AZAD JAMMU & KASHMIR (AJK) TODAY

Ahmad Faruqui, Ph. D.
Pakistani-administered Kashmir

AJK is one of two areas administered by Pakistan in the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. The other area is Gilgit-Baltistan, which is much bigger but less populated.
Geography

5,134 square miles spread out in the shape of an archer’s bow, 250 miles long and 10-40 miles wide

AJK abuts the Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir

At the south-eastern end, it contains a huge water reservoir which is formed by Pakistan’s Mangla Dam on the Jhelum River
Demographics

AJK is home to 5 million people (versus 12 million in Jammu & Kashmir). Population growing at 2.4% per year. Nine out of ten people live in rural areas. Average household size exceeds seven. Literacy rates are higher than those in Pakistan. A large expatriate population lives in the UK.
Governance

- Unicameral legislature with 49 seats
- Prime minister is the chief executive
- President (elected by the legislature) is the titular head of state
- Has its own High Court
- Two administrative districts and eight
A pocket history

Kashmir from Indian occupation

Created in October 1947 with the sole aim of liberating Jammu and adjacent “occupied” state. Meant to be a “free” model state that would inspire rebellion in the accede to India and allowing India to fly-in troops the Pakistani side, prompting the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir to To catalyze the rebellion, raiders were interjected into Kashmir from Kashmir lay in Pakistani hands and two-thirds in Indian hands. When a UN-sponsored cease-fire took effect in January 1949, a third of forces left the region. A plebiscite would decide the future affiliation of Kashmir once all armed refugees and the plebiscite

In March 1949, AJK signed a power-sharing arrangement with Pakistan ceding all authority related to defense, foreign affairs, asset Pakistan created a Ministry for Kashmir Affairs to look after its newest
Pocket history (continued)

of AJK to suppress street violence In 1955, Pakistan declared martial law in some parts to create a united Kashmir. In 1957, Pakistan resorted to police action in AJK to quell a public meeting that was seeking direct action with the people of AJK. Legally only applied to Pakistan, further straining ties in AJK through a Basic Democracies Ordinance which In 1961, President Ayub carried out indirect elections, y movement for creating a unified Kashmir. Subsequently, faced with Islamabad’s dominance in their day-to-day
affairs, several AJK leaders started a
Kashmir, once again hoping to instigate a rebellion. In August 1965, Pakistan interjected guerillas into Indian an all out attack on West Pakistan. This did not happen, instead India upped the ante by launching was limited action along the cease-fire line In the 1971 war that led to the secession of East Pakistan, there Agreement. This was converted into the Line-of-Control as part of the Shimlap India seized the Siachen Glacier in 1984. Both countries exploded nuclear bombs in May 1998. In 1999 Pakistan attacked Indian positions at Kargil. In 1999, Pakistan attacked Indian positions at Kargil forces in Siachen. This was designed to cut off India’s lines of communication with its Ultimately, the move back-fired
A brief electoral history

A legislative assembly was set up in 1970. A constitution within a year of Pakistan adopting its. In 1974, an interim constitution was adopted, considered them free and fair for the assembly, though few observers. Three rounds of elections have taken place. Political parties Muslim Conference (MC) are the two main. Azad Kashmir People's Party (AKPP) and the Azad Kashmir Peoples Party (AKPP) and the.
Electoral history (continued)

In the 1996 elections, AKPP emerged with a majority of seats after the MC boycotted the Muhammad Anwar Khan) weeks Gen. Pervez Musharraf installed his In 2001, the MC won the elections, but within hijid t( MJGS down choice of president (ex Maj.-Gen. Sardar which the MC won a majority In 2006, 369 candidates from 15 parties 006, 369 cad dates o 5 pa tes contested the 41 directly
elected seats, of
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Electoral history (concluded)

Analysts widespread charges of poll rigging by opposition political parties and independent. The elections were flawed and "greeted with in the wake of the 2005 earthquake did candidates or their supporters, possibly featured few instances of physical violence. However, unlike the 2001 elections, the polls because of the greater international presence and harassment—aside
from threats—against

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Political status marked by ambiguity

not an "independent" state but the UN does not consider it an independent state. Pakistan considers AJK to be an agency of Pakistan. Nominally, AJK is not a province or a part of Pakistan. In reality, AJK is under the tutelage of the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs in Islamabad.
Living in Pakistan’s shadow

legislation Islamabad’s approval is required to pass

The Pakistani Minister for Kashmir affairs handles the daily administration of the state. Pakistani decision makers The Kashmir Council is dominated by The Kashmir Council is dominated by issues of politics and governance. The Pakistani military retains a guiding role. The Pakistani military retains a guiding role.

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Pakistan’s Kashmir Command contains the largest corps

X Corps — headquartered at Rawalpindi
12th

19th Infantry Div., Jhelum
23rd Infantry Div., Mangla
111th Infantry Brigade, Rawalpindi
8th Armored Brigade Kharian
Case in point – Sardar Ibrahim’s presidency

2003) and four time president The founder of AJK (passed away aged 88 in Kashmir on the Swiss model to create a neutral state of Jammu and Favored accession to Pakistan but also sought Gen. Ayub during this second term
Created a parallel government in AJK in the mid-1950s and was dismissed in May 1959 by Gen. Zia during his third term. Dismissed in 1978 by Gen. Zia during his third term.
The Freedom House 2009 assessment

and 7 being worst), civil rights a score of 5Political rights gets a score of 6 (with 1 being best
Status not free Status – not free
to Pakistan The constitution of Azad Kashmir forbids
individuals and political parties from taking part in activities
that are prejudicial to the ideology of the state’s accession
detentions in 2008 but there were no reports of deaths or
lengthy Police in recent years have regularly
suppressed
gyppp antigovernment demonstrations,
sometimes violently,
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The Human Rights Watch (HRW) assessment

Individuals and political parties who do not support Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan are barred from the political process, government employment, and educational institutions. In general, anti-accession parties and individuals are subject to surveillance, harassment and sometimes imprisonment.
by harassment, and sometimes imprisonment by Pakistani intelligence and security services.
The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) assessment

Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) operates throughout AJK and engages in extensive surveillance. Arbitrary arrests and detentions are commonplace in custody have been reported. The security forces are tortured, and several cases of death. In some instances, those detained by the ISI, the police, or remains the norm of civilians by the
military and intelligence services Impunity for acts of torture and other mistreatment

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Torture and imprisonment of political opponents

of 12 small pro-independence Kashmiri groups have been less tolerant of groups that espouse support to armed militants fighting in India, they Kashmiri self-determination, including primarily the All Parties National Alliance (APNA), a conglomerate. While the Pakistani authorities have readily provided representation Gilgit Baltistan United Movement and others, Gilgit-Baltistan United Movement, and others,
Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), the continued in 2007 to agitate for increased political Nationalist and pro-independence groups such as the
A deadly new import

AJK In June 2009, a suicide bomber killed two soldiers in a military barracks, raising questions whether the militants had opened a new front just as they came under pressure in the northwest. The attacker targeted the Pakistani army in the FATA on the Pakistan Taliban, which has been hit hard by nobody claimed responsibility but suspicion centered ever since the attacks in Mumbai. Another candidate is the banned outfit Lashkar-e-Taiba, which has long operated on the Indian side of Kashmir and is being restrained by the Pakistani state.
AJK is a pawn in the Indo-AJK is a pawn in the Indo-Pakistan conflict

is about territory and water resources. Some have argued that the Kashmir dispute is about ideology. Others say that it is about ideology. Secular versus religious just the most visible symptom. Just saying that Kashmir is the primary cause of Indo-Pakistani tensions and others saying it is. Cause and effect are often blurred, with some.
the resolution of the Indo-Pakistan conflict
Regardless of cause, AJK’s future hinges on
The crux of the dispute

Both sides claim all of Jammu and Kashmir

India wants to discuss all issues with Pakistan besides Kashmir

Pakistan regards the core issue as Kashmir

India seeks a bilateral solution, Pakistan has long sought a multi-lateral solution

to Yes”
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The “Back Channel,” as narrated by Steve Coll

India in 2004 called “The Back Channel” force, Musharraf, the architect of the 1999 Kargil Convinced that Pakistan could not wrest Kashmir by incursion began to pursue a negotiated solution with incursion, began to pursue a negotiated solution with

It envisioned that Kashmir would become an autonomous region in which Kashmiris would move
freely across the Line of Control and conduct trade
demilitarization of the region d li i i l ld ll d ldeclining
violence would allow a gradual Over time, the LoC
would become irrelevant, and

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Musharraf’s “paradigm shift”

The general gathered his formation commanders at GHQ in Rawalpindi and told borders and our economic development. And what is security? Safety of our security. And what is security? Safety of our raison d’être is not permanent enmity with India. The raison d’être is Pakistan’s permanent both have nuclear weapons. War is no longer an option for either side since a settlement with India. Put your hand here—on your heart—and tell me that Kashmir will gain freedom without negotiating.
Peace is rational and war irrational, said Musharraf.

could strengthen Pakistan--and its military could strengthen Pakistan and its military with India would produce economic benefits that Musharraf told the corps commanders that peace growth would only be achieved through rapid economic growth. The Army had a fifteen-year development plan which commanders who began to think along different growth. There was a broad change in outlook among the
me? What does the world think of us? Can my economy support me? Can my foreign policy support
The Indian leaders also sensed an opportunity (according to Coll)

power by the mid-twenty-first century. class consumers swelled; and it became possible for Indian strategists to visualize their country rising to become a great power; the ranks of its middle. After 2002, India’s economic outlook changed dramatically and said. Only a catastrophic war with Pakistan--or Pakistan’s collapse into chaos--would stand in the way of India’s greatness. “We must,” Jaswant Singh, who was then India’s foreign minister, were convinced these two countries must learn to live in accord
convinced these two countries must learn to live in accord-and dinner in Kabul.” On January 8, 2007, Manmohan Singh remarked in public, “I dream of a day, while retaining our respective national identities, one can have breakfast in Amritsar, lunch in Lahore,
Why India did not attack Pakistan after the Mumbai attacks

and thus exacerbate the terrorist threat faced by it would likely Singh’s decision-making was grounded in military only deepen Pakistan’s internal turmoil. If India were to launch even selective strikes, India.

Any Indian military action would also risk an escalation that could include nuclear deployments—which may be precisely what the jihadi leaders hoped.
to provoke.  
said not “rally the nation around them ”said, not rally the nation around them.  “Th i ilit ti h ” L lit M i h“There is no military option here,” Lalit Mansingh, a had to “isolate the terrorist elements” in Pakistan, he former Indian Ambassador in Washington, said. India
Back to Square One

the Chief Justice In 2007, Musharraf overplayed his cards and fired stageHe went into a political death spiral and exited the He went into a political death spiral and exited the The attacks in Mumbai halted the front channel ti k th C it Di lconversations known as the Composite Dialogue proposals to India recently that there is no record of Musharraf’s yThe Zardari government’s foreign minister said from a clean slatefrom a clean slateThis week’s discussions with India are likely to start

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Quo Vadis?

In the near term, the slug-fest will continue toward peace. Over the long haul, the quality of life along both Pakistan and India do not rebuild their momentum sides of the LoC could worsen significantly worse if sides of the LoC could worsen significantly worse if accepts India as the South Asian hegemon liberate Jammu and Kashmir, accepts the Line of Control as the international border with India and Things could improve if Pakistan calls off the Jihad to go their accusatory stance and temper, and offer Pakistan “substantial” concessions in other areas.
“substantial” concessions in other areas. This move will only happen if India’s leaders extend the hand of friendship to the people of Pakistan, drop
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