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Editorial

Welcome to Issue 34 of ADV

by Sven Brendel

It may be hard to believe but the world today is the most peaceful and prosperous it has ever been. Never before has human existence been as harmonious and pleasurable as it is today. Given the ongoing military conflicts that rage in the Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, as well as the humanitarian disaster in Haiti this might seem like an odd statement. Yet, if we compared our current era to any previous chapter in human history, we find a much more humane world. This is not to deny the need for further progress, nor is to say that we should be complacent with the current state of affairs. Instead, the general improvement in the welfare of humankind is testament to a) the ability of humankind to grow and advance, and b) the accuracy of political theory. Most of the suffering we see in the world today could be remedied by a better understanding of, and better implementation of the most basic insights offered by political science. At its core political science is the examination of coercion. We study how people are and can be forced to things against their will. The most basic insight we have to offer the world is that in any society there must be a monopoly on violence held by one united institution: the government. When we look at Afghanistan, Iraq, Haiti, Somalia, the Congo, what do we find? We find governments that do not have a monopoly on violence. In the absence of such a monopoly violent infighting that brings forth the very darkest aspects of human nature comes to the fore-front. While various factions fight over power and resources, effort that could be used to build a better society is wasted on violence. This is the central problem that has plagued and continues to plague humankind. Conversely, the progress humankind has made over the past centuries was enabled by the more widespread existence of governments that hold an effective monopoly on violence. The creation of governments with an effective monopoly of violence is of course a great challenge. Countless volumes of books and journals have been filled with theories and empirical studies on how to accomplish this most necessary of feats. Considering the effective governments are more widespread today than ever before one can reasonably deduce that all this efforts on the part of political scientists has been for while. So it is with great joy that we bring you the newest edition of A Different View. As you can see we have a new design and logo, but remain dedicated the publishing the best scholarship produced by aspiring political scientists from across the world. Let's all hope that political science research will continue to guide the way to a more peaceful and prosperous world.
nd he 2 of October 2009 was a date of relief for many at the EU with the clear consensus of the Irish the Lisbon treaty overcoming its biggest hurdle. With the waiver of the Irish the bidding for the upcoming EU top jobs was initiated. And something sensational happened, the technocratic, dull and rigid EU gained colour and attention with the likes of Tony Blair and David Miliband being named as potential candidates. Politically seen the likes of Mr. Blair and Mr. Miliband were clearly not the top notch —Europe an -dol tion ne ve rthe le ss the y off e re d something which a Van Rompuy and or Balkenende could never offer, which is visibility. In times of shining political figures like Barack Hussein Obama it is more vital than ever to have clear visible and credible political figures, which are known outside of the microcosm of Brussels. Today when we think of the U.S administration we don’t think of Joe Biden or Timothy Giddner, we think of Obama who has imposed the new post-Bush U.S doctrine. The EU with the Lisbon treaty on its doormat had the same striking and rare opportunity as the U.S had in November 2008 a opportunity to put its stamp on world politics and elect a global poster boy with which it could model, advertise and spread its message of efficient smart power across the world, however it didn’t.

With the election of Herman Van Rompuy and Catherine Ashton as the new European —duoll has reconfirmed its stigma of being a consent-based institution with the timidity of a church mouse. The EU
Silent European Union
by Robin Tim Weis

in a way has silenced itself with this decision hence it should not wonder why its presence in the ASEAN area is questionable and why the likes of the EU is not mentioned in the G2 discussions surrounding China and the U.S.A. The answer is simple the EU lacks personalities with edges, personalities which can mobilize and stimulate discussion, personalities which polarize and ignite debates on a European and international level.

By electing Herman Van Rompuy and Catherine Ashton the power of the EU and its international scope remains with the likes of Sarkozy, Merkel, Brown and Berlusconi who further dictate the international scope of the EU. However this multilateral selling of the EU lacks a central approach and credibility, a Sarkozy only being able to advertise and talk on behalf of France and no the EU. Therefore a Tony Blair or David Miliband is needed despite both not carrying the idea of the European finalité in them. The EU desperately needs,

—People who cause traffic jams when they cross the street. By taking this without a doubt brave step the EU would not jeopardize its goals, aims and commitments but rather strengthen them by placing itself on stage a step which is longer overdue. The economic impact and importance the EU holds today.

The time for such a step as mentioned could not be better the political sphere being in a shifting process of reset. A Syrian intellectual best put it by saying, “The United States is not the world … I eat Korean, I travel to Europe, I drive in Chinese built taxis and use...”
German manufacture d taps. The status quo as we know it has changed and is changing. With the U.S reaching out its hand, with Russia requisitioning its state and demanding equal footing and with the BRIC and ASEAN states gaining importance and standing on the global stage. The EU must not remain in a coma of consent but rather make the best of the situation and use the pragmatic master skills of Herman Van Rompuy and the legal personality it gains with the Lisbon treaty. With the ratification of the Lisbon treaty and the gaining of legal personality the EU reaches yet another stage of international negotiations now being able to formally sign and abide by international conventions and treaties which yet again gives the EU the possibility to spread its values and its doctrine a process which would be best overseen and conducted by a political heavyweight such as Tony Blair.

Having looked mainly over the border a fundamental question remains what does the newly elected EU unbelievably —president till and EU fore ign mini s te r— mean for Europe? Firstly it sets back Belgium big time, Van Rompuy having taken over as Belgian prime minister a year ago at the height of Flemish-Wallonian tensions, disputes and parliamentary disillusion. It is with the clear, pragmatic and a calm attitude that Van Rompuy has managed to soothe the tensions and initiate consents building measures in Belgian politics. Values, which he will duplicate onto European affairs strengthening the consent-based approach in Brussels as mentioned. Certainly this approach holds assets without a doubt as it will if successful lead to a stronger European unity. Concerning Catherine Ashton an issue to behold is that Baroness Ashton of Upholland has never had to stand for democratic elections and lacks the fundamentals of citizen interaction and having to stand up ones decisions and bearing ones consequences. For the EU these appointments mean business as usual which is the tragic element of these appointments as the EU fails to address the wider issues of the EU which is were the EU will find itself on the international level once it has foregone and completed the pathway laid out by Jean Monnet. An isolated EU will hold advantages to no one. The EU no longer can afford to neglect global happenings the economic crisis being the best example of a foreign epicenter problem which has grasped the EU. It should be in the interest of the EU to intensify relations with its closest and most vital neighbour Russia and to in accordance with Russia claim equal footing on the international level.

Ultimately the question that remains is whether the EU managed to answer Henry Kissinger’s question of: “Who do I call if I want to call Europe?” On paper, yes, namely Catherine Ashton the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. However I believe Kissinger certainly had something else in mind when posing the question since it most importantly depends who answers the phone. Robin Tim Weis, 20, is a university student at Vesalius College in Brussels, Belgium. He is pursuing his bachelor degree in International Affairs with a concentration in politics and
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history. Mr. Weis holds special interests in European affairs, Balkan history and studies and the Russian Federation and its surrounding CIS states. He is especially interested in political comparative studies and the unique model of Swiss direct democracy.
The Romanian Presidential Campaign started October 23rd, 2009 and it will end November 22nd, 2009, when will go to the polls and elect their President.

The last Presidential elections were held in November 2004, when Traian Basescu won the elections with a margin of 51.23% against its opponent Adrian Nastase, who only got 48.77% of the votes. Since 2004, the Presidential mandate was stretched to five years, after the Romanian constitution was amended in 2003. However, things have dramatically changed since 2004. The current President, Mr. Traian Basescu faces serious competition from the leader of the National Liberalist Party, Crin Antonescu, and Mircea Geoana, the leader of the Democratic Socialist Party. However, all of these presidential candidates will have to deal with the tough economical, social, and political times currently haunting Romania.

From 2004 until 2008, Romania went through economic growth of even 8%, while at the time of elections in November 2009, Romania’s growth already stood at 1.5% growth. At the time of the current Presidential campaign, Romania is going through a political and economical crisis, which is linked to the financial crisis that swept the world in 2008. Therefore, political decisions are of prime importance in bringing a breath of fresh air in Romania’s suffocating political and economical environment. Apart from the severe economic crisis, Romania is faced with a political earthquake. The Romanian political crisis started in middle-October 2009, when the governing coalition dissipated after all the Ministers belonging to
the Social Democrat Party resigned. Then, a motion of censure led to the demise of the entire government, including the Prime Minister, Emil Boc. Following that, the President of Romania had to nominate a new Prime Minister. The political parties in Romania presented the President of Romania, Traian Basescu, with various choices. First, the Mayor of Transylvanian city Sibiu, European Capital of Culture in 2007, a Romanian born with German ancestry, Klaus Johannis, was proposed by the Social Democrats and the Liberals, but President Traian Basescu didn't approve of him. In this case, the President's choice for Prime Minister, Lucian Croitoru, an economist and advisor for the International Monetary Fund, didn't pass the Parliament vote. Finally, the Parliament approved of Liviu Negoita, member of President Basescu's Democratic Liberal Party, and mayor of the 3rd district in Romania's capital, Bucharest.

This type of political crisis is not unfamiliar for Central and Eastern Europe, since governing coalitions fell in Latvia, Hungary and the Czech Republic in 2009. However, another whirlwind sweeps Romania during this storm. Struggling with the financial crisis, Romania decided to borrow 20 billion euros, out of which 12.95 billion euros are from the International Monetary Fund, 5 billion euro from the European Comission, and 1.215 billions from the World Bank and a billion euro from other international institutions. Estimates say that the borrowed money shall be returned by 2015, with a 3.5% interest rate. However, the political crisis has affected the timelines of the loan, because the money
Also, many foreign private investors think twice before investing in this politically unstable Romania. Additionally, the Romanian currency has been depreciating in reference to the euro. Also, unemployment in Romania is at 8%. To emphasize the gravity of unemployment, the government closed 119 governmental agencies and they dissolved 9,200 government jobs. Another much contested law discussed recently was the law regarding the government salaries. Basically, the law states that those working for the government should be paid based on their level of education, and experience. However, the discrepancies between the pay of different professions caused much debate and protests. Also, the Romanian military personnel does not get bonuses anymore, such as bonuses for confidentiality or bonuses for being exposed to possible dangers of radiation. It is important to mention that the Romanian military has been present in Iraq and Afghanistan since the beginning of the conflict. Romania had 730 troops in Iraq, and it now has 900 troops in Afghanistan. There have been discussions of bringing the troops home in the past, especially after 11 Romanian soldiers have died while on deployment.

The next Romanian President will lead a country with bleeding economy, murky political scene and unhappy people. The next Romanian President needs to come with a new vision, to steer Romania towards new direction. After having reached its goals of joining NATO and the European Union, Romania needs a new path. Hopefully the next President will give Romania the vision it desperately needs. Raluca Raileanu, 21, is a master student who received her Bachelor in ―International Relations‖ and ―Business Administration‖ at Old Dominion University in Norfolk, USA, in 2009. She has interned at the National Defense University in Washington, DC. Currently, she is pursuing her Master degree at the National School of Politics and Public Administration in Bucharest, Romania. Her interests are human rights advocacy, solving and analyzing conflicts, and human development.
Linked but Separated

by Hovhannes Nikoghosyan

The Armenia-Turkey reconciliation process, which has justifiably been labeled historic, has kept us in suspense since mid-August of 2008.

Although semi-secret talks between officials began in January-February of 2007 in Bern and in Vienna, the kick-off was the widely-publicized statement and follow-up letter by Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan at the beginning of his term in June 2008. Of course, it is noteworthy that the trigger was the assassination of prominent Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in Istanbul (January 19, 2006) by a young Turkish nationalist O.S., an alleged member of the Ergenekon gang network.

Nevertheless, as a logical stopover for the talks, preliminary protocols (initially on April 2, 2009) about establishing diplomatic relations and normalization, were signed Oct. 10 (2009). The signing process was difficult for both parties. The last-minute statement-checks threatened to ruin the efforts of the mediators: The parties were ready to go home empty-handed, as Armenian Foreign Minister, Edward Nalbandian, refused to accept certain items in the Turkish official statement. However, thanks to U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s flexible diplomacy and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s friendly message (—Edward, agree upon a ceremony without statements. 19:35), it became possible to prevent a diplomatic catastrophe. The protocols and the annex (i.e. road-map) were signed, but no one knows when they will be ratified and come into force.
Turkish. Of course, this is not a zero-sum game, and the outcome should be in win-win logic, but much depends on the actual process which is now in its “le gal de baté phas e”. In the meantime, the local political landscape is getting tense on both sides. Dashnaktsutyun, a traditional Armenian political party and a longtime ally of the incumbent president, is now “threatening” Sargsyan’s Administration, saying that if Armenia’s Parliament ratifies the protocols as is, the party “will struggle for the change of authorities” (Nov. 24, 2009). A nearly similar situation prevails in Turkey, in addition to recent developments in Turkish-Kurdish relations.

**Pacta sunt servanda**

Two recent statements by Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan pushed forward the start of the next round of the diplomatic game: the legal debate. Statements about the ongoing process around the Zurich Protocols, signed on Oct. 10, represented two different approaches to the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement process. At first, in a statement at the 12th convention of the ruling Republican Party of Armenia (Nov. 28), the President reminded attendees about the principle of “sensible time frame” which was employed in the Protocols: “If Turkey prolongs the process of ratification, Armenia … will take without delay corresponding steps envisaged by international law.” The second statement, with an additional explanation to the previous one, came out during the press conference.

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1 Pacta sunt servanda (Latin for “agreements must be kept”), is a brocard, a basic principle of civil law and of international law.
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with his Latvian counterpart Valdis Zatlers (Dec. 10). Sargsyan later said that Armenia —...is ready to ratify and implement the Protocols ... in accordance with our international obligations in a sensible time frame ...‖. In the meantime, as the President noted, he instructed the corresponding state bodies to draft amendments for national legislation pertaining to the signing, ratification and abrogation of international agreements. Legally, the said protocols are described as “international treaty” per Article 2.2 in Republic of Armenia’s Law on International Treaties (2007).

As Armenian PM Tigran Sargsyan told Hurriyet Daily News & Economic Review (Dec. 18), —If Turkey comes up with preconditions, Armenia would be free to do so as well itself‖.

It’s clear now that both parties are eager to make specific reservations while ratifying the Zurich Protocols, under Article 19 of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), which says that —a State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, formulate a reservation‖. A bold target for such action from Armenian side can be the controversial sub-commission on the historical dimension which the Armenian Parliament is eager to cancel. On the other hand, in a response to an open letter by the president of the International Association of Genocide Scholars, William Schabas (Oct. 13), Serzh Sargsyan wrote: —...it is not a (sub) commission of historians. The purpose of that (sub- commission is to give an opportunity to Armenian and Turkish peoples to find common grounds for mutual trust and dialogue … [and] to contribute] to the elimination of the consequences of the Genocide … and the fact of the Genocide itself can in no way become a subject of discussion...‖.

The Turkish side, hand-in-hand with Azerbaijan, is expected to make a special comment on the 3rd paragraph of the Protocol in the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations,
lin king the phrase of ―non intervention in internal affairs of other (i.e. third states – H.N.) states, territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers‖ to her own understanding of ―still unresolved legal issues of de-facto independent entity of Nagorno Karabakh.‖ Another hot aspect is hidden in 5th paragraph, the same Protocol, where a reference is given to ―relevant treaties of international law‖ speaking about the mutual recognition of the existing borders.

We are now at the stage of procedural ratification of the Protocols by both parties. According to national legislation, Turkey's PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan sent the documents to the Parliament, and President Serzh Sargsyan, according to the Article 27 of the Rep. of Armenia (RA) Law on International Treaties (2007), appealed to the Constitutional Court to decide on the Constitutional validity of the obligations referred to in the Protocols. And here we see the challenge. Under the Article 29 of the RA Law on International Treaties, in case the Constitutional Court will come up with a legal conclusion (on January 12, 2010) whether the Protocols contain any obligation incompatible with the Constitution. In this the Protocols will not be sent to the Parliament. Then the President can initiate a second round of negotiations with Turkey, bearing in mind the legal conclusion of the Court. The procedures of rejecting or declaring the international treaty null and void are described in Article 6 of the Constitution, and Articles 2732 of the abovementioned Law.

**Nagorno Karabakh Process**

Legally, the most curious development is that Turkey has already been actively violating the Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations which says that the parties ―...reiterate their commitment to refrain from pursuing any policy incompatible with the spirit of good neighborly relations.‖ Turkey is...
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ranking officials’ statements on Nagorno Karabakh peace process are viewed in Yerevan and Stepanakert as failing to show any commitment. The most recent statement came from PM Erdogan in Washington, DC, in early December. However, as he put it the same day, there was no precondition behind the Protocols when signing them in Zurich: —When we signed the protocols with Armenia, there were no preconditions. However, in our Parliament, the adoption of these documents requires some conditions. (Regnum, Dec. 8)

By and large, experts, who have expressed their opinion about the process, can be divided into two camps, depending how they link/separate the Nagorno Karabakh peace talks to Armenian-Turkish reconciliation process. In an interview to A1+ Armenian news agency (www.a1plus.am; Nov. 23), Hamlet Harutyunyan, an MP from ruling Republican party, said:
—Of course, the [Armenian-Turkish rapprochement and Nagorno Karabakh issue] are naturally interconnected. Azerbaijan and Turkey have the same foreign policy.

In early December, at a meeting in Athens about security-related issues in South Caucasus, Turkish Ambassador Unal Cevikoz, who is most likely to become the first-ever Ambassador to Yerevan, said that Turkish MPs would make up their mind on how to vote on the Zurich Protocols depending also on the situation around the Karabakh conflict. When someone asked whether there was also any connection between the country’s relations with Georgia with Georgia-Russian relations, Ambassador Cevikoz said, —Our [i.e. Turkish] understanding is that these [i.e. Nagorno Karabakh and Armenia-Turkey] are two separate processes but they impact each other. Accordingly, nearly all analysts and commentators, writing about Armenia-Turkey diplomatic developments, started to count the number of meetings between Armenian and...
Azeri presidents starting September 2008, when President Gul visited Yerevan. It will be the nth presidential meeting since Turkey and Armenia began reconciliation talks as the template sentence for most commentators. Citing another opinion, by MP Metin Yilmaz of the ruling AK party (www.day.az; Nov. 25), said that it seemed strange that the Turkish foreign policy rests on the principle:—If Ilham Aliyev says everything is OK, we will bring the Zurich Protocols on the agenda.

At the public level, we can see how Nagorno Karabakh negotiations turning into a specific phase, where war between Azerbaijan and Armenia-Nagorno Karabakh seems a natural next-step after politics, to paraphrase Clausewitz. Shortly before the meeting in Munich, Mr. Aliyev said his country was well prepared and ready to use military force against Armenia if ongoing negotiations failed to produce concrete results. The unprecedented military rhetoric of Mr. Aliyev II was assessed by the co-chair states as negative. To ease tensions, the parties decided to adopt a joint statement at the OSCE Ministerial Council in Athens to continue negotiations. But, to my mind, despite all efforts, the Moscow Declaration and the era of Russian-led mediation has been neglected once and for all since the parties could not follow their commitment to refrain from military rhetoric. In short, both processes are now a bit comatose. Both processes have arrived at the point where neither party is ready to do his homework, and therefore arrive to a compromise solution. Win/Win strategy is an absolute must and non-alternative to secure a solution in a long run. On the other hand, the paradox appears: i.e. it is impossible to imagine such a level of legitimacy of the authorities in Armenia and Azerbaijan, so that they could afford, respectively, to give any territory or to recognize the independence of
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Nagorno Karabakh. On the Turkish side the process of ratification of the signed documents seems at a standoff. It was a courageous step of signing the two protocols, but the so-called political will is still insufficient for the successful outcome of the "football diplomacy".

And the natural deadline for the kick-off on the Turkish dimension is mid-March...

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since the break-up of the Soviet Union

three unresolved conflicts have undermined stability in the South Caucasus in the end of the 20 century. Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia stood up to fight for their self-determination. After the long years of war all three entities got de facto independence, while de jure they are still recognized as part of Georgia and Azerbaijan. Neither of them is considered a legal statehood. South Ossetia was the focus of a full-blown war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008, when Georgian government made up a decision to regain control over the area but received a strong resistance from Russia, a staunch ally of South Ossetia, which defeated a Georgian incursion into South Ossetia in a Five-day August war. Days later, Russia announced it was formally recognizing both South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states despite the protest of the international community and UN Security Council.

Like all the other inter-ethnic conflicts, this one as well has a very complicated character. It is wrong to give a one-sided assessment to this conflict. On the one hand all the Russian activities can be characterized as an obvious military occupation that purposed only one object — to seize very important from the point of view of geopolitical strategies

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/37977
territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. There are all the reasons to state that Russia, immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union and till now, does everything in order not to lose and nowadays also to restore its influence on the post-soviet territories, especially on the South Caucasus and Eastern Europe. From this point of view it is important to understand that Russia tried to benefit from those ethnic conflicts first of all using the formula divide et impera (divide and rule), and secondly as a tool of pressure and enforcement of its military-political and economic positions there. The same format had for instance the conflicts in Pridnestrovie (Transnistria): actors-Moldavia, Romania, Russia, Ukraine, Abkhazia and South Ossetia: actors-Russia, Georgia, and people of North Caucasus, NagornoKarabakh - actors-Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Turkey, partly Iran.

Now let us analyze the subject of the research. Already during the first years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union it was clear that Georgia, only formally a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), in her long-term strategic policy chose a direction of leaving the military-political bloc of Russia and joining the bloc of NATO and European integration. It is clear that such direction of the development contradicts to the Russian Geopolitical interests, especially if taking into account geographical aspects of Georgia and its satellites- Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
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(Abkhazia - an autonomous republic, South Ossetia - an autonomous province). In the last 18 years Russia was realizing an intensive military-political, economic, and cultural politics to strengthen its influence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It is important to mention that the political vector of the first president of the independent Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia furthered significantly above mentioned Russian goals. His nationalistic announcements generated frantic protests of Ossetian and Abkhazian population. Zviad Gamsakhurdia was a very popular leader in Georgia and possessed an absolute support of the Georgian population. He immediately started to realize ultra national politics that fully feeded an ideology of classical nationalism with a formula - Georgia is for Georgians. His politics right away provoked the national movement in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where people demonstrated mass disturbance and discontent of the Gamsakhurdia's politics. This gave ground to Russia to consolidate the reaction in Abkhazia and South Ossetia against Georgia. An important fact is that Russia those years (after the collapse of the Soviet Union) was much weaker then today and did not possess the recourses for the direct intervention in the conflict, but contributed significantly to the creation of chaos in the region. Abkhazia and South Ossetia received a military support from the volunteer army from the neighboring North Caucasus - historical enemies of Georgians. What took place was the activization of historical offence and memory - a traditional conflict between Georgians and people from the Mountainous Caucasus.

The failure of the inter-ethnic warfare, economic collapse and decrease of the standard of living reduced significantly president Gamsakhurdia's popularity among Georgian people. In 1993 president Zviad Gamsakhurdia was killed in very strange conditions that are not cleared up even today.
The nostalgia about the “better times” (USSR) helped Eduard Shevarnadze, who was the former minister of Foreign Affairs in the Soviet Union to come to power, and with the definite support of Russia. Shevarnadze was trying to conduct a complementary politics between Moscow and the West. Nevertheless, Eduard Shevarnadze couldn’t manage to find a solution to all the above mentioned problems, though he was able to frozen military actions during his presidency. However, Eduard Shevarnadze did not improve an economic situation in Georgia, just the opposite: he created a state where the total corruption was dominating in all the sectors. The country was divided between oligarchs that had connections to the Shevarnadze’s family. A typical example where the “Iron Law of Oligarchy” was a base of the society. As a consequence of the above mentioned Georgian people started their fight against president Shevarnadze’s government. In November 2003 Eduard Shevarnadze couldn’t withstand the political and national pressure and resigned on the 23 November. He was succeeded by the President Mikhail Saakashvili, a person who seemed to meet the demands of Georgian people, having a good, Western education and Western viewpoint and mentality. He was the best type of the leader for such a transition country as Georgia. His subsequent electoral victory in January 2004 was widely seen as a vote for change in the Caucasian republic. Saakashvili launched a strong and institutionally literate campaign to fight the corruption and oligarchic regime. It took him only several years to realize deep and high-quality reforms in the field of the economic regulation and reached

3 Robert Michels (1911), Political Parties: a sociological study of the oligarchical tendencies of modern democracy.
4 www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1250&l=1
unprecedented positive results: the decrease of poverty rate, the living standards of the population improved significantly, the rights and freedoms of citizens also developed a lot. Mikhail Saakashvili's successes of economic reforms together with his pro-western political views to speed up Georgia's acceptance to NATO received an unprecedented in the history of South Caucasus support of the United State and the European Union. Georgia started receiving large financial aid to assist the process of reforms and strengthen the state itself.

Until now people in Armenia remember the excitement and euphoria of Georgian people after the victory over the state corruption and the Russian destructive influence in the era of Mikheil Saakashvili. It seemed that some few more years were needed for Georgia to reach the high standards of living. The people's movement in 2007-2008 in Armenia against the state corruption, oligarchic structure and undemocratic elections was one of the direct consequences of the Georgian success. If only Mikheil Saakashvili continued the same policy of rapid reforms and brought Georgia towards the high level of institutional development already in 5-7 years this state could have get not only the NATO membership but to come much closer to the European Union, for instance in the status of the free trade agreement. Unfortunately president Saakashvili overestimated his role of the —father of the nation that had to restore formal Georgian territorial integrity. During the last years of his presidency the rhetoric of Georgian authorities were full of ultra national expressions, humiliation and offence of the national dignity of neighboring nations. For instance, several years successively Saakashvili and his minister of defense Irakli Okruashvili in their speeches gave announcements and promises to the Georgian people to celebrate the forthcoming New Year holidays already in Tskhinvali and Sukhumi. The anti-Abkhazian and anti-Ossetian propaganda was creating a hostile mood for Georgian people towards the both nations and Russia as we II. S a kas hv ili's government continued the politics of accusing Russia and Russians in all the internal Georgian problems (political, economic). In fact in 2008 and till now anti-Russian mood in Georgia was on too high and dangerous level, reaching even a stage of national —psychosis. He re al o the Kremlin skillfully used this factor in its favor, expelling more than 2000 Georgians from Russia and raided and shuttered several Georgian-owned businesses. Moscow has also intermittently halted air, land and sea traffic with Georgia, banned its vegetables, mineral water and wines from the Russian market and started anti-Georgian media propaganda in Russia, what raised up a resentment of the ordinary Russian population. Already within the Russian territory the hostile movements against Georgians living in Russia (more then 1 million Georgians) started to infringe the rights and freedoms of Georgians there. Till now the role of President Bush in the August War has not been proved. Nevertheless, the fact that for the period of the last years there was a strong modernization of Georgian army with the participation of Ukrainian troops, permanent presence of instructors from the pentagon and very active dialogs between the United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, George W. Bush and Mikheil Saakashvili demonstrate that even if the United States were not the direct participants in the conflict, they acted as an indirect supporting force in the war.

It seems that Russia has been waiting for a moment when Saakashvili will make a fatal mistake in order to finish the process; it has been preparing for 18 years, i.e.
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separation Abkhazia and South Ossetia irrevocably from Georgia. President Saakashvili committed that mistake eventually. An interesting and important trait here is the fact that to Georgia's deep annoyance the majority of the Abkhazian and South Ossetian population are citizens of the Russian Federation and Russian rouble was also commonly used in trade. In the end Russian troops were defending their own citizens whose life was at risk of the ethnic cleansing and from the legal and ethical point of view this can even be justified. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov argued that Russian military intervention into Tskhinvali was justified not only by the principle of the "responsibility to protect" - the principle claiming that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe - from mass murder and rape, from starvation - but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states, but also under the Russian Constitution when its own citizens were at risk. The word —mis take— mentioned above also can be replaced with the word —brutali ties— instead. The reason is that an ethical person did not have any moral right to send the army against peaceful citizens. With a direct pointing of Georgian Army an enormous number of the peaceful Ossetians (children, women) was killed. On the other hand Russia made an unequal and disproportionate military intervention, practically —punishin g— Georgia. Even after a Five -d ay Warll w as o ver r Rus s ian

forces continued to liquidate military bases of the Georgian territory operating on the territory of the sovereign state. The situation in Georgia today differs from the situation several years ago. Saakashvili harshly lost his popularity. It is obvious that very soon Mikheil Saakashvili will lose his power as well. Nevertheless, whoever comes to power in Georgia in the nearest future, ultra national mood will dominate there for a long period of time, because the —s yn drome of a los e— will be strengthened further in the Ge orgia socie ty. This destructive element will be an obstacle for development in this country for a long time. An important point concerning Abkhazia and South Ossetia is that the post-war chaos there will dominate for a quite a long time also. There are two reasons for it: first is a —Vi etnam S yn drome— as it is often used in the lexicon of the international relations and second factor is a kleptocracy (corrupted oligarchic political system). Both Sergei Bagapsh (president of Abkhazia) and Eduard Kokoity (president of South Ossetia) are the classical representatives of corrupted authoritarian leaders. Judging by the policy of Russia on the North Caucasus, we see that the establishment of —kle ptocr atic crim in al sy s te ml of co ncil iat ion of inter nal centrifugal processes ( Chechnya- Ramzan Kadyrov, Ingushetia- Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, Dagestan - Mukhu Aliyev, North Ossetia- Taymuraz Mamsurov - the worst —kle pto cra ts— of their countries) is a ki nd of a — politics— for Russia. In South Ossetia together with Abkhazia the current processes also match the politics of Russian government (ruling) on the North Caucasus. Nevertheless, people of South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia are better than their leaders. The opinion derived from CharlesLouis de Monte s quie u that —Eve ry Nati on
Taking into account ethno-psychological and informal closeness of the Georgians with the Ossetians and Abkhazians makes it possible that one day international organizations in collaboration with great powers (United States, Russia and European Union) will manage to find a compromise in the solving of geopolitical problems in the region. The ground for such an optimistic argument is an improvement of Russia-United States relations. If this improvement will develop the same way, there is a possibility of a realization of the model that appears in the literature from time to time - creation of South Caucasian confederation within an integration process on the European platform, for example Eastern Partnership (European Neighborhood Program).\footnote{Dag Sourander (2006), Briefing Note on the 'Frozen Conflicts' in the South Caucasus, The General Situation in the Region and its EU-relations, European Parliament, 17 February, p.11.} The decision to include South Caucasus into European Neighborhood Program was taken in June 2004. There is a crucial importance for the confederation to be within above mentioned European framework. The reason is that today only European values, i.e. democratic tendencies, development of the institutions of civil society, striving for just and equal accessibility to the resources, and equidistant from the center (core) of power can strengthen and develop the South Caucasian region. Unfortunately a coercive Russian influence does not provide a -happiness and well being- of Caucasian people. Russia today only solves political problems on the Caucasus, but not the problems of Caucasian people. In case one day the positive changes will occur within Russia itself (though it is hard to believe), it will only accelerate the process of integration, and the Russian intervention and influence will be changed from the destructive to a constructive one. The Russian people need democratic reforms as much as Caucasian people (Russians are better than their leaders). The Russian problem demonstrates what an important role the great powers can play in the new world structure improving people’s life. Instead of military-political hostility, EU-RussiaUnited States can form economic and military political cooperation. If such thing ever happens many resources can be directed to the integration processes, (instead of destructive actions) which in its turn will contribute to the fostering of globalization and improvement of life on the earth. In other case the danger of Russia turning again into the -Evil Empire (as Ronald Reagan call the Soviet Union) will hinder the integration processes not only in South Caucasian region but also worldwide. To conclude it is important to repeat that all the existing till now traditions, forms, institutions, mechanisms of solving international (interethnic) conflicts seem desperately outdated, and not corresponding to the new challenges. International legal system has to develop new forms of conflict conciliation that will go ahead with the era of Globalization.

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Innovative Institutions As A Solution To The Silent Water Crisis

by Conrad Rein

“We never know the worth of water till the well is dry.” – Thomas Fuller, 1732

The water crisis is to a large extent a silent crisis that affects millions of people around the globe (UNDP, 2004). A mixture of secure water supplies and sufficient hygiene standards is crucial for both human health and development. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) set comprehensible targets of halving the share of the world’s population without clean drinking water supplies by 2015. To support this daunting task, the UN General Assembly declared the year 2008 the International Year of Sanitation. Increasing the amount of people enjoying access to safe water contributes tremendously on the road to eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, fighting major diseases and improving ecological sustainability. The MDGs were reaffirmed at 2002’s World Summit for Sustainable Development. The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted the “right to water” in its General Comment No. 15 in 2002. Collective action is urgently needed to respond to the crisis. The annual World Water Day that is celebrated on March 22 is an excellent approach for raising public awareness. However, much more has to be done. Thus, the UN Secretary-General, together with an assembly of dedicated companies launched the CEO Water Mandate in 2007. Its first conference took place in 2008 and it offered a panel for the exchange of...
Lack of access to water is worsened by the interlinked factors of industrial water use, population growth as well as urbanization (Nash, 2007). The vast majority of the world's affected people reside in urban regions. As a major side-effect, the amount of people living without safe drinking water and without adequate sanitation is, due to the continuing urbanization, reaching sky-rocketing numbers in slums (Porto, 2007). According to the World Health Organization (WHO), almost 2 billion people will be living in regions in which water resources per inhabitant fall under the suggested level of 500 cubic metres per year. Although every continent is affected by water-scarcity, it is nowhere else more challenging than in Africa, where desertification increases the threat dramatically (WHO; UN CCD). The world's poorest continent has witnessed literally no progress during the past decade. It is not only a problem of sufficient water supplies, but also an economic problem, in particular due to the mismanagement by governments that fail to implement satisfactory legislation and policies for proficient distribution and utilization of water resources. Water companies also share responsibility for the cause célèbre due to a lack of skilled staff. Local communities are to a large extent as well guilty of having failed to escape from the
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disastrous curse. It is argued that their participation is representing the key on the road to improvement of water policies. Thus, there is a clear link between good governance and the involvement of all stakeholders, in particular of small, local groups. Countries that are linked to the rivers Nile, Niger, Volta and Zambezi could, if no urgent improvement is reached, be so-called hotspots for possible water wars in the future. Proper water resources management represents the key to the concept of water scarcity in Africa (UNECA, 2006).

Public Provisions

Politicians and unions, due to their dependence on the support of poor groups, have a strong interest in keeping water prices low. The habit of below-cost pricing owed to populist pressures, the contradictory goals of the different interest groups as well as the problems associated with the often corrupt organizational schemes represent the three primary challenges for public provision (Araral, 2006). They are increased in developing countries when governments both monitor and own public enterprises. The absence of competition translates into a deficiency of innovations that causes a great inefficiency, which, in turn, increases the costs the customers have to afford.

Both private as well as community provision also have their limitations. Political intervention would be essential for avoiding this curse, but is rather rare because politicians usually reject unpopular decisions that would endanger their power. Thus, the answer to the question of how much time will be necessary to depoliticize the public water management is clearly depending on the character of the political system in each country (Foster, 1996).
The excitement of the 1990s, inspired by the Washington Consensus from 1989 and the Dublin Statements and Principles of 1992, that privatization would solve all problems surrounding the water supply in the developing world has quickly vanished. The overwhelming majority of the population of developing countries does not receive their water-linked services from the private sector. It is very unlikely that this will change in the foreseeable future. Efficiency remains the key to the problem.

Although privatization has the potential of improving the water services in the developing world by annulling long periods of low output and insufficient investment under state provision, not much has been achieved. Unfortunately, when it comes to the performance of state-owned and privately-owned utilities, in particular in Africa little difference can be detected. The portion of the population served in both cases is not different (Kirkpatrick et al., 2006).

In spite of all that, it is extraordinary important to highlight the magnitude for policymakers in the developing world to ensure the constant provision of low-priced as well as secure water supplies. It is especially challenging for them to negotiate between the poor households that are interested in low, affordable prices and the companies that have to recuperate their investments in the water supply network. The politicization of privatization does not properly serve the interest of the poor either and is widely regarded as outdated as well as insufficient for the purpose of improving the water services for the poor. The dilemma is obvious: On one hand it is the responsibility of governments to make sure that basic needs are met, but on the other hand economic freedom, with as little
interference by governments as possible generates beneficial competition, inter alia through offering higher quality for lower prices. It goes without saying that both approaches have their various limitations and none of them represents a perfect solution. Both require strict controls for avoiding any abuses.

**Community Provisions**

A solution such as —green sanitation‖ that reprocesses waste helps to recognize the prospective for reusing our reserves. Participatory initiatives and management conducted by communities are essential in collective decision-making processes. The potential ready for exploitation in this sector seems to be unlimited. The millennium-old method of collecting and storing rainwater represents only one victorious example for meeting water provision needs. It decreases the challenging dependence on groundwater supplies. This idea can easily be implemented everywhere, even in the most rural villages. Standpipes represent a further example and can easily be constructed by development agencies or NGOs and managed by local authorities.

So-called water councils are another suggestion that could effortlessly be integrated into the existing traditional organizational schemes most of the societies in rural areas in Africa have. Networks among different councils could be established and could share crucial knowledge aimed at further improving the systems. The mobilization of the public will ensure the political will to do more.

Concerning the smallest thinkable options for developing nations, so-called household treatment and storage possibilities (nota bene: chlorination, filtration, solar disinfection, a combination of filtration and chlorination as well as a combination of flocculation and chlorination (Lantagne, 2006)) represent a valuable strategy.
inexpensive and provide those who will not have constant supply to water in the foreseeable future with the opportunity of improving their quality of life tremendously.

Development agencies should focus on such rather small programmes because the extraordinary elevated investment expenditures necessary for large-scale assets create an access barrier for the income deprived (Krause, 2008). Unfortunately, they have their constraints when it comes to sanitation. Public toilet blocks can fill this vacuum and are not only suitable in slums where room and funding is limited. Such regional projects could be governed by an international body, probably under the framework of the UN that distributes contracts to international donor organizations in a transparent manner and ensures that certain standards are met.

**Innovative Provisions**

In its comprehensive guide *Water Governance for Poverty Reduction*, UNDP considers publicprivate partnerships as one of the most promising approaches to provide water-related services to the poor in developing countries (UNDP, 2004). The potential of a close partnership among all stakeholders, especially between governments on a national as well as regional level, communities and enterprises, combines a considerable collection of people with different ideas and approaches as well as with diverse areas of expertise that is essential for meeting the daunting challenge of the water crisis. Public-private-partnerships help to overcome limitations by bringing in potential partners without overloading the state. The variety of available options includes lease, management and service contracts, concession, divestiture as well as the possibility of building, operating and transferring or owning a joint venture. Therefore, the conditions as well as the
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prospects of a public-private-partnership are open to negotiation. The institutional, legal as well as regulatory structure has to consider the interests of all involved agents based on transparency.

Investments from the outside make available the financial resources that public funds cannot afford. The involvement of private players generates the expertise, the financial background as well as the innovation that is necessary for the improvement of services. Another advantage can surely be the benefit of more transparency and of fair processes. The development and health of the developing world is dependent on the success of these partnerships. Certain efficient institutional and regulatory structures are crucial for the success of public-private endeavours in water utilities. Assurances against currency devaluation as well as against social unrest among other political risks are also of key importance. Naturally, partners from the private sector look for tariffs based on cost recovery, which permits them to act more effectively.

Public and private sectors unite their strengths internationally in ensuring the implementation of basic infrastructure projects. A clear timeframe for the financing and construction part as well as a constant evaluation of the project helps to meet certain quality and performance standards. Such initiatives are important tools that attract national and international investment. However, they should not be misinterpreted as privatizations. They are aimed at serving the interest of the population and the private side is rewarded if certain goals, laid out in advance, that encourage a high quality standard of services are met.

Clearly, different approaches can be used for expanding opportunities and for closing gaps in the water sector for combating the silent crisis. It became apparent that a focus on small-scale projects has proven to be more successful rather than large ventures. The smaller attempts involve different layers of the society, but most importantly they include the communities, nongovernmental organizations and the media that ensures their transparency and helps in acquiring political will to support them. They contribute tremendously in increasing the coverage in the critical rural areas as well as in slum areas and informal settlements. Investment in community-based water and sanitation projects guarantees a noteworthy victory for sustainable supplies. Participatory water management can be guaranteed via the creation of so-called water-managing groups that should incorporate women and the disadvantaged. This can be especially fruitful in traditionally governed rural areas in Sub-Saharan Africa. Naturally, every case is different and requires profound research and communication between all those who are involved. Development agencies should pay more attention to such initiatives and increase their funding systematically.

Other factors that have always to be taken into consideration are environmental concerns and sustainability. Furthermore, the integration of water, sanitation and hygiene programs at the same time is essential. Gaps in research and communication among all stakeholders, inter alia the policymakers, NGOs, societies and donor agencies, have to be closed. If all those who are involved interact and form a strong alliance, additional financial resources can be made available for expanding the access to secure water and sanitation. Especially communication and the exchange of ideas are crucial for exploiting the entire collection of gainful and co-operative solutions. Advances in research and new technologies will enhance the benefit for all sides.
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The benefits of improved water supplies can be outlined in a pro-poor approach. Customers should be faced with affordable, regular bills. Targeted tariff level subsidies can be achieved through the distribution of cash or vouchers to the poorest of the poor. Standpipes with free water offer an alternative in such areas. The introduction of water services provides new job chances through the training of new employees.

The most significant characteristics for the concept of a partnership include a common dedication, a distribution of the risks and joint benefits – all based on harmony. To achieve this noble goal, all stakeholders should show the necessary care and flexibility obligatory for a thriving performance as well as for a smooth process. Howsoever, the main goal should always be to provide the poor with an improved system of safe water supplies and sanitation. To meet this goal, it is irrelevant if water services are managed by the State or by a private venture. What matters most – and what should be regarded as a sine qua non – is that as a result a fast, efficient, affordable and suitable arrangement is found.

People that conduct proper leadership at all layers are as important as is the financial background (van Ginneken, 2008). A combination of different tools, so-called best-fit measures instead of blueprints, is the solution to the diverse and complex situations for the provision of adequate water services to the poor.

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U.S. Primacy in an Age of Uncertainty

By Daniel R. DePetris

For the past six decades, the United States has been the most influential and powerful state in the international system. The U.S. Military remains the most sophisticated and dedicated in the world, prepared to deploy to any region at a quick pace when needed. While the American economy has been slipping for the past two years thanks to an economic recession, Washington's market-oriented ideology allows it to rebound and adapt with impressive precision and speed. Politically, the United States is one of the most prominent members in the international community, a country that is frequently asked by its European and Asian allies to step in and mediate a conflict. Only the U.S. Government has a sole responsibility to maintain a basic peace in the Middle East, and only the United States is required to protect allies in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East with a lasting security umbrella. With all of these factors included, it appears that U.S. primacy is unchallenged, if not absolute, in the 21 century. Yet some problems are beginning to pile up. American adventures into both Iraq and Afghanistan have dealt a severe blow to the U.S. global image. China is rapidly building its domestic infrastructure and continues to boast a double-digit growth rate, all the while maintaining an authoritarian political system that goes against the very fabrics of democratic governance (Gat 2007). Russia, while dependent on oil revenues for economic prosperity, is flexing its muscles with increased...
intimidation in Central Europe (Kagan 2008: 18-19). Poland, and Czechoslovakia, despite a U.S. shield, remains worried about a Russian resurgence. Put the constant threat of Islamic fundamentalism into the mix and U.S. primacy may not be as secure as previously thought. With everything going on in the world today, a couple of big questions need to be asked. First off, is the maintenance of American primacy a rational and attainable goal? And secondly, how can the United States evolve its foreign-policy to maintain the international status-quo? As far as the first question is concerned, there is no doubt that the United States Government has the ability and wherewithal to maintain its prestigious position as the world’s only remaining superpower. This does not necessarily attribute to U.S. military power as much as it attributes to the actual weakness of authoritarian powers in today’s global order. Although China is set to pass the United States in GDP in the next few decades, its political environment remains contentious and imbalanced. Although the Chinese Communist Party remains in power and controls every aspect of the Chinese Government, there are a number of dissidents that are still striving to open up Chinese politics to the world. This is no more evident than in China’s ever-growing middle-class, a contingent that has the capacity to challenge the Communist Party and demand more transparency and accountability from its leaders (Deudney, Ikenberry 2009). This does not even take into consideration the hundreds of millions of people in Western China that remained displaced, unemployed, and poor compared to their compatriots in the
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eastern cities, many of whom are growing tired of the same-old status-quo (Deudney, Ikenberry 2009). Russia is another case where events on the ground do not necessarily correlate to its supposed strength. First and foremost, Russia is heavily reliant on oil revenue for economic growth, and any drop in global oil prices has the effect of slowing down Russian prosperity. Even in areas where Russia is boasting success (leadership in the Caucus and a relationship with the developing world), it is contingent upon international institutions created by western powers. The global interdependence and the widespread globalization that has emerged from the United Nations-as well as the Bretton Woods system-has forced authoritarian powers like Russia to cooperate in a constructive manner for the sake of its political legitimacy and economic survival (Deudney, Ikenberry 2009). As Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry proclaim, “today’s autocracies may be illiberal, but they remain fundamentally dependent on a liberal international capitalist system.” In other words, while Russian and Chinese influence may be increasing in their respective neighborhoods, the odds of both countries catching up to the United States in any profound way is quite slim. Absent their participation in the United Nations and in a global capitalistic system— the same system that gives western democracies a leading voice in global affairs- the strength of authoritarian powers may decline in an abrupt fashion. Just take a look at North Korea, a country that has been isolated from the international community for the past decade. Surely China and Russia do not want to experience the same poor, alienated, and depravity-ridden fate of Kim Jon-il’s regime. All of these realities point to one conclusion; the United States remains in a position of relative strength compared to other actors (both democratic and autocratic) in the global system of nation-states. There is no question that America’s image has taken a drastic hit from the War on Terrorism and the debacle in Iraq. However, this is anything but permanent. Military conflict aside, Washington continues to bask itself in its primacy. This, however, does not mean that the United States cannot do a better job in order to maintain its position in the system. There are a variety of policies that are outdated, unnecessary, and downright contradictory that policymakers on Capitol Hill can change. For instance, instead of relying on military force, economic sanctions, and threats of force to achieve national objectives, the U.S. Government may find it wise to attach a human-element to its foreign-policy. Of course, this is not a new idea. Respected scholars such as Stephen Walt and Marc Lynch have been arguing this for years. Yet it appears that the U.S. is reluctant-if not opposed-to this simple, yet effective, approach. Consider the War on Terrorism as an example. While it was absolutely justified for the United States to respond militarily after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, people in the Islamic World viewed this forceful action as a western assault on Muslim soil. The American policy of preemption in particular—outlined in the 2002 National Security Strategy—only buttressed this sentiment (Walt 2005: 224). Now, in addition to military action in Afghanistan, the United States allowed itself to have a certain degree of “wiggle-room.” Justification from the United Nations Security Council was no longer required for an American military offensive. Instead, it would be the President of the United States that would determine whether military force should be used to eliminate a perceived threat to U.S. objectives. After Afghanistan and Iraq, Muslims- most of whom hold moderate views and are opposed to the fanatic ideology of
I ranic terror groups now became enmeshed in the concern that they were next on the list of U.S. targets. Preemption has done nothing but decrease the legitimacy of the United States, both in the eyes of adversaries and in the eyes of traditional allies. Rather than a responsible nation protecting their own interests, the world has increasingly perceived the U.S. as a bullying-power unwilling to solve problems through dialogue and discussion (Kagan 2008). If a main goal of the White House and the U.S. Congress is to enhance the primacy of the American people, erasing the policy of preemption would certainly aid this mission. Instead of relying on force to defeat America’s enemies, perhaps the U.S. should advocate an effective campaign of “soft power,” thereby mitigating the hostility that many Muslims, Latin Americans, Asians, Africans, and Europeans direct towards America in particular. Encouraging democratic values and endorsing economic development in the developing world in a peaceful and legitimate way would go a long way in serving American interests. Through a combination of cultural respect, religious tolerance, and a willingness to shift the political and economic mindset of the world’s people, the U.S. can improve its image in the eyes of all nations and all peoples (Inglehart, Welzel 2009). Of course, enhancing U.S. primacy is not as simple as opening up dialogue and treating others with respect. The United States cannot simply boast the principles of democracy without following these same principles themselves. Therefore, they must also change their policies in a way that would lend credence to a more peaceful and tolerant world. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a main issue in this regard. For decades, Washington has poured billions of dollars into Tel Aviv while neglecting the plight of the Palestinian people. Indirectly, the United States has supported Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory—specifically the West Bank and East Jerusalem—despite its illegality according to international law. In a more direct fashion, various American administrations have given Israel the benefit of the doubt in terms of dealing with the Palestinians. More often than not, dealing with the Palestinian people means setting up roadblocks, building fences, depriving them of political rights, and treating them like second-class citizens. This must change if the United States is serious in maintaining its current position of primacy. Rather than siding with the Israelis and continuing to tolerate illegal settlement building in the occupied Palestinian territories, Washington must make it clear that both sides of the conflict are responsible for the current stalemate. Failing to understand Palestinian grievances has done nothing for the United States other than heighten the recruitment of Islamic terrorist organizations (Walt 2005: 233). It is time for the United States Government to put a greater amount of pressure on both the Israelis and the Palestinians. For the Israelis, this could possibly mean cutting off generous American donations if they continue to expand Jewish settlements on Palestinian land. For the Palestinians, this could mean cutting off American funds to the Fatah Security Forces if they are not logical in their demands. While this attempt will certainly generate a backlash from Israeli lobbyists in Washington, it is the best solution to a crisis that should have been resolved a long time ago. Finally, American primacy cannot be accomplished without a sustained American effort to practice what they preach. Far too often, the United States expects other countries to support democratic values without actually supporting these values themselves. The U.S. Government continues to back Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt in the Middle East;
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three autocratic regimes that jail and
prematurely prosecute political dissidents on a
daily basis. Billions of dollars go into the hands of
the Israeli Government, despite their occupation of
the Palestinians and their quasidemocratic
system. In Latin America, Republican and
Democratic American Presidents have used
taxpayer money to strengthen the security
capabilities of Columbia, a state that is hardly an
example of an open and accountable political
environment. If the American people expect to
remain on top, they should also expect their
politicians to reform their foreign-policy in the right
direction. Championing the principles of
democracy and implementing them at the same
time would not only serve U.S. interests in the
short-term; it would also provide Washington with
the best chance of sustaining the American
persona. This will by no means be an easy task.
After all, President Barack Obama just recently
tried to lay pressure on Israeli Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu on freezing settlement
construction indefinitely, with no avail. But just
because tacit pressure did not succeed this time
does not necessarily mean that the policy should
be abandoned. In fact, it should be expanded to
other U.S. allies, wherever they may reside.
President Obama laid the groundwork for this
policy in his 2009 speech in Cairo, where he
spoke to the Muslim World and declared a
reformed American strategy bas ed on —mutual
interests and mutual respect. This is a good
start, but more needs to be done. Without
soft-power and a greater perception of the United
States by the international community, sustaining
American

primacy will be an extraordinarily difficult
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A Comparative Discourse Analysis of the 1979 Soviet Invasion in Afghanistan

By Moritz Pieper

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late December 1979 initiated a period of occupation that should last for nine years and that should later be referred to as the Soviet equivalent of the United States’ war in Vietnam. In an international political climate that had been shaped by the ideological bipolarization of the world into two mutually exclusive political blocs, wars against the ideological political enemy came to be seen as part of a certain statist self-justification and self-validation of the respective political system. When rebellious groups of the mujahideen resistance movements attempted to overthrow the government of the leading Marxist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and violently opposed the envisaged series of reforms, the Afghan government, which had been a receiver of Russian military, financial and technical aid since the 1920s, called for the introduction of Soviet forces to assist in the fight against the mujahideen rebels. The reasons for this Soviet foreign political action in 1979 have thus to be seen against the background of the Cold War in general and the historical bonds that Russia has had to Afghanistan in particular. Additionally, the Islamic Revolution in neighbouring Iran in February 1979 had contributed to a climate of decisive political upheavals and turmoils to the

Soviet disadvantage, ultimately provoking the deployment of US ships to the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea. Even more, 1979 marked the signing of an US-backed peace agreement between Israel and Egypt, which the Soviet
government perceived as a major advance for its ideological enemy, the US. Soviet deployment in Afghanistan in December 1979 in order to assist the allied Afghan PDPA government has therefore to be seen in the context of these events which marked the end of Soviet-American Détente and contributed to a change for the worse in international relations.

In the years that followed, Soviet troops gradually took control over the major urban centres, strategic installations and main axes of communication and infrastructure, waging local guerilla wars against the provincially dispersed mujahideen groupings. As the Soviet invasion was a breach of the principle of a state’s self-determination in international law, given that Afghanistan had not been a Soviet satellite state and could therefore not even have been justified by the Brezhnev doctrine, the public international reaction brought forth a majority of states condemning the Soviet deployment as an illegal invasion. Hence, if one sets out to analyse political statements of particular political actors of that time period, one needs to be aware of the whole socio-political context and the political prologue of events that subsequently has culminated in utterances or specific speeches at stake. Public speeches of that time have to be seen in the broader context of Soviet foreign policy doctrine establishing the limited independence of communist satellite states belonging to the Warsaw pact. The Brezhnev doctrine served as a justification to put an end to liberalization efforts in socialist states (cf. termination of the Prague Spring in 1968).
political discourses that have both shaped and affirmed prevalent political concepts, perceptions and opinions in a particular society. —Dis cours e analy s is l l , Tonkis s (2 0 0 0 ) write s , —take s its pla ce within a larger body of social and cultural research that is concerned with the production of meaning through talk and te x ts il (p.2 4 6 ). Langua ge, from this pers pecti ve , is not simply a medium of communication but activ e ly —orde rs and s h apes pe o ple ’s rela tion to the ir social worldIl (p.2 4 9 ). Since the Cold War period is especially prone to ideologically loaded discourses, it is crucial to depart from a discourse-analytical point of view if we are to assess international political reactions to such an event as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Only through the critical endeavour of a deconstructivist analysis, intended to reveal implicitly underlying convictions of different political actors, a realistic evaluation of the international political reaction becomes possible. By the way of a comparative discourse analysis, this article will thus focus on selected excerpts of the Soviet newspaper Pravda which reflect the way the decision by the Soviet government to intervene in Afghanistan has been discursively framed and presented to the public and US-president Ji mmy Carte r’s spee ch on 4 J anu ary 1 9 8 0 in which he publicly reacted to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan of December 1979. These documents provide an insight into the way that concepts and opinions have been shaped discursively in a period that marked the end of détente and a deterioration of ideological bipolarization again.

Different political viewpoints on the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan

Interestingly enough, the Soviet government initially reje cte d the reque st of PDPA’s le ader 2Amin to send in Soviet troops to assist in the fight against the Mujahideen rebels (cf. Westand, 2001, p.128). There have been several explanations for the sudden turn in policy in late 1979, but the precise reasons for the US S R’s de cis ion to inter ve ne in Afghanis tan are still subject to speculation today. Despite the recent access to former Soviet documents, there is huge space for political guesswork, partly because leading Soviet officials at the time knew that a direct intervention in Afghanistan would provoke a harsh condemnation worldwide and was initially to be avoided at all costs. Documents intended for internal circulation in the CPDSU CC Politburo show that in spring 1979, the Soviet government did not consider departing from their mere technological and informational support for the Afghan government. As mutinies and rebel attacks by the Mujahideen increased, however, the stability and security situation in Afghanistan severely deteriorated. —The weight of evidence in the documents that have become available sugge st that Mosc ow’s considerations were more influenced by fear of losing Afghanistan to Islamic radicalis m[…][CWIHP Bulletin, 2001, p.17]. However, secrecy was of utmost priority and decisions were not even formally taken by the Politburo, but rather by several internal meetings of ambassadors and both Afghan and Soviet officials. Hence, there is no such thing as an unmistakable order by Brezhnev to intervene in Afghanistan. It is this policy of concealment and disguising that reveal the ambiguity with which the issue has come to be framed in Soviet propaganda through the daily newspaper

2 „T h a t a full CP S U CC P olitbu ro me e ting wa s n ot he ld to approve the invasion until it had taken place[...] or even t o (a void) Afg ha nast a n ( —All ) r e fle ct t he se cre cy w it h which the fateful step ultimately came about” (W oodrow W ilson International Centre for Scholars)
Pravda. Knowing that a direct intervention in Afghanistan meant a political catastrophe, the government’s final decision nevertheless had to be presented in such a way as to generate public support for this move. Pravda portrayed the invasion in April 1980 as an act of humanitarian intervention initiated at the request of the Afghan government (Pravda, April 27, 1980). It went on mentioning that Soviet forces were to aid in stabilising the situation and the repulsion of possible external aggression (Lяховский & Забродин, p.48).

Basically presenting the Soviet invasion as a peacekeeping operation, Soviet newspapers framed the issue as a humanitarian intervention in the name of the freedom of the Afghan people. Soviet forces were thus sent—at the request of the Afghan government with the only goal to protect the friendly Afghan people (Pravda, March 16, 1980). Further calling upon Soviet patriotism, the operation was intended to preserve peace—on the borders of our homeland (Pravda, April 2, 1987). By referring to the impact a politically devastated or Muslim-ruled Afghanistan would have on the Soviet Union (with which it shared a border), such formulations discursively framed an invasion into a foreign sovereign state as one for the sake of pre-emptive self-defence.

Third, the 1979 invasion was presented as being in full compliance with and appreciation of international law (cf. Pravda, December 31, 1979). As formulated by general Boris Gromov, commander of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan:

—We came to Afghanistan at the end of 1979 at the request of the lawful government [of Afghanistan] and in

3 Brezhnev and other Soviet officials knew they had to avoid public discussion. A reconstruction of the precise reasons to intervene in Afghanistan is thus hardly possible.
accordance with the agreement between our countries based on the Charter of the United Nations [quote Izvesstia, July 2, 1988]. Given that the Soviet forces assassinated PDPA president Amin and pushed for the accession to office of Karmal in December 1979, the allegation that such a move had been in accordance with international law provisions comes to be a blatant audacity.

Media coverage thus accounts for a process of knowledge construction (even propaganda) in the Russian society at the time with the aim of gathering public support for a foreign political decision that has been regarded as an illegal invasion in the rest of the world. Patterns in newspaper language and recurring political discourses help to model public perceptions and to socially construct relations between events, ideas of certain political circumstances and identities of the Russian people. Especially by labelling the Afghan war as a matter of patriotism and liberation, government opponents and critics of the invasion within the Soviet Union could have been muzzled by having them deprived of publicly valued foundations for their argumentation—namely the security of their own country. The political marginalization of possible critics thus followed the line of an overall rhetorical organization that modified the discourses about intrinsic values of Russian society to suit the context of the invasion and to deprive opponents thereby of any solid ground to convince the public. Discourse analysis of Soviet newspapers at the time is thus concerned with the complex processes through which social meanings and thus subsequent public justifications for the deployment of troops in Afghanistan are produced.

This speech serves as a prime example for the public international reaction that the Soviet invasion had provoked and exemplifies how the issue has been framed discursively outside the Soviet Union. —Massive Soviet military forces have invaded the small, nonaligned, sovereign nation of Afghanistan, which had hitherto not been an occupied satellite of the Soviet Union. Carter introduces the issue and thereby implies the core perception that he further elaborates upon in detail: the sovereignty of Afghanistan that is being threatened by an illegal invasion. Moreover, by juxtaposing in opposition the —massive dimension of the Soviet troops to the —small nation of Afghanistan, he subtly conveys the perception of an unfair onset upon a weak victim.

By further deconstructing the Soviet claim of request by the Afghan government as a false pretext, he labels the invasion —an extremely serious threat to peace because of the threat of further Soviet expansion into neighbouring countries in Southwest Asia [...] II. Against the background of the Cold War and its underlying fierce opposition of societal systems, such a statement clearly reveals the American perception of Communist expansion—a perception that had led to the formulation of the =Containment policy= in the 1950s. Calling upon this inherent American fear at the time, Carter implicitly annunciates the end of Détente that inevitably follows the aggressive Soviet act.

His reasoning culminates in a formulation that, by its strong choice of words, sums up all the perceptions and core assumptions that discursively underly his speech and which makes it clear that further careful diplomatic negotiation will be fruitless: —This is a callous violation of international law and the United Nations Charter. It is a deliberate effort of a powerful atheistic government to subjugate an independent Islamic people. The sheer hampering key words once more define the invasion as an illegal act (even a callous one), concede the independence of the Islamic people and thus implicitly the self-determination of peoples and underline the unscrupulousness of the (atheistic) Soviet government, against which Afghan Muslims do not have the ghost of a chance (thus being subjugated). Acknowledging the aggression of the Soviet invasion and the determination that this demands from the international community to react (—the world simply cannot stand by [...] II), he advocates trade embargos and licenses curtails (e.g. grain and fishing privileges) against the Soviet Union as adequate means of retaliation. Boycotts of the upcoming Olympic Games in Moscow in 1980 have inevitably been one additional consequence as well.

Once more calling upon the American fear of Communist expansion during the Cold War, he holds that —aggression, unsupported, becomes a contagious disease. Employing the metaphor of a contagious disease here, Carter actively arouses atavistic fears of a developing epidemic, when left uncontrolled. The natural response to that danger would thus be to put the infected under quarantine—conferred back to the Soviet aggression—Carter’s metaphor thus implicitly justifies the envisaged embargos and trade curtails, thereby putting the USSR under politico-economic quarantine.

—The response of the international community to the Soviet attempt to crush Afghanistan must match the gravity of the Soviet action—Carter concludes, emphasizing once more the collective determination required on the side of the international community of states. Carter’s impulsive choice of words (—crush the Afghan tan!) conveys the degree of indignation and outrage he thereby communicates.

Ending with a rhetorical three-part list, he states that —we will deter aggression, we...
Academic Papers

will protect our Nation’s security, and we will preserve the peace, thus ultimately referring to national security as an intrinsic value of the American people that eventually will be threatened by unopposed Communism.

Carte r’s speech is a prime example for the way that political issues are framed discursively. His strong choice of words and determined formulations perfectly reflect the international public reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Even more, his speech can be seen as a cornerstone for the end of a period of relative relaxation between the two superpowers’ USSR and USA and a renewed hardening of ideological fronts in the last phase of the Cold War. The American perception and fear of Communist desires for expansion resonante decisively between the lines of Carter’s speech, thus rendering it a textbook example of how political discourses frame popular perceptions in the public sphere, constituting social identities and a particular public awareness of certain issues. The same is valid for newspaper articles and statements in the Soviet Union at the time which set the framework of reference for popular perceptions through the active construction of social identities and political perceptions by discursively framing Soviet foreign policy in a complaisant light. Popular manipulation by means of mass media and propaganda (especially in authoritarian regimes) is an example of how public opinions are being discursively framed and shaped. It is the task of discourse analysis to critically deconstruct the underlying power structures in society and to look under its surface to demask the motives and concepts behind discursive practice. Discourses have to be seen both in their interpretive context in general and their rhetorical organization in particular (cf. Tonkiss, 2000, p.249). In my case study, the former essentially has been analysed as the underlying tension between the American perception of Communist expansion and the Soviet perception of hostile ideological encirclement (in this case, the fear of spreading Islamism in their immediate neighbourhood). Rhetorical organization then refers to the argumentative schemes of the respective locutions which need to be analysed and deconstructed critically, as this article has tried to show for two opposing viewpoints on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Bibliography

Does Money Talk? The Effects of Public Financing on Voting Records

by Asad Lugman Asad

When Barack Obama opted out of the public financing system for presidential campaigns in June 2008, a media circus erupted. Critics claimed that Obama's actions had left them "dis
turbed" and began framing the election around issues of "trust" and "whether you can take people's word" (Zeleny, 2008). Despite such rhetoric, Obama was elected to the White House despite his decision to forgo public financing by instead relying on individual contributions. What, then, does it matter from where a candidate receives his or her funding during a campaign? Does it ultimately influence his or her record as a politician or is public financing merely a ruse meant to level the playing field among more well-connected candidates and those who are less so? To answer these questions requires an examination of a smaller political system than that of a presidential campaign, that of the forty-ninth Legislature of the Arizona State House of Representatives. Arizona is a prime example of what public financing should accomplish: With the passage of the Citizens' Clean Elections Act in 1998 that "revolutionized campaign fundraising" to provide the average citizen "a voice in the political process" and candidates the opportunity to "forgo special interests" so that "everybody wins" (Arizona Clean Elections), one can expect to see a clear relationship between public financing and its influence on a politician's record. Examining the history of Arizona's Citizens' Clean Elections.
Act, and analyzing the original statistical calculations conducted for this investigation, reveal that--despite strong arguments to the contrary from clean election commissions across the United States--there does not seem to be a significant relationship between public or private campaign financing and a politician’s voting record.

**Campaign Finance**

Campaign finance refers to the fundraising and spending conducted by political campaigns throughout their respective election cycles. Because campaign expenditures are many, ranging from travel to printing costs for pamphlets to be distributed to prospective voters, politicians spend a great deal of time fundraising. Even President Obama continues to fundraise for the Democratic Party as it prepares for the 2010 midterm elections, appearing at his twenty-sixth fundraiser during his first year in office as of October 2009 (Weisman, 2009). Donations can be either —private or —public in nature. The former implies that an individual or group has contributed funds directly to a candidate while the latter involves a candidate drawing from a general pool of state or federal money to finance his or her campaign.

It is these private donations that have come under fire in recent years. While no one can say with total certainty that special interests donate to political campaigns to reap some sort of benefit in return, many believe that —donations come from firms, associations, and individuals that seek private benefits in the
form of subsidies, favorable regulations and other policies set by the government (Stephen Ansolabehere, June). The dominance of special interests in politics has become a well-documented phenomenon in recent years. In 2000, three of the most important U.S. industries—defense contracting, agriculture, and energy firms—gave a total of $50.1 million in donations to political candidates and parties (Stephen Ansolabehere, June). In fact, to take a stand against the strength of special interests in Washington, D.C., President Obama refused to take money from them during his campaign—and has now extended that rule to the Democratic National Committee—since they represented those that spent millions and millions of dollars in unlimited donations to run—as mears and attacks against his campaign (Zeleny, 2008).

In Arizona, as far back as its admission to the Union in 1912, its founders worried about legislators being the ‘captives’ (Berman, 1998) of large special interests. One freshman legislator was so sure that such had become the case that he proclaimed that ‘thieves and fools’ (Berman, 1998) who had sold their votes for money filled the Arizona State Legislature. As time passed, and special interests became even more of a political force in the state, scandals became commonplace in Arizona. One major incident incriminated the state Liquor Department early on in the history of the state. John A. Duncan, the officer in charge, requested that those seeking liquor licenses apply directly to their state legislators instead of to the State Department, which allowed legislators to take credit for providing their constituents with the licenses and improving Duncan’s goodwill among a vast pool of legislators. Furthermore, although Duncan provided state legislators with the liquor licenses for free, the district attorney soon discovered that some charged ‘fees’ of

go odwill among a v as t pool of legislators. Furthermore, although Duncan provided state legislators with the liquor licenses for free, the district attorney soon discovered that some charg
Unfortunately for Arizonan politics, this was not the only instance of legislative influence from special interest groups. Perhaps the most famous example of the impact of special interests in the state occurred in 1991, commonly referred to as the "AzScam scandal." Beginning in 1989, the Phoenix Police Department led a sting operation that resulted in the indictment of seven Arizona state legislators for accepting bribes from an undercover agent posing as a gaming consultant looking for help in setting up casino gambling in the state. With bribes ranging from $660 to $660,000, legislators' excuses varied as to why they accepted the money, some saying they needed it to help them in a difficult campaign, while others said the funds would help others in their party get reelected. No matter what the excuse, one thing was clear to 70% of Arizona voters: special interests dominated state politics, especially when considering the 4,743 registered lobbyists working for private firms or associations in the legislature and the 1,672 others representing various governments before the Arizona legislature in 1996 (Berman, 1998). Arizona voters would head to the polls in November 1998 to make their voices heard when it came to the level of the state's governmental corruption.

Historical Examination of Citizens' Clean Elections Act

When Arizona voters approved the Citizens' Clean Elections Act in November 1998, its purpose was to limit campaign spending for candidates in both statewide and legislative elections so as to prevent such overt cases of corruption among politicians. For many, requiring publicly-funded campaigns can have four advantages: First, it can help candidates
overcome financial barriers to running; second, it can encourage the emergence of candidates without substantial personal resources into elections against those with the ability to invest millions of their own dollars in their campaigns, increasing competition; third, it can reduce the influence of private contributions on political business; finally, it can control campaign costs (Kenneth R. Mayer, 2005).

To achieve these benefits, the Act created an optional system of funding for state political campaigns, as well as a Clean Elections fund to provide money to candidates choosing to participate. Conversely, for those candidates, the act strengthened limits on private campaign donations while also establishing more stringent reporting requirements (Franciosi, 2001). To fill the fund, money is collected from a variety of sources and coordinated by the newly-established Clean Elections Commission, including: a 10% surcharge on all civil penalties and criminal fines; a voluntary $5 donation on Arizona state income tax returns; voluntary tax credit on donations of up to $640; civil penalties paid by candidates; and, $5 qualifying contributions collected from participating candidates. The Commission projects that in 2010, 53% of its funding will come from Court Assessments and 47% will come from tax donations (Arizona Clean Elections).

To be eligible for Clean Elections funding, candidates must receive a certain number of $5—qualifying contributions, which depends on the office for which a prospective politician is running (Franciosi, 2001). For legislative candidates, this means two-hundred five dollar donations must be made, and with each donation, an accompanying reporting slip must be turned into the Clean Elections Commission. Ultimately, candidates from parties who received 5% or more of votes in the last elections are able to receive up to
100% of the spending limit from the public fund, while independent candidates receive no more than 70% since they run unopposed. Spending limits for any state legislative office in 2007 were $12,921 for the primary and $19,382—fifty percent more than the primary-for the general elections (Arizona Legislature, 2007). One year after the program’s inception, a total of $1.9 million was given to fifty-nine participating candidates representing a 26% participation rate (Franciosi, 2001). In 2008, candidate participation in the public financing system increased to sixty-five percent (Arizona Clean Elections).

Nevertheless, candidates are not the only ones with access to funding from the public fund. The Commission itself also has access to spend no more than —10% of its funding on enforcement and at least 10% on education (Arizona Clean Elections). In this case, —education— refers to sending a pamphlet describing relevant candidates to every home in Arizona with a registered voter for both primary and general elections. Furthermore, legislative and statewide candidate debates are also sponsored, events that all —clean— candidates are required to attend as a condition for accepting public funding (Franciosi, 2001). All of this is done to —improve the integrity of Arizona state government and promote public confidence in the Arizona political process by —implementing and [administering] the Citizens’ Clean Election Act fairly, faithfully and fully (Arizona Clean Elections).

Statistical Analysis of the Forty-Ninth Arizona State House of Representatives

Since its implementation, much has been written about the utility of the Citizens’ Clean Elections Act. Some have championed it as a way to —level the playing field (Arizona
Clean Elections) in political elections, while others have deemed it unnecessary since —the relatively little money ... spent on legislative races gives circumstantial evidence against the proposition that money has overwhelming power at the state capitol (Franciosi, 2001). While these arguments are interesting, they are outside of the scope of this investigation. Instead, it seems more prudent to analyze whether or not a candidate accepting public funding influences his or her voting record while actually inside the state capitol, and not just his or her ride there. In other words, it is more relevant to test whether public or private financing impacts legislative behavior than to test just how such funds influence election results. To determine an answer to this conundrum requires an analysis of the Arizona State House of Representatives' legislators during the most recent—forty-ninth—session. Only one session was examined because comparisons across legislative sessions are unlikely to yield verifiable results since the composition of the chamber changes after each election cycle. Methodology in this case consisted of tracking every vote—yea, nay, or abstention—made by each representative for all bills and resolutions set forth by the current session. Party affiliation and whether or not they accepted solely public financing were also noted. Some basic statistical observations were then made. For instance, in evaluating the approximate 41.7 average yea vote margin that allowed for passage of the majority of legislation, one sees substantial success rates in passing legislation. That is, in the 2008-2009 session, 89% of all legislation was approved and became law (Arizona State Legislature, 2009). In a general sense, this reveals the presence of a strong —gatekeeper— in the House that does not allow legislation to come to a vote without first having the capability to approve it. Although the data itself does not lend itself to extrapolation as to why this happens, it has been argued that Houses are more likely to submit bills to votes only when they are sure it jives with the policy proposals of whoever will be signing it—the governor, in this case (Schroedel, 1994).
Moreover, it was also calculated how parties voted as one entity before a final breakdown was conducted to determine how different funding decisions affected legislative voting in the House. In the forty-ninth session, Republicans were able to band together 91.5% of the time, while Democrats saw substantial dissention among their ranks with a 65% rating. Furthermore, how often members of these groups abstained from voting is also of relevance, since, often times, “abstention may be active non-support (or —shirking), which is not subject to stringent penalties from constituents” (How to Vote, Whether to Vote: Strategies for Voting and Abstaining on Congressional Roll Calls, 1991).

To that end, it was found that individual Democrats chose not to vote 11.6% of the time while individual Republicans voted on all but 2.7% of roll calls. Rather than providing justifications, data does not provide such conjecture is difficult to make in a scientific investigation.

The next step was to determine whether or not public financing played a role in how individual representatives voted. To find the response, each yea vote was assigned a value of —1, each nay vote a value of —6, and every abstention was given a —9 value. The same numbers, chosen based on the operations of a modeling program called NOMINATE that performs a spatial analysis of the roll call votes that were tracked (Poole, Keith T., 2009). That is to say, the program allows users to determine how they want their data to be interpreted and produces an output accordingly. In this case, data was input into the program based on a legislator’s party and whether or not they accepted public financing. Coordinates were then produced according to publicly- and privately-funded Republicans and Democrats.

The above coordinates were then used to yield the following spatial representation:

The above graphical depiction presents a number of interesting results. First, it confirms what the basic statistical analysis above revealed about how often the different parties vote with each other.
Republicans, for instance, regardless of their color in the graph, are clustered closely together, which
agrees with the 91.5% statistic from above. By contrast, Democrats are more distant in their spread, indicating smaller intra-party cooperation. More importantly, however, the spatial representation also places representatives according to the type of funding they accepted in their last campaign cycle. Based on how the parties cluster together along party lines along the Left-Right spectrum—regardless of what type of funding they received—the data demonstrates that there does not seem to be a correlation between the type of funding used and how a representative votes.

Nevertheless, there is one Democratic outlier in this dataset who voted more conservatively than the rest of his party members. This anomaly, however, does not contradict the previously-stated idea. Since this Democrat receives public funding, it is unlikely that special interests influenced his or her voting behavior based on campaign incentives. This is not to say, however, that this representative is immune from such influences, but does further the point that election-funding does not seem to influence legislative behavior. In evaluating whether or not accepting solely public financing influences a representative’s legislative voting record, it is important to consider a few caveats. First, it is necessary to determine whether special interests have a hold on elected candidates to serve as their political pathways, this project has focused on a more pressing— and less investigated— issue of whether private funding influences legislative behavior. By comparing privately-funded candidates to the voting records of publicly-funded representatives within parties, there does not seem to be a substantial correlation between the two matters. This is not to say, however, that this has always been the case. Rather, the data in this investigation did not lend itself to a comparison across legislative sessions since the dynamics of a chamber change with each election based on who enters and exits it. Moreover, future investigations might consider focusing on the reasoning behind the substantial number of abstention votes from the Democratic Party, as well as why the Republican Party has such high levels of voting cohesion. The data in this case was unable to determine motivations for such questions. What is clear is that the Citizens’ Clean Elections Act of 1998 did indeed attempt to fix—a broken and corrupt system of campaign finance in Arizona, tarnished by a variety of scandals throughout its history. What remains unclear, however, is whether the Act assisted in reducing such scandals by forcing politicians to be more accountable for their voting records. It seems certain, however, that money does talk, but what it says remains to be deciphered.

Asa Asad, 20, is a junior at the University of Wisconsin majoring in Political Science and Spanish. He is currently abroad in Madrid, Spain studying international relations and Spanish at the Universidad Complutense de Madrid. His senior thesis will discuss whether or not the government’s privatization of border security to security firms such as Blackwater has resulted in higher levels of violence against undocumented immigrants. His interests include immigration, international relations, human rights, and Latin American politics.
Bibliography


Is the Ratio of Public Expenditure to GDP a Good Measure of „Welfare Effort“?

by Alexi Gugushvili

valuation of country’s welfare effort is a controversial task primarily because scholars so far have not been able to measure it [welfare] empirically in any objective and


All public expenditure is classified by public social and public non-social expenditure. The former occurs when the benefits are intended to address one or more social purposes and participation is compulsory (Adema, 2005: 8). Unlike a ratio of total public spending to GDP that indicates how much the government is able to spend in comparison with the scale of economy, the social expenditure shows social priorities which the government puts into the agenda (Castles, 2004: 39-40). Therefore, more precise valuation of the state’s welfare effort is given by a share of social expenditure in overall public expenditure.

Social Approach

Table 1: Bivariate correlations between total public and public social expenditure and human development index, coefficient of income inequality and female participation rate* for 25 OECD countries in 2001

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broadly acceptable (Tanzi and Schukenecht, 2000: 74). According to EspingAndersen, the welfare state consists of legal and organizational features that are systematically interwoven and cannot be regarded simply as a numerical cumulation of social policies (1990: 2, 26). Besides, from the 1980s, trends of globalisation complicated national governments’ ability to employ public expenditure for demand-side economic growth, full employment and social protection (Clennerster, 2003: 233). However, as Castles notes the majority of comparative welfare studies still refer to the ratio of public expenditure to GDP as the substitute for states’ exertion for welfare (Castles, 1994: 349). This application can be challenged through social and economic points of view.

Social Approach

Table 1: Bivariate correlations between total public and public social expenditure and human development index, coefficient of income inequality and female participation rate* for 25 OECD countries in 2001

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Public Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP

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Public Social Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP

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* Defined as female labour force of all ages divided by female population aged 15-64.

Pearson's r. a = significant at .05 level; b = are not significant.
Even though it is not possible to estimate exactly how much is required to prevent individual hardship and how to avoid inequality in welfare distribution, increase of social expenditure most likely facilitates social welfare. However, Clayton and Pontusson (1998: 70) argue that the account of social expenditure as a percentage of GDP fails to consider revised demand for welfare services. Demographic changes, widely observed in the developed world, tend to increase social expenditure because old people receive more social assistance and need more health care. Higher unemployment also tends to affect demand on social security. Consequently, higher ratio of public social expenditure to GDP may give the false impression that the welfare effort is higher, when in fact welfare per recipient is not (Davis, 1998: 17).

**Economic Approach**

It is generally believed that socioeconomically advanced countries, through better institutional settings and tax systems, are able to mobilize a greater percentage of national income for financing growing public expenditure (Ebbinghaus and Manow, 2001: 153). However, Tanzi and Schukenecht argue that within the group of industrial countries some states with relatively small public expenditure have better or at least the same levels of social and economic welfare performance (2000: 76). Changing trends of public expenditure are also hard to detect. Pierson (1996: 179) insists that countries where the public sector is already big further enlarge their public expenditure, while Caslite (2001: 205) observes an adverse relationship between prior level of public expenditure and later expenditure growth. Nevertheless, there are several economic explanations why marginal increase in expenditure does not necessarily correspond to marginal output of welfare (Perdomo, 2004: 6).
The main problem is that "not all spending counts equally' (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 19). In the developed world, approximately one third of public expenditure comes on transfers that facilitate the redistribution of resources in a society (Corry, 1997: 17). However, without having information on the impact of tax systems, by which governments can levy direct and indirect taxes on cash transfers and products bought by benefit recipients, it is impossible to have a full picture of governments' welfare effort (Adema, 2005: 6). The high public expenditure consumes too many resources out of economy and implies less immediate or future private spending with high opportunity costs (Tanzi and Schukenecht, 2000: 74). Furthermore, human-intensive character in most of the public services is linked to poor growth in productivity (Davis, 1998: 30), which means that an increasing share of public expenditure to GDP often results into the same amount of welfare effort.

Disparity in public expenditure as a share of GDP across the countries can be also explained due to changing pattern of public service delivery. Reorganization of the public sector leads to a discovery of the new ways of delivering existing public goods. Many services, previously regarded as the indispensable part of the public realm, have been transferred to private agencies (Corry, 1997: 15, 20-21). "Fiscal welfare", that is the redistribution of income by the state for its citizens through tax relief or allowances, is increasingly supplemented by "legal welfare", which is "the use of regulation and legislation to intervene in market outcome" (Le Grand, 1997: 150). It means that in some cases government's welfare functions are undertaken by private expenditure, often regulated through legislation and encouraged by indirect financial support and the tax systems (Adema, 2005: 6). Obviously, these activities do not fit in
standard statistical calculations that determine the ratio of public expenditure to GDP (Castles, 1994: 352).

Overall, a ratio of public expenditure to GDP is not a good measure of different countries' welfare effort. What it really shows is the government’s institutional capacity to mobilise and spend resources that maybe potentially directed to welfare purposes. In order to transform this ratio into a sophisticated measurement of welfare effort further disaggregated information should be analysed, including data on social expenditure, the socioeconomic structure of population, the nature of social security and tax systems, and the character of public service provision and private social expenditure.

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Conflict Resolution: Theory, Method and Practice

by Chak Sopheap

When discussing historical wars or simply current conflicts, it is important to emphasize their complexity. Often conflicts engage several people including civilian and military, in both direct and indirect ways. They link both to internal and external factor driven by multiple and competing motivations like state power; national identity and interests; and natural resources. Due to this complexity, conflict resolutions are also vary and their practicalities to current world order need to be discussed. Though there is no full guarantee that a single theory will ensure the conflict settlement, mediation; facilitation; and rights to protect (R2P) and forceful intervention by international coalitions or bodies, like the United Nations, have gained much recognition in a way of resolving conflicts. Though they have been successfully proven in some conflict cases, there are also evidences of their failure and escalation of more tensions. Hence, this paper attempts to address how effective these conflict resolution theories by examining their success and failure and seeking how these theories are contested in the real practice. Meanwhile, this paper will go beyond these theories by exploring for other alternatives and seeking for effective solutions to current unsolved conflicts as well as future clashes. Finally, these theories will be synthesized with reflecting to Johan Galtung’s non-violent means of conflict resolution. Before illustrating those theories; however, we need to understand concepts related to conflict and conflict resolution.

Conflict and Conflict Resolution: Concepts and its Importance

A conflict usually refers to — a condition in which one identifiable group of human being (whether tribal, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious, socioeconomic, political, or other) is engaged in conscious opposition to one or more other identifiable human groups because these groups are pursuing what are or appear to be incompatible goals. This emphasizes that conflict often involves three main elements: action, actor, and incompatibility. This emphasis is also supported by Peter Wallensteen, the author to — Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System, who defined conflict as — a social situation in which a minimum of two actors (parties) strive to acquire at the same moment in time an available set of scarce resources. Similarly, Lewis A. Coser, the first sociologist who attempted to bring together structural functionalism and conflict theory, described conflict as a struggle over value and claims to scarce status, power, and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure, or eliminate their rivals. Then we can conclude that conflict is an interaction involving humans who are fighting, maybe violent or nonviolent, over their claimed interests. To understand the variety of interests, we should look at types of conflicts. There are three types of conflicts: conflict over tangible gains, conflict as a consequence of state policy failure, and conflict over a world order of current order.

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14 On identity. With this conflict classification, it would require a comprehensive approach to the problem and deep understanding of ways to prevent, control, limit, or terminate it—that is conflict resolution.

15 In reflecting on the huge disasters of a series of war including World War I, World War II, and the cold war, there have been many attempts to stop and prevent recurring conflicts among major states as well as civil wars and genocides. Since then the concept of conflict resolution has been emerged and transformed accordingly to respond to the change of the world order. According to Louis Kiesberg, the professor of Social Conflict Studies at Syracuse University and the founding director of the Program on the Analysis and Resolution of Conflicts (1986-1994), conflict resolution is oriented toward changing conflicts so that they can be conducted constructively, even creatively, in the sense that violence is minimized, analogism between adversaries is overcome, outcomes are mutually acceptable to the opponents, and settlements are enduring. Kiesberg also highlights that major contributions of many scholars, practitioners, and organization have made the concept of conflict resolutions gradually developed within the four periods. 1914-45, the emergence of conflict resolution field due to some prepared ideas and actions like the creation of the League of Nations and Wilsonian idealism. 1946-69, early effort and basic research was significantly launched, key research institutes was established including the Center for Conflict Resolution of the University of Michigan in 1959, International
Peace Research Institution Oslo (IPRIO) in 1959, and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in 1966. These research institutions have contributed much to the expansion and development of the conflict resolution field through their research activities and publication. 1970-85 then is a period of crystallization and expansion when several theories have been analyzed such as game theory and quantitative studies, sociological approach and conflict process, peace research and the social and institutional causes of war, management theory and conflict resolution, and the conflict resolution practice and procedure. 1986-present is the ongoing period of differentiation and institutionalization which the conflict resolution field further expanded to several phases of conflicts, increasing the training efforts and using the new technologies and media as the tool of its advocacy. Regardless the concept development of conflict resolution, one should not perceive that conflict resolution is just to stop the conflict or it is just exchangeable meaning to the conflict termination. Yet, conflict resolution involves termination of a conflict, prevention of the conflict from erupting again and removal causes and roots of the conflict.

Likewise, Kiesberg gives a definition of conflict resolution in relations to the three elements of conflict—actions, actors and incompatibility—conflict resolution refers to removing the causes as well as the manifestations of a conflict between parties and elimination the sources of incompatibility in their positions.


William I. Zartman et al, [editors], Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques, p. 12
Conflict Resolution: Theoretical Concept, Methods, and Practice

The following are the most common approaches of conflict resolutions that have been engaged with several conflicts.

18 Mediation According to webmaster dictionary, mediation is the process or the act as intermediary agent in bringing, effecting, or communicating; especially, inventing between conflicting parties to reach reconciliation, settlement, or compromise. Similarly, I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval, cited in the book titled Herding cats: multiparty mediation in a complex world, illustrate that mediation is best thought of as a mode of negotiation in which a third party helps the parties find a solution which they cannot find the most easily. Likewise, Jacob Bercovitch, the author of Mediation in International Affairs, gives a very comprehensive definition of mediation which is— a process of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties own negotiation, where those in conflict seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an outsider (whether an individual, an organization, a group, or a state) to change their perception or behavior, and to do so without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law. Regardless any definition, mediation must involve third party to mediate for reaching the agreement among conflicting parties and maintain peace. There are several factors that explain why parties seek mediation: to achieve aims by other means when war or violence fails to reach the goal; to achieve a favorable settlement while pursuing fighting may produce worst outcome; to seek protection against stronger side which is mostly employed by the losing party; and to gain propaganda an publicity by advocating that the other side is provoking conflict or atrocities. Jacob gives additional reasons to the mentioned factors: the conflicting parties may want to place the blame for failure to an outsider and they want the mediator to play the role to monitor, verify and ensure the implementation of agreements. Beside, the actors who can play the roles as mediator are not limited to individuals, states or institutions. What important are their motives to be mediators, their resolution strategy in reflecting the conflict situation, and the agreement from the conflicting parties. Though general claimed motives of mediators are for humanitarian interest in preventing war and escalation to regional or world security; especially the mediators’ state security, some hidden agenda should be also highlighted such as: the enhancement of their influence and leadership, if for state level is to gain political power, and to gain gratitude from the parties and international prestige. Usually, the mediation can be effectively conducted when the conflict reaches a “hurting point” or when cost becomes unbearable so that there is reassessment. However, it also depends on the control and possession resources of mediators that will help to determine their ability to achieve favorable outcome. Theses resources include reward, coercion, referent, legitimacy, expertise and information. Seemingly, there are many dimensions to be considered for a

18 Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, Pamela Aall, [editors]. Herding cats: multiparty mediation in a complex world, United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999, p. 7

19 Jacob Berkovitch and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Mediation in International Affairs: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management, St. ma rt in’s P re ss, Ba singst oke , 1992, p. 7

Note: The text is provided without page numbering, and the page dimensions are not relevant for the content. The references are integrated into the main text for clarity.
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successful mediation and the supporters of this approach advocate that it is the effective tool for peaceful conflict resolution. Yet, it may uneasy when it comes to the real practice.

**The case of Aceh, Sri Lanka, and Palestine-Israel**

Why was mediation successful in Aceh but not in Sri Lanka, and Palestine-Israel? Mediation in Aceh was a success deemed to: Firstly, the spirit of newly elected president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyouno, who appealed publicly not to use military force in resolving conflict as done by previous predecessors, and assigned the right person to make contact with Free Ache Movement (GAM), that is Vice President Jusuf Kalla who was perceived as a neutral person by both GAM and Indonesians. Kalla then reached for mediation by former Finnish President Marti Ahtisaari whose career was well-known for peacemaking in Namibia and Kosovo. Secondly, the effect of Tsunami in December 2004 placed a demand for peace agreement from GAM while the Jakarta also reached its hurting point as the democratization in Indonesia raised the costs of continuing the conflict. It can be concluded that the hurting point was genuinely identified and the creditability and confidence in the role of mediator made the peace talk successful.

In comparison to Sri Lanka, the genuine hurting point was not identified as the LTTE become a terrorist organization, which without a complete separation, there is no endless point for their fight and the control over its arm forces would be considered as a threat. Moreover, there was controversial role of Norway of which the Sinhalese government preferred Norway to be facilitator while the LTTE wanted Norway to be mediator. Importantly, this mediation was a failure once mediator lost its creditability by seeing to
the Tamil side, and also there was a great division among Sinhalese government (the Prime Minister favored the peace talks while the President was so hostile to the peace process and the Norwegians). As a result, the mediation stage gave time for LTTE to regain its military forces and again launch attack while the Sinhalese spoilers also wanted to fight on (the President declared the state of emergency and suspended all peace talks once the prime minister was out of the country, and the LTTE demanded to removal of the Norwegian monitoring mission).

Similarly to Palestine-Israel conflict, there were several mediation attempts done by different actors, such as UN and US of which different administrations involved (Camp David by Jimmy Carter and followed by Clinton, then the Road Map to Peace by Bush Administration), to reach peace settlement in these nations. Though some peace proposals have been proposed and mediators were able to bring both conflicting parities to negotiating table, the conflict is still enduring and it even becomes complicated when there are spoilers from both parties and other international nations are pulling behind.

**Good offices and facilitation**

Another approach in resolving the conflict is *=good offices and facilitation*. By definition, facilitate is to make easier and facilitation, according to the context of US. Alternative Dispute Resolution is referring to a process in which a neutral person helps conflicting parties to work together more effectively. The role of facilitators may include: the opener of communication channel and discussion initiatives; resource expander who will provide assistance to the groups and links them to outside sources; or problem explorer by examining a variety of viewpoints and help the
group to reach consensus. Similar to mediation, it requires the third party involvement in settling the conflicts. However, the role of the third party in this process is usually limited which they just simply bring the disputing parties into communication and facilitating their negotiation. This will help the conflicting parties not to lose their face even though they are willing to negotiate for resolution. On the other hand, there are potential drawbacks from this facilitation process due to: non-neutral position, either side may perceive facilitator bias; limited role of facilitator (conflict may not be resolved when there are opponents to each other’s ideas and facilitator have no authority to intervene further); limited time, information, and resources of facilitator.

**The case of Palestine-Israel**

Norway played the role as facilitator in the Oslo Accords. Though Norway could bring both Israel and Palestine to negotiating table and agreed to Oslo accords, it failed reaching substantial interests. As the result the conflict is recurring in these countries. According to Johan Galtung, there is flawed process, referring to the peace negotiation in Israel-Palestine by Norway, which necessary led to a flawed outcome. He identified five main points that led to this flaw: the exclusion of extremist that led to terrorist activities; peace actors and movement were excluded; USA who was the major actor in Israel side was not a signatory; underestimation of internal polarization of both sides; and secrecy and limited room for dialogue. This case clearly emphasize that the limited role of facilitators will result to recurring the conflict after the conflicting parties are able to strengthen their military or capacity bases.

**R2P and Forceful Intervention**

With the failure to address on the Holocaust or the tragedy of Cambodia and a continuing series of human rights abuses including genocide and atrocity crimes throughout the 1990s—like the case of Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo—the concept of Rights to Protection (R2P) have emerged. It was first articulated by the Canadian-government sponsored International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) of 2001, then followed by the UN Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change in 2004 and by the Secretary-G general’s own further report to the World Summit in 2005. Then there were 150 heads of state and government unanimously endorsed during the General Assembly in the UN’s 60th Anniversary year. Observably, R2P is a more favorable and revolved language of a controversial “humanitarian intervention” which places much emphasis on “rights to intervene” and the use of military force. From the outset, The R2P encompasses of three responsibilities: to prevent, to react, and to rebuild. The responsibility to prevent is to address the root causes and direct causes of domestic conflict.

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22 N. S. Coory (2008, Oct 29) —Con flict Tra ns form a t ion a nd Negot iation: E vidence fr om Sri L a nka, Lecture Slide of IPSP Class, IUJ.

and other avoidable crises that put populations at risk. If prevention fails and crisis is occurring or about to happen, then the R2P get to the responsibility to react. This may include diplomacy, persuasion, and if necessary coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution, and in extreme cases, only for last resort, military intervention will be employed. After that, the R2P deal with the responsibility to rebuild by providing full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation to address the causes of the harm that the intervention aimed to halt or ameliorated. This operation may clash with the sovereignty of the hosting state. Yet, R2P, as clearly stated in its core principle, is aimed to put primary responsibility of sovereign states to protect their citizens from genocides and mass catastrophes and if the states are unable or fail to fulfill this commitment, the international community can intervene. This implies that state sovereignty should not be an excuse to prevent intervention from international community but it shields states' responsibility to protect its people in cooperation with others.

Notwithstanding, the question of legitimacy, authority, operational effectiveness and political will are still the challenges in implementing R2P. Once the action proposed is extreme like military intervention, it does not only concern an intrusion of sovereignty of a concern state, but involvement the use of deadly force, which may reach a massive scale. Thus, R2P needs to resolve with whom authority and when to intervene. ICIS S recommends three levels of responsibility: to protect the lives and promoting the welfare of citizens is the foremost duty of the sovereign

state, and it lies secondly with domestic authorities in partnership with external players, and ultimately, when the primary and secondary levels fail to improve the situation, the role of international organization is significant.\textsuperscript{26} For the third level of responsibility, ICISS also suggests that the UN’s Security Council would assume the primary responsibility in directing the combined efforts of the UN system. If the UNSC is paralyzed, then the General Assembly must attempt to reach a consensus on how to proceed, and if it still fails, it must go through – collective action of will or regional organizations, like NATO for example.\textsuperscript{27} Concerning to the UNSC level, R2P may be hard to get approval as the present Permanent Five obtain the veto power of which one or more members may obstruct the needed actions. The case of Kosovo proved clearly that SC was blocked by veto. Also, for legitimacy of R2P to response to humanitarian emergencies, the commission proposes just cause threshold (halting or preventing humanitarian disaster such as ‘large scale loss of life’ and ‘large scale ethnic cleansing’ and precautionary principle ‘right intention’, ‘last resort’, ‘proportional means’ and ‘reasonable prospect’). Yet, to what extend that the just cause will be determined, or simply how much large scale loss of life will be considered for collective actions. There were already failures in preventing genocide in Cambodia, Rwanda, Congo, Kosovo, and many other African countries as proofs to this just dilemma. Also,

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid, p.49

\textsuperscript{26} Alex J. Bellamy, – The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem of Military Intervention, International Affairs, Vo. 84, No. 4 July 2008, p.152

\textsuperscript{27} Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, International Crisis Centre, p. xi-xiii)
what criteria to measure the right intention is debatable. Why NATO's 1999 intervention in Kosovo was viewed by international communities as highly justified on moral and practical grounds, while the US's 2003 invasion into Iraq is condemned. This requires a clear interpretation of the criteria and it also demands the real political will from all five permanent states in UNSC as well as other members dedicated to world security and wellbeing of humanity. Beside these mentioned challenges, the limitation of UN itself may hinder the operation of humanitarian intervention and produce setback outcome. The short mandate, due to budget constraint and lack of military force contribution and professionalism, could only treat the symptom of the conflict, but not the causes. This would be considered as an incomplete missionary and it may create new injustice as it strengthens the victim side which will then plan revenge. The French intervention into Rwanda in 1994, for example, strengthened the Tutsis and led to the conflict in Congo is an indication of this drawback of ineffective humanitarian intervention.

The case of African Conflicts

As already mentioned, implementing R2P may be contested to sovereignty of concerned states, legitimacy, authority as well as its capability to effectively address the conflicts. More importantly, the lack of political will from UNSC and international communities have hindered R2P to quickly prevent the tragedy of genocide in many states. These challenges have been clearly proven in a series of conflict such as Rwanda, Liberia/Serra Leone, Bosnia/Kosovo. Thus, it should be the best experiments that the international community; especially the UN and African Union, needs to learn from their failure and improve their mechanism to quickly address the unresolved conflict in Somalia, Congo, Sudan/Dafur.
Decisive victory – War

With exception to the military intervention employed by UN, all above mentioned mechanisms are peaceful means toward conflict resolution and those who advocate this approach will refuse to deploy any violent acts; especially war. Like Johan Galtung, the principal founder of the discipline of peace and conflict studies, all violence is wrong and force cannot bring a lasting resolution. However, for opponents to idealists and peace advocates, they believe that conflict must be resolved by a decisive victory— one must dominate to maintain peace. Without a decisive victory conflict will continue to smolders and external resolution is impossible. Like Edward Luttwak, the senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in his Foreign Affair article titled —Give War a Chance II, underlines that war has a great virtue in resolving political conflict. He criticizes the cease-fire or peacekeeping efforts by mediators or international organizations such United Nations who do not allow the war of lesser powers to run their natural course. By promoting the cease-fire, Edward states that it would only able to arrest war and give chance to rebellion group or either sides to be able to reestablish and rearm their forces. This will aid to prolong and widen the scope of killings and destruction. Interestingly, this model maybe supported by the US administration who invaded Iraq in March 2003 with the claim to bring democracy to Iraqi people. It thus prove fallacies as the war launcher may only use war as the tool to reach its own interest while the weaker are at disadvantage and the suffers of civilians are ignored.

Proposed Resolution

Following the conceptual development of conflict resolution, there are different methods have been explored and employed to different context of conflicts. Different methods of conflict resolutions have its own unique characteristics and both advantages and disadvantage, thus it may well equip to a certain conflict but it is not for others. Therefore, we need to understand clearly the main characteristics of these methods and seek how it can be used with a specific circumstance. Regardless any circumstance, conflict resolution approach should supply sufficient and concrete situational analysis of conflicting parties or states and also civilians' interests should be considered. Among above mentioned theoretical approaches, R2P should future developed and promoted as it covers all critical conflict stages: prevention (pre-conflict); react (during conflict); and rebuild (post-conflict). Though it may contest with the ideal principle of Johan Galtung, that force cannot bring a lasting resolution of conflict, R2P should be seen as both idealist and realist approach since it employs all mechanisms from diplomacy, persuasion, and if necessary coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution, and in extreme cases, only for last resort, military intervention will be applied. Johan Galtung's peace ful me an is appropriate in addressing the structural violence since it can only be exercised for early and after conflict stage, but it cannot be used with direct violence of while the conflicting parties are still going on war.

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Turkey once more in history by Mahir Zeynalov

Following a long stall subsequent to the declaration of a new, secular Turkish Republic by hardline founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Turkey has entered into a different track of constructive engagement with its neighbors and involved powers in the region, in recent years.

Ottoman state, which ranged from Morocco to the West and to the Caucasus in the East, and from the Black Sea in the north to the Arabia in the South, has been a significant actor in the Middle East for more than four centuries. During the Ottoman period, Middle East little fell into trouble or significant wars waged within the state. This has been due to Ottoman’s leadership across the Middle East establishing an intra-civilizational grip on power. Turkey, a secular republic born as a result of the first anti-colonial struggle, seeks to return to its heyday, again.

Greater Middle East project led by the USA under former American President George W Bush, which faced with partial failure, fell short in re-organizing the Middle East with its modernization and democratization goals. Resistance to these ends in the Middle East leaves no need for an explanation that the Middle Eastern culture is too resistant to any changes brought outside through foreigners, particularly if its advent is through an apparent occupation. The recent chaos in the Middle East particularly after the US has invaded Iraq is a testimony that America’s any project should be supported with regional countries, especially with those that have visible power in the region. For instance, uneasy relations of the West with Iran give it a reasonable chance to destabilize Iraq by its substantial Shiite population. Turkey’s disengagement in providing military transit route for the American military to attack Iraq from the northern Iraq and many times putting Egypt at straits against Arabic countries in Israeli-Palestinian conflict are some cases displaying the importance of involvement of culturally close countries in modernization in the Middle East. The US, therefore, should not particularly attempt to erase evil forces’ in the Middle East, but rather push regional powers for more involvement.

Turkey, in this sense, plays a particular role in being a role model for the regional countries. During the Cold war, Turkey’s passive foreign policy, mainly regulated by strict Western course of Turkey, did little to establish its independent foreign policy. PostCold war period, however, which demands far more geopolitical calculation and delicate foreign policy, is aptly undertaken by Turkish leadership, offering new and more engaging image with leadership attire in the Middle East. It is more than obvious; despite Turkey’s reiteration that its EU bid is Turkey’s first priority; Turkey pays more attention to its Eastern neighbors than its Western. Turkey’s ever-expanding geopolitical influence and increasing economic capability has pushed Turkey to improve its engagement with its
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eastern neighbors. Recent visits of 6 Arabic countries’ Foreign Ministers to Turkey in the framework of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Turkey relations are a clear evidence in point. In a joint declaration they have released subsequent to the meeting, they declared common foreign policy visions in the region. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu have paid several visits to Iraq, Syria and Iran. Not more than a month ago, Turkey and Syria lifted visa requirements between each other. However, only a decade ago, two countries were on the verge of the war following Syria’s host to Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terrorist organization members in its territory. During Prime Minister Erdogan’s visit to Iraq, Turkey and Iraq has signed 48 agreements and according to observers, that was a milestone in Turkish-Iraqi relations after the chaotic collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister also visited Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan during October and November, signing a series of agreement between these countries and Turkey. Turkey is expected to spearhead a union in the Middle East soon. Strategic Cooperation Councils established to bring these countries together is an apparent testimony in this respect.

Turkey has long ignored its Arab neighbors, often having no relations and only a modest volume of trade. Recently, the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government’s far-reaching foreign policy has embraced the Arab countries of the Middle East. In addition, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s recent sp at with Is rae l at Davos gained many allies for Turkey across the Arab world. The appointment of Ahmet Davutoglu, who had been Erdogan’s chief foreign policy advisor since 2003, to the post of foreign minister on May 1, 2009 also paved the way for Turkey's expanding foreign policy towards the Middle East.

Turkey has attempted to institutionalize its foreign policy with Arab countries in recent years. Particular agreements have been signed with the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Arab League to improve trade and economic relations during foreign ministers’ meeting at the Çiragan Palace, on July 9, in Istanbul. Turkey signed a Strategic Dialogue agreement with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, which consists of Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman and the UAE, in 2008 in Saudi Arabia, to boost political and economic relations and to open a new page with these countries. Within this framework, the foreign ministers met in Istanbul on Tuesday to clarify relations and ease the process of trade between these countries. Turkey’s trade volume with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries was around $2 billion in 2002 but has recorded an enormous increase to $17 billion in 2009. Turkey’s reforms in the last seven years both in economic structure and political bureaucracy have made Turkey’s economy and its trade relations more lucrative. These reforms also made Turkey a profitable country for the foreign direct investment. In addition, in the last seven years, the total business volume of Turkish contractors in Gulf Cooperation Council countries amounted to $16.1 billion.
Turkey’s rapprochement with the Arab countries may be detrimental to its relations with Iran, considering Iran’s uneasy relations with Gulf countries. However, Turkey’s delicate balancing policy with Iran and its rivals, including Israel and Arab countries, would tackle this issue, too. Arabs, to some extent, both in the public and the political circles, have constituted a negative image for many decades in the post-Ottoman Turkey. However, this negative image is fading away as the Turkish government opens up to the Arab world and Arabs, with their increased tourism to Turkey, are reversing the stereotypes.

Turkey, in addition, is also interested to institute peace in the Middle East. Of particular attention needs to be paid to Turkey-mediated peace talks in the Middle East and the Caucasus. Turkish efforts to mediate recent Israeli-Syrian indirect talks over Golan Heights have been praised by many Western countries. Turkey also played a crucial role in pushing Russia to immediately stop violence and stop disproportionate use of force against Georgia, over disputed territory of S. Ossetia, a Georgian territory currently controlled by Russian military forces.

In addition to that, Turkey is also the loudest country in Uighur ethnic violence in China. Despite President Abdullah Gul’s recent visit to China and strong diplomatic relations established, Turkey attaches more importance to its Turkic brothers than the fourth largest economy in the world, China. Several ministers have paid important visits to several capitals of European Union and also most notable of them was Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Brussels visit. These visits are seen as the revival of Turkish EU bid stagnation over 2-3 years. The moving picture tells more than a snapshot. These are all a testimony for Turkey’s aspiration to be a regional power in a region between the Europe and the Middle East.
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