dynamics. The gender wage gap in the dispatch labor market, for example, is 53 percent (that is, women earn ¥53 when men earn ¥100), almost 14 percent below that in the full-time labor market.36 Although the unemployment rate among women, at 5.1 percent (2002), is comparable to that of men (5.5 percent), the majority of the homeless are men, with the average

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35Interview with the Director of the International Division, Department of International Affairs, Japanese Trade Union Confederation 14 December 2004.

being in his late 50’s, joined by an increasing number of young men in their late 20’s and early 30’s.  

Finally, unlike in many other developed countries where a significant migrant worker population is present, Japan has an extremely restrictive immigration policy vis-à-vis migrant labor. The 1990 Immigration Control Act made it illegal to import unskilled labor, while allowing South Americans of Japanese descent to live and work in Japan. The latest revision of the Immigration Control Act in 2003 increased the penalties for illegal migrant workers from ¥300,000 to ¥3 million and a period of 10 years before a deported migrant worker can re-enter Japan. The tensions between Nikkeiren (desire to introduce a more flexible migrant labor policy) and RENGO (policy to protect Japanese workers) add an extra unresolved dimension to the labor crisis in Japan.

In view of these factors – the continuing trend to structural reforms, the limited effectiveness of RENGO, the gender gap, and the controversy over migrant immigration – community unions and other members of an emerging alternative globalization movement in Japan have opted for a continuum of methods from the local to the international to counter the deteriorating labor situation in Japan. Existing unions take on the issue of non-regular employment. Tokyo Union, for example, set up the Haken Rodosha Union. New networks

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37 Interview with the Executive Director of the Shinjuku Homeless Support Center, 28 November 2004.

38 RENGO’s stance on migrant workers can be summarized in its 2004 position paper on FTAs/EPAs as follows: “It should be taken into account that receiving foreign workers may adversely affect national employment conditions and has possible risks of vast costs over the future, including non-financial ones in terms of medical and housing services, education, cultural friction, and security. Consequently, foreign workers should be limited to those engaged in jobs requiring professional knowledge, techniques and skills in conformity with the national employment situation, based on national consensus… Non-skilled foreign workers should not be admitted to work in Japan… Foreign workers who have been already admitted to the country should be guaranteed fair labor standards.”

have been formed, such as the Haken Rodo (Dispatch Workers) Network (1991\(^{40}\)); Kinto Taigu (equality action) 21 (1999), focusing on equal treatment of male and female workers on the one hand and full-time and part-time laborers on the other); the Human Rights Center for Working Women in Osaka (2004); and the Hiseki Koyo (non-regular employment) Forum (in 2004) to organize study groups and symposia, raise consciousness, advocate, and connect internationally.\(^{41}\)


\(^{41}\)Haken Rodo Nettowaaku 2004.
CHAPTER 2
JAPANESE DO NOT WANT TO EAT GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS

Neoliberal globalization manifests itself not only through corporate and labor restructuring. Since the Uruguay Round negotiations began in 1986, two core issues—agricultural liberalization and GM foods—have become the focus of critiques against neoliberal globalization for farmers and consumers. If food is considered to be an important part of culture and national identity, this affirmation seems particularly strong in Japan. From rice to Japanese tangerines, Kobe beef, miso, and tofu, public opinion surveys of Japanese consumers have consistently shown that cost-efficiency is not the only criterion that they care about. There is a strong tradition of consumer’s movements in Japan. They have consistently fought for food quality and safety, notably through the nationwide food cooperative system.42

In some respects, postwar agricultural development in Japan resembles that in other industrialized countries. It was assumed that agriculture would play a supportive role in the national policy of rapid economic development. The modernization of agriculture meant mechanization, specialization, intensification, and industrialization. Two historical-political factors, however, have caused the structural vulnerability of the agricultural sector in Japan: postwar land reform and forced agricultural liberalization under the Allied Occupation Forces. Before World War II, only 30 percent of all agricultural land was tilled by land-owning farmers. The land reform imposed by the United States eliminated absentee landlords and redistributed land to farmers (four hectares43 per farmer in Hokkaido and one hectare per farmer elsewhere in

42Maclachlan 2002.

43One hectare is approximately 2.5 acres.
the country). The resultant pattern of small-scale farming has often been considered as a structural impediment to increasing agricultural productivity in Japan. Further, in 1954, Japan was forced to import ¥5 billion yen worth of wheat from the United States as part of the Mutual Security Act (MSA). The import of the so-called MSA wheat ushered Japan into agricultural liberalization and exerted a profound negative impact on food self-sufficiency. From that year on, for example, bread was introduced as a staple food in schools under the School Food Law.44

Critics of agricultural liberalization within Japan argue that the nation’s farmers are particularly vulnerable. The modernization policy espoused in the 1961 Agricultural Basic Law, coupled with land scarcity on the one hand and an aging population on the other, resulted in irreversible trends of declining self-sufficiency, farm closures, health hazards, and environmental destruction.45 Japan has the lowest food self-sufficiency rates (calorie-based) in the developed world: 40 percent, compared to 50 percent in Korea, 71 in the United Kingdom, 97 percent in Germany, and 136 percent in France. Across a wide spectrum of foods, the self-sufficiency rate is alarmingly low: 0 percent in corn, 0.1 percent in canola, 5.2 percent in soybeans, and 36 percent in beef.46 The amount of agricultural land, estimated at about 6 million hectares in 1961, is expected to decrease to some 4 million hectares by 2010; most of this is due to farm abandonment. The age bracket of the majority of Japanese farmers in 2000 was 70-74. Under the modernization policy, pesticides and additives have been widely used, putting environmental concerns behind economic growth. The high dependence on food imports has also meant

44Dore 1985.
45Dore,
Japanese exposure to diseases such as bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)/mad cow disease and the avian flu.

Agricultural trade liberalization intensified under the Nakasone administration as Japanese manufactured goods took flight in international markets. The yen appreciated by 60 percent between 1985 and 1987 after the Plaza Accord; at approximately the same time (1985 – 88), food imports from the United States increased by 40 percent. Rice was forced to be put on the agenda when agricultural trade negotiations began under the Uruguay Round in 1986. Because of its structural (more than half of all Japanese farm households were engaged in rice farming) and political (farmers had and still have disproportionate voting weight and support for the Liberal Democratic Party [LDP]) significance, most politicians thought it was “politically dangerous to touch upon rice.”

In 1990, however, Keidanren issued a letter to the government, urging it to “reduce or eliminate restrictions on agricultural imports, while taking measures to minimize damage to Japan’s farmers…. Japan should not try to protect any domestic product or service from foreign competition (to successfully conclude the Uruguay Round).” At a midnight press conference on December 7, 1994, Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa urged Japan to “endure sacrifices in difficult areas such as agriculture for the sake of the future of the world’s free-trade system and bringing a successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round.” By 1994 when the trade round was concluded, Japan had agreed to a “minimum access” of 4 percent to rice imports, a 20 percent reduction of domestic support, tariffication of nontariff barriers, and a 36 percent reduction of

[47 Davis 2003.]
[48 Davis 2003.]
[49 Akao 1994, quoted in Davis 2003, 196.]
export subsidies.\textsuperscript{50} By 2000, total imports of all agricultural products had risen more than 40 times in value since 1970, and the average dependency across the main food categories had doubled from 21 percent to 42 percent. Since agricultural trade talks resumed in the Doha Round in 2001, Japan has been under pressure to further reduce tariffication, in particular, of rice. Because of high price differentials, the reduction of the current tariff rate of 490 percent on imported rice will de facto mean the complete liberalization of the rice market.\textsuperscript{51}

Centered on the Consumers Union of Japan and farmers unions and supported by a broad spectrum of NGOs in the alternative globalization movement, a coalition called Food Action 21 Japan was formed in 1994. Like the labor-focused coalition Labor Net, Food Action 21 has used a variety of mechanisms from domestic legal process to issue reframing through global norms to resist the neoliberal paradigm of agricultural liberalization. It successfully lobbied for the passage of the Basic Law on Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas in Japan in 1999, in which the basic principles of stable food supply, multifunctionality of agriculture, sustainability, and regional development are affirmed.\textsuperscript{52} It participates in regional and international summit meetings and uses global frameworks to lobby domestically. For example, at the Regional NGO Consultation for Asia and the Pacific at the World Food Summit in Bangkok in April 1996, Food Action 21 joined members of nearly 100 NGOs from 18 Asian countries to denounce the increasing control of agribusinesses at the expense of small local farmers and the environment.

\textsuperscript{50}Ono 2004.

\textsuperscript{51}Interview with an agricultural journalist and member of the No! WTO – Voice from the Grassroots Campaign, 6 December 2004.

\textsuperscript{52}Food Action 21 2004. For the entire text, see \url{http://www.maff.go.jp/soshiki/kambou/kikaku/NewBLaw/BasicLaw.html}. 21
These NGOs argue:

Democratic control of the food system is the ultimate test of democracy. Food security cannot be ensured by entrusting agriculture, food production, and trade to global markets. Land, water, biodiversity, and traditional/intellectual practices, which are the vital resources that make food security possible, should stay under the democratic control of those who produce the food and local communities themselves, with special emphasis on establishing mechanisms to ensure the participation of women at all levels of the decision-making processes. Therefore, a new social contract needs to be established among Asian farmers, Asian peoples, and Asian governments. This social contract must be people-derived, people-led, and people-managed. It must be centred on a vision at the centre of which is the integrity of local farming communities and the food security of the national community. It must be implemented via strategies that promote social equity, ecological sustainability, people's empowerment, and gender balance. Finally, this social contract must include policies aimed at immediately countering the negative impact of forces and institutions that promote food insecurity, like the GATT Agricultural Accord and the policies of international financial institutions.53

At the World Food Summit in Rome in September 1996, the United States warned that it would not sign a final summit declaration referring to food as a human right or that left out a central role for GM food in ending hunger.54 It was also here that a worldwide food movement criticized not only the United States, the only nation that refused to sign the final declaration because it contained a reference to the right to food, but the U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization as well as for failing to address the inequity involved in food provision (the dumping of cheap imported foods) and the insecurity of relying on the international market for basic foods.

In contrast to “food security,” this movement proposes the concept of “food sovereignty,” whereby “all people at all times have physical, social, and economic access to sufficient, safe,
and nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.” Instead of the narrow trade function of agriculture used in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, the movement emphasizes a multifunctional approach to agriculture that focuses on a variety of social goals such as food security, rural development, rural employment, cultural heritage, environmental protection, etc.  

In the WTO ministerial meeting in Cancun in 2003, Food Action 21 Japan issued a position paper in which it wrote as follows:

Concerning agricultural negotiation, we consumers proposed the term multifunctionality of agriculture and each country’s food self-sufficiency. Since liberalization of food trade has brought benefits only to developed exporting countries and multinational agriculture industries, the agriculture in almost all the importing countries has suffered a great loss due to imported foods, and developing exporting countries have not been able to win in export competition. Indeed, consumers in a few developed countries (as in Japan) have made a profit from free trade in food, but their traditional foods have gone out of use, their health has worsened with chemicals and high-calorie foods, and their environments have been badly affected by the decline of domestic agriculture.  

While Japan is a member of the “Friends of Multifunctionality” group within the WTO – a bloc of food-importing countries that are against food trade liberalization – it remains unclear how Japanese agriculture might yet have to be sacrificed for Japan’s gains in other trade sectors in the current round of negotiations due to be completed by 2005.  

Besides liberalization, the issue of the safety of GM foods has also galvanized the mobilization of the food movement in Japan, especially after BSE/mad cow disease was detected in Japan in 2001. A nationwide No! GMO Campaign was launched as soon as GM soybeans, corn, and canola imported to Japan were approved for human consumption in 1996. Its goals are threefold: food safety, environmental sustainability, and food democracy (versus control by

55Glipo et al.

56Food Action 2003b.
agribusinesses). Given the low rate of food self-sufficiency in Japan, Japanese consumers have
been automatically exposed to GM foods without their knowledge. Take the case of corn, for
example. In 2003, 40 percent of all U.S. corn was genetically modified. Given that Japan has
zero self-sufficiency in corn and imported 87.6 percent of its corn from the United States in
2001, roughly 35 percent of all corn and corn-related food products consumed by Japanese in
2003 were genetically modified.  

The immediate action of the No! GMO Campaign was to push for mandatory labeling. It
successfully lobbied for the passage of the GM labeling law, the Standardization and Proper
Quality Labeling of Agricultural and Forestry Products (under the responsibility of the Ministry
of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries), and the amended Food Sanitation Law (under the
GM labeling system, any food containing more than the threshold level of 5 percent has to be
labeled “GM food.” The Food Sanitation Law also makes it illegal to import or sell GM foods or
foods made from such foods that have not undergone a safety assessment. The third pillar of
government regulations, after labeling and food safety, took the form of the Law Concerning the
Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biological Diversity Through Regulations on the Use of
Living Modified Organisms (Cartagena Law), passed in 2003. 


58Interview with Executive Director of No!GMO Campaign, 8 December 2004.


60For more details, see Japan Biosafety Clearing House, 21 March 2005
After the labeling battle was (partially) won, the No! GMO Campaign focused on two issues: preventing GM cultivation in Japan and stopping GM research by public research institutes through a combination of local petitions and international lobbying. In July 2002, it organized the Stop GM Rice National Assembly in Nagoya and handed a petition with 323,097 signatures from throughout Japan to the Aichi Prefecture Agricultural Research Center, which successfully halted its development of an herbicide-resistant variety of rice called “Matsuribare” with Monsanto. The following month, the No! GMO Campaign joined more than 200 NGOs worldwide to issue a Statement of Solidarity with Southern African Nations Over GM Food and Crops at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg:

We condemn the United States’ use of food aid as a tool of propaganda to force acceptance of GM food and crops by Southern nations on the eve of the World Summit on Sustainable Development. Peasant farmers and indigenous peoples in many Southern nations are opposing GM crops and condemning GM contamination of their land whilst the recipients of food aid are protesting the dumping of GM foods that have not undergone independent safety testing. We decry the bio-imperialism of dumping food aid in Africa, the endangerment of food sovereignty and security, and the deviation from principles of self-determination.

In the NGO Johannesburg Declaration on Biopiracy, Biodiversity and Community Rights, social movements from North and South reiterated their alternative vision:

Mindful that the content and spirit of this declaration is a culmination of a decade of resistance to the privatization of our food, water, and biodiversity; Recognizing that human beings are an integral part of the web of life on Earth and that our well-being is derived from and depends on the health of our ecosystems and species… We declare that local communities, indigenous peoples, and farmers are

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61 The threshold level has been widely considered as too high, compared to 1 percent in the EU. Many Asian countries have since then followed the lenient standards of Japan (Consumers Union of Japan 2003).


custodians of biodiversity and that they have the inalienable right and responsibility to continue to manage, save, exchange, and further develop the biodiversity under their custody, over and above any external commercial interests. Similarly, we consider food sovereignty – the right of people to sufficient and healthy food at all times and access to natural resources – as a central principle, which should not be subject to other interests or considerations... We declare our opposition to the patenting of life and to the patenting of crops and seed, because we are concerned about the removal of control of food production from local communities and farmers to multinational corporations. We propose that concern over food and health security and the environment should take precedence over international trade interests. The WTO is not the place to decide on these issues. Neither should regional or bilateral trade agreements affect local biodiversity management.64

When the Fourth Session of the Codex Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Task Force on Foods Derived from Biotechnology met in Yokohama in March 2003, 200 participants from 33 member countries, intergovernmental organizations, and NGOs were greeted by a band of No! GMO Campaigners accompanied by a farm tractor. They protested the controversial bracketed paragraph 7 in the draft text: “On the condition that the microorganism is considered to be safe when compared with the conventional counterpart taking into account its interactions with the food matrix of the microflora, that any newly expressed protein(s) encoded by the modified DNA is considered to be safe.” Instead they presented their appeal with seven demands on international regulation that prioritizes the safety of life and environmental protection before trade considerations; the banning of patenting on life forms; application of the precautionary principle; and transparency of the Task Force proceedings.65

One of the most successful activities of the No! GMO Campaign, in addition to the passage of labeling and assessment laws, as well as the 2003 Food Safety Basic Law, is its international lobbying against the approval of GM wheat in the United States and Canada. In


65Consumers Union of Japan 2003a.
2003, the campaign against GM wheat began in Japan. The No! GMO Campaign submitted a formal letter to Monsanto Japan, stating that 59.5 percent of Japanese consumers thought GM food was bad; only 2.9 percent thought it was good. It demanded the withdrawal of approval of the GM wheat developed by Monsanto in the United States and Canada, two major wheat exporters to Japan. At the same time, the No! GMO Campaign managed to get a consensus from the Japanese Flour Millers Association that it would not handle GM wheat. In March 2004, a delegation of Japanese consumer representatives carried a petition signed by 414 organizations in Japan representing 1.2 Japanese people to the Canadian federal government in Ottawa and the state government of North Dakota. Two months later, Monsanto announced its suspension of all development of GM wheat.

In addition to international lobbying, the food-based coalition in Japan connected with the anti-GMO movement worldwide to raise consciousness within Japan. In 2003, for example, the National Committee Against the Planting of GM Rice, a coalition of consumers’ cooperatives, consumers groups, farmer’s organizations, food processors, and environmentalists invited Percy Schmeiser, a Canadian canola farmer who was prosecuted by Monsanto for patent infringement, for a national tour in Japan. At the end of a meeting in Morioka in northern Japan, a rice farmer and member of the Iwate GM Rice Monitoring Network said to Schmeiser: “I am an organic farmer and have never used Roundup in my field, but now I am concerned that I could be sued by Monsanto if Roundup Ready canola or wheat is planted in Japan.” At the end of the meeting, the participants agreed not to “accept the domestic planting of GM crops. Let us launch action to stop the planting of GM soybeans and stop field tests of GM rice.”

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67 Consumers Union of Japan 2003.
The resistance movement against GM food in Japan goes beyond national and international protests. Since 1998, it has sought to build a positive alternative to the dominance of agribusinesses through, for example, a nationwide Soybean Field Trust movement, the goal of which is to increase self-sufficiency of soybeans through the growth of organic crops in Japan. This food-based movement has become part of an emergent slow food/slow life movement in Japan (itself part of a larger international movement begun in Italy in 1986), in which food safety and quality becomes an integral component of an alternative globalization agenda.\(^{68}\) For veteran Japanese consumer activists and farmers, food is also intimately tied to peace. During World War II, there was an emergency law whereby farmers were mobilized to support the war. In the current context of Japanese participation in the War in Iraq through the dispatch of the SDF and the political movement to change the peace constitution, an alterglobalization activist called on some farmer friends concerning a farmers’ declaration on the refusal to provide food, land, and water for war purposes in 2003 and won the support of thousands of farmers all over the country. Some of the activist’s friends sent out the declaration to consumers in their organic food delivery boxes.\(^{69}\)

\(^{68}\)Tsuji 2001.

\(^{69}\)Interview with Board Member of No! WTO – Voices from the Grassroots Group, November 2004.
CHAPTER 3
MILITARISM AND NATIONALISM: REVERTING TO A “NORMAL COUNTRY”
FOR “INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION”

Neoliberalism has developed in tandem with nationalism and militarism in Japan since the late 1990’s. While a nationalist legacy – centered on the ideology of racial purity, restoration of the emperor, and denial of war responsibility – never faded under the ruling conservative LDP, the late 1990’s saw officially sanctioned nationalistic policies. In 1996, the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform (Atarashii Rekishi Kyokasho Tsukuru-kai) and the Liberal Revisionist Research Institute (Jiyushugishikai Kenkyuu-kai) were formed to “portray Japan and the Japanese with dignity in reaction to what the society felt as an increasingly ‘self-denigrating view’ of Japan’s national history.”70 The Bright Japan Diet Members Coalition (Akarui Nihon Kokkai Giin Renmei) within the LDP as well as the Sankei Shinbun have made public statements that: rape is a natural part of war; the comfort women were voluntary prostitutes; the inclusion of comfort women in textbooks is “anti-Japanese, self-abusing, dark, and apologizing;” and that the “brighter side” of history should be taught.71

In April 2001, the Ministry of Education approved a new set of textbook changes diminishing the presentation of Japan’s wartime aggression. In 1999, despite opposition from local school boards and teachers, the hinomaru and kimigayo were formally adopted by the Diet as Japan’s national flag and national anthem, respectively, de facto imposing a legal duty on all schools to adopt both during school ceremonies. Further, in March 2003, the Central Council of

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71 Tawara 1997.
Education submitted a report to the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, recommending the amendment of the 1947 Fundamental Law of Education to restore “the ability of the home to educate children,” “respect for tradition and culture, and a sense of love and respect for the country and home and internationalism.”

After September 11, 2001, the Diet passed a series of amendments and special measures allowing more flexibility for the dispatch of the SDF in emergency and war situations. In October 2001, the Special Measures Against Terrorism were enacted, allowing the SDF to use arms not only to defend themselves but also to protect those “under their care” such as refugees and wounded foreign troops. In June 2003, a set of three laws was passed, strengthening the power of the SDF in the event that Japan comes under attack. The Diet also passed the Iraqi Reconstruction Special Measures Law to allow the dispatch of the SDF to Iraq for reconstruction efforts. Six months later, the Koizumi Cabinet approved the dispatch of the SDF to southeastern Iraq. In June 2004, another set of seven war-contingency laws (yuji hosei) was enacted, allowing, among other things, the U.S. military to use private land upon the approval of the prime minister.

Further, the movement to revise Article 9 (on war renunciation) of the 1947 Japanese Constitution is currently gathering force within the LDP. The political move to revise the constitution has been around since the 1950’s. Although the revision movement was defeated by the end of the 1950’s due to strong popular opposition, the idea has lingered on in the minds of

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72 Interview with the Director of the Education and Culture Bureau, Japan Teachers’ Union (Nikkyoso), 14 December 2004.

73 Article 9 states: “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a mean of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”
some LDP politicians. Former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone (1982-1987), for example, just recently reiterated his ideas on the topic. In his draft, the first article of the amended constitution stipulates the emperor as the “head of state of Japan.” He wants to rename the Self-Defense Forces as the Defense Forces and allow them to be dispatched overseas. According to Ken Takada of the No to Constitutional Revision! Citizen Group, the constitutional revision movement is linked to U.S.-led globalization. Article 9 has become the target so that the United States and Japan can establish joint military defense capabilities on a global scale.

Many Japanese citizens consider these developments to be at odds with the peaceful constitution. Japan’s neighbors in Asia have also closely watched these trends. Several antiwar coalitions have emerged in the past few years. In 1999, 100 of these groups came together to form the No to Constitutional Revision! Citizen Group to oppose the current political trends to amend the constitution. They have been alarmed by the fact that the Research Commission on the Constitution in the Diet has moved from researching the constitution to revising it. In 2002, Taro Nakayama, the chairman of this commission, remarked that, by 2005, there should be a Standing Committee on Constitutional Revision in the Diet. The No to Constitutional Revision! Citizen Group has launched a nationwide campaign on Article 9. Another national network, 9-jo no Kai (Article 9 Association) was founded in June 2004 when nine Japanese intellectuals decided to come together to support Article 9 as it stands. These are well-known individuals: Hisashi Inoue (novelist), Shuichi Kato (commentator and doctor), Mutsuko Miki (U.N. Women’s Society), Makoto Oda (writer), Kenzaburo Oe (novelist and Nobel Laureate), Yasuhiro Okudaira (constitution scholar), Hisae Sawachi (writer), Shunsuke Tsurumi (philosopher), and Takeshi

74 Interview with the Director of Education and Culture Bureau, Japan Teachers’ Union/Nikkyoso, December 2004.

75 Interview, December 2004.
Umehara (philosopher). They have given talks in nine major cities in Japan, addressing 30,000 people so far. There are now local 9-jo no Kai chapters in 1,800 places throughout the nation.  

This movement against constitutional revision has also been fighting against a proposed amendment of the 1951 Fundamental Law of Education. For Nobuaki Nishihara of Nikkyoso (Japan Teachers’ Union), to legally mandate a “respect for tradition and culture, and a sense of love and respect of the country” in the Fundamental Law of Education contravenes the freedom of thought and conscience stipulated in the Constitution as well as the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (Article 14).

In 2002, World Peace Now (WPN), Japan, another coalition of citizens' peace groups, religious groups, international NGOs, and individuals, began with a peace parade in Tokyo. Until the coalition came into being, many NGOs in Japan were focused on just a single issue. WPN wanted to forge links among war, human rights, the environment, etc. So WPN contacted other NGOs including Peace Boat and Greenpeace Japan. WPN has organized numerous peace parades. In March 2004, on the first anniversary of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, WPN, Japan, joined the international antiwar action. An estimated 130,000 people in 120 locales nationwide and consisting of citizens’ peace group coalitions, NGOs, labor unions, and other organizations took to the streets.

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76 Interview, December 2004.
77 Interview, December 2004.
78 Interview with WPN, Japan, November 2004.
CHAPTER 4
CRITIQUES OF AND ALTERNATIVES TO NEOLIBERALISM, MILITARISM, AND NATIONALISM

The critiques of the antiglobalization and antiwar movements in Japan are multifaceted and interrelated. For a college student who is involved in the youth and environmental movement like Yuko Mitsumoto (A Seed Japan), neoliberal globalization has increased poverty and the wealth gap and brought about insecurity and human rights violations, such as the lack of access to water in countries like South Africa, which she personally observed, or increasing privatization of water services in countries like Japan.79 For a leader in the national anti-GMO campaign, Keisuke Amagasa, the WTO is dominated by multinational corporations like Monsanto.80 Other food activists including Yasuaki Yamaura believe that agricultural liberalization under the WTO has brought profit only to developed exporting countries, multinational agricultural industries, and consumers in developed countries such as Japan, while almost all importing countries have suffered.81

For environmentalist Toyoyuki Kawakami of AM-Net, the principle of the WTO rules is based on market mechanisms that cannot properly deal with externalities such as environmental issues. AM-Net has signed the declaration by the global justice movement, “Our World Is Not for Sale: Sink or Shrink.” Criticism of neoliberal ideology by these activists is not only at the global level. Several cite the role of Japanese multinational corporations as well as the Japanese

79 Interview, December 2004.
80 Interview, December 2004.
81 Interview, December 2004.
government as actors in neoliberal globalization. Mitsumoto highlights the responsibility of Japanese corporations such as Mitsubishi in logging in Southeast Asia and that of the Japanese government in condoning such practices through Japanese ODA. Similarly, Kawakami explains the relationship between over consumption of forest products in Japan on the one hand and trade liberalization like tariffication and illegal commercial logging, deforestation, non-sustainability overseas, and foreign exchange rate setting by large exporters of industrial goods on the other. Further, Jun Shikita of Be Good Café, an ecology-peace-slow food group, points out the “huge gap” between the Japanese economy and the environment. Above all, labor activist, homeless support, and migrant worker groups have all pinpointed the detrimental effect of kozo kaikaku (restructuring) under the shinjiyushugi (neoliberalism) of the Koizumi administration on labor conditions in Japan. They argue that, if unchecked, neoliberal globalization will further exacerbate non-regular employment, homelessness, liberalization and privatization of public services, declining average wage levels, and the disappearance of a social safety net that used to be provided by the corporate system. From a migrant worker’s perspective, Virgie Ishihara of the Filipino Migrants Center Nagoya reminds us that the structural employment crises in countries such as the Philippines caused by neoliberal globalization are a direct cause of migration and trafficking into Japan.

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82 Interview, December 2004.

83 Interview, March 2005.

84 Interview, December 2004.

85 Interviews with the Director of International Affairs of RENGO; member of Equality Action 21; member of Shinjuku Homeless Support Center; and member of Labor Net, November and December 2004.

86 Interview, December 2004.
For many Japanese who are involved in the opposition movements, neoliberalism and militarism have been developing in tandem in Japan to support globalization and militarism led, in turn, by the United States. 87 Within Japan, nowhere other than Okinawa represents that development in a more poignant way. If U.S. economic power depends on its military might, Okinawa has been crucial for U.S. dominance. More than one fourth (about 28,000 out of a total of 100,000) of all U.S. troops stationed in the Asia-Pacific are located in Okinawa. Several antiwar activists have suggested the blatant racism of the Japanese media. 88 One of the reasons why the anti-U.S. military base movement in Okinawa has not developed into a national antiwar movement is the lack of national media coverage and public attention. For Okinawans, the critiques against militarism are loud and clear. Their land has been confiscated with little compensation. They live under the constant threat of military accidents. Women worry about rapes. Residents in general have to bear the noise and pollution, not counting the psychological impact of “contributing” to war when troops are sent from bases in Okinawa.

Since September 11, 2001, militarism has been manifested in Japan in many ways. The antiwar coalition, World Peace Now, Japan, for example, states their disapproval of increasing militarism in Japan clearly in four principles: no more war, opposition to the attack on Iraq, opposition to Japanese government cooperation in the occupation of Iraq, and non-violent action. This coalition and others such as the No to Constitutional Revision! Citizens’ Network also oppose the conservative movement to revise Article 9 of the Constitution to give more “flexibility” to the Japanese military to participate in “international cooperation” as a “normal country.” Despite the personal networks and overlapping memberships, however, it remains

87 Shirakawa 2004.

88 Interviews with members of the Grassroots Movement to Remove U.S. Bases from Okinawa and the World; and World Peace Now Japan; November and December 2004.
unclear whether the anti-military base movements in Okinawa and the new peace coalitions in Japan proper are connected as a larger antiwar movement in Japan.  

A common criticism of the global justice movement is the lack of concrete alternatives. What do the antiglobalization and antiwar movements in Japan propose? The varied responses can be grouped into five categories.

The first one represents a reformist approach to existing international institutions. Kenichi Kumagai of RENGO, for example, advocates the inclusion of “social dimensions in existing international economic and trade institutions including the WTO.” Similarly, the Japanese and Korean NGO networks that protested in front of MOFA against the Japanese-Korean FTA in November 2004 demanded the recognition of the basic human rights of Japanese and Korean workers, information disclosure, and the participation of Japanese and Korean civil society especially in the affected sectors of labor, human rights, environment, and food. Nikkyoso advocates the outright exclusion of education from the General Agreement on Trade in Services. Most Japanese NGOs involved in global governance, including AM-Net, No WTO – Voices of the Grassroots in Japan, and No! GMO Campaign, are fighting for a strengthening of a citizens’ movement to monitor rather than to eliminate the WTO.

A second approach focuses on legal changes at the national level. Food Action 21 successfully lobbied for the Basic Law on Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas that was passed in 1999. The All-Japan Water Supply Workers’ Union has proposed a Basic Law on Water.

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89 Interview with Acting-Secretary General of Pacific Asia Resource Center, December 2004.
90 See Cavanagh and Mander 2004 for a response to this criticism.
91 Interview, December 2004.
93 Interview, December 2004.
Beyond these two more classic responses focused on legal and institutional reforms, a third alternative proposed by various advocacy movements in Japan emphasizes the construction of people’s networks, not only in Japan, but regionally as well as internationally, relating to self-governance and people’s security, community development, peace, sustainable development, ecology, and/or slow life. This is particularly the case when both international and national legal and political changes seem to be out of reach. Moto Hirayama of the Grassroots Movement to Remove U.S. Bases from Okinawa and the World, for example, aims at building a broad national and international citizens’ movement against U.S. militarism. Keiko Nakamura of Peace Depot emphasizes the importance of citizens’ initiatives in creating a Northeast Asia nuclear weapon-free zone.

A fourth related approach focuses on alternative agriculture, lifestyle, and economy. In 1998, Food Action 21 began a nationwide Soybean Field Trust movement with 39 local production areas to increase self-sufficiency in soybeans through the growth of organic crops in Japan in the broader movement on “local production and local consumption” (chisan chiso). Be Good Café works to promote permaculture and ecovillages. A Seed Japan runs projects on eco-saving and youth NPO banks.

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94 Interview with a board member of People’s Plan Study Group, November 2004.
95 Interview with the senior researcher at Japan International Volunteer Center, November 2004.
96 Interviews with the founder of Peace Boat; November and December 2004.
97 Interview with the founder of Be Good Café, December 2004.
98 Interview with the founder of Body and Soul, December 2004.
99 Interview, November 2004.
100 Interview, December 2004.
Finally, a fifth alternative centers around self-expression. This is the case not only for individuals from minorities such as Hwangbo Kangja, who uses family photos to narrate an alternative history of Japan and Koreans in Japan; Jewong and Liyoon of the KP group, who use hip-hop to express their Korean cultural identity and issues of multiethnicity in Japan; or Mina Sakai who insists on her right to an education in Ainu. Peace activists who use samba music, Korean drums, traditional Okinawan dance (*eisa*), and color (*Momoiro Gerira*, Pink Guerrilla, and Women in Black Tokyo), are also involved.

Indeed, the question of the role of self-expression, art, activism, and resistance in the larger context of neoliberalism, militarism, and nationalism has emerged as a critical one posed by intellectuals and activists in Japan. In the inaugural issue of a quarterly *Zeny* (The Eve), a cultural critic Fua-Jon Ko articulates the importance of individual resistance; resistance becoming a culture; culture becoming resistance; and the connections with past resistance,\(^{101}\) with both culture being broadly defined across genres and oppressions being understood from multiple perspectives including gender and minority.\(^{102}\)

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\(^{101}\)Ko 2004.

\(^{102}\)Zeny 2004.
Nongovernmental advocacy networks vary in their degrees of connection and mobilization. As Keck and Sikkink argue, networks are sets of actors linked by shared values, dense exchanges of information, and common discourses; some networks are formalized, while others are based on informal contacts.  

How are Japanese NGO networks connected globally, regionally, and nationally? Studies on the diffusion of international norms have tended to focus on formal features of international linkages, such as state ratification of international conventions and NGO participation in international conferences. Many Japanese advocacy NGO networks are connected internationally through the U.N. human rights system (conventions, committees, world conferences, rapporteur systems, etc.).

Besides these more formal linkages, outcome documents of world conferences, though not binding, can exert a strong normative influence. As Satoko Taira of the Association of Indigenous Peoples in the Ryukyus explains, 75 Okinawan women attended the Fourth Conference on Women in Beijing in September 1995, and though rape had always been a problem around and near U.S. military bases on the island, the Beijing Platform for Action provided an international definition and standard that rape constituted a violation of women’s human rights, something that Okinawan women’s groups have emphasized since the 1995 incident in which a 12-year-old girl was raped by three U.S. servicemen.

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103 Keck and Sikkink 1998.
104 Boli and Thomas 1997.
106 Interview, December 2004.
To focus on the more formal aspects of the U.N. system exclusively, however, miss the myriad ways in which international norms travel. When one looks at the brochures and websites of Japanese advocacy NGOs or asks these activists directly whether their groups are connected internationally, one might get the impression that few are, in terms of organizational linkages at least. Yet, the interview data are permeated with the connections between Japanese NGOs and international NGOs (INGOs) on specific issue areas.

In 1997, after visiting Public Citizens in the United States, Tomoko Sakuma of the Japan Center for a Sustainable Environment and Society, for example, helped start a national campaign against the MAI with several other NGOs in Japan.107 On the issue of timber liberalization, AM-Net was contacted by the U.S.-based NGO Pacific Environment to organize opposition prior to the APEC meeting in Vancouver in 1997. Then in 2001, AM-Net formed a ramin (ramin is a species of tropical hardwood) research group after inviting a member of an Indonesian NGO, Telapak Indonesia, which focuses on the illegal logging of and trade in ramin, and found that more than half of 500 Japanese companies surveyed imported rare species of ramin that are registered with Appendix II of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna.108 On the issue of GM foods, No! GMO Campaign in Japan, which was established in 1996, invited the Canadian farmer Percy Schmeiser, who was sued by Monsanto for canola seed pirating, to visit Japan in 2003. As a result, the Japanese group became connected to the Council of Canadians and subsequently went to Ottawa to successfully oppose the imminent approval of GM wheat developed by Monsanto.

107 Interview, December 2004.
Japanese advocacy networks are not only connected internationally through intergovernmental organizations or INGOs. Many alternative globalization, peace, and human rights activists emphasize the importance of regional networking in Asia, and, in many cases, have already been undertaking networking and grassroots empowerment activities.\textsuperscript{109} Japan International Volunteer Center, an NGO on community development, peace exchange, emergency relief, and advocacy since 1980, has been carrying out projects in agriculture, water provision, forest preservation, children's education, and peace-building in Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Afghanistan, and North Korea.\textsuperscript{110} The vision of People’s Plan Study Group, a researcher-activist network formed in 1995, is to create alternatives in Asia, different from nation-state construction. Together with NGOs such as Focus on Global South and the Asian Regional Exchange for Alternatives, it created the Asian Peace Alliance in 2003 to construct a people-based peace movement in Asia. Body and Soul, a youth and ecology group set up in 2002, has organized student exchanges between Japan and Korea. Since 2003, the Pacific Asia Resource Center has also started a farmer cooperative project in collaboration with local NGOs and cooperatives in Sri Lanka and East Timor to focus on grassroots capacity-building. Peace activists have all emphasized a people-based peace movement within Asia,\textsuperscript{111} while labor activists highlight the importance of joining hands with Korean labor unions in their fight against neoliberalism.\textsuperscript{112}

\textsuperscript{109}Fan et al. 2003.

\textsuperscript{110}Interview, December 2004.

\textsuperscript{111}Interviews with members of the Grassroots Movement to Remove U.S. Bases from Okinawa and the World; Peace Depot; and Asia Pacific Peace Forum; November and December 2004.

\textsuperscript{112}Interviews with members of Labor Net and RENGO, November and December 2004.
Though international and regional networking exists, most networking activities by Japanese advocacy NGOs remain at the national level. The size of each network varies, from more than 200 (No to Constitutional Revision! Citizens’ Network) to 50 NGO group members (World Peace Now Japan). The existence of networks, however, suggests neither the extent of their activity nor their effectiveness. As Teruyo Otsuka of the Asia Pacific Peace Forum notes, the breadth and depth of Japanese NGO networks remain an issue.113

Like any networks, and, in particular, nongovernmental ones, Japanese NGOs face several issues. A main concern is the lack of resources for network-building. In addition, networks are plagued by ideological as well as gender divisions. As Sakuma points out, the potential of developing networks is hampered by “ownership” and “identity” issues and an implicit gender division of labor. According to her, the movement against agricultural liberalization in Japan is dominated by men and has not been successful in attracting mothers who are concerned about food safety or food self-sufficiency.114 Ken Takada, a secretariat member of national and local networks of the Article 9 Association, emphasizes the common desire of the nine intellectuals and prominent individuals involved to preserve Article 9 on war renunciation despite their different political leanings.

113 Interview, December 2004.
114 Interview, December 2004.
CHAPTER 6

NGO, NPO, AND GOVERNMENT PARTNERSHIPS

One of the most contentious issues concerning networking is NGO/NPO relationships with the government. Many scholars of Japanese civil society have pointed out the traditional and continuing close relationships between voluntary associations and the central and local governments. ¹¹⁵ In particular, after the NPO Law was enacted in 1998, the Japanese government began to take an active role in managing various aspects of NPO activities, from providing the overall regulatory framework to funding, and, in some cases, soliciting NPO participation in international cooperation.

Political scientist and journalist Akihiro Ogawa argues that the Japanese government has engaged in constructing a “volunteer subjectivity” to promote “civil society” that provides service in the context of a retrenching Japanese state. ¹¹⁶ Through the investigation of a specific case involving Nihon Iraku Igaku Kyokai (Japan Iraq Medical Association) – an NPO that allegedly shares the same founder and office with a for-profit medical consulting company – which has delivered medical equipment to hospitals in Iraq worth ¥3.56 billion (about $3.56 million) as part of Japanese ODA in February 2004, Ogawa argues that some NPOs have actually become vehicles through which MOFA promotes Japanese business interests in the name of “humanitarian reconstruction.” ¹¹⁷


¹¹⁶Ogawa 2004.

Regardless of whether this is a widespread phenomenon, the issue of the service provider role of Japanese NPOs has aroused heated debates within the nongovernmental as well as the scholarly community.\textsuperscript{118} In addition to the contentious gap in funding – NPOs that receive support from MOFA have large offices and full-time staff members and are run like businesses, according to some activists – there is the more fundamental issue of independence. On the one hand, many Japanese NPOs do not see any conflict of interest in accepting grants from MOFA; many do and have been implementing projects in education, infrastructure, medical services, and community development, particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq, where most Japanese ODA has been channeled in the past few years. In particular, 20 NGOs have signed up for Japan Platform, a network involving MOFA, foundations, the “One Percent Club” of Nikkeiren, and NPO/NGOs for emergency relief.

On the other hand, many NGOs are critical of the close relationship between these service-delivery NPOs and the government. Hideaki Uemura of Shimin Gaiko Center argues that these groups have lost the raison d’être of NGOs, that is, critical independence from the authorities.\textsuperscript{119} For instance, NPOs/NGOs that have received money from the Japanese government might not be able to convey antiwar comments back to the government. Toyoyuki Kawakami of AM-Net emphasizes that real partnerships with the government depend on some minimum common ground; NGOs must participate in the entire process from planning to objective analysis, decision-making, and implementation, rather than being only on the delivery end.\textsuperscript{120}

\textsuperscript{118}Shirakawa 2004 and 2002.

\textsuperscript{119}Interview, December 2004.

\textsuperscript{120}Interview, March 2005.
Beyond the issue of independence lies the broader question that feminists, for instance, have raised concerning the state as the site of engagement.\footnote{Stetson and Mazur 1995.} For three decades, since the International Year on Women in 1975, the women’s movement in Japan has focused on legal and political change as one of its main objectives. The decade since the mid-1990’s has been particularly significant in the institutionalization of gender equality in diverse areas from employment to violence against women, political participation, and state feminism.\footnote{Chan-Tiberhgien 2004.} The legal changes, as well as the strengthening of the Council for Gender Equality (from merely an inter-agency liaison body), can be interpreted as evidence of the success of the women’s movement in Japan.

Yet, feminist activists and scholars have begun to question the co-optation of women’s participation by the Japanese government to serve its own agenda in combating aging and surviving global competition. Feminist and scholar Yoshiko Kanai, for example, critiques a perverted shift from the focus on women’s human rights by the women’s movement in the Law on Gender-Equal Participation in 1999 to subsequent government policies that focus on the strategic use of women’s labor, in what she calls a “total mobilization.”\footnote{Kanai 2004.} She is highly critical of the disciplinary power of the state in controlling women’s bodies. On the one hand, a backlash is eroding both the institutional support and individual freedoms that the women’s movement has won (e.g., the future of the public National Women’s Education Center is in question, while textbooks using a reproductive rights approach were scrapped). On the other, the Koizumi
administration has been actively managing women’s reproductive and productive capacity, for example, through the 2002 Josei charenji shiensaku (Women Challenge Support Policy).

On this delicate issue of women’s engagement and disengagement with the state, Kanai advocates participation and resistance, that is, to participate in order to resist. In particular, she urges a return to the spirit of radical feminism seen during the women’s liberation movement of the 1970’s in opposing the encroachment of the state on women’s lives.

A similar critique of state co-optation has been made by the minority rights movement in Japan. While this movement of various minority groups from Okinawans to foreign residents continues to focus on domestic legal change (e.g., an anti-racial discrimination law or migrant protection), some have raised concerns about the official multiculturalism practiced by the Japanese government. Uemura, who advocates on behalf of indigenous groups in Japan, calls the governmental approach “cosmetic multiculturalism.” The 1997 Ainu Culture Promotion Act, for instance, does not recognize the basic human rights of the Ainu people: land rights, fishing rights, and the right to education in one’s own culture and language, as stipulated in the CRC.124

More basic than these questions of independence and extent of engagement is the possibility of dialogue with the Japanese government. It is important to disaggregate the “state.” Depending on the issue, NGOs deal with various organs of the Japanese state, from the bureaucracy (including MOFA; the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare; the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries; the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry; and the Ministry of Environment) to political parties and politicians. Several interviewees have lamented the “high wall” that the Japanese political system represents and the lack of recognition not only

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124 Interview with a member of the Tokachi Eteke Kanpa Study Group, December 2004.
by the Japanese government, but also by the general public.\textsuperscript{125} Here, strategies among Japanese NGOs diverge. Groups such as the Asia Pacific Peace Forum, cognizant of the gap between social movements and the political process within the Diet, aim at creating better connections between and among citizen groups, Diet members, and international NGOs. Others such as the People’s Plan Study Group and the Asia Peace Alliance move beyond only responding to the state, focusing instead on grassroots empowerment and people’s networks. The question of dialogue and partnership with the state remains one of the major challenges that Japanese advocacy NGO networks face today.

\textsuperscript{125}Interviews with the founder of Shimin Gaiko Center and Body and Soul, December 2004.
CONCLUSION: NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
AND GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION IN JAPAN

Resistance lies in self-conscious engagement with dominant, normative discourses and representations and in the active creation of oppositional analytic and cultural spaces. Resistance that is random and isolated is clearly not effective as that which is mobilized through systemic politicized practices of teaching and learning. Uncovering and reclaiming subjugated knowledge is one way to lay claims to alternative histories.

– Chandra Mohanty, quoted by Bell Hooks 1994: 32.

Teaching to Transgress: Education as the Practice of Freedom.

The past two decades have seen the rise of various resistance movements – on labor, the environment, women’s rights, HIV/AIDS, migrants’ rights, food sovereignty, water, indigenous peoples’ rights, and water etc. – against existing global governance structures centered around the United Nations, Bretton Woods institutions, the WTO, and other regional intergovernmental organizations. By the late 1990’s, many of these movements had coalesced into a global justice movement that specifically targets the neoliberal policies of the WTO and other regional and bilateral FTAs. After the war in Afghanistan in 2001 and the war in Iraq in 2003, this global justice movement has further merged with a global antiwar movement. These movements have been attempting to push for a greater role of global civil society in global governance reforms to make existing institutions more transparent, democratic, and equitable.

This development of grassroots globalism coincides with the emergence of civil society within Japan. There has been significant social, political, and scholarly attention on the emerging third sector in Japan, beyond the traditional emphasis on the market and the state. After the passage of the NPO law in 1998, nonprofit activities have become legitimate and have been
encouraged by the Japanese government. At the same time, many new nongovernmental networks have been formed, actively participating in a wide spectrum of world conferences on gender, racism, food, HIV/AIDS, sustainable development, and peace, as well as monitoring various international organizations and conventions. Since the war in Iraq and the dispatch of Japanese troops to Iraq in 2003, some alterglobalization and antidiscrimination networks have joined hands with new antiwar coalitions. There are parallel debates concerning the role of Japanese civil society in reforming national institutions, constructing peace in Asia, and contributing to a larger global civil society.

This paper is situated at the interstices of these global and local developments in the context of three conjunctural forces: neoliberalism, militarism, and nationalism. The realities of a global economy and a commensurate global resistance movement challenge the predominant national definition of citizenship. To push this argument to an extreme, when the state so often fails to guarantee basic rights and people’s civic participation has extended beyond national boundaries, one might raise the rhetorical as well as theoretical question of whether “citizenship” is still a useful notion.

The emphasis on global citizenship education in this paper reflects not so much the lack of grassroots alternatives to the existing global governance structure, but the continuous importance of citizenship in the struggle for a renewed, participatory democracy. In particular, I propose a postnational and postmodern reconception of citizenship that emphasizes “conversability,” that is, the end of a single sovereign understanding of “citizenship.” Instead, citizenship can be conceived as a continuous, open pedagogic process of performance in conversation with one another. It is pedagogic because one has to unlearn the predominant

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126For some examples, see Cavanagh and Mander 2004.
neoliberal, imperial, and nationalistic discourses and unearth previously subjugated knowledge in order to construct alternatives. It is performative because citizenship is a set of expressions that are intimately linked to power struggles. And it has to be in conversation with one another because there is no one single truth. This process of “cultural communication, contestation, and resignification occurring within civil society” is important in a participatory democracy.¹²⁷

A conception of global citizenship centered on conversability depends on participation, knowledge production, and space. The World Social Forum (WSF) process that started in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in 2001 is one of the examples of global citizenship education that emphasizes participation, new knowledge, and space. The annual gathering draws around 100,000 participants from diverse social movements worldwide to participate, converse, and create a “radical, participatory and living democratic process.”¹²⁸ Despite many tensions over issues of representation, organization, and strategies,¹²⁹ the WSF and its many regional and local extensions have become a public political space where people come to live and re-create their citizenship through democratic deliberation. As former political theorist Selya Benhabib argues,

In deliberative democracy, as distinguished from political liberalism, the official public sphere of representative institutions, which includes the legislature, executive and public bureaucracies, the judiciary, and political parties, is not the only site of political contestation and of opinion and will formation. Deliberative democracy focuses on social movements, and on the civil, cultural, religious, artistic, and political associations of the unofficial public sphere, as well. The public sphere is composed of the anonymous and interlocking conversation and contestation resulting from the activities of these various groups.¹³⁰

¹²⁷Benhabib 2002.
¹³⁰Benhabib 2002.
In Japan, advocacy NGOs encourage civic participation not so much to provide services, but to contest the non-transparency, “black-box” nature of many state policies or counteract the biased textbooks and media that they do not necessarily trust. As some activists argue, direct participation and democracy are crucial in peace education. Through the participation of 500-800 people in each cruise, Peace Boat becomes an alternative media, that is, people themselves observe and experience and then distribute information in Japanese society. In particular, through exchange programs on board where young students and NGO activists from conflict areas share and contextualize their own experiences, Peace Boat aims to build peace through participation and mutual understanding.131

Similarly, the Freedom School of the Pacific Asia Resource Center was created to encourage people to engage directly with the issues and materials themselves. World Peace Now, a new peace coalition, emphasizes individual participation and new ways of expressing peace. Keiko Nakamura of Peace Depot highlights the importance of experience-based learning in her outreach work concerning disarmament. Green activists further point out the important connection to the earth. The “Trace and Smile” program of Be Good Café, for example, by connecting consumers to the farmers who produce the food they eat through their mobile phones, encourages people to think where and how their food has been grown and get closer to nature through what they eat.

Other youth-oriented groups such as A Seed Japan and Body and Soul are conscious of creating opportunities for young people who might not identify sufficiently with older social movements to join them. Finally, participation is not only about local, regional, global, and earth connections, but also maintains a past and future relation. If global citizenship depends on

131Interview, November 2004.
participation in its broadest sense, questions, as posed by the founder of Peace Boat, Tatsuya Yoshioka, remain: Does participation alone lead to action? What is the connection between participation and action?

Social movement scholars argue that activism, alternative articulation, and networking draw upon and at the same time produce movement-based knowledge.¹³² As an alterglobalization activist reflects,

As important as winning that battle was, realizing that the better part of a decade of grass-roots organizing – very tedious, painstaking, district by district, small town by small town, educating rooms of people, 50 at a time – had actually come to critical mass… The time of all times was to see so many Americans educated enough to take time off and come to Seattle on their own dollar, with all of the chaos and confusion of trying to find a place to stay, simply to have their own word.¹³³

Studies of Japanese civil society have rarely focused on the epistemic functions of NGOs/NPOs, that is, how the third sector is not only a service provider or political actor, but also a knowledge producer. In Japan, the large volume of research publications by NGOs/NPOs, proceedings of benkyokai (study meetings), and mini-komi (mini-communication) in the form of newsletters, magazines, and web-based materials, such as the “Liberalization Impacts Monitor” by AM-Net and “Tanemaki” by A Seed Japan, have largely escaped scholarly attention. Many NGOs specifically run popular educational programs. Besides the much-noted example of the Freedom School of the Pacific Asia Resource Center since the 1970’s and Peace Boat since 1983, advocacy NGOs in Japan use education caravans, popular tribunals,¹³⁴ farming, radio programs,

¹³²Conway 2004.
¹³³Wallach 2000.
Internet courses, video documentaries, and domestic and international art shows to engage the public. Just as feminists have argued, that the “women’s problem” was believed not to exist because there was no name for it, several activists in Japan have mentioned the importance of new data, language, and knowledge in their struggle against the politics of non-transparency and invisibility.

The challenge for Japanese NGOs to put forward competing ideologies and alternative knowledge against the predominant neoliberal, militaristic, and nationalistic discourses is formidable. In this regard, the activists involved in the emergent alterglobalization and antiwar movements can be considered to be “cultural negotiators” and knowledge-producers. They negotiate between global human rights frames and local cultural narratives to translate global governance issues in accessible terms and introduce an international human rights language to the Japanese public. Against each state metanarrative on deregulation, privatization, liberalization, efficiency, “sacrifice for the sake of the world’s free trade system,” “a sense of love and respect of the country,” and becoming a “normal country” to participate in international cooperation militarily etc., advocacy NGO networks construct their alternative knowledge surrounding international human rights standards such as decent work, equal treatment, food sovereignty, access for all, and reproductive rights (see table below).
### Table

**Another Japan Is Possible: Alternative Knowledge**

*by Japanese Advocacy NGO Networks*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue Area</th>
<th>Neoliberal, Militaristic and Nationalistic Ideologies</th>
<th>Alternative Knowledge by Advocacy NGO networks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kozo kaikaku (structural reforms)</td>
<td>Deregulation, privatization of public services, and cuts in public spending</td>
<td>Decent work, equal treatment, and right to public services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Trade Agreements</td>
<td>Liberalization</td>
<td>Transparency, participation, and human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Liberalization within the WTO</td>
<td>“Sacrifice for the sake of the world’s free trade system”</td>
<td>Multifunctionality of agriculture and food sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service liberalization within the WTO</td>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Koyuu zaisan (public commons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>“A sense of love and respect for the country”</td>
<td>Freedom of thought and conscience, guaranteed in the constitution and the CRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispatch of the Japanese SDF to Iraq</td>
<td>Emergency legislation and international cooperation</td>
<td>World peace now; people’s security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>Treatment access depending on immigration status</td>
<td>Access for all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>“Participation” to revive Japanese demography and economy</td>
<td>Reproductive rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>U.S.-Japan Security Treaty</td>
<td>Indigenous peoples’ rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign residents</td>
<td>Crime committed by foreigners</td>
<td>Recognition, participation, and human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>“Crisis”</td>
<td>Slow life; other work is possible</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If movement-based knowledge helps construct new subjectivities of who “the Japanese” are and how they relate to others – locally, regionally, and globally – these new subjectivities
nonetheless need space to be expressed. To the extent that space reflects power struggles, the lack of social, political, and cultural space for advocacy NGOs speaks volumes on the power of the state and the market in Japan. As Sakuma points out, the recent NPO boom in Japan does not necessarily increase the space for NGOs to function; given that public interest corporations rarely identify themselves with NGOs, NGOs in Japan represent a very limited sector of the society.

Advocacy NGO networks have attempted various ways to create new space for “conversability.” Peace Boat began in 1983, when space for dissent was shut off in major Japanese universities, because “ships had a lot of space” and students were “thirsty for such a space.” Upon his return from the Fourth World Social Forum in Mumbai in January 2004, activist Toshimaru Ogura started the WSF Japan listserv so that members of the emerging antiglobalization movement in Japan could connect and organize. Later that year, ATTAC Kyoto organized the Kyoto Social Forum to create space for the various resistance movements within Japan to come together.

When the Japanese educational system, media, and electoral politics limit the space for civic participation, NGO networks in Japan go abroad, to utilize or create the space in solidarity meetings, counter-summits, world conferences, art exhibitions, and press conferences. Every single group interviewed for this study has engaged in cross-border conversations. For example, both ATTAC Japan and World Peace Now organized workshops at the WSF. While there are

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136 Interview, December 2004.
137 Interview, Interview 2004.
occasional success stories (e.g., No! GMO’s campaign against GM wheat) of such effective use of international space for lobbying, the bulk of spatial politics remains at the local level.

Few examples are as illustrative as the struggles in Okinawa. In addition to the subversive activism of the Hitotsubo Antiwar Landlord Association, in which 3,000 landowners whose land had been confiscated for military purposes have each been selling one-tsubo (a tsubo equals approximately 36 square feet) plot of land as an act of defiance since 1982, Okinawan obaasan (grandmothers) have been demonstrating under water to protest the construction of a new offshore military base on the protected coral reefs of Henoko Bay in Nago. The commonality between the antiglobalization and antiwar movements in Japan is the reclaiming of the commons. As land has been appropriated by the military and the market, these activists are reclaiming their nature, culture, and public space, all of which are important preconditions for the expressions of citizenship and for those expressions to be conversable.

Such an introductory study on the emergent alterglobalization and antiwar movements in Japan would not be complete without examining the issues and challenges these movements face. Nongovernmental organizations in Japan remain small in size. Movement organization faces a numerous practical constraints from resources to marginalization. Cross-issue networking within and between the alterglobalization and antiwar movements is not devoid of tensions (to name just a few, intellectuals versus grassroots; relationships between labor unions and NGOs; class issues, for example, who can afford to go “slow” in the slow life movement; and gender dynamics within each movement).

Members of various movements disagree on tactics (undo no yarikata), the extent of engagement with the Japanese government, and emphasis on grassroots empowerment. Internally, these movements face issues of funding, scaling up (professionalization and
sustainability), post-campaign follow-up capacity, and innovation. Externally, they strive for recognition, connections with political channels, public interest, and international networking.

Although each issue covered in this paper represents an opportunity for future research, three areas – alternative media, the role of academia, and regional social movements – in particular, are important in furthering our understanding of the role of civil society in resistance in Japan and Asia. While there are some studies on corporate ownership and the close ties between the government and media, few have yet looked at the role of the Japanese media in perpetuating neoliberal, militaristic, and nationalistic ideologies; the emergence of alternative media; and the relationship between the media and new social movements.

Concerning the role of academia, several activists have commented on the limited role scholars play in social movements in Japan. We know that some academics are founders of NGO networks. They contribute to social movements through theory-building and knowledge-dissemination. They serve on government councils as well as national delegations to world conferences, and, in that capacity, could function as a bridge between NGOs and the government.

But beyond these obvious roles, little is known about the connections between academia and social movements in Japan. In particular, in the current context of university restructuring, the introduction of market forces might further curtail the potential for universities to take on critical functions related to an agenda for alternative globalizations including the promotion of democratic participation, sustainable development, cultural diversity, and peace. Not only is the university an important public and communal space where ideas of citizenship are debated.

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138 See, for example, Pharr and Krauss 1996.

139 Peters and Roberts 2000.
and expressions of it are encouraged; academic research – “a relentless erudition, scouring alternative sources, exhuming buried documents, reviving forgotten (or abandoned) histories”\textsuperscript{140} – plays a crucial role in holding neoliberalism, militarism, and nationalism at bay as only one set of truth claims.

Finally, the resistance movements that have sprung up not only in Japan, but also in Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Hong Kong, constitute an understudied part of the “multitude,” a global grassroots project of renewing democracy.\textsuperscript{141} In the post-Asian financial crisis and post-September 11 context, the growing economic power of the region, the expansion of FTAs, and increasing opposition to U.S. military presence make Asia a fertile ground for comparative studies of new social movements. In question is not only the articulation of alternatives to corporate-led and imperialist globalization, but the meaning and future of democracy itself.

\textsuperscript{140}Said 1994.

\textsuperscript{141}Hardt and Negri 2004.
Appendix: List of Interviews

I. Global Governance
AM-Net
Japan Center for a Sustainable Environment and Society
Peoples’ Plan Study Group
Association for the Tobin Tax for the Aid of Citizens (ATTAC), Kyoto
Pacific Asia Resource Center
Japan Volunteer Center

II. Labor
Japan Trade Union Confederation (RENGO)
Shinjuku Homeless Support Center
Equality Action 21
Filipino Migrants Center Nagoya
Labor Net
All-Japan Water Supply Workers’ Union

III. Food Sovereignty
No! WTO – Voice from the Grassroots Group
Food Action 21
No! GMO Campaign
Watch Out WTO Japan

IV. Peace
World Peace Now Japan
Grassroots Movement to Remove U.S. Bases from Okinawa and the World
No to Constitutional Revision! Citizens’ Network
Japan Teachers’ Union
International Criminal Bar
Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines
Peace Depot
Asia-Pacific Peace Forum

V. HIV/AIDS
AIDS and Society Research Association
Place Tokyo
Africa Japan Forum

VI. Gender
Japan NGO Network for CEDAW
Japan Network Against Trafficking in Persons
Soshiren/Starting from a Female Body
Tokyo Regumi Studio
Sex Workers and Sexual Health
VII. Minority and Human Rights  
Japan Civil Liberties Union Subcommittee on Foreigners’ Rights  
International Movement Against Discrimination and Racism (IMADR)  
*Buraku* Liberation League  
Citizens’ Diplomatic Centre for the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Shimin Gaiko Centre)  
Tokachi Eteke Kanpa Study Group  
Association of Indigenous Peoples in the Ryukyus  
Mirine  
Issho Kikaku  
Disabled People’s International, Japan  
Center for Prisoners’ Rights Japan  
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