Emotion and Morality: A Tasting Menu

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In recent years, moral psychology has undergone a renaissance characterized by two dramatic changes (Haidt, 2007). First, the scientific study of morality has become a broad, interdisciplinary enterprise, drawing on insights and methods from philosophy, neuroscience, economics, anthropology, biology, and all quarters of psychology. Second, emotion now plays a central role in moral psychology research. This special section on Emotion and Morality is a testament to the ingenuity, open-mindedness, and energy that has infused this field.

Today’s moral psychology is quintessentially experimental, trying new things. In this spirit, the present volume is itself an experiment. The new moral psychology is exciting, not because of the longstanding questions it has definitively answered, but because of the novel questions it is asking. The canonical format of the review volume, however, threatens to make a weakness of this strength. With this in mind, the present volume, rather than collecting ten or so lengthy review articles, presents a tasting menu of concentrated ideas. This volume’s contributors were asked to prepare for the readers of Emotion Review an “amuse-bouche”—a short article presenting a new question, an intriguing observation, a morsel of new data, a prediction about the future of the field, etc. My hope is that this non-traditional, more prospective format will stimulate new research by giving readers dots that invite connecting.

Lest we sacrifice all depth for breadth, this volume begins with three longer theoretical pieces, to anchor and complement the thirty bite-sized articles here assembled. Daniel Batson (2011) hypothesizes that moral problems arise, not primarily from poor moral judgment, but from lack of moral motivation, which may in turn arise from a lack of genuine moral emotion. Horberg, Oveis, and Keltner (2011) provide a framework for organizing moral emotion, arguing that distinct moral emotions amplify different kinds of moral judgments. Finally, Sherman and Haidt (2011) present a theory of the “cuteness response” as a humanizing moral emotion and the functional opposite of moral disgust.

The next four articles, like the two preceding, present functional frameworks that explain what different moral emotions do and the relations among them. Robert Frank (2011) recapitulates the argument made in his path-breaking book Passions within reason (1988), according to which moral emotions facilitate solutions to social problems that can only be solved through the subversion of narrow self-interest. Chapman and Anderson (2011b) distinguish different moral emotions based on their eliciting appraisals and argue that the causal arrows run both ways, with emotions influencing appraisals as well. Gray and Wegner (2011) present a two-dimensional framework for organizing moral individuals (and the emotions they elicit) based on the valences of their actions and their levels of agency. Finally, Fiery Cushman (2011) relates a scientific parable underscoring the value of functional thinking in moral psychology.

The articles that follow carry the functionalist banner while focusing on specific moral emotions. Simone Schnall (2011) argues that feelings related to cleanliness influence both moral and non-moral behaviors and may have their functional origins in the grooming behaviors of non-human primates. Pizarro, Inbar, and Helion (2011) ask whether moral disgust is a moral emotion and argue that the evidence for disgust as a moralizing emotion is weaker than some researchers assume. Royzman and Kurzban (2011b) challenge Chapman et al.’s (2009) claim that moral disgust is truly (non-metaphorically) disgust. In a lively exchange, Chapman and Anderson (2011a) respond and Royzman and Kurzban (2011a) press their critique further. In the spirit of Robert Frank (1988, 2011), Valdesolo and DeSteno (2011) argue that some morally unappealing emotions such as jealousy may play indirect roles in promoting social welfare and thus stabilize moral systems. Finally, Adina Roskies (2011) poses a puzzle about empathy based on apparently contradictory lessons from studies of psychopathy and autism.

The next six articles examine (or resist examining) moral emotions within a dual-process framework (Sloman, 1996; Chaiken & Trope, 1999) according to which automatic and controlled processes exert distinctive, and in some cases competing, influences on moral judgment. Van den Bos, Müller, and Damen (2011) document effects of behavioral disinhibition on
judgments in response to moral dilemmas. Mallon and Nichols (2011) challenge the conventional dual-process and social intuitionist (Haidt, 2001) wisdom according to which automatic processes dominate moral judgment. Jonathan Baron (2011) offers a personal, introspective meditation on the role of emotion in utilitarian moral thinking. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2011) argues that moral psychologists and philosophers with normative interests should focus less on the influence of emotion per se and more on the reliability of the cognitive processes that influence moral judgment. Following on the theme of reliability in decision-making, Bazerman, Gino, Shu, and Tsay (2011) present a tool for managing the behavioral influence of unreliable emotional responses. Finally, Mikhail (2011) offers an alternative account of dual-process phenomena, arguing that moral judgments are driven by rational moral rules engraved in the mind.

The next three articles examine the relationship between moral emotion and psychopathy. James Blair (2011) explains how data from clinical and sub-clinical psychopathic populations may link specific domains of morality to specific emotion-related neural systems. Harenzki and Kiehl (2011) review evidence for moral-emotional deficits in psychopathy and argue that parallel research on non-psychopathic sexual offenders and individuals with paraphilic disorders may shed light on these conditions and on ordinary moral psychology. Finally, Glenn, Raine, and Laufner (2011) make a provocative case for allowing psychopathy to count as a mitigating factor in assessments of criminal responsibility.

Four additional articles view moral emotion through a neuroscientific lens. Decety, Michalska, and Kinzler (2011) describe a developmental shift in neural responses to empathy-eliciting stimuli and relate these to brain regions that play critical roles in moral judgment. Ciaramelli and di Pellegrino (2011) focus on one of these brain regions, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, arguing that it influences moral judgment by giving moral decision-makers affective previews of morally significant consequences. De Oliveira-Souza, Moll, and Grafman (2011) present an alternative to dual-process theories or moral judgment based on the complex architecture of the human brain. Finally, Helen Immordino-Yang (2011) presents a neuroscientific account of moral reflection, introspection, and the mechanisms by which they influence moral judgment.

The next three articles concern the relationship between moral evaluation and mental states. Fedotova, Fincher, Goodwin, and Rozin (2011) suggest that moral transgressions may be evaluated more favorably when they are seen as driven by emotion rather than principled reasoning. Merritt and Monin (2011) present evidence that people are uncomfortable with deliberative responses to moral taboo violations, and Phillips, Misenheimer, and Knobe (2011) argue that some apparently objective mental state attributions involve implicit moral evaluations.

This volume concludes with four articles examining moral judgments that differentiate and, in some cases, divide us. Young and Saxe (2011) discuss evidence for individual differences in various cognitive processes that influence moral judgment and argue that these differences may explain cultural variation in moral values. Janoff-Bulman and Sheikh (2011) argue that increased transgressive behavior among children of highly restrictive parents is best understood as an over-regulation of proscriptive morality rather than an absence of internalized moral standards. Skitka and Wisneski (2011) argue that moral convictions and the behaviors they motivate depend on emotional responses that are, whether negative or positive, particularly strong. Finally, Ditto and Koleva (2011) argue that political conflicts are exacerbated by people’s limited ability to empathize with the feelings that organize their opponents’ moral worldviews.

That’s what’s on the menu. Some bites will go down easy. Others are acquired tastes. The diversity of flavors and traditions represented here ensures that no palate will go unchallenged. And that’s as it should be for a field that is just getting warmed up. Bon appétit!

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References


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